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This dissertation is a defence of a logical approach to 
presupposition. In it 
(1) 1 enumerate, by wayZapologiar some fundamental assumptions 
underlying both antagonistic and protagonistic treatments of such an 
approach, and argue that they are conceptually unnecessary, 
methodologically untoward, and/or logically contradictory. Most 
sal iently, 
(a) I demonstrate the conceptual and logical contradiction in 
the view that presuppositional logic might be compatible 
with (or even imply) an ambiguity of natural language 
negation, 
(b) I provide a critique of the now traditional disassociation 
of the problems of presupposition-definition and presupp- 
osition-projection, 
(c) I provide a critique of the view that presuppositional 
logic -might be compatible with (or imply) logical 
trivalence. 
(2) In the light of a discussion of the conceptual distinction, I 
propose logical criteria f or the distinction between a three-valued 
logic and a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. - 
(3) 1 demonstrate that, by these criteriar the standard 
(Strawsonian) Definition of Presupposition (SLDP) induces a 
trivalent logic. 
(I ý 
(4) 1 present a distinct (but comparable) revised logical definition 
of presupposition (MDP) r showing that it induces a system that 
conforms to the proposed criteria for a two-valued logic with truth- 
value gaps. 
(5) By showing that the several problems associated with the SLDP do 
not arise (are 'solved') in the. framework of the RLDPF I show (a) 
that the problems encountered by the SUP stem more or less directly 
from its trivalence and (b) that the facts of presupposition- 
projection are (and should be) immanent in the concept (and hence 
the definition) of presupposition itself, rather than represented as 
properties of logical functors. I also show that the revised 
definition reveals an unsuspected connection between compound 
counter-examples and simple counter-examples to the SLDP. 
(ii) 
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(V 1) 
INTROWCTION 
"Presuppositions, that set the limits to debate" 
Noam Chomsky 1979. 
The subject of this dissertation is the logic of presupposition. In 
saying this, I mean to place quite a severe restriction on itsscope 
and empirical import, as I now explain. 
The discussion that follows arose out of my need to resolve a 
conceptual problem that has been with me for more than ten years. 
In 1950 Strawson published his p aper 'On Referring', the first 
thoroughgoing attempt to rebut Russell 1905 and resurrect and add 
some detail to Frege's idea of presuppositionally induced truth- 
value gaps. In the hands of linguistic semantics, this is the idea 
that the truth-conditional semantics of natural language should 
include a logical relation of presupposition distinct from the 
relation of (strong) entailment. Within linguistics, this idea was 
taken up with enthusiasm and applied to an increasingly wide range 
of natural language data, some of it quite far removed from the 
phenomenon that the concept of presupposition was originally 
designed to characterise, namely reference and failure of reference. 
For example (1) contains the referring expression 2he Idila QI 
Franc , one which at present fails to refer. On Strawson's account 
the logical implication from (1) to (2) is one of presupposition 
rather than (strong) entailment. 
(1) The king of France is bald 
A. 
(2) There is a king of France. 
In the 19701sr however, a stock-taking took place. The very 
idea of presupposition as a theoretical concept, let alone as a 
truth-conditional (logical) concept, came in for severe and 
outspoken criticism (Wilson 19751, Kempson 1975, Boer and Lycan 1976, 
Atlas 1977, Karttunen in several publications, Gazdar 1979 - to 
mention only the most well-known critics in the linguistic rather 
than philosophical literature). Taken generally, the criticisms 
constituted a strong, perhaps even compelling case against the 
logical modelling of presuppositional phenomena as this was 
conceived. A new consensus seemed to have emerged in which no 
rational, right-thinking semanticist would wish to to entertain the 
idea of a logically based treatment of presupposition. 
On the one hand, then, the case against logical presupposition 
seemed to me in general terms strong and, when harnessed to the call 
for a proper application of a sem anti cs-pragm ati cs distinction (as 
it generally was; see Wilson and Sperber 1979: 299)r compelling. On 
the other handr I found myself still, and against my apparently 
better judgement,, regarding the idea of presuppositionally-induced 
truth-value gaps, at least in the context of reference-failurer as 
not in principle lacking in strong intuitive appeal or conceptual 
coherence and potential. I was left in the position of sensing that 
the critics both had and had not hit the mark. I do not claim never 
to have held contradictory beliefs, but the contradictions I seemed 
to be committed to were too evident to be ignored. Some resolution 
was clearly called f or. Somethingr perhaps several things - 
connected or nOtr must have escaped the debate. 
The discussion that follows attemptsf among other things, to 
explicate the sense in which the criticism hits the mark and the 
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sense in which it does not, to pin-point what I see as having 
escaped the debate, to elaborate those principles in terms of which 
the appeal, coherence and potential of a logically based approach to 
presupposition can- be maintained and even enhanced notwithstanding 
the criticism of that general idea. The discussion thus owes an 
intellectual debt to those critics. I suspect thatr without themr I 
would have remained more or less content with the concept of logical 
presupposition embodied in Strawson's definition as being the very 
best we could do by way of a logical definition. 
A major thesis of the dissertation is that the literature on 
presuppositional logic (pro and counter) is remarkably cohesive in 
its assumptions about the character of such a logic. I shall show 
that these assumptions are at best not necessary, that they are 
conceptually or methodologically untoward, and in some cases not 
coherent or self -consistent. I shall not enumerate them in this 
introduction; they stem more or less directly from a single 
assumption which, in Chapter I. I call Standard Assumption 1: that,, 
if presupposition is to be given a logical def initionr there ist 
and could only ber one candidate for that definition, that adopted 
by Strawson (see 1952: 175). This is the definition which in this 
dissertation is called the Standard Logical Definition of 
Presupposition (SLDP). 
A prima facie case against such limitations on the 
presuppositional debate can be made in its own terms. But in the 
final analysis that negative case must follow from a more positive 
case put in terms of a demonstration of the possibility of a genuine 
logical alternative to that definition of presupposition. nis is 
the task to which this dissertation addresses itself, the 
development of a Revised Logical Definition of 'Presupposition. The 
definition itself is extremely simple; what takes more effort is 
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the spelling out of the general theory that seems to follow from it. 
As mentioned, I do not go into any detail in this introduction. 
But there is one feature of the treatment that the logic Vý 
presupposition has received that is so general and crucial to the 
discussion that follows that I must mention it here. This is the 
lack of serious-attention paid to the intuitive distinction between 
a three-valued logic and a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. 
It is, I believer generally assumed thatr in so far as this 
distinction has a properly logical status, the Standard theory of 
presupposition is a theory of TRUTH-VALUE GAP S. Notice that the 
previous paragraphs of this introduction do not question this 
assumption. But it is an assumption that is questioned in this 
dissertation. The discussion develops a simpler general, logical 
criterion (from which several specific logical criteria foli6w) for 
deciding whether a logic that gives rise to a third logical status 
is to be construed as a three-valued logic or a two-valued logic 
with truth-value gaps strictly construed as such. The Standard and 
the Revised theories are distinguished in the most general terms by 
the fact that, by these criteriar the Standard definition is shown 
to induce a logic that is in fact three-valuedr whereas the Revised 
definition induces, and is designed to induce, a logic conforming to 
the criteria f or a two-valued logic with genuine logical gaps. I 
argue that a coherent logic of PRESUPPOSIT10N as such must be 
construable as -a gapped logicr not a trivalent logic. In the light 
of this, and in the light of a demonstration that the Revised 
definition does not encounter (or 'solves') the problems that face 
the Standard definition, I draw the general conclusion that the 
problems of presuppositional logic as instantiated in the Standard 
theory stem more or less directly from the fact that that particular 
theory is TRIVALENT and, as suchr does not reconstruct the generic 
TYPE of logic that is required for the logical modelling of the 
t. 1- 
concept of presupposition. 
This is the kind of general conceptual consideration of 
principle that I am concerned with here. Since this is so, I am 
extremely conservative in what I cite by way of presuppositional 
phenomena. In factr I stick to what seems to me the clearest case 
of logical presupposition - the presupposition associated with 
referring expressions (an existential presupposition) - the original 
phenomenon in contention between Russell and Strawson,, as (1)-(2) 
above. I am of course aware that an argument for a specifically 
presuppositional analysis as against a Russellian analysis is that 
the former is more readily extended to cover cases not involving 
definite descriptions/ref erring expressions. But to discuss each 
particular proposed further application would take us too far from 
the concerns of the dissertation. Several of the proposed 
applications do not strike me as justified even on pref ormal 
observational grounds anyway, so that their discussion could have no 
bearing on what is more generally at issue here. In this 
connection, a major contention of the critics of. presupposition on 
any terms (in particular Wilson 1975 and Kempson 1975) seems to me 
amply justifiedr that the application of the concept of 
presupposition had got out of hand in being indiscriminately over- 
extended to cover phenomena that were observationally distinct. So, 
for the purposes of this discussion, I wish to leave completely open 
how much other natural language data might be am&nable to treatment 
in terms of the Revised theory of presupposition developed here. I 
should say, though, that I am not unsympathetic to the treatment 
adopted by Wilson and Sperber 1979 in terms of ordered entailmentsr 
especially for the kind of data they wish to treat of. In a 
footnote (299) they briefly entertain the possibili ty that a theory 
of ordered entailments might complement a suitably restricted theory 
of presupposition. In fact it seems to me (though I do not address 
the issue here) that the Revised theory of presupposition developed 
here is cognate with a theory of ordered entailments. 
Another limitation implied by my taking the LOGIC of 
presupposition as my subject is that I have little or nothing to say 
on the subject of pragmatic theories of presupposition (eg Stalnaker 
1974) or pragmatic presupposition as distinct from semantic 
presupposition (see eg Keenan 1971) or use/appropriacy formulations 
of presupposition as such (eg Fillmore 1969,1971, Kiparskq & 
Kiparský 1971) 
Inspection of the Contents willf I believer give a general idea 
of the structure of the argument. It is divided into three parts. 
The FIRST is concerned with the prevailing c'oncept of logical 
presupposition. It identifies and provides a critique of certain 
features of that concept. The SECOND part begins by continuing 
that critique but with special reference to the distinction between 
trivalent and gapped logicr which is what this part is really 
concerned with. The conceptual distinction is discussed in some 
detail and logical criteria for the distinction are developed. That 
part concludes with a demonstration of the triValence of standard 
presuppositional theory. The THIRD part presents the Revised 
Logical Definition of Presupposition, a definition conforming to the 
criteria for inclusion in a two-valued logic with logical gaps, and 
spells out the general theory of presupposition that follows from 
it. In particular, it treats of how the distribution of 
presuppositions in compound sentences, the resolution of 
presuppositional conflict, and intuited differences in logical 
status of simple sentencesr follow automatically from the 
definition. 
6: 1. 
PART ONE 
TOE PREVAMING CONCEPT OF LOGICAL PRESUPFOSMON. 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is a contention of this 
dissertation that the linguistic and philosophical literature on 
presuppositional logic is highly cohesive in its-basic assumptions. 
This first part is devoted to delineating, and providing a critique 
off certain pervasive features of the prevailing concept of 
presuppositional logic. Since the main thrust of this part is to 
suggest that these and the assumptions upon which they are based are 
not necessary for, or (in some cases) even compatible withr a 
coherent presuppositional logic for natural language, this first 
part is somewhat negative in character. 
CHAPTER I. 
THE STANDARD LOGICAL EEFINITION OF PRESUPPOSITION. 
I begin, in Section It with some expository remarks on the logical 
equivalences holding between different formulations of the Standard 
Logical Definition of Presupposition (SLDP). Section 2 contains the 
main burden of the chapter. It focuses on a prevailing assumption 
involving the SLDP, which I shall call 'Standard Assumption'l' - 
ISA-l' for short. Section 3 discusses Frege's concept of 
presupposition - in particular, it examines the relation between his 
remarks on presupposition and the SLDP. Section 4 deals with the 
notion of 'trivial presupposition' and again is mainly though not 
wholly expository in nature. Section 5 gives a partial summary of 
the chapter and presents a couple of its implications. 
1. Scme logical equivalences. 
In referring to the Standard Logical Definition of Presupposition, I 
refer to the definition in (1). 
A presupposes B if and only if 
(a) wherever A is true B is truer 
(b) where B is false A has some third logical 
status, other than true or false. 
I use the term -"third logical status" as being superordinate to, and 
hence indifferent to, the distinction between a third truth value 
and a (truthvalueless) truth gap. I shall not address this 
distinction in detail until Part Two. 
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It is well-known that (1) has several equivalent formulations, 
the most obvious being (2): 
(2) A presupposes B if and only if 
(the truth of) B is both 
(a) a (pre)condition of the truth of A,, 
(b) a (pre)condition of the falsity of A. 
(1) and (2) may be proved equivalent as follows. The truth of B is 
a (pre) condition for the truth of A if and. only if B is true 
wherever A is true. Hence (la) and (2a) are equivalent. 
Furthermore,, from (2a) and (2b) taken together,, it follows thatr if 
B is false, A cannot be true (by (2a)) or false (by (2b)). I will 
comment further on this directly. (1) and (2) are, ther_efore,, 
equivalent. 
If the truth of B is a (pre-)condition of the truth and of the 
falsity of some A, it follows that B is implied not only by A itself 
but by the neg ation of A, -Ar which under standard negation is true 
if and only if A is false. It is readily seen, then, that (2) is in 
turn equivalent to (3): 
(3) A presupposes B if and only if both 
(a) A implies B 
(b) -A implies B. 
(2) and (3) commit us to a logic that admits of a logical 
status other than the classical truth values 'True' and 'False, as 
much as does -(l). otherwise, with just those classical values, the 
falsity of B would permit the inference BOTH that A is false (by 
madu tollen from (2a)/(3a)) AND that -A is false (by modu tollen 
from (2b)/(3b))., But this is a contradiction. The contradiction 
could be escaped only by allowing that B could never be false. 
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This would be equivalent to identifying the set of presuppositions 
of any A with the set of tautologies. it is in fact the case that 
tautologies (necessary truths) do satisfy these equivalent 
definitions of presupposition with respect to every single 
proposition (i. e. for every proposition taken as the value of the 
variable A). They are referred to as 'trivial presuppositions'. 
However,, while tautologies satisfy these equivalent definitions of 
presupposition, the primary intention behind the formulation of the 
definition is that contingent propositions be included among the 
presuppositions of A. In other wordsr the definitions are intended 
to afford a non-trivial logical relation of presupposition. The 
logical concept of trivial presupposition is dealt with in a 
preliminary way in Section 5 below and, in passing, throughout the 
dissertation. 
It is important to note, thenr that the sense of 'imply' 
invoked in (3) cannot be one that validates the inference of modu 
I-Q1.1-au - Instead, it must be that sense of 'imply' and 
'implication' which is also known as NECESSITAT10N by Van Fraassen 
eg 1968: 137-8,. 1970: 14, as LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE by Keenan & Bull 
1973: 450, as WEAK ENTAILMENT by Wilson 1975: 4 and pore ambiguously 
as (SEMANTIC) ENTAILMENT by many, including van Fraassen 1968, Horn 
1969, Morgan 1969? Keenan 1972. Since the unmodif ied term 
'entailment' is. vague in the absence of supporting discussion, I 
shall follow the general practice of distinguishing between 
STRCNG ENTAILMENT (which supports modu tollen ) and WEAK ENTAILMENT 
(which does not), using the unmodified term 'entailment' only when 
it can be clearl y understood in context as a superor'dinate term for 
both strong and weak entailment. 
On the (weak) sense of 'imply' with which we are concerned, 
then, A implies B if and only if B is true wherever A is truer but 
Ir 
nothing is said about the consequence of B beih'g false. This sense 
validates modp vongn but does not validate modij tollen . the 
inference in terms of which the above contradiction is derived. 
Modus Ponens: 
1. 
2. 
P implies 
Modus Tollens: 
P 
therefore 3. 
1. P implies 
2.. -Q 
therefore 3. -P 
(3) is therefore equivalent to each of the definitions in (4): 
(4) (i) A presupposes B if and only if 
(a) A necessitates B 
and (b) -A necessitates B. 
presupposes B if and only if 
B is a logical consequence 
(a) of A 
and (b) of -A. 
(iii) A presupposes B if and only if 
(a) A weakly entails B 
and (b) -A weakly entails B. 
These equivalences have been noted many times. The two 
suggestions known to me to the effect that these definitions might 
not in fact be equivalent are cursory and tentative. The discussion 
note Katz 1973 begins by assuming their non-equivalence (256); but 
the note ends with a conclusion that entails their equivalence. The 
other suggestion is made in passing in a footnote in Hausser 
1976: 269. Having acknowledged their equivalence (262) Hausser 
presents his counter-suggestion as turning upon his analysis of 
the empirical status of a particular example (not relevant here). 
This has elicited the following comment by Gazdar 1979b: 94. 
"Given this proven equivalence, it is somewhat surprising to 
find a footnote later in the paper in which Hausser remarks 
"it seems that (18) and (19) [ (1) and (2) above - NBR] are 
not in fact equivalent" as if the question of their 
equivalence was somehow a matter to be resolved 
empirically. " 
In what follows I shall take it as proven that all the definitional 
formulations here considered are equivalent. 
2 Mie Standard Definition and a standard assumption. 
The pre-eminent assumption that underlies the overwhelming majority 
of linguistic and even philosophical treatments and criticisms of 
presupposition. al logic. is: 
STANDARD ASSUMPTION - 1. 
That, if presupposition is to be given a logical 
definition, then its definition is that given in one of 
the logically equivalent forms presented as (1) through 
(4) above (or any further logically equivalent form) - 
in other wordsr the Standard Logical Definition. 
Standard Assumption-1 (SA-1) is pre-eminent because so many other 
assumptions and features of the prevailing concept of presupposition 
can,, more or less directly, be traced back to it. 
It is assumed that in order to defend the generic concept of a 
logical approach to the phenomenon of presupposition" it is necessary 
to defend that particular definition. Conversely, it is assumed 
that in order to demonstrate the inadequacy and/or general 
undesirability of the very idea of a logical approach, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacy and general undesirability 
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of that particular definition. 
It is a central argument of the present work that these 
interrelated assumptions are not warranted. To show that the SLDP 
is inadequate and undesirable is merely. to show that, if 
presupposition is to receive a logical definition, then the SLDP 
cannot be that, definition. There are no general consequences of 
such a demonstration for the general concept of a logical modelling 
of presupposition. There is, in other words, no warrant for 
extrapolating from particular features of the presuppositional logic 
induced by that particular definition to the generic concept of 
presuppositional logic. 
In drawing attention to this obvious point,, I do not seek to 
criticise the critics of logical presupposition as instantiated in 
that particular definition. in the absence of alternatives, 
criticism must perforce focus on what is available for criticism 
and, in the m. ain, I concede the justice of these criticisms of the 
SLDP. But, if it can be shown that SA-1 is unwarrantedr the j; le 
fact lack of serious comparable logical alternatives to the SLDP 
has the unfortunate consequence that criticisms of presuppositional 
logic that take the form of criticism of the SLDP are of less 
theoretical and general interest than might otherwise appear. What 
is Perhaps surprising is the tenacity with which proponents of an 
approach to presupposition based on a logical definition have clung 
to the SLDP despite its well-documented problems. This general 
reluctance to consider any genuinely distinct logical definition of 
is illustrated as recently as 1979, when we f ind Katz (102) 
defending (5) below, which, leaving aside the matter of 
'proposition' and 'statement', is again logically equivalent to (1) 
above. 
I '-ý 
(5) lbesptrup roposition 
rAition 
of an assertive 
e e cgo pi ition under which p ma es a statement, 
that-is, under which P is a truth of falsehood. 
See also Mioduszewska 1985. It is suggested below that Bergmann's 
1981 definition is also effectively equivalent-to the SLDP. 
In what f ol 1 ow sI shal 1 take it as am atte r of accept ed f act 
that it is the SLDP, and overwhelmingly only the SLDPr that has been 
at the focus of discussion of presuppositional logic. It is 
impractical to give anything like an exhaustive listing to 
demonstrate this. That this is indeed the case is reflected in the 
fact that it is only the SLDP that is cited in-textbook discussions 
of the logical approach to presupposition; see Strawson 1952, Leech" 
1974, Palmer 1976, Kempson 1977, Fodor 1977p Lyons 1977F Allwood'ý 
And4er%on & bahl 1977F Smith & Wilson 1979: 285, McCawley 19811 
Levinson 1983. Two attributions of particular relevance should be 
made, however. The IS' of ISLDPI can, of course", be taken to stand 
for IStrawsonian'. It is the definition given in the text cited 
above,, 1952: 175, in the form given as (2) abovey and assumed 
informally in Strawson 1950, the paper which, in response to 
Russell's 1905 critique of Frege's remarks on presupposition, gave 
rise to the controversy surrounding presuppositional logic. 
Furthermorer it is the SLDP in all its equivalent formulations that 
is cited in the important work by van Fraassen on presuppositional 
logic (1968: 137-8,1969: 68,1970: 13-4). 
The above statement that it is only the SLDP that is considered 
in discussions of presuppositional logic has to be qualified by 
'overwhelmingly' since I am aware of two alternative definitions, 
within the linguistically orientated literature at least. The first 
is that offered in a footnote in Karttunen 1971: 67" (here adapted in 
non-relevant respects): 
I tf- 
(6) A presupposes B if and only if Possib]: e-A implies B 
and Possible--A implies B. 
Since the SUP is standardly assumed to be incapable of predicting 
the intuitive presuppositional implications of sentences of the form 
Possible-A (see Thomason 1973, Karttunen 1973: 171, Gazdar 1979: 92), 
this might indeed be taken to represent a distinct logical 
definition of presupposition. Indeedr I had thought that this 
supposed fact actually provided the rationale for (6). Howeverr 
Karttunen did not develop the definitionr and as Gazdar (ibid) 
notesr actually abandoned it on those very grounds (ibid). * 
The other non-equivalent definition is proposed by Hausser 
1973: 199 - again adapted here: 
A presupposes B if and only if 
(a) A implies Br 
(b) -A implies B, 
and (c) A is an elementary formula. 
where an elementary formula is one that is not compound in 
Karttunen's 1973 sense, i. e. not overtly involving propositional 
binary connectives. Definition (7) has the consequence that 
compound propositions by definition do not have presuppositions. 
Since the SLDP does not have this rather far-reaching and 
empirically counterfactual consequence, (7) does indeed represent a 
distinct concept of presupposition. 
Without (c), however, (7) is in fact identical to the SLDP. 
And, paradoxically, the rationale of Hausser's modified definition 
* In fact, (6) deserves more consideration than Karttunen concedes 
it (and than it will receive here). It is stron eminiscent of 
Rescher's 1960: 523 definition of 'Presup 0 ný12Y 
r( 
presuppose-2 
(p : q) =df Cýp >- q). In chapter VIII 
tesliotwi, oit 
is shown, contra 
Karttunen 1973, that the SLDP does actually entail that vossibl 
Aab presupposes what (-)A presupposes. 
K .. 
merely reinforces the assumption which is at issue in this chapter, 
namely that -there is no logical alternative to the Standard Logical 
Definition of Presupposition. That very assump tion is again clearly 
evident in Gazdar's rejection of Hausser's definition: 
"This definition has the effect of ruling out all the known 
counterexamples ýy jiat, since every counterexample to the 
semantic ýypothesis involves non-elementary formulae. Anyone interested in why such formulae behave the way they do will not find Hausser's definition of the slightest use to them. " (Gazdar 1979b: 93) 
Gazdar's criticism is (only) valid because both definition and 
criticism embody the same assumptionsr viz- 
To adopt "the semantic hypothesis" of presupposition (to 
adopt a logical approach to presupposition) is to adopt the SLDP, on 
the further assumption that 
the MDP is satisfactory as far as elementary formulae are 
concerned and that therefore 
(iii) the only logical possibility for a semantic theory of 
presupposition (=theory of presupposition as a logical relation) is 
to solve or -otherwise mitigate the projection problems attendant on 
that definition i. e. to develop an independent theory of the 
distribution of presuppositions in compound sentences. 
As indicated, these three assumptions are intimately connectedr 
though f or purposes of presentation they are dealt with separately 
in what follows. 
The co/rrelation between Hausser's explicit modification of the 
definition, (7), and the implicit assumptions underlying the great 
volume of work on the projection problem for presuppositions 
(particularly that of Karttunen 1973) has not been sufficiently 
appreciated, I believe. This is discussed in Chapter 11, Section 1. 
But, to anticipate, there is a related feature of Karttunen's 1973 
discussion which is appropriately discussed here. 
I (- 
A characteristic of the SLDP which will become increasingly 
important as the discussion proceeds lies in the fact that, under 
the SLDP, presupposition-failure in A is definitionally IDENTIFIED 
with A being assigned the third logical status, i. e. the falsity of 
a presupposition INEVITABLY results in the lack of a classical truth 
value in the pr esupposing sentence. Any theory of presupposition 
from which this follows is equivalent to the Standard Logical 
Definition of Presupposition. Now a good part of the first 
section of Karttunen 1973 is devoted to demonstrating the author's 
agnosticism as 'regards what a presupposition might actually be, as 
to whether it is to be given a semantic (=logical) or pragmatic 
definition and, more particularly, if the former,. what its logical 
definition might be. He suggests that it is not relevanCto his 
purpose to discuss these matters: "Let us simply assume that we 
understand what is meant by a presupposition" (171). Such remarks 
are misleadingr however. Notwithstanding any suggestion to the 
contrary, Karttunen in fact has a very precise understanding of what 
we are to understand by a presupposition, at least in the case of 
logical presupposition: it is the SLDP itself. Much of his 
discussion simply cannot be understood except in the light of that 
definition. By way of illustration of this, consider his discussion 
of the example. 
(8) Jack fias children and all of Jack's chi: Ldren are bald. 
On the assumption that John has no children, the second conjunct 
suffers from presupposition-f ail ure and is therefore assigned the 
third logical status by the Standard theory. But intuitively the 
conjunction as a whole does not inherit the presupposition (as such) 
of its second conjunct. Karttunen makes the following comment: 
"As far as I can see, it does not presuppose that Jack 
has. children. If it should turn out that ýhe first 
con nct is falser then the whole conjunction surely ou ht 
to false, not indeterminate or truthvalueless. " 1178?. 
This comment implicitly assumes an identity that arises only by 
virtue of the SLDP, namely the identity between the falsity of a 
presupposition and the third logical status'of the sentence that 
presupposes it. For Karttunen, to say of (8) that it is false 
rather than neither true nor false when lack . 1" childre is false 
is equivalent to saying of Z=k lag childre that it is not a 
presupposition of (8). This is to presuppose the SLDP. 
I have -singled out Karttunen 1973 for discussion in this 
context precisely because that paper does not give EXPLICIT 
expression to the assumption that is the concern Of this section; as 
an illustration of the f orce of SA-lr it is all the more vivid f or 
being implicit. A further example is cited in Ch 11: 1 below. 
In conclusion, I imagine the fact that the presuppositional 
literature does exhibit SA-1 (that if presupposition is to be given 
a logical definition then it must be the SLDP) is uncontroversial. 
What is controversial is the claim (to be supported in the chapters 
that follow) that that assumption is not necessary. In arguing, as 
I shall, that the SLDP is, at leastr not a necessary component of a 
coherent presuppositional logic, I shall be arguing inter jaLia that 
the identification of presupposition-failure in S and S's having the 
third logical status is not only not necessary to a presuppositional 
logicr but actually militates against the coherence of a P-logic 
that includes it, quite apart from the empirical inadequacies that 
the equation induces. 
Let me anticipate in very broad terms some of the discussion of 
the following chapters with this observation. The undeniable 
intuitive force of the SLDP derives from the fact that it addresses 
I i- 
itself very directly to reconstructing what I shall call the SALIENT 
PRESUPPOSITIONAL 1NTUITIONF the intuition that a presupposition is 
implied equally by a sentence and its negative counterpart. The 
SLDP in fact DIRECTLY EXPRESSES that intuition. After allp the 
standard test of whether a given implication is presuppositional or 
not is whether it remains constant under negation. Furthermore, 
this Salient Presuppositional Intuition (SPI) is, as we have seen, 
interdefinable with what I shall call THE TRUTH GAP INTUITION (TGI)f 
a version of which is also DIRECTLY EXPRESSED in the Standard 
Definition. It is then incumbent on anyone who wishes to claim 
that the SLDP is not necessary to a coherent and intuitively 
adequate presuppositional logic to show that the SPI can be 
explained simply and insightfully without its being directly 
expressed in terms of the logical definition itself. As regards the 
empirically attested Truth Gap Intuitionr we shall in due course 
find reason to doubt that the particular version of the Truth Gap 
Intuition that-is modelled by the SLDP does in fact reconstruct the 
empirically attested intuition either in principle (in the general 
character of the intuition) or in practice (in predicting the range 
of contexts in-which the intuition is empirically attested). 
3. Frege and the Standard Definition. 
In this section I discuss the relation between the concept of 
presupposition that is embodied in the Standard Logical Definition 
of Presupposition and Frege's 1952 remarks on presupposition. My 
argument will be that (i) it is dif f icul t on practical grounds to 
deduce a logical definition of presupposition from that discussion 
in and of itself, (ii) that the SUP in particular can be deduced 
from it only if we accept (and in fact seek to maintain) some rather 
dubious and controversial features of Frege's general theory of 
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sense and reference, and (iii) that paradoxically the admission of 
logical statuses other than the classical truth values (an admission 
entailed by the SLDP) throws Frege's general theory into confusion. 
That Frege might have problems in accepting the SLDP was 
suggested to me by Levinson's presentation of the matter (1983: 169- 
170), and further confirmed by my reading of Dummett 1973: esp Ch. 
12). This is not intended as a criticism of Levinson 1983; on the 
contraryr Levinson's is a clear and accurate introductory picture of 
how the SUP comes to seem so necessary a part of presuppositional 
logic. Levinson quotes the following passages from Frege 1952, 
which constitute pretty well the whole of Frege's pronouncements on 
presupposition that are taken into account (see Evans 1982 and 
Dummett 1973 for further Fregean references however. ) 
If anything is asserted there is always an obvious pre- 
supposition that the simple or compound names used nave a 
reterence. If one therefore asserts 'Kejýer died in misery' 
V there Is a presupposition that the name Kepler' designates 
something. jFrege 1952: 69). 
That the name 'Kepler' designates something is gst as 
much a presupposition of the assertion 'Kepler ied in 
misery as for the contrary assertion. (ibid. ) 
'After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark 
Prussia and Austria quarrelled. ' ... It 
is surely suffic- 
inently-clear that the sense is not to be taken as having 
as a part the thought that Schleswig-Holstein was once 
separated from Denmark, but that is the necessary presupp- 
osition in order for the expression 'After the sep. aration 
of Scbleswiy-Holstein' to have any reference at all. 
(op. cit. 7) 
Furthermore, anyone ignorant of the historical facts 
will take our sentence ... to be neither true nor false but will deny it to have any ref erencer on the ground of 
absence of reference for its subordinate c1aupe. This 
clause would only apparently determine a time* (ibid. ) 
As Levinson observes (169) r this is an "elliptical discussion 
that allows considerable freedom of interpretation". Nevertheless, 
he draws from it a quite specific and explicit theory of Fregean 
'2_0 
presupposition: 
Referring phrases and temporal clauses (for example) 
carry presuppositions to the effect that they do in fact refer 
"(ii) A sentence and its negative counterpart share the same 
set of presuppositions 
In order for an assertion (as he put it in the Kepler 
case) or a sentence (as he put it in the Schleswig- 
Holstein case) to be either true or false, its pre- 
supposition must be true or satisfied. ", -- 
It is explicit and specific enough for us to be satisfied that it is 
exactly reconstructed by the SLDP,, in which (ii) and (iii) imply 
each other. 
The first question I wish to raise is: given that Frege's 
discussion is in fact sufficient to legitimise ANY explicit general 
theory of presupposition, are (ii) and (iii) above. the uniquely most 
appropriate summary and generalisation of that discussion? With the 
exception of the general statement that "if anything is asserted 
there is always an obvious presupposition", Frege restricts himself 
to the consideration of particular examples. It appears to me that 
Frege's discussion in and of itself provides no guarantee of 
generalisation without modification in the form of a logical 
definition of presupposition. Levinson accurately represents what 
is the universal interpretation of Frege here: that these rather 
particularised remarks constitute, are co-extensive with, a 
complete theory of presupposition. But there is, in principler an 
alternative interpretationr namely, that Frege's remarks merely 
point up the particular implications, for particular examplesf of a 
more generalf yet-to-be-developed theory. 
On this latter interpretationf the discussion taken in itself 
does not imply that, because Frege requires some general theory to 
have the particular implication that the Kepler sentence be without 
')-I 
a classical truth value when 'Kepler' fails to have reference, Frege 
envisaged a general theory that it have.. that implication 
universally. On this latter interpretation, in other wordsr it need 
not, follow (as it does under the SLDP) thatr beýcause 'Kepler died in 
misery' lacks a classical truth value if it has a false 
presuppositionr no sentence with a false presupposition can have a 
classsical truth value. 
It is not that discussion in itself that commits Frege to the 
9, DP (or makes the SUP the most appropriate reconstruction of what 
Frege had to say on presupposition) but the fact that Frege's 
discussion takes place against a backcloth of assumptions deriving 
from his general theory of Sense (, UDD) and Reference (Bedeutung). 
And,, in so far'as there is a single correct understanding of these 
assumptions (they have been the subject of considerable debate) they 
are controversial (see eg Searle 1969: esp. Ch. 5, Dummett 1973: esp 
Ch. 12t Evans, 1982: Ch. 1). Furthermore, as I shall argue, they 
have paradoxical implications for presuppositional logic. 
The particular feature of Frege's semantic theory that is at 
issue here is his systematic generalisation of the sense-reference 
distinction. Let us accept for the sake' of argument Frege's 
proposal that names have both a reference and a sense. On one 
interpretation of Frege's intentions.. he sought quite literally to 
generalise this observation to cover expressions of all the major 
semantic types - in particular, predicate expressions and sentences 
themselves. Corresponding to the sense of a namer a sentence 
expresses a thought (its sense), and corresponding to the object 
which is the reference of a namer a sentence has a truth value as 
its reference - one of the objects The True or The False. (Notice 
that under this generalisation truth and falsity are not exactly 
PROPERTIES of sentences. ) The corresponding *distinction for 
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predicates is less clear. Frege clearly inten6ed the reference of 
a predicate to be a concept but it is not clear what there is 1 ef t 
for a predicate to have as its sense (see Dummett's discussion 
quoted below). 
Now, on a literal interpretationr Frege might appear to be 
committed to the SLDP - on the following grounds. Since the sense 
and reference of a sentence is a compositional function of the sense 
and reference off inter Wjar the names it containsf it would follow 
that if we allow that expressions WITHIN sentences (eg names and 
predicates) may have sense without ref erende, any sentence 
containing such an expression will also have sense without 
reference; and since the reference of a sentence is a truth valuer 
it follows that no sentence containing an empty reference can have 
(or refer to) a classical truth value. 
Thus,, given the principle of compositional ity and given the 
generalisation of the sense/reference distinction to include 
sentences in its applicationt it follows that failure of 
existential presupposition in a sentence has the 1NEVITABLE 
consequence that the presupposing sentence fails to have a classical 
truth value. This is tantamount to the SLDP. 
The SLDP is thus seen to follow from Frege's discussion of 
presupposition only provided we accept Frege's systematic 
generalisation of the sense-reference distinction and on its most 
literal interpretation. Withdrawn from th&t framework of 
assumptionsr the conceptual necessity of the SLDP (and the 
associated identification of presupposition-f allure and lack of 
classical truth value) disappear. As noted, that framework of 
assumptions is anyway controversial. It is not, for exampler 
accepted by Strawson, the major proponent of the SLDP. As Kearns 
1970: 49 insightfully remarks "Strawson has taken over Frege's claim: 
). 
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But he has abandoned the philosophical underpinnings of Frege's 
views and this leaves him with nothing to rely on except ordinary 
language, which is less than conclusive on this Point". 
Furthermorer even accepting the Fregean generalisation of the 
sense/reference distinction, the admission of a logical status other 
than the classical truth values is problematic. f or that theory of 
sense and reference. The literal assimilation of the semantic types 
of sentences and predicates to that of names actually breaks down if 
we admit of such a logical status. This can be shown by posing the 
following question. If lack of reference in a name is to be 
correlated with lack of a classical truth value in a sentence, what 
is a reference to The False by a sentence to be correlated with in a 
name? The the ory provides no answer to this. At the very leastr 
the parallelism is not as neat and simple as Frege's discussion 
appears to suggest. 
The point may be approached from a dif f erent angle. Certain 
aspects of the discussion of Dowty et al (1981: 25F 144) rather 
strongly suggest that the correspondence theory of truth underlying 
their presentafton of Montague semantics (and indeed the intension / 
extension distinction) have their roots in the Fregean theory of 
sense and reference. Now it is reasonable to construe lack of 
reference in abame as a lack of correspondence between that name 
and any object'in reality. And if indeed a reference to The False 
by a sentence is to be construed as lack of correspondence to 
reality by the thought expressed by a sentence.. this suggests that 
lack of reference in a name is to be correlatedr not with the lack 
of a classical truth value in a sentence, but with the FALSITY of 
the sentence. Thus the lack of a classical truth value fails to 
correlate with any such comparable status in a name. A name either 
does or does not have a reference (correspond with something in 
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reality) : if reference and the lack of it is, to be construed as 
correspondence with reality and the lack of it, as Frege's 
generalisation would seem to imply, the correct sentential 
correlates of reference and the lack of it are classical truth and 
falsity respectively. Within such a scheme, thenr a logical status 
other than the classical truth values has no role to play. 
I believe these remarks converge with the discussion of Dummett 
1973: Chap 12 jesp 410-12). Quotation might be useful: 
The Bedeutung of a name is its bearer; the Bedeutung of a 
sentence is its truth-value. But, if a part of a complex 
;e ression lacks a Bedeutungj, th n the whole lacks a 
eleutung: hence if a name occuaný in a sentence lacks a 
bearer the sentence as a whole lac sa truth value. (410) 
Having raised the question of whether we are to understand 
'Bedeutung' as semantic value or, more literallyr as referent 
(bearer) I he continues 
If ... we understand Bedeutung to mean 'referent', then the 
ginciple thatr if part of an expression lacks a referent 
e whole lacks a referent, is far from compelling. It 
derives its force... from the case of complex names. If 
there was no such man as King Arthur, then there was no such 
man as King Arthur's father.... It is by no means obvious, 
however.. that the principle extends to complex expressions 
of other types. We may#, for exampler choose to say that, 
if there was no such person as Kiny Arthurr then there is no 
concept to be the referent of - was married to King 
Arthur': but it is not evident that we are bound to say 
this, rather than that the predicate has a reference a 
concept under which nothing falls. We must, indeed, choose 
the former alternative if we are to follow Frege in holding 
that, if there was no such person a King Arthurj, then a 
sentence of the form 'a was married to King Arthur' is not 
even false: but to use this as a premiss in the prýesent 
context would be to argue in a circle. The only non circul- 
ar ground, for holding that such a predicate has no 
referent i-s the desire to make the analogy between proper 
names and incomplete expressions as good as possible by 
maintaining the principle that, if a part lacks a referent, 
the whole does: it has no intrinsic plausibility. (410-1). 
To regard sentences as having truth values as their 
referentsi. does not entail the assimi-I ation of sentences to 
complex na . mes. If sentences are expr4sions of a different 
logical type from names, then truth values are not objects, 
and the relation of a sentence to its truth value is, like 
the relation of a predicate to a concept, only an analogue 
25 
of the relation of a name to its bearerr not the same 
relation. (411) 
If sentences are agreed to have truth values as their 
referents, but this is regarded, not as a special case,, but 
merely as an analogue, of names having objects as their 
ref erents,, then... there is no cogent argument from first 
principles to the conclusion that sentences containin a 
name which-lacks a bearer are devoid of truth value. (411). 
I take it that Dummett is demonstrating the interdependence 
between a certain interpretation of Frege's general theory of 
sense/reference and the admission of a logical status other than 
true and f al se but arguing that the general theory does admit of a 
(more plausible) interpretation in which there is no necessary 
commitment to any such logical status. The trend of the argument of 
this section has been slightly more specific: that if Frege was 
9 committed to a presuppositional logic, it is far from beinc 
uncontroversial that the particular brand of presuppositional logic 
suggested by his brief remarks commits us ýo reconstructing 
presupposition specifically by means of the %DP. The preconditions 
for concluding this are unacceptable. Not only are we obliged to 
accept the most dubious interpretation of his general theory - the 
wholesale and m ost literal generalisation of the sense-ref erence 
distinction - but on closer inspection the obligation turns out to 
be self-defeating since the very admission of a third logical status 
throws that generalisation into doubt. Dummett, thenr is arguing 
against the Fregean admission of a third logical status in 
principle, on -any terms. I have argued against the Fregean 
admission of a third logical status on the specific terms provided 
by the SLDP, in which presupposition-f ail ure in'S is INVARIABLY 
correlated with lack of truth vale in S. My conclusion, then, might 
be expressed by Dummett's last quoted sentence, provided 
'necessarily' is inserted before 'devoid of truth value'. 
2.6 
Canments on trivial presupposition. 
As noted in passing in Section 1 abover under the SLDP the set of 
tautologies (the set of necessary truths,, including logical truths 
and analytic truths) are def ined as presuppositions of every 
sentence. This is so even if we retain a standard classical logic, 
admitting no logical status other than the classical truth values. 
indeed, within such a logic, sentences have all and ONLY the 
tautologies as their presuppositions. This is so because, in both 
presuppositional and standard classical logicst" a tautology is true 
in every state of affairsp and will therefore be true in states of 
af f airs described by A and in states of af f airs described not -A. ' 
Hence tautologies (and, in a standard classical logic, only 
tautologies) satisfy the standard definition of presupposition. It 
is standard to call such presuppositions 'trivial presuppositions'. 
I have the impression that the existence of trivial 
presuppositions is regarded with some suspicion or unease, and, hence 
as constituting at least a potential objection: to presuppositional 
logic - though I find I am unable to cite clear references that 
justify this impression. Gazdar 1979b: 107 might be taken as 
conveying some unease about the matter. Discussing pragmatic 
definitions of presupposition he comments: "There is a third general 
objection to the definitions... although it is not sufficient in 
itself to count directly against them. Curiously enoughr it has an 
analog in the definitions of semantic presupposition, most of which 
have as a consequence that tautologies are presupposed by every 
sentence. " (qazdar 1979b: 107). Boer & Lycan 1976, also highly 
critical of the logical approach to presupposition, comment "We 
propose to pass over this fact as being a 'don't-care': it is no 
more interesting that tautologies are semantically presupposed by 
every sentence than it is that they are semantically entailed by 
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every sentence. " (1976: 7). What Boer and Lycan mean by 
"interesting" is aguable, but I take them to be suggesting that this 
implication of presuppositional logic is of purely technicalr as 
oppposed to conceptual or intuitiver significance. 
Keenan 1972r 1973 devotes some discussion to this implication 
Of Such logics. That discussionr howeverr appears to be driven more 
by the (undoubted) fascination of the logical technicalities of the 
implication than by any desire to explicate its preformal and 
intuitive rationale. In the course of conducting the present studYr 
I have come to the conclusion that this feature of presuppositional, 
logic is no mere technicality but is fundamental to our intuitive 
conception of presuppositioni, that it must be taken seriously and 
retained in any coherent theory of presupposition. The attempt to 
explicate its intuitive rationale provides the present work with but 
a 1PUtmotif, one that would constitute the central theme of any 
further research. 
By way of introduction, consider again the quotation f rom Boer 
and Lycan. As their comments indicater all tautologies are indeed 
entailed by every sentence. And this constitutes something of a 
problem for an entailment based natural language semantics. The 
problem is illustrated in the fact that, while1himmliample -QD 
your monocl , for example, semantically entails AU *gjgk Rand 
. aighr 
the latter is not part of what is said or can be meant (in 
some relevant sense of "mean") by someone uttering the former. 
Wilson 1975 addresses this familiar issue in the following comment: 
"If we take two necessary truths such as (23) 
. 
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A" gip-M and (24) [AU bachelor. = =1 it will follow from 
my definitions that they entail each other. But again though 
an entailment relation holds between (23) and (24) it is intuitively clear that (23) is semantically independent of (24) 
and that the semantics should record this fact. For one who 
believes in the truth-conditional approach to semantics,, the 
solution to this problem is to narrow down the type of truth 
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condition and [sic] entailment which are seen as semantically 
relevant" (Wilson 1975: 7). 
Wilson does not consider the possibility that the narrowing 
down might be achieved automatically kch"v-4, 
4, in a classical as 
well as a non--trivial presuppositional language, by the distinction 
between entailments and presuppositions as defined in the SLDP. 
Assuming that presupposition is distinct from (strong) entailment, 
.1 
bMM 1"mple gn your monocl presupposes rather than entails 
Wilson's (23), ' And her (23) and (24) do not entail but presuppose 
each other. j3ven in a classical logic, we have semantic 
presupposition, at least trivially. We can use it to draw the 
distinction between those logical implications that are felt to be 
relevant to some linguistically restricted concept of sentence 
meaning (entailments) and those that are not (presuppositions). We 
do not want to banish logical relations such as hold between 
Wilson's (23) and (24) - and especially not, given that they satisfy 
the standard definition of presupposition: for part of the 
intuitive content of the idea of every sentence in a language having 
trivial presuppositions can be expressed by generalising over such 
relations of trivial presupposition and saying that 
every sentence S in a language L logically presupposes that the 
semantical rules of L are in force in S. 
The meaning of S depends on this being so (see Kejs 1970: 50). This 
fundamental presupposition is connected with the matter of reflexive 
presupposition discussed immediately. 
It might be argued that these observations can be used as an 
argument against a P-logic that admits non-trivial presuppositions 
(admits, for example,, = CWj] g mgnocl as a presupposition of Jýya 
tracnpl-ed = y= mongQje , since non-trivial presuppositions would 
be relegated, by the above distinction, to being)asrofý little 
; Ij 
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relevance to a linguistically restricted concept of sentence meaning 
as necessary truths are. This is not the caser however. Trivial 
presuppositions are quite clearly distinguished from non-trivial 
presuppositions by the fact that (all and) only trivial 
presuppositions (necessary truths) presuppose themselves. In other 
words, standard presupposition is reflexive when and only when it is 
trivial. This is proved by observing 
(i) for any relation R. if R is both SYMMETRIC and TRANSITIVE 
then R is REFLEXIVEr 
(ii) since every sentence (including the tautologies) 
presupposes each tautology, tautologies (and only tautologies) 
presuppose each other i. e. standard presupposition is SYMMETRIC when 
and only when it is trivialr 
(iii) generally, standard presupposition is TRANSITIVE: the 
proof of this -is given, for example, in Boer & Lycan (1976: 7): 
"Suppose S1 presupposes S2 and S2 presupposes S3. Now if S3 is 
false and hence not true, then S2 is truthvalueless and hence not 
true, and if S2 is not true then Sl is truthvalueless. Thus Sl 
presupposes S3. " 
Hence a sentence standardly presupposes itself if and only if it is 
trivial (necessarily true). 
As implied earlier, however, the concept of trivial 
presupposition has a more specific relevance to the central theme of 
this study. assume thatr included in the general task of 
developing a coherent and perspicuous logic of presupposition is 
that of developing a logic that can be construed as reconstructing 
WHAT IT IS TO PRESUPPOSE A PROPOSITION (be this an act, or an 
epistemic state, or whatever) as opposed to assertingr or judging, a 
proposition. I shall suggest that to presuppose-a proposition 
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consists in being committed to that propbsition while NOT 
countenancing the possibility that it may be false. By contrast,, to 
assert a proposition is to be committed to that proposition while 
countenancing the possibility of its being false. I shall not 
elaborate this further here - it is discussed in Part Two in 
connection with the distinction between three-valued logic and two- 
valued logic with truth-value gaps. I mention it here because, if 
this characterisation seems at all plausible, it has the effect of 
placing trivial presupposition much more in the centre of the stage: 
the tautologies of a language are precisely those'propositions whose 
truth the speakers of that language are committed to WITHOUT 
countenancing the possibility that they may be false. 
5. Concl usion. 
I have suggested uncontroversially that it is the -SLDP, and only the 
SLDPI that has received serious attention in discussions of 
presuppositional logic, that such discussions exhibit the assumption 
that there is no logical alternative to that definition of 
presupposition, Since the SLDP DIRECTLY EXPRESSES the Salient 
Presuppositional Intuition (that of a proposition being implied both 
by A and -A) this assumption may seem reasonable, and indeed more 
than reasonable. Howeverr I have also suggested, more 
contr over sial ly, that the assumption is not warranted, that it 
would be a 'mistake to identify the generic notion of 
presuppositional logic with the SLDP itself. This is controversial 
on at least two counts: (1) it implies that a logical definition of 
presupposition need not (and perhaps should not) DIRECTLY EXPRESS 
the SPI mentioned above - this is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 11; (2) it implies that it is possible (and perhaps 
desirable) to formulate a definition of presupposition that does not 
ýl 
have the consequence that the failure of a presupposition INEVITABLY 
results in the presupposing sentence having a third logical status. 
In order to justify these remarks, I must develop an 
alternative (but comparable) logical definition of presupposition. 
This is the enterprise to which this dissertation addresses itself. 
Before doing thisr however,, I devote the second chapter of this 
first part to* a discussion of some further assumptions attendant onj 
and other consequences of, the assumption (SA-1) discussed here. By 
showing, as I hope, that these assumptions and consequences are 
unfortunate, I intend to cast further doubt on the 9, Lilm faci 
warrant for that assumption. 
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COAPTER II 
FURTHER ASPBM OF THE FRWAILIM CONCEPT. 
1n this chapter I continue the critique of the treatment that 
presuppositional logic has received. I focus on four further 
assumptions which I take to be characteristic of this treatment. 
These stem more or less directly from the assumption discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
1. lhe disassociation of definition and projection. 
The matter to be discussed in this section is a trend inaugurated by 
Langendoen and Savin 1971 and prefigured in Morgan 1969. Langendoen 
and Savin proceed on the assumption that the concept of 
presupposition is unproblematic and well understood at least in 
respect of its application to simple sentences (they give what they 
describe as a Fregean character i sation). The problem, as they saw 
it,, was to predict the presuppositions of compound sentences from 
the presuppositions of the simple sentences contained in them. This 
they described as 'THE PROJECT10N PROBLEM FOR PRESUPPOSITIONS'. 
They predicted that the presuppositions of any simple sentence would 
be inherited as such by any compound sentence containing it. 
Following Morgan 1969: 170 this has come to be known as the 
Cumulative Hypothesis. 
Langendoen & Savin's working assumption (which I shall dub 
Standard Assumption 2) may be expressed as 
Standard AssumPtion 2: 
It is reasonable to treat of the projection of presuppositions 
either independently of the definition of presupposition 
or on the assumption that a correct definition may be 
taken f or granted in respect of simple sentences. 
This working assumption has proved popular, and has led to what can 
only be described as a tradition in which the definition problem and 
the projection problem are disassociated, identified as separate and 
mutually independent problems. A solution to the projection problem 
for presuppositions has come to seem a coherent autonomous objective 
- perhaps even the most important one. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the best known exponent of this approach 
is Karttunen 1973,, which is a response to the inadequacies of the 
Cumulative Hypothesis. And, again as noted in Chapter 11 the 
assumption that underlies this exclusive preoccupation with 
projection is rather clearly in evidence both in Hausser's 1973 
definition and in Gazdar's criticism of the definition. A look 
through the ýepers in Oh and Dinneen 1979f perhaps the largest 
collection on the single subject of presupposition#, gives a good 
idea of how pervasive are the preoccupation with providing a 
projection solution and the disassociation on which that 
preoccupation depends for its coherence. Two papers in that 
collection (by Katz (1979) and by Gazdar(1979a)) actually contain 'A 
solution to the projection problem' in their titlesf as does 
Mioduszewska 1985. Most recentlyr the publisher's summary that has 
been made available of van der Sandt (forthcoming) indicates that 
the disassociative tradition is very much alive. 
This disassociation has had the unfortunate effect of cutting 
off serious thought on the logical nature of presupposition itself. 
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Langendoen & Savin 1971, for exampler entirely'ignore the fact that 
their (as it happens incorrect) cumulative prediction is anyway 
problematic if Frege's concept of presupposition is understood as 
being reconstructed by the SLDP. This is so because S2 being a 
syntactic constituent of S1 is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for Sl and S2 being in any kind of logical relation. Butr 
by the SLDP, presupposition is defined as a logical relation. 
The general question that I wish to raise here is whether any 
putative solution to the projection problemp if it purports to be 
JUST that,, can be a coherent objective. A correct definition of the 
relation of presupposition between A and B will predict the 
intuitive presuppositions and logical status of A whether A be 
simple, compound or complex. To accept that there is a projection 
problem is tantamount to accepting that the correct definition of 
presupposition has yet to be formulated. Any purported autonomous 
projection solution will,, by definition, either conflict with the 
definition that throws up that problem or, in the absence of any 
explicit definition, will not be a solution to anything and hence 
will be trivial (in a very ordinary sense of that word). For 
projection problems are thrown up by definitions: without a 
definition, there can be no coherent problem. 
At this point in the presentationi, I am concerned only with 
making this general point. Karttunen's work on presupposition 
projection has been mentioned and will, with others', be discussed 
in detail in due course. No discussion of the disassociation 
identified in this section, howeverr would be complete without a 
special mention of the influential treatment presented in Gazdar 
1979a and b. That treatment represents the highwater mark of the 
disassociative tradition which I seek to repudiate. In it, the 
disassociation of definition and projection extends beyond the issue 
of what the LOGICAL definition of presuppositiofi might be to include 
a lack of concern with ANY kind of definition whatsoever. Gazdar 
1979b begins by noting (89): 
In the course of this debate [about presupposition] there 
have been two main issues that turn out to be heavily 
interdependent. One has been whether the notion should be 
semantically or pragmatically definedr and the other has been the thorny issue of "projection".... 
This allusion to the 'interdependence' of a definitional issue and 
the projection issue is surprising given Gazdar's purported 
projection solution,, which may be summarised as follows. 
An utterance is defined as a sentence-context pair (following 
Bar-flillel 1954). only utterances have presuppositions as such. 
But 'PRE-SUPPOSITlONS' are assigned to sentences (in semantic 
representation). The presupposition of an utterance (of some 
sentence) is def ined as a 'pre-supposition' (of that sentence) that 
is epistemically consistent (cf. Hintikka 1962) with the context. 
with which the sentence is paired. 'Pre-suppositions' (of 
sentences) fail to become presuppositions (of utterances) if and 
only if they are epistemically inconsistent with that context. In 
that case they are cancelled. The presuppositions of an utterancer 
thenr are a post-cancellation subset of the 'pre-suppositions' of 
the sentence uttered. Presupposition is thus defined in terms of 
'pre-supposition'. But the sole information proVided as to what a 
'pre-supposition' might be is that a 'pre-supposition' is a 
potential presupposition. Taken seriously as a definition of 
presupposition this is, of course, circular. But Gazdar does not 
intend it to'be taken seriously as a definition. The notion of 
'pre-supposition' is not intended to have any ontological status 
(p. 24) and in fact has a purely technical role to play in the 
proposed projection solution. The introduction of 'pre-supposition' 
is Gazdar's way of telling us that he neither knows nor cares what 
it is that he is projecting. (See Burton-Roberts 1984: 204 for 
further discussion. Stalnaker effectively made the same point in his 
1980 review of Gazdar 1979b (903-4), commenting that Gazdar 
"bypasses the descriptive question what is the phenomenon of. 
presupposition". ) 
I suggest that, even were Gazdar successful in what he aims to 
achieve, the nature of that achievement would remain obscure. 
Gazdar (among others) appears to have been conceptually side-tracked 
by the programme inaugurated by Langendoen and Savin 1971, to the 
extent of losing sight of the real challenge of the so-called 
projection problem. The challenge is that of knowing what a 
presupposition is and in the light of that knowledge predicting 
which intuitive presuppositions will manifest themselves. In a real 
sense then the trick actually consists in knowing (being able to 
define) what it is that is being projected. Even this way of 
putting it concedes too much coherence to the disassociation of 
projection and definition since, as implied above, an appropriate 
characterisation of presupposition would of itself preempt the 
projective task. As a matter of principle, a real solution to the 
projection problem will not be a solution to the projection problem 
as such, but will consist in abandoning the definition that leads to 
that problem in favour of one that does not. In presenting (in 
Part Three) the alternative theory of presupposition to be developed 
here, 1 face a certain difficulty in presenting these issues 
separately. 
I have suggested above that Gazdar's criticism of Hausser's 
definition (9) in Chapter 1. and that definition itself , manifest 
three interrelated assumptions. I repeat them here. (i) To adopt 
"the semantic -hypothesis" is to adopt the SLDPF on the further 
assumption that (ii) the SLDP is satisfactory as far as elementary 
formulae (simple sentences) are concerned and that therefore (iii) 
the only logical possibility for a semantic theory of presupposition 
is in some way to solve or otherwise mitigate the projection problem 
attendant on that definition. In this section 1 have been concerned 
with (iii) and its relation to (i). I have argued that (iii) is 
misguided and may not even be coherent. In the next section I 
consider assumption (ii). 
2. Standard presupposition and the logical status of simple sentences. 
I have presented some evidence that suggests a prevailing assumption 
that 
STANDARD ASSUMPTION 3. 
The SLDP is (Most) satisfactory in its application 
to simple sentences. 
The preoccupation with the projection problem may be taken as 
general evidence of this and, as already notedr both Hausser's 1971 
def inition-and Gazdar's criticism of it constitute quite specif ic 
evidence oý it. 
That this IS an assumption needs some explaining, for the SLDP 
is clearly problematic even in its application to simple sentences, 
as noted by critics such Kempson 1975 and Wilson 1975. The problem 
was first acknowledged in print by Strawson himself 1954 (more 
extensively discussed in 1964 (reprinted 1971)) and has been quite 
widely noted by those more sympathetic to Strawson's general 
position than Kempson and Wilson. (Cooper 1974: 38-91, Gundel 1977: 
Sect. 2.7. Lyons 1977: 601-2. Fodor 1979: 209, McCawley 1981: 240-1, 
Reinhart 1982: 15-6r Seuren 1984: 351). Yet it has had less impact 
on the development of an appropriate presuppositional logic for 
natural language than might have been expectedr being completely 
ignored in the general preoccupation with putative projection 
problems. 
The problem is this. We have seen that, under the SLDP, we may 
equate the falsity of a presupposition and lack of a classical truth 
value in the presupposing sentence. If A has a classical truth 
value then either B cannot be a presupposition of A or,, if B IS a 
presupposition of A. B must be true. Yeti, even among those who 
acknowledge that the TYPICAL and CHARACTERISTIC consequence of a 
false presupposition is lack of classical truth value in the 
presupposing sentencer it is a common intuition that this is not a 
NECESSARY or. INEVITABLE consequence. That is, even allowing that 
(1) 
(1) The present king of France is wise 
lacks a classical truth value on account of the falsity of its 
presupposition (2) 
(2) There is a present king of France 
it is a commonly attested intuition (which I share and have 
extensively but informally tested) that (3) 
(3) The king of France visited me today. 
either is false, or under certain circumstances CAN be false, even 
though it presupposes what (1) presupposes. 
This intuition is in conflict with the SLDP. Since (3) 
intuitively has. (or may have) the classical value 'false', even for 
those who admit of a third logical status, and since (2) is false, 
(2) cannot be a presupposition of (3). But (2) intuitively is a 
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presupposition of (3), as much as of (1). 
It is noticeable, for example,, that Kempson 1975: Ch. 5.1 (85- 
95), an outspoken critic of the logical concept of presupposition, 
herself concedes an intuitive distinction between examples such as 
(1) and examples such as (3). Her most telling counter-examples to 
the logical, theory of presupposition instantiated by the SLDP 
crucially involve successful referring expressions in addition to, 
referring expressions with no actual referent (as in (3)). With 
regard to examples such as (1), on the other hand, she explicitly 
concedes the intuitive force of the characteristic prediction of a 
presuppositional logic: 
"the concept of neither true nor false matches the native 
speaker intuitions about the oddity of saying either tile king 
= Fran ie i-. q, bald or lha kiW Dj Franc " W2t bWj where there is no such main. 
Kempson 1975: 90. 
I believe the reason why this intuitive- distinction has had 
less impact -than it ought can be explained in terms of Strawson's 
own 1971 reaction to it. That reaction is itself ambiguous and 
problematic. Strawson proposed that whether a false presupposition 
results in the lack of classical truth value f or the presupposing 
sentence depends on whether the expression that induces the false 
(existential) presupposition (hencef ortb,, with Strawson, the 
"guilty" expression) identifies the tcpic of the utterance or not, 
whether it is the topic-expression (which Strawson identifies with 
subject function). For Strawsonr lack of a classical truth value 
results only from the falsity of a presupposi tion induced by a 
topic-expression. (On this accountr presumably,, we are to take the 
presence of extra, successful referring expre - psions as being of 
relevance only because they provide natural alternative candidates 
for topic. ) 
o 
First,, the matter of ambiguity. The resj? onse is ambiguous in 
its implications because it is not clear whether, in saying thist 
Strawson is (a) abandoning the MDP or (b) maintaining and defending 
the SLDP. Even under this latter interpretation it is equivocal in 
its implications for the SLDP since it can be interpreted (i) as an 
attempt to buttress the logical definition as it stands by a kind of 
non-logical post-definitional filtering or (ii) as constituting a 
non-logical intrinsic modification of it,, as restricting the class 
of presuppositions to those induced by tcpic-expressions. McCawley 
1981: 240,, who concurs in the intuition and in Strawson's exPlanation 
of itt interprets him as abandoning the SLDP. But Reinhart 1982 
sees Strawson as maintaining the SLDP, and has it that "it follows 
from [Strawson's] analysis that only topic noun phrase expressions 
carry existential presuppositions" (15). This is interpretation 
(b(ii)). That interpretation is, of course,, highly counterintuitive 
(Cooper 1974: 37 describes it as "totally implausible"). Quite 
independently of topicality, the intuition that (2) is a 
presupposition applies equally to (1) and (3). But Reinhart's 
comment does at least point up the ambiguity of Stawson's discussion 
(andr in fact, in Ch. IX below I come to the conclusion that, 
counter-intuitive though the interpretation is, it is the correct 
one. ) 
For the proponent of presuppositional. logicr Strawson's 
discussion is also unfortunate becauser construed as an attempt to 
buttress the SLDPr it represents a buttressing that depends on the 
extra-logical concept of topic; it depends furthermore on faulty 
assumptions about topic; finally,, it can be shown to be empirically 
incorrect. 
The extra-logical character of Strawson's explanation of the 
intuitive observation has had the unfortunate effect of suggesting 
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to writers interested in the more strictly logical aspects of 
presupposition to believe that they can safely ignore the intuitive 
observation itself as being, from a logical point of view, 
epiphenomenal. This at least would explain why the intuitive 
observation has not had the impact that it might in more formal 
treatments. The alternative to ignoring it is not attractive from 
a logical point of view. On the assumption that the appeal to topic 
is made as a means of defending the SLDP#, Strawson makes it appear 
as if a presuppositional logic can be accepted only by accepting a 
topic-dependent definition of truth. This unwelcome consequence is 
duly noted by Kempson 1975: 88 in her argument against the generic 
concept of presuppositional logic. 
Furthermorer Strawson's controversial (andr it should be noted, 
quite unnecessary) identification of topic-expression with subject 
function opens the way for Kempson,, who interprets Strawson's 
explanation as an attempt to salvage the SLDP, to. point out what is 
clearly the case: that whether in subject position, as in (1), or 
not, as in (4), 
(4) 1 was visited by the king of France today 
referring expressions do intuitively induce existential 
presuppositions but, even where these presuppositions are falser it 
is not always counterintuitive to regard sentences containing them 
as false and hence as truely negatable. This IS Contrary to what 
Strawson would predict by his comments on topic and subject, and 
since these comments are construed as an attempt to salvage the 
SLDP, the implication is that the SLDP is unsalvageable. 
Furthermorei since the SLDP is assumed to be necessary to a 
presuppositional logic, the implication of this in turn is that the 
enterprise th at presuppositional logic represents should be 
abandoned. 
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Thus, r if we take Strawson's intuitive observation seriously - 
as I do, it is of some importance to show that his explanation is 
not only not necessary, but even in its own terms (as an account of 
topicality and independently of any implications of that account for 
presupposition) improbable. An alternative account of the intuitive 
datum must be provided. This is the subject of Part Three esp. 
Chapters IX and X. There it will emerge that there is a quite 
striking connection between the problems posed for the SLDP by 
compound sentences (those that constitute the so-called projection 
problem) and the problem posed for it by the logical status of 
simple sentencesr discussed in this section. It is in part this 
connection that motivates my earlier critique of exclusively 
projectional studies,, though it appears to me that the prima facie 
argument against the disassociation of definition and projection 
advanced there stands in its own right. on prima facie grounds at 
least, a successful alternative to the SLDI? must be capable of 
handling these data globally, in terms of a single principle, 
following from or constituted in the act. ual definition of 
presupposition. 
I conclude this section with a general remark. It will emerge,, 
if it is not already beginning to, that the SLDP is a very blunt 
instrument. it makes, as we have seen, the BLhNKET prediction that 
the falsity of a presupposition inevitably, universally results in 
lack of classical truth value for the presupposing sentence. The 
alternative required must be capable of making a more sensitive 
range of logical predictions. Success in this enterprise would 
have implications over and beyond matters of empirical adequacy. 
For, under the SLDP,, it was enough to show that the blanket 
prediction was counterintuitive in some (and perhaps even many) 
cases to cast doubt on its correctness even when it succeeded in 
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matching the intuitions. If this is the force behind Kempson's 
criticism, as I take it to be, it clearly hits the mark. 
The point will bear emphasis. The intuition that sentence (1) 
above lacks a truth value on account of the falsity of its 
presupposition (2), the intuition that questions of its truth value 
simply do not arise under that circumstance, is very strong and is 
overwhelmingly more often conceded than not. But the SUP can take 
small comfort from this, since it makes that prediction simply as a 
particular instance of its blanket prediction. And this blanket 
prediction is much less palatable from an intuitive point of view. 
Naturally enough, this casts doubt on the logical character of the 
intuition and has rather strongly motivated the search for an 
alternative NON-logical modelling of the few intuitive predictions 
of lack of truth value that the SLDP does succeed in making. But 
if an alternative logic of presupposition were to succeed in 
matching the intuitions more accurately, this would have the effect 
of re-instating those intuitions as specifically LOGICAL INTUITIONS 
(intuitions as to the logical status of presupposing sentences) and 
hence as appropriately and properly modelled by a LOGIC of 
presupposition. (The same point is made by Fodor 1979: 200. ) 
3. Presuppositional, logic and the ambiguity of negation. 
In this section'l discuss an important fourth assumption which is 
evident in the overwhelming majority of treatments of 
presuppositional logicr both protagonistic and antagonistic. Since 
discussion of this assumption leads us directly towards the topic of 
Part Two of the dissertation, it is treated in slightly more detail. 
Rescher 1969: 122 observes "in a many-valued logic, various 
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types of negation are possible. " Logicians . interested in such 
things have consistently availed themselves of these possibilities, 
notably Bochvar 1939, Smiley 1960, Van Fraassen (eg 1969), 
Herzberger 1970,1973, R. Thomason 1972: 242 et seq., who cites 
further references,, as does Rescher 1969. More recentlyr so have S. 
Thomason 1979 and Seuren 1984. Horn 1985: 126 reports that the same 
is true of Q. ) Martin 1979r 1981 (neither of w hich have I bad sight 
of). Bochvar 1939: 290 (see Rescher for a discussion in English 
(339 - and 31 but there with a crucial misprint) defines a Truth 
operator IT' as in (1) 
p TP 
TT 
FF 
3 
(where 131 represents a third logical status) in terms of which 
'external' counterparts of all the (internal') standard logical 
connectives may be defined, including negation. 11bus, if 'internal' 
negation isas in (2): 
(2) p 
TF 
F' T 
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and if external negation 1-1 is defined as in (3) 
(3) -p = (df ) -Tp 
we derive a truth-table for external negation as in (4): 
(4) p -p 
TF 
FT 
3T 
As Horn 1985 observes, this derivation. of a further negation 
operator has become standardr and 1 shall not comment further on it 
in this section. (It is discussed in more detail in Part IL) 
The implication of this distinction between internal and 
external negationr when applied to the notion of presupposition 
(specifically as defined by the SLDP),, is that internal negation 
(since it preserves the third logical status of the positive 
sentence) is 'presupposition-preserving', while external negation 
(since it takes all third logical statuses into the classical truth- 
value, true) is 'presupposition-cancelling'. 
It is widely taken for granted that 
Standard Assumption 4. 
anyone wishing to claim of (some) natural language that 
it is, logically, a presuppositional language - that its 
sentences can lack a classical truth value in virtue of the 
falsity of a presupposition - is committed to the claim that 
the negative sentences of that language are truth-conditionally 
and truth-functionally ambiguous, that the semantics of the 
language. includes two logical negation operators. 
This stems f rom what many acknowledge to be the empirical need to 
recognise that,, although negations such as that in (5) 
(5) The king of France isn't bald - therels. no king of Francel 
are in some sense marked (Kempson 1975: 85 even c(? ncedes that they 
are they are 'unnatural'), they do appear to be possible uses of 
negation. 
Thomason 1973: 2 is representative in commenting: 
Lj- 
I can think of only one way for the rop onent of semantic 
t resupposition to rebut evidence oTthis kind (supposin 
hat the evidence in agreed upon) and this is.... 
. 
[by? 
claiming that negation is ambiguous. Unless the claim is 
made, I do not believe that the semantic notion of 
presupposition can be defended at all. 
The cry has been taken up and ambiguous negation used a cudgel on 
theories of semantic presupposition: 
"The absence of ambiguity [in negation] implies the 
nonexistence of semantic presupposition and indefensibility of 
truth-value gaps. " 
(Atlas: 1979: 268) 
"It was only under a presupposition based analysis that the 
ambiguity of negation need be invoked" 
(Kempson 1979: 295). 
And, since negative "are indeed unambiguous", 
"the W il son-Kempson view of presupposition receives further 
confirmationt since the invocation of an inter nal-exter nal 
negation ambiguity to preserve the case for presuppositions 
will no longer be a possible move to make" 
. (Kempson 1979: 286) 
Horn 1985 provides a not altogether accurate survey of the matter. 
He comments (126): 
"The existence of marked negative statements which are true when 
the affirmative counterparts are neither true nor false has led 
proponents of semantic presupposition to conclude that natural 
language negation must be represented as ambiguous, either by 
allowing dual interpretations of a single operator or by 
r oviding dual scope possibilities for negation in logical form. 
systematic ambiguity of negation figures prominently in ALL 
[SIC] theories which admit semantic presuppositions - but, as Russell illustrates, not only in these. " 
Among proponents of P-logic, Strawson 1950,1952 has explicitly 
argued (contra Russell) that negative sentences are not ambiguous, 
effectively retaining just Bochvar's internal negation (though he 
would not, of course, put it this way), contrary to Horn's claim 
that ALL proponents of presupposition have advocated the ambiguity 
of natural language negation. Consistent with this, Strawson 1971: 93 
argues that R and Z are equivalent in a presuppositional logic, as 
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they are in classical logic. In doing thisr Strawson is not merely 
ignoring the data presented by critics of P, 1ogic and proponents of 
the ambiguity within P-logic,, but simply attesting the intuition 
that to negate a sentence with a false presupposition sounds odd - 
for him, odd to the point of unacceptability. This,, after all,, is 
the intuition that led Strawson, against Russell. to f orm ulate a 
logical definition of presupposition in the first place. This 
debate between Russell and Strawson is a matter I return to shortly. 
As indicated, the claim that negative sentences are ambiguous - 
due either to a Russellian scope ambiguity or to a 'lexical' 
ambiguity in the operator itself - has of course come in for severe 
criticism f rom opponents of P-logic (see Allwood 1972, Wilson 
1975: 471, Kempso n 1975: 95-100,1979,, Boer & Lycan 1976,, Atlas eg 1977 
and Gazdar 1979a,, 1979b: 64-66. ) Gazdar present's what seems to me 
the strongest argument against a 'lexical' ambiguity. He points out 
(1979b: 65-6) that lexical ambiguity is almost without exception a 
language-specif ic phenomenon. A lexical ambiguity in one language 
is typically not retained by a translation into7 another language. 
Yet the putative ambiguity of negation is systematically attested 
across a wide range of languages - if not all. Gazdar comments that 
as far as he is aware no language is known to have "two or more 
different types of negation such that an appropriate translation 
[from English]... could be automatically Idisambiguated' by the 
choice of one rather than the other"(66). See Horn 1985: 163-4,, 
howeverr for a fuller discussion of the matter. 
And there is the further argument that the two putative senses 
of the negation are semantically related to each other in such a way 
that it is dem. onstrably impossible (Zwicky and Sadock 1975) to 
establish empirically that there is indeed a genuine semantic 
ambiguity. This essentially is Kempson's 1979 argument. 
An important argument against the ambiguity of negation that 
has not, as far as I am aware, been advanced is that the 
incorporation of a further means of negation within the semantics 
leaves totally unexplained the specialo, marked and, in Kempson's 
word,, unnatural character of the negations it is designed to account 
for. It seems too far-fetched to suggest that an operation for 
which specific provision is made within the semantics should result 
in any feeling of specialness,, markedness or unnaturalness when 
actually applied. On the contrary, the effect of incorporating such 
an operator within the semantics would be precisely to NORMALISE 
that sense of negation. But this contradicts much of what a P- 
logic is supposed to account for. This observation prefigures the' 
more general discussion below. 
I shall not review the specific arguments against the ambiguity 
of negative sentences because I wish to address three general and 
more important issues that arise if/when the ambiguity of negation 
is invoked in support of a presuppositional logic. These will have 
the effect 'of directly contradicting the suggestion made by 
Thomason, Kempson, Atlas in the above quotations, and of vitiating 
the arguments FOR or AGAINST P-logic that are based on any supposed 
semantic ambiguity of negation. 
These issues may be approached by asking a question which is 
obvious but which I do not recall having seen posed bef ore: If the 
putative ambiguity of negation is so important to the defence of a 
logic of presupposition for natural language, how is it that the 
anti-presuppositional Russell 1905 argued that negative sentences 
are ambiguous, whil e the pro-presuppositional Strawson 1950 argued 
against. that proposition? 
The FIRST issue can be presented by tackling the Strawsonian 
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side of the question. I have suggested that Strawson is only 
being consistent in claiming that negative sentences are not 
ambiguous, but are univocally presupposition-preserving i. e. neither 
external nor internal, but univocally taking truth into falsity,, 
falsity into truth andr therefore,, 131 into 131. After allr this 
is exactly what his theory of presupposition predicts. Since 
presuppositions are (and, by the SLDPr are BY DEFINITION) 
implications shared by both S and not-S. it follows that a logical 
theory of presupposition must capture at least the idea thati, in a 
presuppositional language, there is no negation of S that is 
expressive of presupposition-f ail ure in S. This is what makes a 
presupposition a presupposition. (We shall see in due course that. 
the SLDP includes this idea but goes beyond it. ) To admit into 
the language a further semantic type of (presupposition-cancelling) 
negation into the language would be flatly to contradict the theory. 
It would be tantamount to: 
In a presuppositional language, there is no negation of S 
expressive of presupposition-f ail ure in S but there is a 
negation of S that is expressive of presupposition-failure in 
S. 
It would be tantamount to defining presupposition as: 
A presupposition is a logical implication from both A and its 
negation but there are presuppositions which are logically 
implied by A but NOT by its negation. 
These are contradictions. I suspect that this observation will be 
greeted by shouts of "Onfairl" but I believe that the contradiction 
can be escaped only by rendering the theory trivial and vacuous as a 
theory of presupposition. Fairness/triviality would be 
(re)introduced by making explicit reference to the two distinct 
types of negat ion, as in: 
A presupposition is a logical implication from both A and the 
presupposition-preserving negation of A but there is a negation 
of A in respect of which the prequpposiýions of A function as 
strong entailments of A and are therLefore cancelled. 
There are several senses in which such a theory is trivial as a 
theory of presupposition. one is dealt with below in connection 
with Russell. Leaving that aside, a logical theory of 
presupposition that includes a presupposition-cancelling negation is 
either trivial or contradictory (or both) because it is, quite 
simplyr unfalsifiable. It is unfalsifiable for a reason that is 
logically prior to the mentioned impossibility of. establishing the 
existence of an ambiguity of negation; it is unfalsifiable because, 
even allowing that the ambiguity could be established, no putative 
counterexample to the original definition could possibly be a 
counterexample since all and only 'apparent counter exam pl es' would 
be handled by the presupposition-cancelling negation. This theory. 
would be , in effectr a theory capable of handling its own proper 
counter-examples. 
Consider the matter from this angle. Under the Standard theory 
of presuppositionr (5) above is a contradiction. Any theory in 
which (5) does not emerge as a contradiction contradicts that 
theory. There are of course coherent theories in which (5) is not a 
contradiction (e. g. those of Wilson and Kempson). But these are 
NON-presuppositional theories, not to say anti-presuppositional, 
theories. To allow a PRESUPPOSITIONAL theory to characterise, (5) as 
non-contradictory would simply be to raise the contradiction out of 
the EXAMPLE and place it squarely in the THEORY ITSELF. It would 
combine the central tenet of (standard) presuppositional *theory with 
the central tenet of counter-presuppositional: theories. This 
yields, not- the best of both worlds,, but a trivialising 
contradiction (contradictions are trivialising because from a 
contradiction anything follows). 
c; j 
The real argument against the ambiguity, of negation then must 
come from within presuppositional logic itself; to postulate an 
ambiguous negation in the context of a presuppositional logic 
renders a logical theory of presupposition contradictory and 
vacuous. The point seems both obvious and important, but I do not 
recall having seen it made before (though it may be that Wilson 
1975: 94.. 137 is touching on the matter). 
The SECOND issue arises when we consider the Russellian side of 
the question. Russell argued for a scope ambiguity in negative 
sentences as providing an ALTERNATIVE means of accounting for what a 
logical theory of presupposition was designed to account for. The 
force of Russell's theory of descriptions in this context is that it 
was offered as OBVIATING the need for logical presupposition and the 
need for truth-valuelessness strictly interpreted. However 
successful Russell's analysis may or may not be, it is offered as a 
logical alternative to a logic which defines a relation of 
presupposition as such. To incorporate the Russellian ambiguity (or 
any other device with an equivalent logical effect) into a 
presuppositional logic would be otiose, rendering it trivial as a 
theory of presupposition. Russell and Strawson appear to have seen 
this rather clearly: they disagreed and they knew that they 
disagreed, but the matter has definitely become obscured. 
This is illustrated by Dummett's 1973 discussion of a similar 
point in respect of Frege. Towards the end of Chapter 12 Dummett 
develops at length the argument that what Frege attempts to express 
in terms of presuppositions and the logical status of neither true 
nor false can be accounted for (and the need for such a status 
circumnavigated) by having two falsity operators, 'false-11 and 
'false-21. "The case in which we are calling the sentence 'false-11 
is of course just-that in which Frege calls it simply 'false', while 
that in which we are calling it 'false-21 is týe one in which Frege 
says it is neither true nor false" (421). 
The parallelism between this and Bochvar's distinction between 
'internal' (narrow scope) and 'external' (wide scope) negation is 
striking. inspection of the truth table for external negation 
reveals that the operation it defines is one which, whatever the 
argument, unfailingly obtains truth or falsity as value. In 
particular,, 131 is mapped onto truth. But if 131. can be mapped by a 
NBGATION operation onto classical truthr this makes 131 a species of 
falsity. This is perfectly consistent with the claim of Russell and 
Dummett that logical statuses other than the classical truth values 
are not required. 
Dummett's discussion leads us to the THIRD issue - connected 
with the comment by Rescher 1969 with which I opened this section. 
In discussing it, I must anticipate some of the issues to be 
discussed in Part II. 
Dummett points out that in the interpretation of Frege outlined 
above, he is "in effect, describing the use of the negation sign by 
means of a thkee-valued truth-table" (421). Now in philosophical 
logic, multivalent systems are formulated without regard to their 
possible application and without regard to either their semantic 
interpretation (in terms of truth and falsity) or their intuitive 
interpretation. They are purely formal systems. They are 
certainly not specifically intended to reconstruct the intuitive 
notion of the radical kind of failure constituted by the failure to 
make a statement. Indeed, if the making of a statement consists in 
asserting something that can be assessed for truth valuel, it follows 
that if what ip asserted is assessed as having a third truth-value 
(strictly interpreted as such) then a statement will indeed have 
been made by its assertion. It is on these grounds that Evans 1982 
criticises Dummett's interpretation of Frege: "Frege registered this 
[radical kind of failure) by saying that the sentence is neither 
true nor false and his reason for saying this. makes it absolutely 
clear that he meant that the sentence fails to have any truth value 
at all; he was not thinking of a third truth value... as Dummett 
1973: Chap 12 has suggested" (Evans 1982: 11). 
Dummett and Evans disagree on the correct interpretation of 
Frege specifically and it is not my purpose to decide between those 
interpretations. What Dummettr Evans and I do seem to be agreed on, 
however, is the existence of a correlation between an enlargement of 
the set of falsity/negation operators in a logic and the 
interpretation of that logic as being STRICTLY multivalent - as 
having an enlarged set of actual truth values as such. Indeed, one 
might wonder in passing whether Rescher's remark quoted above is not 
too weak. I surmise that the number of such operators in a logic is 
a function of the number of truth values it admits. In a two-valued 
logic there are two truth values and one logical function from one. 
to the other. This function is called 'negation'. As Dummett has 
shown, and Evans agrees,, if a logic admits t hree truth values it 
will (must? ) define logical functions between these valuesr and the 
combined operation of two such functions is both necessary and 
sufficient for this. (The suggestion made in this paragraph would 
seem to be consistent with assumptions made by Seuren 1984 whose 
Section 2 is entitled 'Two negations and three truth values'. 
Indeed Seuri2n goes on to allow for no less than three kinds of 
negation and FOUR logical statuses: 'undefined', Itrue'r If alse-11j, 
and 'false-21. Seuren in fact suggests (p. 362) "for any n-valued 
system ... n-1 negations can be defined ...... This comment 
implies 
that Seuren's "undefined" is indeed a truth-value. ) 
There is, then, a third unwelcome general consequence of the 
appeal to ambiguous negation in support of a P-logic in natural 
language. Within linguistics at least (but certainly for Strawson 
himself) the appeal to a non-standard logic for capturing 
presuppositional intuitions - one that admits of a logical status 
other than the classical truth values - is made as a means of 
reconstructing the intuition of a very radical kind of failure,, the 
failure to make an assertion that has a truth value. I am calling 
this 'statement failure'. With Evans, I would wish to say that a 
logic can be interpreted as reconstructing exactly this notion if 
and only if # can demonstrably be construed, not as a three-valued 
logic, but as a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. This of 
course presupposes that we have a demonstrable decision procedure 
for this and it is far from clear that we dc>; Part II offers a 
remedy for this. This much is clear from the preceding discussion, 
however. The admission into a logic of negation operators in 
addition to classical negation (a function from truth to falsity 
and vice versa) is incompatible with an interpretation of that logic 
as being a two valued logic with truth-value gaps. I return to the 
matter in Part Two. 
As notedr it is clear from Strawson's informal discussion of 
presupposition -that he intended a two-valued logic with truth gaps. 
In the light of the foregoing remarks,, thenr Strawson is absolutely 
righý/, ---bherý, to shun ambiguous negation. This does not meant 
however, that Strawson achieves a gapped P-logic (rather than a 
trivalent P-logic) simply by refusing to countenance additional 
falsity operators and hence a semantic ambiguity of natural language 
negation. The matter is treated in more detail in Part IL 
Since a two-valued logic (with or without truth-value gaps) can 
only assign one coherent interpretation to negative sentences (the 
so-called "internal" interpretation),, instances of marked, special, 
,ý1, S., 
negation, such as that in (5) must be handled independently of the 
system - that isr non-logically,, non-truthconditionallyr non- 
truthfunctionally. This is precisely what we should expect, given 
the above observation that the semanticisation of further negation 
operators implies the NOMIALISATION of further senses of negation. 
The issue is discussed at length in Chapter X. 
In the light of the general issues discussed in this sectionr 
one might wonder why proponents of presuppositional logic would 
want, or could be seen as wanting, to espouse any kind of 
semantically ambiguous negation. How has this idea arisen? Consider 
Kempson's 1979 discussion, for example: "Insofar as this problem is 
treated within the pro-presupposition lobby, it is dismissed as a 
matter of ambiguity involving a quite different senseý' of the 
negative sentence in question"(284). The reference cited in support 
of this statement is in a footnote (tagged to 'lobby' in the above 
quotation) - to Kiparsk Y and Kiparsk 1971: 351, described as 
"Starting the recent controversy". Kiparsk Y and Kiparsk 1971: 351 
reads 
"Presuppositions are constant under negation. That isr when 
ou negate a sentence you don't negate its presuppositions... 
nf act, if you want to deny a presupposition, you must do it, 
explicitly:... bj2e di g! l REGRE. T ±jjjt lie bgd forgotten. - lie ha 
remembered. The second [main - NBR] clause casts the negation 
of the first into a different level; it's not the 
straightforward denial of an event or situation, but rather the 
denial, of the appropriateness of the word in question 
([capitalised above]). Such negations sound best with the 
inappropriate word stressed. " 
This description leaves something to be desired in the matter 
of explicitness, certainly - and this is part of the problem. If 
one were disposed to interpret this as a sem antic theory of the 
ambiguity of negation, such an interpretation is, I suppose, just 
about possible. But why should one be so disposed? That is not a 
necessary interpretation by any means. The Kiparslls at no point 
1ý ý 
explicitly sanction a presupposition-cancelling negation. on the 
contrary, they explicitly say (i) that presuppositions are constant 
under negation and (ii) that it is the (positive) second clause, and 
its inconsistency with the presupposition of the first, that has the 
effect of bringing the presupposition into question. This is of 
course perfectly consistent with a univocal negation operator when 
combined with a pragmatic account of presupposition-cancellation. 
It is true that the KiparsLAJ s do not develop a pragmatic account - 
but they don't develop a semantic account either. In fact the 
Kipars1j's don't pretend to offer an account at all. Nevertheless, 
there appears to me no cogent reason to suppose.. that, when properly 
developed, their comments should be seen as inevitably leading to a 
semantic rather than a pragmatic account. 
If the considerations presented here have the force that I 
attribute to them, they effect something of a reversal in our 
picture of things. A coherent presuppositional logic f or natural 
language, far from implying an ambiguity in negative sentencesr 
should be regarded as downright incompatible with such an ambiguity, 
and on several dif f erent grounds. In these terms, it appears to me 
that discussions of P-logic which are based on the theoretical 
(un)desirability or empirical (in)adequacy of postulating a semantic 
ambiguity in negative sentencesi, lose much if not all their 
relevance to the issue of presuppositional logic. .1 conclude 
that 
ambiguity of negation or the lack of it is not dn issue that needr 
or can, divide the pro- and anti-presupposition camps. 
The discussion has in part dppended on the intuitive 
distinction between a trivalent logic and a gapped logic. That a 
supposed semaniic ambiguity of negation has come to seem so central 
to P-logic is,, I believe, in large part due to the lack of serious 
attention paid to that distinction. And this lack of attention in 
c. 7 
turn can be shown to arise from the assumption that there is just 
one possible logical definition of presupposition, namely the SLDP. 
For if there can only be one definition anywayr the distinction 
between trivalence and gapped bivalence must remain a purely 
academic one. 
4. Logically defined presupposition and intuitive presuppositions. 
Before directly addressing the topic of this sectiong, let me draw 
together some implications of the discussion so far. 
1. The Salient Presuppositional Intuition is that of some prop- 
osition B being implied both by A and by its negation, -A. - 
2. The prima facie appeal of the SLDP is that it embodies 
DIRECT EXPRESSION of that intuition,, at least in one of its several 
logically equivalent formulations. 
3. The SLDP makes what I have called a BLANKET PREDICTION to 
the effect that A has a false presupposition if and only if A lacks 
a classical truth value. In the formulation (1) in Chapter 1, this 
takes the form of DIRECT EXPRESSION of a Truth Gap Intuition. 
4. The blanket prediction of the SLDP is counterintuitive. 
Intuitively, lack of a classical truth value in a presupposing 
sentence is the TYPICAL and CHARACTERISTIC consequence of a false 
presupposition but not a necessary or inevitable consequence. In 
other words, even accepting that 'truth gaps' may occur, the 
intuitive distribution of truth gaps is not co-extensive with the 
intuitive distribution of false presuppositions. 
In (l)-(4) we have reached an impasse. Given the equivalences 
noted at the opening of Chapter Ir (l)-(4) contradict each other. 
This is precisely the kind of impasse whichr very naturallyr 
motivates the adti-presupposition lobby. I have suggested, however, 
that there is an alternative to abandoning the very idea Of P-10gicr 
and a more obvious one. It consists in abandoning the SLDP as the 
paradigm of what a P-logic should express. In suggesting thisr I am 
suggesting that we should abandon yet anotherj, apparently very 
natural,, assumption associated with SLDP and from which the SLDP 
derives its apparent necessity. It is this: 
Standard Assumption 5. 
That any intuitively adequate logical definition of 
.y 
direct expression of the presupposition must embod 
Salient Presuppositional Intuition. 
The reader might be forgiven for thinking thatr since the 
Salient Presuppositional Intuition is (surely) the very essence of 
presupposition, if a logical definition of presupposition is not 
required to express it directly, then surely nothing (of substance) 
CAN be required of such a definition. But consider: in discussing 
the logical equivalences at the opening of Chapter I,, we were 
implicitly discussing the logical equivalence between (a) direct 
expression of the Salient Presuppositional Intuition and (b) the 
blanket prediction of the SLDP. It follows that an 
intuitivelY/empirically adequate definition 6f presupposition (one 
that avoids the counterintuitive blanket prediction) CANNOT embody 
direct expression of the SPI - and, indeed, cannot embody direct 
expression of a Truth Gap Intuition, since this is equivalent. 
As put, SA-5 seems reasonable,, indeed inevitable. What I want 
to do now is generalise SA-5. When this is done and it is in put 
into a proper perspective, it will, I hope, appear less inevitable. 
se') 
In generalising itt it will be useful to prov6 formally something 
which may seem intuitively obvious - but the proof will be useful 
anyway (it has played an important part in my own thinking on 
presupposition). 
THEOREM. (a) implies (b), where 
(a) =A presupposes B iff A implies B& -A implies B 
(b) =A presupposes B iff -A presupposes B. 
Since both (a) and (b) are biconditional,, the effect of proving this 
will be to prove that, if (a) is the definition of presupposition, 
then (a) and (b) are equivalent; in other words" either (a) and (b) 
are equivalent. or (a) is not the definition of presupposition. 
Since (b) is equivalent to (c)r 
If A presupposes B then -A presupposes 
AND 
(ii) If -A presupposes B then A presupposes 
we first prove that,, under (a). if A presupposes B then -A 
presupposes B (c(i)). Assume the contrary, i. e. assume thatr under 
(a), A presupposes B and that -A does NOT presuppose B (I below). 
Then -A does not presuppose B (2 below). Now if -A does not 
presuppose B.. then it is not the case that both -A and its negation 
--A imply B (3 below). But --A is equivalent to A. So it is not 
the case that B is implied both by -A and A (4 below). Then,, under 
(a), it is n6t the case that A presupposes B (5 below). But this 
conflicts with our initial assumption that A does presuppose B. To 
avoid the contra*diction, we must conclude thatr with (a) as the 
definition of presuppositiont if A presupposes B then -A presupposes 
B. The proof is presented more formally below. 
As shown below this proof (of (c(i)) under (a)) involves double 
negation elimination. The proof of (c(ii)) under (a) involves 
double negation introduction, but is otherwise identical. In what 
follows I use 1>1 for 'implies' and 1>>1 for 'presupposes'. 
(A >> B) & -(-A >> B) 
- (-A >> B) 
-((-A > B) & (--A > B) 
- ((-A > B) & (A > B)) 
- (A >> B) 
(A >> B) & -(A >> B) 
counterassumption. 
from 1 by modus ponens. 
from 2 and (a)-def of IW 
from 3 and double neg. elim. 
from 4 and (a)-def of 1W. 
contradictio6 from 1 and 5. 
Hencer under (a), 7i. (A >> B) > (-A 0 B). 
(CUM 
1. (-A >> B) & -(A >> B) 
2. -(A >> B) 
3. -((A > B) & (-A > B)) 
4. - ((--A > B) & (-A > B) 
5. -(-A >> B) 
6. (-A >> B) & -(-A >> B) 
counterassumption 
from 1 by modus ponens 
from 2 and (a)-def of 1W. 
from 3 and double. neg. intro. 
from 4 and (a)-def of 1W. 
contradiction from 1 and 5. 
Hence,, under (a), 7ii. (-A >> B) > (A >> B). 
Hence,, (A >> B) iff (-A >> B) from U and 7*ii. 
(b) might not appear to be very perspicuous as a formulation of 
the SLDP (not that it was our intention to provide a more 
perspicuous formulation). It can however be made more perspicuous 
by observing. that it allows us to say that,, under the SLDPF 
presupposition is(df) that logical relation which, if it holds at 
all,, holds both between A and B and between -A and B. * 
For illustrative purposes, this can be put to immediate use with 
an interesting result (which, in the light of the [continued over 
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I have suggested that a logical alternative to the SLDP is 
desirable. But it has just been proved that it is under the SLDP 
that A presupposes B if and only if -A presupposes B. The most 
interesting consequence of this is that no logical definition of 
presupposition that is a genuine alternative to the SLDP can 
directly reconstruct the idea that negative sentences share the 
logical presuppositions of their affirmative counterparts. Any 
logical definition of presupposition that has this property is not 
logically distinct from the SLDP and hence not a genuine alternative 
to it. 
This of course is precisely why the SLDP is f elt to be so 
necessary to an adequate P-logic. But there is a hidden further 
Section 3 above, should perhaps not surprise us). Bergmann 1981 
defines a two-dimensional lo? ic (see Herzberger 1973 and elsewhere) 
0 which invokes the notions o truth-value and security value, but 
which provides valuations in terms of just two truth-values (01 1) 
and COMBINATIONS of them on those two dimensions. He defines a 
concept of 'pre-implication' in terms of security. The details are 
not strictly relevant here. What is relevant is his observation 
that "It follows that bothaLg, 2 and. Zla " 21 pre-implyg exist 
and to this extent pre-implication is our forma regimentation of 
presupposition" (Bergmann 1981: 33). Notice thatr in saying this, 
Bergmann is attesting the Salient Presuppositional Intuition and, 
furthermore., evincing the assumption mentioned above that an 
adequate P-logic must embody direct expression of that intuition. 
He turther comments: "As a consequence of the distribution of 
security values in the matrix for 1-1. we have implemented the 
presuppositional policy (Q: For each sentence Ar A and -A 
presuppose axactly the same sentence" (Bergmann 1981: 33). 
Bergmann's acceptance of the mentioned assumption and his consequent 
incorporation of the SPI in his logic allow us to conclude,, in the 
light of the above proof, that his two-dimensional logic is 
equivalent to the SUP itself. Ibis is perhaps less surprising than 
might appear, in view of the comments on Bochvary Dummett and the 
ambiguity of negation in the preceding section. The fact that 
Bergmann s logic does not admit of truth value gaps as such 
indicates that the putative truth gaps of Strawsonian P-logic can, 
as it were,, be recuperated as truth values by an equivalent 'two- 
dimensional' logic. As noted abover this result should trouble 
Strawson given that he intended his presupposition definition to 
induce a logical statusr truthvaluelessnessr that cannot by 
definition be -natural ised/norm al i sed as any kind of value. on the 
other hand,, it is not clear that Bergmann has succeeded in going 
beyond what Bochvar and Dummett proposed.. notwithstanding the new 
terms 'security value' and the replacement of multivalence by 
multidimensionality. 
methodological assumption here - the promised generalisation of SA-5 
above - which can be shown to be unwarranted and perhaps even 
unreasonable in pre-empting the possibility of EXPLAINING intuitive 
presuppositional phenomena such as the Salient Presuppositional 
Intuition and a Truth Gap Intuition. This generalised assumption 
can be expressed as follows: 
Standard Assumption 5- generalised. 
That, under an intuitively/empirically adequate logical 
definition of presupposition every INTUITIVE PRESUPPOSITION 
of S must directly satisfy the logical definition of 
presupposition with respect to S. 
As mentioned. - this is a generalisation of the assumption that an 
intuitively adequate logical definition of presupposition must 
embody DIRECT EXPRESSION of the Salient Presuppositional Intuition 
that, when A presupposes B, B is implied both by A and its negation' 
-A. The above proof that direct expression of the SPI induces an 
equivalent definition of presupposition such that A presupposes B if 
and only if -A presupposes B allows us to generalise that assumption 
as above,, given that it is empirically the case that A and -A do 
intuitively share their presuppositions (i. e. share their intuitive 
presuppositions). 
Let me now show that this generalised assumption, reasonable 
though it might seem, is not methodologically necessary. It will be 
agreed that what we require of an intuitively/empirically adequate 
logical theory of presupposition is that both the attested range and 
the attested character of presuppositional int uitions follow from 
it, that the theory imply and thereby predict those intuitive 
phenomena. One way of placing this condition of adequacy on a P- 
theory is to adopt the methodological principle expressed as (a): 
i-i 
(a) B is predicted to be an INTUITIVE PRESUPPOSIT10N of A 
if and only if B directly satisfies the logical definition 
of presupposition with respect to A. 
(a) is certainly SUFFICIENT as a condition of adequacy. But it 
is much stronger than is actually required; it is not in principle 
NECESSARY. By this I mean that there need be no requirement on a P- 
logic that it directly identifies as a LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION 
everything that is INTUITED to be a presupposition provided, and it 
is an important (double) proviso, (i) that every logically defined 
presupposition is also an intuitive presupposition, AND (ii) that 
those intuitive presuppositions which are not directly defined as 
presuppositions by the definition are nevertheless predictable, and 
indeed predictedr from those that do. 
A P-logic that met these conditions would predict all intuitive 
presuppositions. if a P-logic achieved this, it would be quite 
unnecessary,, indeed otiosei, to place the further -requirement on it 
that all intuitive presuppositions be defined directly. I shallf 
therefore, abandon the biconditional (a) in'f ayour of the weaker, 
conditional, (b): 
(b) If B directly satisfies the logical definition of presupp- 
osition with respect to A then B is predicted to be an 
intuitive presupposition of A. 
subject to the provisos stated above. This, it should be noted, is 
NOT a weakening of the conditions of intuitive adequacy on a P- 
logic. (b),, together with the two provisos, is readily 
reconstructed as a bicondition of empirical adequacy. 
Let me illustrate this in broad terms. I have shown that in 
order to develop a genuine alternative to the SLDP, we are required 
to develop a P-definition that does not have the consequence that -A 
and -A share their logically defined presuppositions. But 
INTUITIVELY A and -A do share their presuppositions; in other words, 
A and -A do share their INTUITIVE presuppositions. Here, then, we 
have a case where the required logical theory cannot allow that A 
and -A share their logically defined presuppositions but must 
predict that they share their INTUITIVE presuppositions. 
I am conscious thatr prior to a full explanation of this, I 
will be suspected of a sleight of hand in this or of engineering a 
terminological revolution in which the problems and the data are 
made to disappear in a puff of smoke. By addressing myself to the 
possibility of this charge, I can perhaps show the grounds on which 
the generalised assumption mentioned above might be regardedr not 
merely as unnecessary, but positively unreasonable. 
What I am doing is distinguishing between the logical theory 
and the intuitive data that the theory is designed to predict and 
explain. The term 'intuitive presupposition' is not some novel 
technical term of art. In using it 1 refer to the intuitive data 
that needs to be predicted. By 'intuitive presupposition' I mean 
exactly what has always been meant by it in the logical context. 
For example, when I say that it is an empirical fact that when A 
intuitively presupposes B then both A and -A intuitively imply Br I 
mean just that and am acknowledging a central intuitive datum that 
any logical theory of presupposition is required to handle. Againr 
that the falsity of an intuitive presupposition characteristically 
results in the truthvaluelessness of the sentence that intuitively 
presupposes it is an empirical fact that I accept on its normal 
interpretation and accept that a logical theory must predict. 
Here I wish to raise the question of whether there is not a 
sense in which a theory in which every intuitive presupposition is 
I -' 
defined directly as a logical presupposition can be said NOT to 
PREDICT the intuitive phenomena. In incorporating direct 
expression of the Salient Presuppositional Intuition and a logically 
equivalent version of the Truth Gap IntuitiOnr the SLDP cannot 
exactly be said to predict them; instead it actually DESCRIBES thEt 
phenomenon that would have to be PREDICTED by any EXPLANAT10N of 
it. In order to predict and explain somethingr one has to go beyond 
it and DESCRIBE something else. (This is why there is no end to 
exPlanationr as work over the years on syntactic constraints on 
transformations evidences. ) But the SLDP does not go beyond the 
Salient Presuppositional Intuition or the Truth Gap Intuition, in 
the sense that it does not FOLLOW FROM the' SLDP that when A 
presupposes B. B is implied by both A and -A; nor does the Truth Gap 
Intuition FOUCK FROM the SLDP. On the contraryr the SLDP CONSISTS 
precisely in the combined (and interrrelated) logical DESCRIPTION 
of these intuitive phenomena. 
In conclusion, I have argued in this section that it is not 
necessary,, as - is generally supposed, to demand of a logical theory 
that every INTUITIVE presupposition it predicts also be directly 
identified by the logical definition. If the full character and the 
implications of this claim remain as yet unclear, I expect this to 
be remedied in Part Three. * 
More tentatively,, I have suggested that that requirement might 
* On intuition and resupposition, see Donnellan 1981.1 take 
Stalnatker 1980: 903 
ýo 
be making a similar point to the one I am 
making'in this section in connection with SA-5. He comments that 
Gazýar in particular "seems to take it for granted, incorrectly I 
believe, that the descriptive concept [of presupposition] Vhich 
identifies the phenomena to be explained will co-incide with a 
theoretical concept which will provide a uniform explanation of 
them". He also notes, more generally, that' the theories of 
presupposition criticised by Gazdar themselves identify the 
descriptive with the theoretical problem"(ibid). 
even be seen as unreasonabler as pre-emptin6 the possibility oý 
predicting and explaining the intuitive presuppositional phenomenon. 
I have shown furthermore that it is a necessary condition on 
any genuine (logical) ALTERNATIVE to the SLDP that it does NOT meet 
this 
. (unnecessarily strong) requirement. In a logical theory of 
presupposition, the intuitive presuppositional phenomenon (incl. SPI 
and TGI) cannot be directly expressed in, but'must be derivable 
from, the logical definition of presupposition. in Part Two it will 
emerge in fact that direct expression of the Salient 
Presuppositional Intuition and the resultant logically equivalent 
direct expression of the intuitive Truth Gap phenomenon in a logical 
definition of presupposition can be seen as incompatible with the 
development of a two-valued logic with genuinely truthvalueless 
truth gaps. 
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PART 9WO 
TBE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TRIVALENT LOGIC AND A TWO-VALUED LOGIC 
WITH GAPS 
This part provides a bridge between the discussion of the Standard 
theory of presupposition in Part One and the discussion of the 
Revised theory to be presented in Part Three. This part provides 
the theoretical framework in terms of which the major contention of 
the dissertation can be expressed: that the Standard theory and the 
Revised theory are distinguished in the most general conceptual 
terms by the fact that the Standard theory induces a trivalent logic 
whereas the Revised theory induces a gapped bivalent logic and is to 
be preferred at least on these grounds. 
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CHAPITR III 
DEVELOPING TBE DISTINCT1ON 
1. Current 13tatus of the distinction. 
If the SLDP were the only possible logical definition of 
presupposition - and, more generally, if there were only one 
Possible logical definition of presupposition - then the intuitive 
distinction between modelling presupposition by means of a trivalent 
logic and modelling it by means of a two-valued logic with truth 
gaps would be logically empty. The distinction would merely be a 
matter of taste in the informal intuitive interpretation of the 
logic induced by that definition. it was argued in Part One that' 
the treatment that P-logic has received rather clearly evinces the 
assumption that, if presupposition is to be given a logical 
definition, only one such definition is possible and the MDP is it 
(SA-1). This section, then, reviews what I regard as one of the 
more unwelcome consequences of accepting SA-1. 
it has been noted that Strawson 1950 inf ormally conceives of 
the P-logic induced by his SLDP as two-valued with gaps,. allowing 
for truthvaluelessness strictly interpreted. And I take it that, 
for him at least, it is NOT just a matter of taste to do so but is 
fundamental to his conception of presupposition. But Keenan 1972r 
1973r using that same definition of presuppos : ition, explicitly 
conceives of it as inducing a trivalent logic (see 1973: 366 "Itr fr 
z} is a set of three truth values"). In developing his trivalent 
system, Keenan nevertheless alludes to the properties that might 
intuitively be associated with the notion of truth gap 
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(truthvaluelessness) in the informal presentation and interpretation 
of the third truth value. The actual wording of the definition of 
presupposition given in Keenan and Hull 1973: 450'is "T is a logical 
presupposition of S just in case T is true in every state of affairs 
in which S is either true or false (so S is neither true nor false, 
BUT VACUOUS, whenever T is not true)" (my caps). Karttunen 1973 
adopts this approach, too, consistently intruding the word 
'indeterminate': "the third indeterminate truth value". See also 
the comment in Chap. II: 3 above on Seuren's use of "undefined". 
These locutions concede the intuitive point, which is: that the 
logical notion of a third truth value is NOT in fact what is 
required in this context. But name-calling (cf. 'indeterminate', 
Izerol, Ivacuous'j, 'undefined' or '(truth (value)) gap) does not in 
itself achieve what IS required. 
It is a measure of the lack of importance generally attached to 
the distinction that many writers are happy to allude to P-logic as 
being a three-valued logic in which the third truth value is a 
(truthvalueless) truth gap. This sounds like a contradiction - one 
we have become inured to, but a contradiction nonetheless. How can 
a logic be three-valued if the putative third truth value consists 
precisely in not being a truth value? The contradiction is 
exhibited explicitly in the following: 
"... three-valued logics in which truth gaps arise... 11 
(Horn 1985: 124) 
".... truth values: true, false, and truthvalueless, are 
assigned to formulae... 11 
(Mioduszewska 1985: 84) 
"Note that Table 2 [Van Fraassen's propositional truth 
table] is 
, 
three-valued since... a truth value gp for a 
constituent sentence does not automatically ma e for a 
truth value gap in the complex expression. " 
(Seuren 1984: 347) 
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"To the extent that semantic prýsupposition is identified 
with the trivalent account the issue of whether to admit 
semantic truth gaps ceases to be a verbal one. " 
(Bergmann 1981: 30) 
"Like Russell I shall recognise only two truth values 
and shall not admit gaps. I will not explicate the concept 
of presupposition as trivalent theories do" 
(Bergmann 1981: 30) 
"Since a sentence doesn't need to have a truth value 
(according to Strawson's definition) the usual two-valued 
ropositional calculus cannot suffice for our purposes. 
nstead I pýopose the choice of Kleene's three-valued 
system. " 
(Hausser 1976: 262) 
The quotation from Seuren requires special care. In respect of the 
last two, it needs to be noted that it is precisely the tiýuth gap 
interpretation of the third logical status that does not countenance 
more truth values than the two provided for in a classical logic. * 
In making specific reference to these examples, I have picked 
out only those in which the contradiction is clearly evidenced in 
the space of a single quotation. It may be inferredr however, from 
the inconsistency in the use of terms that is evidenced in almost 
all writings on presuppositional logic (see for example Boer & Lycan 
1976: 7 and 9, Woodruff 1970: 121 and 122, Kempson 1975: Ch. 5 
passim, and, alasi, Burton-Roberts 1986b. ) An exception is Wilson 
1975, who is consistent in assigning presuppositional logic a gapped 
Hausser, incidentally,, goes on to note that "Instead of Kleene's 
system we could as well have chosen Lukasiewicz' or Van Fraassens" 
since these are eguivalent (Hausser 1976: 263). Lukasiewicz, system 
1967a and b is self-avowedly trivalent. on Van Fraassen see 15elow. 
As regards Kleene, in his propositional calculus, the connectives 
are explicitly characterised as (classical but) PARTIAL functions 
(i. e. functions that do not always leld a (truth) value for all 
arguments). See Kleene 1938: ep 
M, 
To decribe Kleene's. system 
as three-valued, then, is to misrepresent Kleene's intentions in 
respect of the distinction at issue. 
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interpretation. 
Van Fraassen is alone among those who actually acknowledge any 
such distinction in taking it seriously. But he too uses that same 
(standard) definition of presupposition. However, in order to 
satisfy himself that he has indeed achieved his'aim of developing a 
gapped rather than a trivalent logic, he resorts to embedding that 
definition within a supervaluational framework (see Van Fraassen' 
1966j, 1968,1969,1970a and especially 1970b). Given the remark 
with which I opened this section, we should not be too surprised to 
find that there is little consensus on whether he succeeds in his 
objective or even on whether anything is actually at issue. For 
example, Herzberger 1970 simply ignores Van Fraassen's objective 
and, to Van Fraassen's dismay (1970b), represents supervaluational 
P-logic as being trivalent. 
"... its trivalence rests on a threefold partition of sentences 
into tr'ue, false and neither -a structural property independent of any further distinctions to be drawn between the 
absence of a standard truth value and the presence of a non- 
standar, d truth value. " (Herzberger 1970: 25) 
Herzberger here expresses the idea that there is indeed nothing of 
substance at issue from a logical point of view. (And presumably it 
is in the light of the idea expressed in this quotation that we 
must interpret the passages quoted above.. if they are not to yield 
the contradiction I have imputed to them. ) The actual form in which 
Herzberger expresses the idea, however, makes it appear more 
reasonable than it is, for "absence of a standard truth value" is 
indeed quite compatible with "the presence of a non-standard truth 
value". But Van Fraassen can be seen as intending to model "absence 
of a standard truth value" only by implication from his intention to 
model something which is more precisely described as "absence of 
[any kind of ] truth value". This latter notion is NOT intuitively 
compatible with "the presence of a non-standard truth value". 
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Gazdar 1979 is non-committal,, both on the distinction itself 
and on the relation between Van Fraassen's work and the distinction. 
Having presented Keenan's trivalent logic, he comments "A somewhat 
less obvious solutiont but one which retains a kind of bivalent 
semantics, is that of Van Fraassen" (91), pointing out immediately 
that "it can-be regarded as a species of three-valued definition and 
can be shown to be inadequate f or the same reasons as the 
latter"(91). Gazdar is right to be non-committal. Since we are all 
using the same definition of presupposition anyway, it is not clear 
that there is anything of logical substance to be decided. In a 
similar vein, Hausser too comments: "supervaluations are simply a 
more complex way of capturing Strawson's intuition" 1976: 247. 
In contrast to the general shoulder-shrugging considered so 
farr Seuren 1984 appears to acknowledge some kind of distinction 
between trivalent and gapped logic. To my knowledger Seuren is the 
only writer whor while acknowledging some such distinction, would 
actually favour a multivalent, as against a gappedr conception of 
presuppositional logic. He provides no rationale for this 
preference,, however. Consider, then, Se'uren's reaction to 
supervaluations: 
'What Strawson had in mind was clearly not a system of 
supervaluations, but rather a system with two truth-values (i. e. 
b0alent) but with truth value gaps. " (Seuren 1984: 348) 
This comment is at least surprising, for it carries the implication 
that any difference between the work of Strawson and that of Van 
Fraassen actually effects a distinction which is exactly the reverse 
of what Van Fraassen intended. it implies that a supervaluational 
framework turns a Strawsonian GAPPED logic into a Van Frassenian 
TRIVALENT logic. Seuren gives only the merest of indications as to 
the basis of this contention (it is given, in. its entirety, in the 
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earlier quotation from Seuren). This issue is discussed in some 
detail in the next chapter. . 
I am tempted to say that I have painted a picture of conceptual 
disarray. And, on an intuitive levelr this would seem justified. 
There clearly is an intuitive distinction between a trivalent logic 
and a gapped logic. Equally clearlyr on that level,, it is the 
latter, not the former,, that is required if presuppositional logic 
to achieve descriptive adequacy in its application to natural 
language, as a reconstruction of the concept of statement-failure. 
So. if the intuitive distinction were a -logical distinctionr it 
would be crucial. In this connection, consider the following 
observation made by Lyons 1977: 596-7: 
"Strawson's view of the tion asserted in Tj1p. Ijing DL 
4ance la bWA is that it%a o 
r=sitruth 
value. An alternative 
viewr which proponents of so-called presuppositional logic have 
adopted, is that it does have a truth value: the somewhat 
peculiar truth value of neither true nor false distinct from 
the two truth values, true and falser of the standard 
propositional calculus. 11 
Lyons is surely correct in noting that the notion of a third truth 
value is peculiar - and more than somewhat. This eminently 
perspicuous observation is seldom if ever made. And the reason for 
this should be clear from the preceding discussion. Compelling 
though the intuitive distinction is, either there is no 
corresponding logical distinction or, where a distinction has been 
made (cf Van Fraassen) it has either failed to convince or has 
appeared peripheral to matters that really concern us,, matters such 
as the definition of presupposition. In such a circumstancer it may 
well be perfectly legitimate to take a third truth value as being 
the logical reconstruction of the intuitive truth GAP. This appears 
to be Quine's 1960: 177 position. And on such an interpretation the 
idea of a third truth value ceases to be peculiar. A third truth 
74 
value is only peculiar on the assumption that the intuitive 
distinction has LOGICAL significance. 
Perhaps the best way to summarise how things stand with respect 
to the distinction between a gapped and a trivalent logic would be 
to sound a Miltonic note: if the distinction is not in Chaos then 
it is in Limbo. The most charitable view of the situation described 
in this section would be that the Chaos is only apparent because the 
distinction is in fact in Limbo. The present investigation is in 
large part motivated by the assumption that the intuitive 
distinction is too important to be left there. Furthermoref as 
suggested at the outset of this section, that it is in Limbo is a 
direct consequence of the assumption that there can only be one 
logical definition of presupposition anyway. But it was the 
argument of Part I that this assumption is pernicious. 
We thus require logical criteria for the distinction between a 
trivalent and a gapped logic. Development of such criteria will 
enable us to characterise the descriptions given above as being the 
contradictions they intuitively are (i. e. in taking the distinction 
out of logical Limbo, it will throw those descriptions into Chaos). 
It will lead us to ask of the SLDP whether it induces a trivalent 
logic or a two-valued logic with truth gaps - indeed,, it will enable 
us to ASK that important question, make it coherent. 
By the interrelated criteria I shall propose, it turns out that 
the SLDP unequivocally induces a three-valued logic (indeed the 
criteria would only be of interest if they had that result). 
Provided they are independently compelling enough, this in itself is 
an important result, having consequences already hinted at in Part 
one. But that result will in turn lead us to ask what a genuinely 
gapped logic would look like and we will thereby be encouraged to 
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entertain the idea of a genuine logical alternative to the Standard 
Logical Definition of Presupposition. 
The attempt to develop criteria for making the distinction 
between a trivalent logic and a two-valued logic with truth gaps, 
then, is of value even as a heuristic: whether or not I succeed in 
convincing the reader that the intuitive distinction can indeed be 
reconstructed as a substantive logical distinction (and by the 
particular criteria I propose) it will have been of value in 
precipitating a novel definition of presupposition. But I believe 
and hope that the distinction as reconstructed here succeeds in its 
own terms for, in the light of the gapped logic that'is demanded by 
the criteria, 1 expect to show that the several problems for 
presuppositional logic that are presented by the SLDP stem more or 
less directly from the fact that it induces a three-valued rather 
than a gapped logic. In this lightr the specific problems 
attendant on the MDP conception of presupposition are seeny not as 
local problems in an essentially correct/necessary logical modelling 
of presupposition in natural language, but aý; consequences of the 
more general and f undamental fact that the SLDP is not compatible 
with the generic KIND of logic that is requiredr and does not 
reconstruct the intuitive notion of truthvaluelessness required of a 
presuppositional logic for natural language. 
2. A prima facie argument for the distinction. 
In this section I consider one particular respect in which a prima 
facie preference for a gapped logic over a trivalent logic seems to 
me rather Clearr namely the treatment of analyticity and analytic 
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contradiction, a matter dealt with by Katz 1972. For that matter, 
this issue provides strong independent grounds for preferring a 
gapped logic over a strictly bivalent semantics too. I shall 
therefore make it a three-way comparison. The overriding (and 
uncontroversial) assumption that informs the discussion is this: 
that it is desirable to be in a position to say that analytic 
tautologies are necessarily true and that analytic contradictions 
are necessarily false. 
Chapter 1 of Wilson 1975 opens with the following statement: 
It is fairly uncontroversial that an adequate semantic 
description must enable us to state,, for each of the infinite 
number of sentences in a language, whether it is analytically 
true, whether it is contradictory.... 
ribis is no trivial enterprise, as Linsky's 1972 devastating critique 
of Katz 1966 makes clear. I shall not address the range of issues 
that Linsky addresses, though the particular problem that does 
concern us here is not unrelated. It concerns sentences such as 
those in (1) and (2): 
a king 
(1) The king of France is 
a monarch 
a king 
(2) The king of France is not 
a monarch 
In some sense, (1) is a set of analytic sentences and (2) a set of 
analytic contradictions. 
Consider first the treatment these sentences receive in a non- 
presuppositional bivalent semantics of the sort envisaged by Wilson 
1975 and others. If an analytic sentence is necessarily true and 
its negation necessarily false., then the sentences in (1) are not 
analytic and those in (2) are not contradictions in a non- 
presuppositional bivalent semantics. In such a semantics, there is, 
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it is claimed,, just one kind of truth condition,, strong entailment 
(supporting modus tollens). * In such terms (3), as a truth 
condition of (1) 
(3) There is a king of France 
is a strong entailment of (1). Since (3) is false, the putatively 
analytic sentences in (1) are in fact FALSE. Conversely, the 
apparently contradictory sentences in (2) are in fact TRUE. 
Within such a semanticst then, the idea that an analytic 
sentence is a necessary truth and its negation a necessary falsehood 
must be abandoned (in which case we abandon the concepts of 
analyticity and analytic contradiction as semantic concepts). They 
could be retained only under an intolerable condition, that 
contingent facts about the world be taken into account in framing 
the definition of analyticity. The unhelpfulness of this latter 
suggestion points up the problem,. which is: that no necessarily 
true sentence (and hence no analytic sentence) can have a contingent 
(synthetic) entailment. $ 
*This cannot be, in fact. While the relation between a conjunction 
and its conjuncts is one of strong entailment, whatever the relation 
between a disjunction and its disjuncts (for e. ý. ample) may be, it is- 
not strong entailment. In the present contextr thoughr this is 
incidental.. 
$A possible solution that might be considered (put to me privatel 
s and I concederan Passant by a critic of presuppositional theoriel. "T is that one should say of the sentences in (1) that . if truer the are necessarily true - but they may be false. Now this SOUNM 
contradictory. To show that it is IS contradictory we must show 
that the cases in (1) bear no relation to other cases of which such 
can be said without contradiction. Kripke 1972: 261 observes that 
Goldbach's Conjecture (that an even number greater than 2 must be 
the sum of of two prime numbers) constitutes just such a case. It 
may be true but, if sOr it is necessarily (must be) true. That no 
contradiction -is involved in saying this is shown by making the distinction (see Kripke 1972) between the epistemic concept of a 
prioricity and the alethic connt of necessity. - (The "may" above 
was an epistbmic modal; the "must' an alethicr or rOOtr modal. ) The 
modal status of Goldbach's Conjecture is that of non-a priori 
necessity. it is non-a priori because we cannot without labour KNCW 
(and in fact, DO not yet know) whether it is true or false; but that 
is independent of its necessity. It is necessarily [continued.. 
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I am not aware of any proposed strictly bivalent solution to 
this problem for a non-presuppositional semantics. Nor have I seen 
a published acknowledgement of it by any -proponent of such a 
semantics. On the contraryr the problem has been turned on its 
head and laid at the door of theories that define a semantic 
relation of presupposition. Wilson 1975: 83 reads: 
"one wants a semantics in which [sentences like (39)] will be 
marked as necessary truths: 
(39) If your neighbour is a bachelort then your neighbour 
is male. 
On the proposed presuppositional analysis, [sentences like 
(39) ] will carry contingent presuppositions. But if a sentence 
carries a contingent presuppýsition, it cannot be a necessary 
truth. Hence the presuppositional, analysi. s must be wrong. " 
Wilson's choice of example is not arbitrary, for a presuppositional. 
and a non-presuppositional semantics are distinguished, inter alia, 
by the fact that presuppositions of clauses IN conditionals, show up 
as presuppositions OF the conditional, whereas entailments of 
clauses 1N conditionals do not show up as entailments OF the 
conditional. 
Nevertheless, this brisk little argument cannot be allowed to 
stand. If Wilson is claiminý that her bivalent semantics indeed 
marks her (39) as a necessary truthi, she is committed to an 
inconsistent semantics. This is so because the necessary truth of 
(39) commits us to the necessary truth of (4). 
(4) The bachelor living next door is male. 
But the circumstance in which a presuppositional' semantics fails to 
true or necessarily false but, since it is non-a priori, we have yet 
to discover which. The case we are dealing with, howeverr is quite 
different. Under a bivalent semantics,, (1) is CWTINGENTLY false. 
And anyway, the truth of an analytically true sentence is both a 
priori and necessary (cf. Kripke 1972: 264). 
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assign truth to Wilson's (39) (and (4)) is exactly the circumstance 
(namely, the absence of neighbours, dwellers next door) in which 
Wilson's semantics assigns FALSITY to (4), just as it does to (1). 
With the result that,, if we substitute (4) or (1) for Wilson's (39) 
and change each occurence of "ptesupposition(al)" to "entailment" in 
the above quote, we derive a statement which. is AT LEAST as clearly 
true as Wilson's own statement. * 
A similar reversal of the argument of this section is to be 
found in Kempson 1975: 88 as part of her general argument against 
admitting a relation of presupposition into the semantics: 
"Notice ... that a large body of contradictions will no longer be labelled as such since the conýunction of any sentence 
containing a definite noun phrase with its. negative counterpart 
will not be necessarily ralse. It may* be neither true nor 
fal se. " 
It seems reasonable to ask which is preferable: (a) an 
entailment-only semantics of the sort envisaged by Kempson, in which 
some contradictions are marked as truer or (b) a system in which 
those same sentences, while not marked falser are not marked true 
either. The-question is not rhetorical. To answer it, though, we 
must acknowledge that it is vague: described. as 'neither true nor 
falself the third logical status is compatible both with a 
(trivalent) value-interpretation and with a (gapped) valueless- 
interpretation. In this context the distinction is crucial. Thisr 
then, brings me to the comparison of trivalent and gapped logics. 
On the TRIVALENT interpretation, with the third logical status 
*If, incidentally, we take the material implication of classical 
logic as providing the semantics of natural language conditionals (a 
controversial assumptiont certainlyr but it has been argued, b D 
Grice 1967, and more recently by Smith 1983), on the assumption thft 
there are no- neighbours, it is the case that (39) comes out as true 
in a non-presuppositional semantics, but not as NECESSARILY true. 
(39) will be contingently true because, within such a semantics, 
both antecedent and consequent are CONTINGENMY,. false. 
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taken as a (third) truth value, (1) is assigned a truth value and 
(2) is assigned a truth value. But the truth value assigned to (1) 
is not 'True' and that assigned to (2), is not 'False'. Oddly 
enoughr they are assigned the SAME truth value, the peculiar 131 
(whatever that might mean). The choice between an entai-Iment-only 
bivalent semantics and the trivalent semantics would be a difficult 
one. In bothr analytic sentences are assigned truth values other 
than true and analytic contradictions assigned values other than 
false. Butr forced to choose, the incorrigible peculiarity of 131 
disposes me to favour the entail ment-onlyr -bivalent horn of the 
dilemma. 
By contrastr under a TWO-VALUED SYSTEM WITH (TRUTUVALUELESS) 
LOGICAL GAPSr neither (1) nor (2) is assigned a truth value at all. 
They are quite literally truthvalueless. And this permits the 
intuitive characterisation of analytic tautology and contradiction 
that we require. An analytic tautology is a sentence which, IF IT 
HAS A TRUTH VALUE AT ALL, always (necessarily) has the value TRUE. 
An analytic contradiction is a sentence whichr IF IT HAS A TRUTH 
VALUE AT ALLr always (necessarily) has the value FALSE. The problem 
posed by the contingency of (3) is resolved on this analysis, for 
(3) is NOT an entailment of (1) and its falsity as a presupposition 
(in a gapped semantics) can only lead to (1) being devoid of a truth 
value, never to its falsity (and never,, theref Ore, to the truth of 
(2)). 
The answer to the non-rhetorical questiop posed above, then, 
seems clear: the presuppositional system is clearly to be preferred 
over the strictly bivalent non-presuppositional system, provided 
that 'neither true nor false' is strictly interpreted as 
Itruthvalueless'. And for this same reason a gapped system is to be 
preferred over trivalent one as a logical modelling of 
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presupposition. 
This discussion has ASSUMED a logical distinction between a 
third truth value and a truth-value gap; we therefore need criteria 
for that distinction. Katz' 
. 
1972 discussion of the matter assumes 
that presupposition as modelled by his (effectively standard) 
concept of presupposition induces a two-valued logic with gaps, an 
assumption questioned in CIL V. (I revisit analyticity at the end of 
the next section. ) 
3. Other prima facie aspects of the distinction. 
The preceding sections will have made clear my assumption that, 
given a prima facie distinction between a three-valued logic and a 
two-valued logic with gapsi, the latter is to -be preferred. This 
section elucidates some pretheoretical assumptions about the nature 
of the distinction and why, prima facie, a gapped logic is to be 
preferred over a trivalent one. It is not simply a matter of 
preference, however. In the course of section I of this chapterr we 
considered several reactions to Van Fraassen's commitment to the 
distinction. I have the impression that what I take to be the 
rationale of Van Fraassen's intention to formulate a specif ically 
gapped logic for a presuppositional language has not been generally 
understood. It appears to me that,, independently of the formal 
implementation of that intention in terms of supervaluations, Van 
Fraassen's more general remarks suggest a conception of 
presupposition,, presuppositional logicr and presuppositional 
languager in terms of which a gapped logic is seen to be not merely 
preferable but absolutely necessary to the -coherent logical 
modelling of presupposition. Whether or not I am correct in my 
interpretation of Van Fraassen in this,. this section develops in 
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prima facie terms that conception of a presuppositional system in 
terms of which the NECESSITY of the connection between 
presupposition and a two-valued system with gaps can be shown. 
CONSERVATISM. I begin by considering an issue which might appear to 
be merely a matter of preference. I share the near universal 
assumption that the less a system departs from classical logic (CL) 
the better. Much of the antipathy to presuppositional logic (PL or 
P-logic) stems, it seems to me,, from the assumed complexity of P- 
logic as against classical logic. P-logic is felt to be exotict 
overly complexr counterintuitive,, to have unpredictable and 
unmotivated properties in which the various babies of CL get thrown 
out with the bathwater or, as Seuren 1984: 345 puts it, result in 
"loss of logic". Rescher 1969: 129 comments "the further a system- 
departs from orthodox logic... the more tenuous its claim to 
constitute a 'logic' will be. " van Fraassen 1969: 69 would look 
askance at the "wonderful new 'logical' connectives" that appear tq 
be suggested by such non-standard systems ("witches' grimoires") and 
flerzberger 1970: 28 talks of "pitfalls and wild beasts" in connection 
with the trivalent connectives that are generally supposed to be 
necessitated by a presuppositional logic. We may sympathise with 
Gazdar in his reaction to Martin's 1975 development of a four-valued 
two-dimensional logic., He comments (1979b: 93) "In the absence of 
any external motivation for such a non-standard semantics it seems 
to me that this approach collapses under its own weight. " 
Prima facie, conservatism with respect to classical logic seems 
a clear,, simple, and desirable goal. (Complications are discussed 
in the next chapter. ) This in itself provides'strong grounds f or 
preferring a gapped logic over a trivalent one on the prima facie 
assumption that it is reasonable to expect a gapped system to be by 
its nature more conservative in any deviation from CL. The comments 
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of this and the next section are intended to make clear the 
rationale and nature of this expectation. 
LOGICAL 'PATflOLOGY. The concept of a third truth value is,, as 
noted,, "peculiar" in itself,, but particularly so as a modelling of 
the consequence of presupposition failure. A logic that defines a 
logical status as a truth value countenances and legitimises it as 
an admissible logical status WITH IN the system If,, in a systemr a 
particular logical status which is defined as the consequence of 
presupposition failure is admitted as a truth value., such a system 
may reasonably be held to fail in capturing what may be called the 
'Pathological' 'character of presupposition failure and the logical 
status that is held to be its consequence. 
There is, it must be said, nothing 'pathological' in a third 
(truthvalueless) logical status in itself. I-take it that . with 
the exception of propositions, all things have precisely this 
status. London buses and the orange blossom in the gardenr since 
they are not logical objects, have this status. To suggest 
otherwise indeed would be to commit a category mistake, implying 
that they were the KIND of thing that COULD be bearers of truth. 
%be third logical status is pathological only when it arises as the 
result of presupposition failure,, for presupposition failure is 
specifically a kind of logical failure. Seen as the consequence of 
such failure the pathological character of the third logical status 
consists in the existence of non-logical (non-valuatable) objects 
within what is otherwise taken to be the proper domain of logic. 
THE LOGICAL DOMAIN. This notion of the proper domain of logic is of 
some significance in this context. The distinction between a 
trivalent and a gapped logic with respect to classical bivalent 
logic can be expressed as lying in a difference in conception of the 
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proper domain of application of logic. There is no quarrel, between 
classical and gapped logic, that the former is complete and 
determinate and sound within its proper domain of application. But 
there is a quarrel over what constitutes that proper domain. As a 
gapped logic, P-logic seeks to restrict the application of CL within 
its proper domain,, chart the limits of that domain and explore the 
interface between it and what properly lies beyond it. In the light 
of a P-logic so construed, classical logic is to be viewed as OVER- 
EXTENDED on its standard applications. (Van Fraassen 1966: 487 
"Classical valuations go beyond the model to which they belong. ") 
Gapped logic charts the consequences of applying (a properly 
restricted) classical logic BEYCND its proper domain of application. 
Prima facie, then, gapped logic'is logically and metaphysically 
conservative with respect to standard logic. There is no 
conceptual novelty in the observation that, on the one handr there 
are logical objects (propositions, with their orthodox truth values) 
and, on the otherr non-logical objects. No change in this overall 
picture is effected in the conception of a gapped logic; but the 
interface between the domains is seen to be less cleanr more ragged, 
when we acknowledge that false friends reside at that interface. 
(This, incidentally, is not to say that the interface is vague or 
fuzzy. ) .. 
By contrast trivalent and, more generally, multivalent systems 
represent an EXTENSION of classical logic., thereby incorporating the 
suggestion that CL is expressively UNDER-EXTENDED within its own 
proper domain, that the proper domain of logic extends beyond what 
can be expressed in classical logic. New ). ogical statuses are 
created; novel conceptions of Truth are contemplated. 
If there were just one general consideration whose significance 
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I would suggest had not been sufficiently appreciated in discussions 
-of presupposition and the distinction between trivalent and gapped 
logic, it would be this: expressive capacity. A trivalent logic 
for natural language incorporates the claim that natural languages 
possess greater expressive capacity than that provided for in a 
classical standard logic. By contrastr a gapped logic for natural 
language incorporates the claim that natural'languages are, in a 
quite particular way,, more constrained in expressive capacity than 
is reflected-in a standard classical logic. Most generally, in a 
gapped presuppositional logicr presupposition failure is not 
expressible. In a standard classical (strictly bivalent) logicr 
(non-trivial) presupposition failure is expressible; but this way 
of expressing it is, to say the least, infelicitous: what would 
otherwise be (non-trivial) presupposition failure is expressible in 
a standardly bivalent system precisely becauser in such a system, no 
recognition is given to such a thing as (non-trivial) presupposition 
(failure) i. e. such a system isr in all non-trivial sensesr NON- 
PRESUPPOSITIONAL, In a trivalent logic that purports to be (non- 
trivially) presuppositional, there are such things. as presupposition 
and its failurer but presupposition failure IS expressible. Here 
perhaps we discern the first intimation of contradiction in a 
trivalent approach to the logic of presupposition. 
A PARALLEL IN THE BORDERLINE CASE. From the remarks on pathology 
and domain, it will be apparent that I see a pretheoretical 
contradiction in the idea that a logical modelling of presupposition 
should take the form of a multivalent logic. In due course I shall 
argue that the contradiction is not merely pretheoretical. But in 
illustration of the pretheoretical notion, consider,, as a parallel 
of what it is to model presupposition logically, what it would be to 
model vagueness in the semantics of a language. Consider a language 
like English which might be taken to include vague predicates. A 
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characteristic consequence of the inclusion of such predicates is 
that occasions will arise on which speakers will be disposed to 
withold both assent and dissent on the question of whether a given 
predicate is true of some individual, i. e. in such a language 
borderline cases and indeterminacy will arise. 
One response to this might be to construct a fuzzy logic 
(perhaps of the sort recommended by Lakoff 1971r 1972). This 
reaction is odd, for logics of vagueness or fuzzy logicsr are 
(presumably) neither vague nor fuzzy and -can 
theref ore be seen as 
banishing vagueness, fuzziness, indeterminacy,, from the semantics of 
the language. For, how does the borderline case arise? It can only 
arise in a semantics that does not explicitly admit of such a thing. 
Borderline cases with respect to vague predicates arise only when a 
generally bi-polar (on-off) semantic structurer defining just the 
means of express ion of assent and dissent (truth and falsity), 
confronts a gradient model. The borderline case appears to fall in 
the interstice between truth and falsity, But in a system that 
defines just truth and f alsityr there IS no such interstice. And 
that is HOW'the borderline case arises. To provide for apparent 
interstices by positing actual interstices does not and cannot 
answer the matter. For the borderline case arises, not in the logic, 
but in a kind of mismatch between the logic and the model to which 
it belongs. It arises in its application to the model. A semantics 
that makes positive provision for a particular borderline case is 
therefore self-defeating. The most we can do for borderline cases 
AS SUCH is make negative provision for them and I shall explain What 
I mean by this directly. 
As an analogy of what it is to model presupposition logicallyr 
the indeterminacy of the borderline case is clearly very close and, 
as will become apparent shortly, suits my purpose rather well. Van 
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Fraassen 1970 in fact suggests (in response to Kearns 1979) that 
vagueness can itself be given a presuppositional analysis. However, 
in offering the borderline case by way of parallelf I am NOT 
suggesting that sentences suffering from presupposition failure are 
to be seen in any way as constituting logical borderline cases (and 
nor was Van Frassen). 
NEGATIVE PROVISION IN A PARTIAL LOGIC. I now draw together the 
brief remarks on domain and the parallel of the borderline case. 1. 
am rejecting the approach which consists in the creation of a new, 
distinct, extended logic, positively going beyond classical logic by 
the inclusion of a multivalent/gradient definition of truth. I am 
insisting on the contrary that the orthodox (on-off) conception of 
truth remain unchanged,, as not only adequate but necessary for our 
purpose. 
Consider again the borderline case. Positive provision for the 
borderline case, I have suggested, is self-defeating. But this 
suggests that the borderline case as such is unrepresentable in the 
logic. Exactly so. For the borderline case LIES BEYOND THE 
SYSTEM THAT GIVES RISE TO IT. It is this idea that we wish to 
capture. Representation of such cases is indeed impossible if this 
is taken to consist in the positive provision for it within the 
system. Such provision' merely changes and extends the systemr and 
domesticates the case. But what is the alternative? What would it 
be to represent a case as lying beyond the system that gives rise to 
it? What we require is a system that gives rise to such cases 
without having a semantic structure that actually countenances themr 
that is, a semantic structure which, while it gives rise to a third 
logical status, is as it were 'innocent' of the fact that it does 
so. This I suggest would consist in the faithful representation of 
a bivalent,, classical logic as being complete within its proper 
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domain of application but PARTIAL with respect to cases that fall 
outside that domain and to which it innocently gives rise when 
applied beyond its appropriate model. (Indeed, CL already is 
partial with respect to (certain) cases that fall outside its 
domain. ) The partialness will consist in the failure of the logic in 
respect of just those cases and those cases are defined in the fact. 
that the logic fails (to assign a truth value) in respect of them. 
(This is, in fact, the approach advocated by Klein 1982, for 
borderline cases. Rather than recognising degreesr Klein defines 
predicates that are classical (bivalent) but partial truth 
functions. ) 
This may sound unduly metaphorical and vague. It can, I 
believe, be made quite precise, though. In talking of a. partial 
logic that is innocent of its own partialness I'am referring to what 
Herzberger 1970 characterises as "semantic closure". The degree to 
which a language is semantically closed is a matter of its 
expressive capacity. I take it that the notion of a logic giving 
rise to a case that it cannot countenance (giving rise to a case of 
which it must remain innocent) is a matter of the expressive 
capacity of the logic in respect of such cases. I shall say no more 
about this here for it is treated in a certain amount of detail in 
the sections-that follow. 
ANALYTICITY REVISITED. In the light of the foregoing remarks, 
consider the earlier discussion of analyticity. This will prepare 
the ground for the sections that follow. It is,, I suggest.. not 
fortuitous that a solution to the problem of the modal status of 
analytic sentences should appear to present itself in terms of a 
specifically gapped presuppositional logic. Prototypically, 
ideally, an analytic sentence expresses a necessary truth and its 
negation expresses a contradiction. I suggest thatr within a 
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gapped presuppositional system, we approach as close to this ideal 
as it is logically possible to do. That this is so, and just how 
close it is, can be seen when we acknowledge that the ideal concept 
of analyticity is itself a presuppositional concept, evincing a 
classical innocence with respect to presupposition failure. 
What 1 mean by this can be expressed in two ways: (1) the ideal 
of analyticity as necessary truth is classical and presuppositional 
because it holds only on the PRESUPPOSITION of a fully determinate 
bivalent language (i. e. only on the presupposition that every 
sentence of the language bears one or other of two truth values); 
(2) the ideal of analyticity as necessary truth is classical and 
presuppositional because it holds only by restricting the domain of 
the definition of analyticity to the fully determinate sub-set of 
the sentences of the language. 
This second way, in turn, needs explaining, perhaps. There are 
two ways of ensuring that the domain of the definition of 
analyticity is fully determinate: (a) by abandoning the concept of 
(non-trivial) presupposition altogether, (b) by PRESUPPOSING that 
the set of presuppositions of the sentences of the language is 
satisfied (ie. by presupposing that all presuppositions are true! ). 
Wilson, Kempson and others choose the former approach. In the 
systems they envisage it is actually the case that every sentence 
bears one of two truth values and a restriction to the subset of 
determinate sentences is set-theoretically vacuous becauser in such 
systems, that subset is not proper, it is the Whole language. These 
systems are specifically designed to countenance what would 
otherwise be "presupposition-failure": this is what makes them (i) 
non-presuppositional and (ii) fully (and bivalently) determinate. 
But, and this is the point, we have seen that in such fully 
determinate non-presuppositional systems an analytic sentence is NOT 
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a necessary truth. 
As mentioned, the other way of ensuring that the domain of the 
definition of analyicity is fully determinate is by presupposing 
that no presupposition of the sentences of the language is false 
(this indeed may be what "innocence with respect to presupposition 
failure" amounts to). Since presupposition failure leads toless, 
than full determinacy,, the presupposition of the satisfaction of the 
presupposition set IS the presupposition of full determinacy. When 
I say that the ideal of analyticity as necessary truth PRESUPPOSES 
full bivalent determinacy, I mean that a definition of analyticity 
that entails that an analytic sentence is necessarily true is 
achieved, not (as we have seen) by getting rid of presuppositions,, 
but by presupposing them: then cases of presupposition failure will 
LIE BEYOND the domain within which analyticity is defined. In other 
words, a language in which it is possible to place a non-vacuous 
restriction on the domain of the definition of analyticity, in such 
a way as to yield the result that an analytic sentence is a 
necessary truth, must be a language in which the subset of 
determinate sentences is a logically proper subset. But this means 
that it must'be a language in which there in fact ARE indeterminate 
(unvalued) sentences. This is what a genuinely presuppositional 
logic would pi; ovide for in the form of a two valued logic with gaps. 
4. Classical logic, semantic closure, and logical. gaps. 
In the preceding sections I have appealed to the concept of a 
classically bivalent logic, and will again in this and the next. At 
some point,, then,, a review of relevant features of classical logic 
is called for. This section begins with such a review. 
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I take it as uncontroversial that CL displays at least the 
properties enumerated below as (l)-(7). I shall not discuss the 
particular significance of any one property as I present it but will 
allow it to emerge in the discussion of this and the next two 
chapters. 
(1) There is a set of precisely two TRUTU VALUES#, interdef in- 
able in terms of the operator defined in (2): [truel false}. 
(2) There. is precisely one unary function from one truth value 
to the otherf NBGATICN: 
I 
TF 
FT 
(3) There is a Truth predicate IT' such that [TA] if and only 
if [A]. I shall characterise this as an "equivalence" truth 
predicate and sometimes call it "Tarskian". (Concomitantly#, a 
falsity predicate IF' may be defined in terms of the truth of 
the negation, such that [FA] if and only if [-A]. ) 
(4) There is a set {&, V, >, =} of truth-functional binary 
connectives, interdefinable in terms of 1-1: 
(a) (Conjunction), such that 
ky & (p ... P)l =true iff forallp 1, < i, <n, Lr[p] 1n1 
true, and u, [&(p ... p )] = false iff for some pr 
1<i<, n, ý, r [p. ]= fal se. i. e 
1 
&TF 
TTF 
FFF 
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(b) IV' (Disjunction) such that 
t3-[V(p 
1 ... 
p )] = true iff for some p 1,, < i<n, u-[p 
true, and v-[V(p p )] = false iff for all pr14in 
U-[p. false. i. e. 
V! TF 
TTT 
FTF 
(C) 1>1 (Material Implication) sw 
w[p > q] = true iff týjp] - 
L>-[p > q] = false iff LT[p] 
i. e. 
>T 
TT 
TT 
-h that 
false or k--[q] true,, and 
true and u, [q] false. 
F 
F 
T 
(d) 'El (Material Equivalence) such that 
"-[p": 3 q] = true iff v[p] = v-[q] = true or Lr[p] = Lr[q] 
false, and Lr[p -= q] = false iff ur[p] = true (false) and - 
Lr[q] = false (true). i. e. 
TF 
TT -F 
FFT 
(5) In virtue of the interdefinability of the connectives, the 
following logical equivalences are among the logical truths of 
the system: 
In terms of W In terms of IV' In terms of 
p&q -(-p v -q) (p > -q) 
IVI -(-p &pVq (-P) >q 
1>1 -(p & -q) (-p) Vqp>q 
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(6) There is, in addition, a set of interdefinable logical 
truths truth-functiona/lly derivable by the operations defined 
in (4), including eg. 
Ip V -pIr -1p & -PI 
(7) As is well-known, material implication constitutes 
something of a problem for natural language semantics both as 
regards whether it can be taken as giving the semantics of NL 
(if-the ) conditionals and whether it can be taken to 
reconstruct the 'relevant' relation of NL semantic entailment. 
In respect of this latter issue,, whether or not a natural' 
language semantics that is supposed to be based on CL actually 
includes material implication (and I do not actually see that 
we can. pick and choose in this matter, as though CL were a 
supermarket).. we must insist at least that in a CL based NL 
semantics certain relevant aspects of material implication be 
preserved. This is achieved by insisting that an NL semantics 
based on CL define a relation of STRONG ENTAILMENT (1>1) such 
that 
A strongly entails B iff v[B] = true wherever LYIA] 
true, and tyfA] = false wherever LT[B] false. 
This has the consequence that the classical inferences of modus 
ponens and modus tollens are valid inferences in a CL based NL 
semantics. 
I have made several more or less metaphori: cal (and overlapping) 
claims about a presuppositional logic: that it should display a 
particular type of 'semantic closure', evincing "innocence with 
respect to presupposition failure" i. e. that it does not and cannot 
countenance the possibility of a presupposition being false. I 
shall suggest that these requirements recommend standard classical 
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logic itself as the very model of what a genuinely presuppositional, 
system should look liker that there are quite strict limits beyond 
which no genuinely presuppositional system can deviate from the 
model provided by CL without contradiction. 
We can dispel any air of paradox these claims may have by 
reference to Herzberger's concept of semantic closure. The 
remainder of the section develops a general preliminary criterion 
for a two-valued logic with truthvalueless truth gaps in terms of 
the semantic closure exhibited by this CL system. The discussion 
continues in the next section by showing the connection between 
semantic closure and my notion of "innocence". I demonstrate that 
a genuinely presuppositional system will, by def inition, evince 
"innocence with respect to presupposition failure". 
The concept of semantic closure is invoked by Herzberger and 
van Fraassen 'in the context of a discussion of the Liar Paradox (in 
Martin (ed) 1970). "The guiding idea is that of a language capable 
of reflecting the principles and details of its own semantic 
structure" (Herzberger 1970: 26). Herzberger alludes to three 
degrees of semantic closure, which mark "increasipg capacity in this 
regard". Degree of semantic closure, then, is in inverse proportion 
to expressive capacity. The first degree of semantic closure (which 
Herzberger calls "atomic closure") is marked by the inclusion of a 
Tarskian Truth predicate (Herzberger ibid). Under this degree of 
closure "given truth,, falsity can be defined as the truth of the 
negation" (ibid). Herzberger observes that Tarskils truth predicate 
"presumed deiinability of all other semantic concepts in terms of 
truth, a reasonable presumption in bivalent frameworks" (27). 
Classical logic as described above, then, exhibits this first degree 
of semantic closure (cf. esp the (equivalence) truth predicate 
defined in (3) . the unique negation of (2),, the bivalence of (1) - 
95 
all of which imply each other. ) 
Now, were (counterf actually) the system described in M-M 
above to give rise to formulae having a third logical statusr the 
system would, rather clearly,, be "innocent" of such cases. By this 
I mean that nothing in the system is expres. sed, and no property 
defined, in terms of any logical status other than truth (and 
falsity - the truth of its unique negation). Clearlyr and uncontro- 
versiallyr this system does not countenance a third logical status. 
Such a status lies BEYONDr (XJTSIDE this system. The system is 
SEMANTICALLY CLOSED with respect to such cases. 
If the third logical status exists (and it does, independently 
of the concept of presupposition; cf. my earlier reference to London 
buses and orange blossom), that logical status is NOT a truth value 
in terms of THIS system. This again is uncontroversial. on this 
basis, then, I am suggesting thati, were this very system ((l)-(7)) 
to give rise to sentences having the third logical status,, it would,. 
very precisely,, be a two-valued logic with logical gaps. 
Now of course this very system does NOT give rise to such cases 
- and no system that does can actually be identical to it; 
nevertheless the system provides one very general necessary 
condition to be met by one that does give rise to them. It seems 
clear in general terms that the formulation of a specifically two- 
valued system with truthvalueless logical gaps must consist in the 
incorporation of a relation of presupposition WITHIN THIS VERY 
SYSTEM. By this I mean that the development of a specifically 
gapped system requires a definition of presupposition that is 
consistent with, that does not override or interfere with, the 
independently established general character of that systemr a 
definition that,. in itself, exhibits the pre-established degree of 
semantic closure of the system as it stands. Clearly, it is not 
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enough, in the attempt to develop a two-valued gapped system, to 
attempt to retain the established features of the system as 
described in W-M above while adding a definition of presupposi- 
tion that is inconsistent with the general character of those 
features. (The degree of semantic closure exhibited by a system is 
the degree of semantic closure exhibited by its 'least closed' 
semantic property. ) This observation may seem obvious but it 
provides one of the bases of the ensuing critique of 
supervaluations. It also has the merit of pointing up the 
centrality of the presupposition-definition itself in discussion of 
the general character of presuppositional languages. 
I shall take it that this discussion establishes in general 
terms a preliminary criterion for a two-val. Ued logic with gaps. 
When I say 'general' and 'preliminary', I mean that it establishes 
specific criteria in principle, showing us. where to look for 
specific criteriar perhaps even establishing a criterion for 
criteriality with respect to the distinction that is our concern. 
5. Semantic ciosurer innocencer and the nature of presupposition. 
Now I show that a specifically PRESUPPOSIT10NAL system must exhibit 
the degree of semantic closure exhibited by the CL system described 
above. in the light of the preceding section, this will have the 
effect of showing that a presuppositional system must have exactly 
the same number of truth-values as the classical system outlined in 
W-(7) of the last section (namely two) and that thereforq if it 
is to give rise to formulae having a third logical status, that 
status is to be construed, not as a truth-valuer but as a logical 
gap; that a presuppositional system will, by definition,, be a system 
that is "innocent with respect to presupposition-f ail ure" (since 
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such failure characteristically leads to the- third logical status) 
and as such cannot countenance the possibility of presupposition 
failure without contradiction. 
This can be shown by considering a language that does NOT 
exhibit the first degree of semantic closure. Herzberger (1970: 27) 
observes 
"the second degree of, semantic closure is marked by the 
emerglance of two negation-like connectives,, commonly known as 
choice- and exclusion-negýtion, which I prefer to have known as 
negation and complementation respectively:.. 
(8) Negation (9) Complementation 
p -P p -1 p 
TFTF 
FTFT 
333T 
The former allows falsity to be defined in terms of truth and 
the latter allows both non-truth and indeterminacy. to be 
defined in terms of truth as well.... Nega. tion without 
complementation shields falsity and indeterminacy from one 
anotherp purchasing consistency on a note of expressive incompleteness" (Herzberger ibid. ) 
A brief illustration of the increased expressive capacity of a 
system exhibiting the second degree of semantic closure is provided 
by reference to the Liar Paradox, exemplified in (10): 
(10) This sentence [(10)] is not true. 
As Herzberger observes (1970: 27) , under the f irst degree of closure 
(that displayed by the system outlined above) the logical status of 
(10) resists [non-, contadictory] formulation. Under such semantic 
closure, 'not-true' = 'false', with the result that if (10) is true 
then it is false, and if it is false then it is true. The paradox 
arises on the presumption (the only presumption that is logically 
possible under this first degree of semantic closure) that every 
sentence of the system is either true or false. 
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Under the second degree of closurer howeverr the non-truth of 
(10) is formulable. This is because a language that includes 
complementation admits and countenances logical statuses other than 
truth and falsity and would assign sentence (10) just such a status. 
Since a sentence having the third logical status is not truer it is 
(by complementation) formulable (and true) that (10) is not true. * 
Nowr returning to our theme, if (a) presupposition failure 
characteristically leads to the presupposing sentence having the 
third logical status, and if (b) a language exhibiting the second 
degree of semantic closure includes the complementation operator,, 
and if (c) the complementation operator affords an expressive 
capacity in respect of the third logical status (taking 3 into 
truth): then (d) a language exhibiting the second degree of semantic 
closure countenances the possibility of presupposition failure. 
That (d) is a contradiction has, in fact,, already been shown in 
Chapter 11.31, where we concentrated on the methodological aspects of 
the matter. There it was shown that an enrichment of the 
expressive capacity of a language by the addition of a negation 
operatorr one that admits presuppositions within its scope (i. e. a 
*Having mentioned the paradox, we should point out the relevance to 
the present discussion of the dilemma its presents. Within the 
language of. (10) (call this V) r (10) is paraýoxical. This would seem to commit us to a choice. We may soldier on with an 
inconsistent logjc of L or, to avoid an inconsistent logic of Lr we 
may eliminate the paradox in L. This may be satisfactory from a 
formal point of view (treating L as a pyrely formal language). But if L is takeýn to be a natural languaqe imposing certain empirical 
constraints in terms of descriptýve adecluacy, this will not do. For 
L is a language in which (10) is paradoxical. - The solution that 
consists in eliminating the paradox, then, cannot be a solution, for 
the language in which (10) is not paradoxical is not L. What we 
reguire is that the logic of L be such as to allow us to formulate 
(without contradiction) the semantic fact that the logical status of 
(10) in L resists non-contradictory formulation (is paradoxical) in 
L. According. to Van Fraassen (1970b: 59). Kearns (1970) attempts to 
resolve the problem where it is encountered, i. e. in L. But, as 
Kearns concedes (58) r he can be seen as eliminating the paradox in L. Our problem is isomorphic with this. 
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"presupposition-cancelling negation") leads- to a contradictory 
concept of presuppositional language. If a presuppositional 
language is one in which there is no negation expressive of 
presupposition failure, it cannot include a complementation 
operator, for that operator is a function from the logical status 
induced by presupposition-f ail ure to truth; hence complementation 
affords an expressive capacity in respect of presupposi tion-f ail ure. 
We derive a character i sati on of presuppositional language as in 
(11) :.. 
A presuppositional language is such thatr in it, there is 
no negation. of S expressive of presupposition-failure in S 
but there is a negation of S that is expressive of such 
failure in S. 
A presuppositional language is precisely one in which there is no 
negation of a sentence S in terms of which the falsity of a 
presupposition of S as such can be expressed. This proposition is 
clearly entailed by the standard logical definition of 
presupposition, though that definition goes beyond that. * 
Inclusion. of complementation (external, wide-scoper or radicalr 
negation) within a (putatively presuppositional) language is only 
the most obvious illustration of the contradiction inherent in the 
idea of countenancing the possibility of presupposition failure as 
such (lack of 'innocence with respect to p-failurel). For exampler 
it seems clear,, if only from the fact that this extra negation is 
itself definable in terms of a truth predicate distinct from the 
Tarski predicate defined in (3) above, namely (12), 
In fact, what the SLDP more precisel entails is this: A 
pýesuppositional language is one which 
=ibits 
that degree of 
semantic closure at which the non-truth of certain sentences (those 
suffering from presupposition failure) is not expressible. This is 
slightly dif f erent f rom the f ormulation in the textr but in a way 
that cannot be elucidated properly until Part Three. 
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p Tlp ("TL-prime") - 
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that a language that includes (12) rather than or in addition to (3) 
exhibits semantic closure only of the second degree and as such is 
not a candidate for being a genuine and noncontradictory 
presuppositional language. This particular example is of relevance 
in the next section, but further (and perhaps less obvious) examples 
will be adduced in due course. 
In case this demonstration that a presuppositional language 
cannot countenance the possibility of presupposition failure without 
contradiction (equivalently: must be a two-valued logic with gaps 
or, again equivalently,, exhibit the same degree of semantic closure 
as classical bivalent logic) smacks of sophistry, let me place the 
result in a broader intuitive context by talking briefly of speakers 
and the ACr of presupposing. 
Not to countenance the possibility that a given proposition may 
be false, while being committed to the truth of that propositionr is 
precisely what it is to PRESUPPOSE a proposition. Ifr as I am 
suggesting, to presuppose P is to be committed to P while not 
countenancing the possibility of P's being false, it is a very 
n atural (and, significant) result that all necessary truths should be 
presupposed: it is precisely the necessary truths of a language to 
which its speaker s/com m itted and whose possible falsity cannot be 
countenanced (in the language) without contradiction. They are not 
subjec 
"t 
to debate in language; in Chomsky's wordst they define "the 
limits to debate". 
Trivial presuppositions apartf though, it is important, in 
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understanding this concept of not countenanci-ng the possibility of 
the falsity'of a proposition, to bear in mind that it is distinct 
from the concept of being committed to the truth of a proposition. 
The assertion of P entails commitment to the truth of P. But the 
assertion of P does countenance the possibility of the falsity of P. 
It is precisely this indeed that motivates the-assertion of P (makes 
P worth asserting). In other words, the assertion of P countenances 
the possibility of the counterassertion,, -P. The'assertion of P and 
the presupposition of P both effect commitment to the truth of P; 
but assertion and presupposition are distinguished in the fact that 
the former, but not the latterr countenances the possibility of P's 
being false. 
If to ASSERT P is to be committed to P while COUNTENANClNG the 
possibility of its falsity,, and if to PRESUPPOSE P is to be 
committed to P while NOT COUNTENANCING the possibility of its 
falsity, it follows that it is impossible simultaneously (by means 
of one and the same sentence) both to assert and presuppose P. 'Ibis 
complementation of (logical) assertion and presupposition is a well- 
recognised necessary feature of consistent presuppositional systems 
(cf. Keenan and Hull (1973: 450, "Any consequence of a sentence is 
either an assertion or a presupposition but never both"). It follows 
from this, incidentallyl that it is (logically) impossible to make a 
genuine assertion in the act of asserting a logically necessary 
truth. Keenan 1973 in fact has shownr in the light of the fact that 
necessary truths presuppose themselvesr that such putative 
assertions in fact assert nothing beyond what they presuppose. 
(This is not of course to deny that some pragmatic utility may 
attach to such acts of assertion, a matter touched on by Grice 
1975. )* 
*For Grice, the pFagmatic utility lies in the conversational 
implicature that arises from the flouting of the Maxim '13e [contled] 
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In making the above observations, incidentally, I must 
emphasise that I am not suggesting that a proposition P which is 
presupposed by some sentence Qr cannot be denied in the language at 
all. Clearly it can: the denial of P is -P, and -P is a sentence of 
the language. But the assertion of -P does. not constitute the 
denial of a PRESUPPOSITION P as suchr q= presupposition: to regard 
it as such would necessitate the contradiction that P was a 
presupposition of itsown denial (-P). Furthermore, the assertion of 
-P countenances the falsity of P because,, much more strongly, it 
effects commitment to -P. But again, just because P may be 
presupposed by some other sentence Qr this does not mean that the 
assertion of -P countenances the falsity of a presupposition as 
sucl-4 Again, this would necessitate viewing -P as presupposing its 
own denial (P). (Since presupposition is a RELATION, the expressive 
constraint on a presuppositional& RELATIVE. ) L 
It follows, then, that the assertion of P and the denial of P 
(the counterassertion, -P) r since they both countenance the falsity 
of both P and -P are both incompatible with the presupposition of Pj, 
and both incompatible with the presupposition of -P. In short, you 
can neither assert nor deny what is presupposed by either the 
assertion or its denial. (This is what I mean in saying that you 
can't assert or deny a presupposition AS SUCH. ) This all-square 
picture is connected with the interrelated incompatibility with a 
informative" since the assertion of a necessary truth is logically 
un i nf or m ativ e. There is a problem here, for the concept of 
information that is appealed to in the Maxim is not the LOGICAL (in 
the sense of alethic) concept of information, but is in itself an 
epistemic and pragmatic concept; it could not strictly be appealed 
to as a means of characterising the utterance of necessary truth as 
a flouting. of conversational principles. It appears to me that the 
presuppositional analysis of the assertion of necessary truths 
provides a pre-condition for the implicaturial explanation of their 
pragmatic utility, since the presuppositional analysis provides us 
with independent logical grounds for regarding such assertions as 
constituting a transgression in the first place. 
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presuppDsitional system of both the extended. negation (-I) and the 
non-Tarskian truth predicate TO in terms of which it is defined. A 
presuppositional language that includes T' and complementation, is 
precisely a language in which it is possible to assert/deny a 
proposition while presupposing it. Furthermore, I take it that these 
remarks rather precisely capture the intuition that, in order to 
bring a presupposition P of some sentence Q into. question "you must 
do it explicitly" (Kiparský and Kiparsk 1971: 351), by issuing the 
separate explicit denial of P itself , namely -P; it cannot 
semantically be done by means of -Q. The matter is dealt with in 
some detail in Part Three: Ch X. 
in conclusion., and as already noted (Ch. 2.3) . in order to 
demonstrate that a given putatively presuppositional system actually 
is presuppositional in the sense of evincing innocence with respect 
to P-failure by exhibiting the first degree of semantic closure, it 
is not suf f icent simply to ref rain f rom def ining a negation that 
countenances P-failure or from defining a truth predicate in terms 
of which such a negation might be defined. Two further conditions 
must be satisfied: (i) The absence of such a truth predicate and 
negation must be compatible with, and indeed implied byr the rest of 
the system; (ii) An alternative, independently motivatedr explicitr 
and non-semantic description of so-called "presupposition- 
cancellation" needs to adduced to demonstrate that such a negation 
(and a semantic ambiguity of NL negation) is not anyway required. 
In this chapter, (1) 1 have attempted to articulate my 
pref ormal understanding of the distinction between trivalent and 
gapped bivalent logic; (2)1 have argued that the distinction should 
be seen as logically reconstructable in terms of criteria deriving 
from a consideration of the properties of classical bivalent logic 
itself. Finally, and more strongly, (3) 1 have argued that we do 
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not have a choice between gapped presuppositional logic and 
trivalent presuppositional. logic. I have suggested that the latter 
concept is not only intuitively incoherent but logically 
contradictory. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLASSICAL VALIDITY AND TOE DISTINCTICIN. 
In this chapter I investigate a more specific implication of 
the general view that a classically bivalent logic provides the 
model to which a presuppositional logic, viewed as a necessarily 
two-valued gapped logic, must conform. In particular, we confront a 
conceptual complication having to do with the status of classical 
validity as a criterion of the gapped interpretation of such a 
logic. 1 compare the positions of Van Fraassen and Seuren 1984 on. 
the general question in section 1. This will lead to a more 
detailed consideration both of Seuren's system (S-84) and of Van 
Fraassen's supervaluational system in later sections. 
As mentioned,, I regard the general conception of a 
presuppositional language outlined in the last chapter as deriving 
in part from Van Fraassen. The technique of supervaluationsr 
however, is criticised on the grounds that it fails properly to 
reconstruct that general conception. 
1. Classical validity and its criterial status. 
In the last chapter it was suggested that classical logic (CL) 
provided the best possible model for a two valued logic with gaps 
and, thereforer for a presuppositional logic. This led me to 
enumerate some relevant properties of CL.,, v Clearly, in the search 
for criteria for the gapped conception of a presuppositional logic 
(PL),, not all of these properties have the same status. Most 
106 
obviously, since the property mentioned under (1) - just two truth 
values - is the property for which we require criteria, it cannot 
itself be criterial. 
Among the CL properties, a set of logical tautologies was 
alluded to as property (6). We should expect that a system Of 
presuppositional logic (PL) - or any system possessing the other 
six properties would automatically possess this property, retaining 
as valid the CL-valid formulae. In other words, we should expect 
that, in a specifically GAPPED PLI the CL-valid formulae are PL- 
valid. We shall see that this observation is radically equivocal. 
It might appear that the expectation is, entirely consistent 
with the basis on which Van Fraassen develops the technique of 
supervaluations. He takes it that the enterprise of developing a 
specifically two-valued logic with gaps (rather than a trivalent 
logic) CONSISTS IN the development of a system which, whilst giving 
rise to formulae with the third logical statusf I nevertheless retains 
as valid all the CL-valid formulae. Van Fraa: ssen is also concerned 
that the classical orthodox connectives be retained, but this is (or 
should be) anyway implied by the adoption of classical validity as 
the criterion of a gapped logic. More on this in due course. But 
there is a general point here. The claim that retention of the 
orthodox connectives is anyway implied by Van Fraassen's focus on 
validity as THE relevant property in this context might suggest that 
such a focussing is merely Van Fraassen's way of rationalising 
(generalising over) the several criteria made available by the 
adoption of. CL as providing a model for PL. It will become 
apparent in what follows however that, even if such rationalisation 
is possible,. this is not van Fraassen's intention. 
Now compare Van Fraassen's adoption of CL-validity as THE 
criterion of the gapped interpretation with the rather different 
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assumption exhibited by the following remark of Seuren (1984: 350): 
"[These tables are strictly bivalent, since U is nothing but the 
absence of a truth value. ] If one wishes to keep the whole of 
classical logic intactr it suffices to stipulate that the logic 
is limited to valued sentences only so that unvalued sentences 
play no part in the logic. " 
As will be apparent from my earlier discussion of analyticity, this 
line of thought seems eminently coherent and I am sympathetic to it. 
As indicated there, I do not regard Seuren's limiting stipulation 
(if it is required at all) as being at all outlandish; it is indeed 
a perfectly classical stipulationr for CL never has been concerned 
with anything other than what can be and is assigned a truth value. 
Neverthdlessr the positions of Van Fraassen and Seuren on the 
criterial status of CL-validity f or a gapped logic are diametrically 
opposed. This is because Seuren's position 'depends upon giving 
criteria for the distinction between a trivalent logic and one with 
(truthvalueless) gaps INDEPENDENTLY OF AND PRIOR TO the question of 
whether the classically valid sentences are PL-valid. In sharp 
contrast, for Van Fraassen,, whether the CL-valid sentences are PL- 
valid IS the criterion. We may schematise the two positions as 
follows: 
Van Fraassen: PL retains CL-validity > PL = 2V +G 
Seuren 1984: PL = 2V +G> PL retains CL-validity 
Should A appear that 1 am over-emphasising the polarisation of 
the two positions, consider that their disparity entails a disparity 
on the very question of what it is to retain CL-validity in PL. Van 
Fraassen's position of taking validity as the criterion commits him 
to admitting as (logically) true EVERY SlNGLE SENTENCE that would be 
logically true in a non-presuppositional. classical logic, whether or 
not it would otherwise be assigned the third logical status in PL. 
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Only then is his criterion satisfied. I shall call this the 
INCLUSIVE C)C)N= OF CL-VALIDITY IN PL, and refer to the 'inclusive 
retention of CL-validityl in connection with it. The position 
expressed in the above quote from Seuren, on the other hand, commits 
its proponent to a different idea of what it is to retain CL- 
validity. On this interpretation,, CL-validity isr as we have seen., ' 
maintained by defining validity only on the fully-determinate SUB- 
domain of sentences, with unvalued sentences excluded. Call this 
the EXCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF CL-VALIDITY IN PL, These disparities 
represent a fundamental conflict and must be resolved. This will 
involve deci. ding which of the two concepts - the inclusive or the 
exclusive - is desirable, possible, and/or most faithful to 
classical logic. This is the issue addressed in this chapter. 
Departing briefly from the main theme, when we ask (as we must) 
what independent, prior criterion for the gapped interpretation of a 
P-logic is envisaged by Seuren,, further fundamental disagreement 
becomes apparent. This involves the connectives (the matter was 
touched on in passing in Ch. III. l. - see the quotation from Seuren 
there). Commenting on Van Fraassen's system of connectives - of 
which I offer just conjunction here, as (1), 
(1) 
TTF3 
FFFF 
33F3- 
Seuren 1984: 347 claims that such a conjunction is "really three- 
valued" since the third logical status (which Seuren confusingly 
calls a truth gap! ) is not "infectious". What Seuren means by 
this is that 131 in a conjunct is not always inherited by the whole 
conjunction. For Seuren, the only conjunction in which 131 is 
legitimately to be seen as counting as a genuine (truthvalueless) 
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gap is that in (2) 
(2) & 
T 
F 
3 
TF3 
TF3 
FF3 
333 
- since there 131 in a conjunct 1S "infectious", is invariably 
inherited by the conjunction. 
-- No rationale, explanation, or further discussion, of this 
implied ("infection") criterion is offered. I can only surmise that 
its rationale is Fregean - as discussed in Chapter 1.3 above. Since 
that rationale was there shown to be problematic,, I do not accept it 
as adequater nor take that criterion to be valid. 'In the next 
section we shall anyway see en passant that,, applied to Seuren's own 
system (which I label S-84), this "infection" criterion is without 
content for all practical purposes. The-point is academict 
however,, since in the chapters that follow some rather strong 
considerations, incompatible with Seuren's infection criterion, will 
be brought to bear in support of Van Frassen's contention that only 
(1), not (2),, can be construed as the proper extrapolation of 
classical conjunction and hence that only (1) is compatible with the 
gapped interpretation of a P-logic. 
Let us now return to our theme. Two positions on the criterial 
status of CL-validity in PL have been presented,, and both at least 
appear coherent and plausible. They arer however, incompatible. 
The plausibility of at least one of them must týeref ore be merely 
apparent. The rest of this chapter (though the next is also 
relevant) is devoted to showing that it is Van Fraassen's position 
that is untenable and in fact self-defeating, that CL-validity 
itself cannot, either in principle or practice, be taken as 
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criterial of the gapped interpretation of a PL system. 
It might appear that, in rejecting Van Fraassen's position on 
the issue, 1 am working on assumptions shared by Seuren 1984. This 
is not the case. In fact Seuren's brief discussion of the 
EXCLUSIVE concept of validity that is implied by NOT taking validity 
as criterial is peripheral to his aims and interests. We have 
already noted that Seuren would seem to be unique in that, while 
acknowledging a distinction between gapped and multivalent systems,, 
he advocates a system with at least TUREE VALUES as being the most 
appropriate in the logical treatment of presupposition. He duly 
defines a system (here labelled "S-84") which he explicitly presents 
as being three valued (and, by his and my criterion of univocality 
vs. ambiguity of negation,, it is indeed incompatible with a gapped 
interpretation). 
Now Seuren 1984: 362 claims of this trivalent system that it 
"has the property of deviating minimally from classical 
bivalent logic.... Any formula expressed-in terms of ithis 
system) which is classically valid is valid in this logic'. 
This not only indicates that (notwithstanding the remarks quoted 
earlier) Seuren is as interested as Van Fraassen in the INCLUSIVE 
retention of CL validity, but also serves to explain why Seuren 
should implicitly reject Van Frassen's adoption of CL-validity in 
PL as the criterion of a gapped logic. Seuren's claim clearly 
entails that the INCLUSIVE retention of CL validity is quite 
compatible with trivalence. Furthermore,, 1 believe it is possible 
to show that Seuren is correct in this (but on grounds that he would 
either reject or find unwelcome). And if Seuren is correct in this, 
it follows (contra Van Fraassen) that retention of - CL-validity in PL 
cannot be used as a criterion of the gapped interpretation of that 
PL. In fact, I will go further and argue that,, by the general 
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criterion for a gapped logic.. the MCLUSIVE retention of CL-validity 
in a PL system should be regarded as not merely compatible with the 
trivalence of the system but actually indicative of it. 
To be more specific, I will show that INCLUSIVE retention of 
CL-validity in a EL system is in fact attainable only by departing 
quite radically from the model provided by CL in other respects - to 
an extent that is incompatible with construing the PL system as a 
two-valued system with (truthvalueless) gaps. To adopt CL-validity 
as the criterion of a gapped logic, then, is self-defeating. 
Related to this, I shall furthermore argue that whether or not the 
matter of validity is taken to have a bearing on the distinction 
between trivalent and gapped systems,, the attempt to engineer the 
INCLUSIVE retention of Cirvalidity in PL is self-defeating in the 
more general sense that what I have been calling the inclusive 
concept of CL-validity in PL is anyway far from being recognisable 
as a classical concept of validity, that such PL-validity bears only 
an apparent and spurious relation to classical validity. 
I am suggesting in short that Seuren's rejection of Van 
Fraassen's criterion (and therefore the enterprise of superval- 
uations) is right but for the wrong reasons: the inclusive 
retention of CL-validity in IPL is compatible (and in fact more than 
merely compatible) with trivalence because (pL-g& both authors) 
INCLUSIVE retention of CL-validity in PL does not in fact amount to 
a RETENTION of CL validity as suchr but gives ise to a "wonderf ul 
new" species, -of validity. We must look elsewhere in the CL system 
for the criteria of a gapped logic and (passively) allow CL 
validity, on the EXCLUSIVE basis explained above, to follow from the 
fact of the system's satisfying those independent criteria. That I 
do not regard this as second best should be clear from the 
discussion of analyticity in the last chapterr but it should become 
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clearer as we see what is involved in the INCLUS1VE concepts of 
validity countenanced by Seuren (section 3) and Van Fraassen 
(sections 4 and 5). 
2. Norr-classical features of the system S-84. 
Here we briefly examine Seuren's claim to have developed a 
MULT1VALENT system that "has the property of deviating minimally 
from classical bivalent logic". S-84 is presented (Seuren 
1984: 362) as follows (where as usual 1= true and 2= false): 
(3) & VB 
-1 
The claim that S-84 deviates minimally from classical logic is based 
on the contention (361) that which Seuren claims is the union 
of minimal (internal,, 1-1) and radical (external, 1=1) negation - 
represents "the classical bivalent negation". "Any formula 
expressed in terms of these three operators [ 
.1 
-1 Ij, W, and IV, of 
S-84] which is classically valid is valid in this system" (362). 
(The asterisks are my own and will become relevant in due course. ) 
First, consider the claim that as defined is "classical 
bivalent negation". By Seuren's own "infection" criterion of what 
constitutes a bivalent operator, 1-11 is NOT bivalent and hence not 
the negation of classical bivalent logic; under the third 
logical status is not "infectious" - i. e. when the third logical 
status is the argument of that function, it does not yield the third 
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logical status as value: maps 3 onto 1 (truth). By Seuren's 
"infection" criterion, the only negation that is a candidate for 
being the negation of classical bivalent logic is 1-1. (In this one 
respect,, incidentallyr Seuren's "infection" criterion for bivalence 
in an operator is consistent with the viewpoint that is being 
developed in the present work - see the comments of ChapterII. 3 
above on the ambiguity of NL negation. ) Furthermore, in connection 
with the ambiguity of natural language negationr it needs to be 
noted more generally that, since classical logic defines only one 
negation anyway,, the possibility of stipulating which of several 
negation operators is to be taken as relevant for the purposes of 
establishing CL-validity in a system might reasonably strike one as 
being, in itself, exoticly non-classical. 
Seuren needs to stipulate this, though. it is demonstrable 
that taking 1-1 as the relevant operator, little if any of CL is 
retained. For exampler the classically valid [-(P & -P) I would not 
be S-84-validr nor would [P & -P] be contradictory. And a host of 
other classically valid sentences. Furthermore, under 1-1, the 
connectives are not interdefinable, as they are in CL. * (in 
connection with the non-interdef inability (under 1-1) of the 
connectives, incidentally, note that the W of S-84 is "infectious" 
and hence bivalent and gapped,, but that IV' is not "infectious" and 
hence trivalent, assuming that we can take "infection" seriously in 
. 
quence that the de Morgan equivalences of *This would have the conse 
CL fail. In additionr since material implication standardly has 
equivalent definitions in terms of W Q-(P & -Q)I) and in terms of 'V` M-P) V Q1) when they are equivalent, and since material 
equivalence is in turn standardly defined in terms of material implication 
. 
([(P>Q) & (Q>P)])r a pervasive duality would result from 
the non-interdef inability (under ") of W and IV', with two 
material implications and two material equivalences. On neither of 
the implications would such classicall valid formulae as [P > PVQ1 
or [P&Q > PVQ1 be valid. I do not 
Semonsttate 
this here since 
taking 1-1 as the relevant negation for deciding such matters has 
anyway been ruled out by Seuren's stipulation. 
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assessing whether S-84 as a system is gapped -or multivalant, which 
these results suggest is inadvisable). 
If we now abide by the stipulation that classical validity and 
the general character of S-84 be assessed in terms of 1-11, it is 
true that the system acquires a more orthodox look to it. Int- 
erestingly, W and IV' do turn out to be inte'rdefinable when 1-11 
is used; so the de Morgan equivalences are logical truths of S-84 as 
they are in CL. There isr though, a problem with the concept of 
equivalence itself, as we shall see immediately. 
While S-84( -1) is more orthodox in appearance, this is I 
suggest more a matter of appearance than reality. Consider first 
that,, if 'T is supposed to be the negation of classical bivalent 
logic, we should expect to find that 
(4)11A A 
since (4) is a logical truth of CL. But, as inspection of the truth 
table for in (3) directly shows, (4) is not a logical truth of 
S-84: 
(5)11A A 
tft 
ftf 
ft3 
That is,, A is not false when 1 -1 A is false and 1 -1 A is not 3 when A 
is 3. Hence A and-j-JA are not equivalent. In saying this, I am 
making a (classical) assumption about equivalence that is entirely 
reasonable given Seuren's claim that S-84 is specifically a 
multivalent system, one in which 3 is to be taken as a truth value 
distinct from true and false, and is furthermore a system that 
"deviates minimally from classical logic". On this assumptioni, I 
take (6) to be the only possible definition of material equivalence 
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that is consistent with, and coherent in terms off classical logic. 
Its intuitive content is spelt out in (7). 
--4 t f 3 
t t f f 
f f t 
3 f f 
(7) Two formulae are materially equivalent if and 
only if they have the same truth value (however 
many truth values there may be). 
This is the meaning Of the equivalence defined in the review of CL 
the last Chapter. (See Van Fraassen's 1970b: 64-5 reply to 
Herzberger 1970 in this connection. ) (6) then is the equivalence I 
have appealed to in showing that double negation 
i ntroduction/el im i nation is not an S-84 sanctioned inference (Notice 
that (6) by Seuren's "infection" criterion is strictly trivalent. ) 
Seuren does not provide the S-84 definition of equivalence. 
When we come to reconstruct the material equivalence that actually 
follows from (3)r however,, we find something rather different from 
(6). On the CL assumption that [A I-E B] is to be defined in terms of 
material implication ([(A>B) & (B>A)]), we first define material 
implication in terms of 1-1 (A &-IB)l (or, equivalently in terms of 
[n A) V B]). . 
This yields (8) 
(8) f 3 
t t f f 
f t t t 
3 t t t 
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(on which, more in due course). 
gives (9) 
(9) " t £ 3 
" t T f £ 
f f T T 
3 £ T T 
Then [(A>B) & (B>A)] inturn 
The equivalence defined in (9), incidentallyr is odd: while it is 
throughgoingly trivalent by Seuren's "infection" criterion, this is 
contradicted by the fact that it actually states that 3 is non- 
distinct from (equivalent to) falsity. Reconsidering (5) above in 
the light of (9), we derive (10) 
(10) -1 'J A -E A 
tft"Tt 
ftfTf 
T f tT 
03 
namely, the result that, contrary to expectations (i. e. 
notwithstanding that when tr[A]=3, Lr[IIA]=F)j, [I]A-=A] isafter 
all a logical truth of S-84r just as it is in CL! 
What should we make of this result? It is, I suggestr 
misleading. I suggest thatr while it is true that (4) is a logical 
truth of both CL and S-84, this cannot be seen as implying that S-84 
deviates minimally from CL: the formula [A BI simply does not 
mean the same thing in the two systems. Seuren's "material 
equivalence" (9) does not state what orthodox classical material 
equivalence states, picked out as (7) above. Furthermore,, it is not 
clear what it does state and hence it is not clear whether or why we 
should want [11A = A] 
"a la S-84 as a logical truth. 
The same. general issue arises in connection with other logical 
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truths of S-84 (and the implication of S-84). -'All the following are 
valid in S-84 (I omit the proofs), as "they" are in CL. 
(11) A>AVB 
(12) A&B> AV B 
(13) ((A > B) &I B) > -I A 
(14) -1 (A > B) '-: ý (I B>I A) 
But, again, it is a troublesome question as to what bearing this has 
on the claim that S-84 'Tias the property of deviating minimally from 
classical bivalent logic", retaining all the classically valid 
formulae. For example, in CL [A>B] is held to be false if and only 
if the falsity of A is NOT inf errable from the falsity of B. Now 
this is exactly what appears to be expressed in (14). Yet 
inspection of the truth tables in (3) reveals that,, for example, P 
is not always false when [P v Q] is false: it may be 3. (1 have 
asterisked the relevant cases in (3). ) Thus the falsity of P is NOT 
inferrable from the falsity of [P V Q]. Nevertheless, by the 
implication in (8) p (11) (which states that A implies [AV B]) is a 
-logical truth of S-841 Hencei, when we say that (11) (and (14) etc) 
is S-84-valid, this MEANS something different from what it means to 
say that (11) (and (14) etc) is CL-valid. 
As a further illustration of the general point, consider (15): 
A&A 
tFft 
fFtf 
3 
03 
t3 
(15) shows that, in S-84, the value of [A CIA] is not always false,, 
but can be 3. Since 3 is a third truth value in this system, that 
formula does not express a contradiction in S-84. In this respect, 
then, S-84 is straightforwardly non-classical and falsifies Seuren's 
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general claim. But in this connection S-84 has a more relevant and 
more surprising property. Given that [A & -]A] is not an S-84 
contradiction, it is surprising to find that the S-84 NEGATION of 
that formula, turns out to be a logical truth of S-84 (as "it" is of 
CL) : 
(A & A) 
Ttfft 
Tfftf 
0T 
T, 33t3 
Now in CL the formula in (16) is used to express the Law of Non- 
Contradiction. In S-84, however, it cannot be so interpreted, 
since the formula it negates, (15), is NOT a contradiction! Thus, 
(16) in S-84 does not mean what we might think it means - and, 
indeed it is not clear, what it does mean, or why it should be valid. 
Speaking generally, we must surely insist that validity in a 
system can only be taken as having a bearing on the relation between 
that system and classical logic, if validity in the system is 
interpretable as CL-validity. We must insist,, furthermore, that it 
can only be taken as CL-validity if it is derived by the NORMAL 
application of the SAME operators that are to be found in CL itself. ' 
Not to insist on these points would be equivalent to allowing that 
someone who had sat on a plank beside a river and someone who had 
served as a. director at a financial institution-had done one and the 
same thing by virtue of the totally irrelevant fact that both could 
be described as having sat on the board at the bank. 
I have shown the basis on which one attempt to maintain 
classical validity on an inclusive basis must be seen to fail. * I 
I assume that Seuren 1984 gives an accurate foretaste of Seuren 
1985, which I did not get sight of in time to digest and consider in 
the present work. 
119 
am of the opinion that, generally, the engineering involved in the 
enterprise (however ingenious) renders it self-defeating, in the 
sense that it transmogrif ies what the enterprise seeks to achieve. 
In the next two sections we shall see how these general remarks 
apply,, in a slightly different way, to the technique of supervaluations. 
3. Supervaluations I: Excluded MiddLe and Bivalence. 
We have seen that Van Fraassen adduces classical validity as the 
criterion of a gapped logic (as against a trivalent logic) and it is 
on these grounds he recommends the technique of supervaluations. 
But we have seen that adoption of validity as the criterion entails 
the same (i. e. inclusive) concept of Cl validity in PL as that 
countenanced by Seuren in connection with S-84. in this and the 
next section we consider the problems that the idea presents in the 
supervaluational framework. 
Van Fraassen contends thatf in a supervaluational system, all 
the logical truths of classical logic are (inclusively) retained - 
but the Principle of Bivalence is abandoned. in particular, some 
discussion (van Fraassen 1966: section VIII) is devoted to a 
demonstration that the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) is retained 
notwithstanding the loss of the Principle of Bivalence (PB). This 
entails that LEM and PB are in f act distinct - and Van Fraassen is 
indeed at pains to show that they are. These interrelated 
contentions lie at the crux of the supervaluational enterprise; this 
section deals with the general issues and conceptual difficulties 
they give rise to and the next deals with the supervaluational 
mechanics of the matter. 
I am of the opinion that Van Fraassen succeeds in showing that 
LEM and PB are indeed distinct. The difficulty lies, not in thisi, 
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but in the fact that classical logic is not and, as I intend to 
show, cannot be such as to allow of a SEPARATELY FORMULATED 
Principle of Bivalencer a Principle of Bivalence expressible AS 
SUCH. (For convenience I shall sometimes ref er to a principle of 
bivalence expressed as such, by a formula distinct from that used to 
express LEM. - as a DISTINCTIVE Principle of Bivalence. ) The prima 
facie rationale of this view might be expressed as follows: CL 
cannot allow of a distinctive Principle of Bivalence precisely 
BECAUSE it is bivalent: expression of a Principle of Bivalence AS 
SUCH requires a degree of expressive capacity beyond that exhibited 
by a system that is semantically closed under bivalence. This 
contention that the PB is not expressible either directly or as such 
in any formula of a bivalent sysytem is what commands my agreement 
with Van Fraassen that the Principle of Bivalence is indeed NOT 
expressed by [P V -P], where [P V -P] is the standard expression of 
LEM and IS d (logically true) formula of the bivalent system CL,. and 
hence commands agreement that PB and LEM are indeed distinct. 
Instead, I wish to say that classical logic EVINCES the 
principle in BEING bivalent. And the classical Law of Excluded 
Middle itself can be used to demonstrate this. LEM evinces the PB 
so perspiciouslyr in fact, that it is often taken to expressr or ber 
the PB itself. But, as Van Fraassen 1966: 4931'arguesr LEM simply 
states that any CL f ormula of the f orm (P V -P] is a logical truth 
of the system. But in expressing this it evinces the Principle of 
Bivalence. For why should [P V -P] be a logical truth of CL? The 
simple answer is that,, given the definitions of the f unctors that 
are included in CL, [P V -P] comes out true f or all assignments of 
truth value to P. BUT: [P V -P] always comes out true only on the 
assumption that P is indeed always assigned a truth value and that 
the truth values assigned are drawn from the set Itrue, false}. 
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Since CL is semantically closed with respect to cases where this is 
NOT so, [P V -P] is a logical truth of CL. It is this sense that 
LEM evinces the Principle of Bivalence. It evinces it in depending 
on it for its (logical) truth. 
We may then ask whether a distinction between LEM and a 
DISTINCTIVE Principle of Bivalence can have any other consequence 
than to leave the former either false or without logical content. 
This requires us to ask: What formular distinct from [P V -Pjr would 
directly express PB? Van Fraassen argues that 'Either P is true or. 
not-P is true' is NOT Excluded Middle but Bivalence (1966: 495). Van 
Fraassen's distinctive Principle of Bivalencer then, is to be 
expressed by the formula [Tp V T-p] - see Van Fraassen 1969: 495. 
Excluded Middle Bivalence 
pv -P Tp V T-P 
The problem is this. This latter formula is only distinct from 
[P V -P] unde'r one condition, that p and Tp are not equivalent (Tp 
-: 
/ p). For if Tp and p are equivalent, f or any occurrence of Tp we 
may substitute p and likewise f or TIp and -p. * This would yield 
ITP V T-PI lp v -PI 
What truth predicate would then serve Van Fraassen's purpose of 
making a semantic distinction between the two formulae? No one is 
suggesting that the definition of the Truth predicate should be 
other than (2) when just truth and falsity are taken into account: 
(2) p TP 
TT 
FF 
See Kneale & Kneale 1961: 46-8 for a useful discussion. van 
Fraassen is in fact replying to the Kneale's here. Their discussion 
is particularly good on the error underlying Aristotle's attempt to 
apply nort-standard logic to statements of future contingency. 
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But in (2) p and Tp are equivalent. The only circumstance in which 
we may entertain the idea of the non-equivalence of p and Tpr then, 
is by taking explicit account of logical statuses other than truth 
and falsity. Two apparent possibilities present themselves: 
p TP (4) p TP 
T T T T 
F F F F 
3 3 3 F 
Since Van Fraassen seeks to maintain a semantic distinction between 
[p V -p] and [Tp V T-p] . only (4) serves the purpose. This is 
because whatever interpretation we give to the third logical status 
(be it a third truth value or a logical gap) Tp and p remain 
resolutely equivalent in (3). Under a TRIVALENT interpretation, 
there are just three circumstances in which [Tp E p] could be true 
and in (3) it is true in all those circumstances (see (31) below); 
under a TWO-VALUED GAP interpretation of (3), [Tp I- p] is again true 
in all (admissible) circumstances, for on this interpretation the 
third logical status is not an admissible statusy lying outside the 
domain within which the interpretation of the operator is definedy 
with the result that the interpretation of the operator remains 
unchanged from that which it has in (2) itself (see (311) below). 
Only in (4), then,, are p and Tp demonstrably not equivalent (see 
(41) below). 
p TP (3 '1) p TP p TP 
TTTTTTTTT 
FTFFTFFTF 
3T33333FF 
(4), then, is the Truth operator that Van Fraassen needs in 
order to express a Principle of Bivalence as such and separately 
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from LEM. It is in -fact the (Bochvar) operator TI (IT-prime') 
defined in Chapter 111.5; see (12) there. We have seen that it 
has an obvious but crucial property: it is,, inter aliar a function 
from the third logical status to falsity. As such, it countenances 
the third logical status (permitting the definition of an additional 
("presupposition cancelling") negation). I have suggested that a 
system that includes this truth operatorr rather than the Tarskian 
Truth operator of classical logic, exhibits an expressive capacity 
in excess of that exhibited by a system semantically closed under 
bivalence - and thereby does not constitute a'possible model for a 
two-valued logic with gaps or, thereforer for a coherent presuppos- 
itional logic. 
It would thus appear that, within the conceptual framework- 
developing in this dissertation at leastr the Principle of Bivalence 
has a rather special status. It is not distinctively expressible in 
respect of any system of which it is a valid principle; conversely, 
it is not a valid principle of any system in which it is expressible 
distinctively and as such, independently of, LEM. In short, a 
Principle of Bivalence is distinctively formulable only in a system 
that is at least trivalent. This result might appear paradoxical. 
Howeverr we have seen in connection with The Liar that self- 
reference leads to paradox in a system that is semantically closed 
under bivalence. A bivalent system affording the distinctive means 
of expressing its own bivalence might be regarded as comparably 
self-referential. 
The paradox that we have been led to contemplate here is 
related to a matter that arises in connection with the SLDP 
considered in more detail in Chapter V. 4. As Wilson (1975: 12) 
observes, under the SLDP, presupposition is conceived of, not merely 
as a truth condition,, but as a CLASSICAL TRUTH-VALUE CONDIT10N (a 
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necessary condition of a sentence having a classical truth-value) 
as a TRUTH -OR-FALS ITY CONDITION; in other words (cf. Karttunen 
1973: 169) as a BIVALENCE CONDITION. We may thus expect that 
definition of presupposition to prove problematic in much the same 
terms as the direct and distinctive expression of a Principle of 
Bivalence does. This at least is one way of viewing the problems 
that the-MDP anyway presents. 
The discussion suggests thatr since Fraassen's system is such 
as to precipitate a formulable distinction between LEM and PB, 
apparently allowing him to maintain the one without the other, it is 
not a system that is semantically closed under bivalence and hence 
not construable as a two-valued gapped logic. It is in part on 
these grounds that I view as self-defeating'the (of necessity? 
inclusive) retention of CL-validity as criterial of the gapped 
interpretation. And I regard it as self-defeating on these grounds 
independently of my contention that the inclusive concept of 
validity is in itself problematic. I turn to this matter (in the 
section that follows) by examining the question of how LEM is 
maintained without PB in the supervaluational context. 
I close this section by sounding a leitmotif of the general 
discussion. In (31)j, (31%, and (41) we compared respectively a 
trivalent equivalence, a two-valued-gapped equivalence, and a 
trivalent non-equivalence between [Tp] and p. By Herzberger's 
definition of the first degree of semantic closure, the exclusion of 
any but the Tarskian truth operator (such that [Tp] "-ý- p) in CL meant 
that CL meets a necessary condition for such closure,, as must any 
putative two-valued gapped logic. But as Herzberger's further 
comments suggest, and as (31) shows, this necessary condition is not 
sufficient. The inclusion of a Tarskian equivalence between [Tp] 
and p is still compatible with semantic closure of the second degree 
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and hence compatible with trivalence. In the search for criteria of 
the gapped interpretation,, the inclusion of a Tarskian truth- 
equival ence is significant only if it is implied by the generally 
bivalent character of the system as a whole. 
4. Supervaluations II: validity and truth-functionality. 
"Clearly the Law of Bivalence fails for supervaluations.... But 
all our interpretations agree that [p V -p] is logically true" 
(Van Fraassen 1966: 493) 
How is this possible? I have argued that [p V "'p] evinces the PB in 
depending on it for its (logical) truth. To'repeat our question: 
Should we not expect loss of the PB to leave LEM either false or 
without logical content? Generalising the question,, for LEM is only 
an example, we may ask how it is possible that CL validityr which is 
precipitated as a consequence of the general CL property of semantic 
closure under bivalencer should be retained in a system that does 
NOT exhibit that degree of semantic closure? 
There is a short simple answer to this question and an 
(equivalent) long and roundabout one. I shall take the latter first 
- because it provides an opportunity to give an overview of the 
technique of supervaluations. 
Van Fraassen opens with a proposal that I'the troublesome truth 
gaps be eliminated by simply assigning truth values to the offending 
statements in some arbitrary manner" (1966: 486). The precedent 
indirectly invoked for this move, strangely enough, is Russell: 
"ThUSr IF IN A GIVEN LANGUAGE, ME ZING LE FRAN 1.19 B= 14EANS 
WHAT RUSSELL SAID IT MEANT,, then it has 
'a 
truth value. And 
even if Strawson is correct concerning Ordinary discourse,, 
sentences that in his view are neither true nor false are 
"don't cares" for all ordinary purposes and there is therefore 
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no reason why we should not arbitrarily assign them some truth 
value. 11 
(Van Fraassen 1966: 482. My caps) 
It is not clear to me what Russell has to do with this: as Van 
Fraassen's own comment (in my caps) implies, the assignment of truth 
value in such cases was notr for Russellf arbitrary. 
Van Fraassen does not specify how such sentences get assigned 
their arbitrary truth valuesr but since they ARE arbitraryr this 
presumably is arbitrary and not susceptible to formal explication. 
Now a CLASSICAL VALUATION is characterised as in (1): 
(1) A classical valuation over a model is a function Wthat 
assigns T or F to each statement, subject to: 
a. if A is an ATOMIC statement containing no nonreferring 
names, then V(A) is determined by the modelt in the indic- 
ated manner, and 
b. If A is a COMPLEX statement,, then W(A) is determined 
by what u- assigns to the simpler statements,, in the usual 
manner. 
This does not cover cases of atomic statements that do contain 
nonreferring names (i. e. suffer from p--failure) butr by the opening 
proposal, if A is such a statement, A is assigned'T or F but this is 
not determined by the model. 
What distinguishes atomic sentences with no nonreferring name 
from those with nonreferring names is this: since the truth 
(falsity) of the former is determined by the model (i. e. non- 
arbitrarily),, and on the assumption that the model is consistent,, 
all classical valuations over the model will agree, assigning the 
SAME truth value to each such sentence. In thecase of sentences 
with non-referring names,, by contrast, since in a "classical 
valuation" each such atomic sentence is assigned a truth value in an 
arbitrary manner (i. e. not determined by the model) it follows that 
there will be more than one possible "classical valuation" in such 
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cases,, one arbitrarily assigning truth and-another arbitrarily 
assigning falsity. Thus a sentence with NO non-referring name will 
be assigned the SAME truth value in each classical valuation over 
the model, while a sentence WITH a nonreferring name will be 
assigned DIFFERENT truth values in each "classical valuation". 
My scare quotes are intended to draw attention to the question 
of whether a valuation that assigns truth (falsity) in an arbitrary 
manner can properly be termed a 'classicall valuation - and even 
whether it IS a valuation. The question seems reasonable in itself, 
but notice anyway that the characterisation of 'classical valuation' 
given in (1) above only admits of assignments to atomic sentences of 
truth value DETERMINED BY THE MODEL i. e. non-arbitrary assignments 
of truth value. By Van Frassen's own characterisation of 'classical 
valuation', then, a 'valuation over a model' that does not agree 
with (i. e. is not identical with) every other possible 'valuation 
over that model' is not a classical valuation. it follows from this 
that there can only be one genuinely classical valuation over a 
model anyway. This is not mere pedantry; for it is clear that 
DIFFERENCE in the truth value assigned to-a particular atomic 
sentence by 'different classical valuations' '(resulting from the 
arbitrariness of each such assignment) is simply an encoding of the 
arbitrariness of the truth value assigned, which is in turn an 
encoding of what would otherwise have been the assignment of a third 
logical status. 
The DECODING is achieved by supervaluation over the 'classical 
valuations' bver the model: 
(2) A SUPERVALUATION OVER A MODEL is a function that assigns T 
(F) exactly to those statements assigned T(F) by ALL the 
classical valuations over that model. 
[my emphasis on 'all' - NBRI 
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The supervaluation fails to assign truth or falsity to a sentence if 
and only if the sentence is not assigned the same truth value by all 
classical valuations. Under supervaluation, then, arbitrary truth 
(encoded in the form of difference in truth value across 'classical 
valuations) shows up (again? ) in its true colours, as the third 
logical status. The point of the encoding is that, at the stage 
where questions of logical truth arise, every atomic sentence and 
hence every complex sentence has, in one way or another (classically 
or arbitrarily) been assigned one of the values [truer false}. 
For illustrative purposes consider Van Frassen's own example 
language and model. Let the language contain the. names a and b and 
consist of just one predicate. E. Let the model define a referent 
f or. A but NOT J2 and let a be in the extension of Then there are 
two 'classical valuations' (cvl and cv2) and a supervaluation (s), 
partially represented in (3a) - but continued in (3b) and (3c) 
below: 
(3a) CV1 cv2 s 
Fa T 
Fb TF 
From (lb) we gathered that if A is not atomic, then cr(A) is 
determined by what Lr assigns to the simpler statements "in the 
usual manner". We gathered, in other words, that all operators have 
their standard CL interpretations. So. to continue: 
(3b) CV1 cv2 s 
-Fa FFF 
-Fb FT 
On this basis, furthermore,, although the values assigned to ED and 
to :, Eb are arbitrary (though not,, of course,, with respect to each 
other), and hence differ in each 'classical valuation'r we find that 
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there is no 'classical valuation' in which one or other of Eb and 
-L& 
is not assigned truth; with the result that [Fb V -Fb] will be 
true in each classical valuation over that model and hence true in 
the supervaluation over the model: 
(3c) CV1 cv2 s 
Fb V -Fb TTT 
Now validity in CL is defined by (4): 
A statement is CL-TRUE(FALSE) if and only if it is assign- 
ed T(F) Ly all classical valuations over ALL models. 
and validity in SL is defined by (5): 
(5) A statement is SL-TRUE if and only if it is assigned T by 
ALL supervaluations. 
i. e. a statement is SL-true iff it is assigned T by the 
f supervaluations over all classical valuations over all models. 
Clearlyr since the supervaluation assigns truth to [Fb V -Fb] in 
this modelr all supervaluations wili do so. Under such treatmentr 
then, "the set of CL-truths and the set of SL-truths are exactly the 
samel" (Van Fraassen 1966: 487). In particularr of courser as we 
saw in (3c), any formula of the form [A V -A] comes out as a logical 
truth of SL. "Hence the Law of Excluded Middle is (inclusively) 
retained. 
The technique of supervaluations is generally regarded as 
ingenious and elegant and I have no wish to play the ghost at the 
feast in this. But I have some conceptual problems here and I am. 
as indicated, sceptical. The main problem can be expressed by 
considering the short simple answer to the question posed earlier: 
how come LEM and classical validity in general are (inclusively) 
retained in SL notwithstanding the loss of Bivalence? The short 
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answer may have been obscured in the long one: 
It is intriguing that Van Fraassen should allude to the truth 
value assignment of complex sentences as being derived "in the usual 
way" from that assigned to their atomic constituents. What Van 
Fraassen rather coyly calls "the usual way" is: ' truth-f unctionally. 
In CL [A V -A] derives its logical truth as a compositional function 
of the value assigned to Ar on the assumption that A is assigned a 
truth value. But it is precisely truth-functionality that is 
abandoned in SL. 
This is clearest at the supervaluational level, since there [A 
V -A] is true even where neither A nor -A is true. Furthermore), 
once arbitrary truth is recognised for what it is, as an encoding of 
the third logical status,, even at the level of classical valuation 
we find ourselves in an interpretative dilemma: EITHER (1) we must, 
contrary to appearancesy view truth-functionality as in fact 
abandoned - on the grounds that the derivation of logical truths 
from ARBITRARILY ASSIGNED truth values is not a legitimate and 
genuine application of the principle of truth-functionality 
(Thomason (1972: fn 13) very relevantly observes "Arbitrary truth 
isn't truthr any more than dry ice is ice"); OR (2) if we allow 
that this is a genuine application of truth-functionality, we must 
view any 'logical truth' truthfunctionally derived from arbitrarily 
assigned truth values as arbitrary itself. Either way, it seems to 
me, validity in SL (and its putatively CL subsystem) does not mean 
at all the same thing, does not have the same rationale, as it does 
in a genuinely classical logic. The point has been made by 
flerzberger (1970: 28) "The number of connectives is not increased 
but THEIR INTERPRETATION IS ALTERED. Connectives are no longer 
truthfunctional in the usual sense" (my caps). 
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I suggested earlier that loss of Bivalence should leave LEM 
either false or, for all purposes of its inclusive retention, 
without logical content. Van Fraassen has, I suggest, chosen the 
latter optionr retaining LEM at the cost of emptying it of its 
(classical) content. In illustration of this, consider that it is 
by virtue of truth-f unctionality that, from the truth of [AV B] we 
may inf er Bf rom -A and A from -B (cf. the classical inference of 
Modus Tollenqo Ponens); that is, the truth of [A V BI guarantees 
(truthfunctionally) that at least one of A and B is true. With the 
loss of truth-functionality this is not guaranteed and hence the 
inf erence is not validi, f or, when A is P and B is -P, [A V BI may be 
true without either A or B being true. More strangely yet,. the 
validity of that inference is a function of the. fact that (6) 
(A V B) > ((-A > B) & (-B > A)) 
is a logical truth of CL. We have been asked to accept that any 
logical truth of CL is a logical truth of SL. So (6) is a logical 
truth of SL. But the inference sanctioned by the logical truth of 
(6) is not a valid inference in SLI 
It appears to me that Van Fraassen's approach to CL-validity in 
PL, while not identical, is comparable to Seuren1s. Whereas Seuren 
simply changes the meaning of the relevant formulae,, Van Fraassen 
treats them as idioms (where the meaning of an idiom is not a 
compositional function of those of its parts). But it is more 
complex than this. For in the context of idiomaticityr an 
abandonment of compositional ity is forced by the distinct non- 
compositional meaning of the idiom. But Van Fraassen treats the 
relevant formulae as idioms while committed to maintaining that his 
idiomatic use of the expression means exactly what it means on its 
non-idiomatic interpretation! 
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How important is truth-f unctionality (a: ) in itself and (b) in 
the present context? On (a) r Thomason 1972: '231 has this to say: 
"There is very little evidence, howevert that truth 
functionality is anything but a superficial feature of two- 
valued logic. All the interesting generalisations of this 
logic (those taking tense into account for instance, or various 
modalitiest- or even quantification over individuals) are non 
truth-functional. On the other hand, the set of valid formulas 
of two valued logic is hardly a superficial feature. To me 
this suggests that a theory of truth value gaps that preserves 
the valid formulas is a more faithful generalisation [of two- 
valued logic] than one preserving truth functionality. Van 
Fraassen's method supervaluations provides just such a method. " 
It will be clear by now that I disagree with this - to an extent 
that makes it appear to me almost incoherent. No enumeration of non 
truthfunctional aspects of two-valued logic can serve to show that 
truthfunctionality, where it shows up, is superficial. 
Furthermore, Thomason's own concession that validity is a "far from 
superf icial "f eature of two-valued logic and in f act, as he later 
observes, is "crucial", simply contradicts his assertion that all 
the interesting generalisations of two-valued logic are non truth- 
functional, since validity in a two valued logic IS, as a simple 
matter of fact,, truthfunctional. In addition, in his listing of non 
truthfunctional generalisations of two valued logic, Thomason 
appears to ignore certain well-establ i shed systematic correlations 
between the truthf unctional connectives, the quantifiers, and the 
modalities (this is touched on again in Chapter VIII). Finally, 
it seems to me that Thomason's complaisance in the loss of truth- 
functionality is inconsistent with his earlier repudiation /arbitrary 
truth (alluded to above); for, as noted, the logical truth of [P V 
-P] in SL can be no less arbitrary than the arbitrary truth from 
which (by spurious truthfunctionality) it "derives". 
Now (b). How important is this loss of truth-f unctionality in 
the context of a consideration of the criteria for a gapped bivalent 
logic? At the outset of this chapter I suggested that Van 
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Fraassen's adoption of validity as the criterion might prima facie 
be construed as a rationalisation of the several criteria suggested 
by the properties of CL enumerated in the last chapter. The 
suggestion has been shown to be rather wide of the,, mark. Validity 
appears to offer itself for this role because CL validity is NOT 
STIPLJLATEDj, BUT OBSERVED as a consequence of the general character 
of the CL system and its bivalence. By contrastr in SL', validity is 
not observed, it is stipulated (it does not ARISEr it is IMPOSED). 
From the point of view being developed in this work, the stipulation 
is self-defeating on at least two counts: (a) it precipitates a 
species of validity that is only doubtfully construable as classical 
validity; (b) it represents,, not a rationalisation of the other 
possible criteriar but a byýpassing of them. In the next chapter we 
shall see the relevance of this latter point to the criterial status 
of the definition of presupposition itself. For the definition of 
presupposition that Van Fraassen adopts is the SLDP and the next 
chapter is devoted to the demonstration that the SLDP inducesl not a 
gapped bivalent 10gicr but a trivalent logic. 
IPOSTSCRIPT. Consider briefly the intuitive natural language 
implications of SL validity. 
(7) Either the king of France is bald or he isn't. 
If a speaker of this sentence is committed to anything, it is to the 
truth of the false presupposition that there is a king of France. I 
cannot think -of a more manifest means of committing oneself just to 
that presupposition. Yet in SL (7) is (logically) true. In SL 
therefore the speaker is not committed to the existence of a French 
king (while nevetheless being committed to "his" being bald or 
otherwise! ). And indeed the truth of (7) is, by the SUP (which Van 
Fraassen takes to be the definition of presupposition), incompatible 
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with its having a false presupposition. This is the kind of thing 
we are obliged to countenance in the attempted inclusive retention 
of CL validity. By contrast, on the EXCLUSIVE approach to CL 
validity in PL that is favoured here, not only is (7) (exclusively) 
retained as a logical tautology (if it had a truth valuer it would 
be necessarily true) but the speaker is made to stick to his guns in 
the matter of the failed presupposition. I return to the example 
(and its negation) in Chapter X. 
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CHAPTER V 
STMDARD PRESUPPOSITION AND TOE DISTINCTION 
This chapter presents the argument that the Standard Logical 
Definition of Presupposition (SLDP) is not compatible with 
interpreting the third logical status to which it gives rise as a 
logical gap and must therefore be regarded as inducing the 
trivalence of any system that includes it. In terms of the general 
conception of presupposition developed here,, thenr a system 
incorporating standard presupposition is only inappropriately to be 
regarded as a specifically PRESUPPOSITIONAL system. The argument is 
introduced by way of a review of how matters now stand with regard 
to the criteria f or the gapped interpretation of the third logical 
status. 
1. A review of the criteria. 
Seven properties of classical logic have been enumerated as 
providing potential criteria f or the gapped interpretation of the 
third logical status in systems that give rise to it. I repeat them 
here in abbreviated form: 
I. Just two truth values. 
I I. A unique truth predicate (T) such that [Tp] if and only if 
E1. 
III. A unique negation taking just truth into falsity and vice 
versa. 
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IV. A certain set of binary connectives (specifically as defined 
in Ch. IIIA. ) whose interdef inability gives rise to 
V. A certain set of logical equivalences. 
VI. A relation of entailment that supports modu tallen (i. e. 
strong entailment). 
VI I. A certain set of logical tautologies (valid formulae) - 
whose interpretation and truth is wholly determined by the 
operation of the truthfunctional connectives that 
constitute the set in IV. 
Here I review the status of each of these properties of CL as 
potential criteria for our distinction. Since I and VI I are to be 
dismissed as criteria, I consider them f irst. 
I. As noted, this has no potential as a criterion. To 
demonstrate that a system giving rise to formulae with the third 
logical status is in fact two-valued with gaps is to demonstrate 
that it has this-very propertyr and hence presupposes criteria that 
are independent of it. 
VI I. In the last chapter it was argued that CL validity could 
only be maintained AS SUCH on an exclusive basis. As already noted, 
the retention of CL validity on this basis presupposes independent 
and logically prior criteria for the system to be interpreted as 
gapped rather than three-valued. On this basis.. then,, VII cannot be 
employed as a criterion, f or the same reason as property I cannot. 
II and III need to be taken together. In itself III the 
inclusion of a. unique truth predicate T such that [Tp] if f [p] , is 
equivocal in respect of the distinction. Truth as in 
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F F 
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is compatible with satisfaction of the criterion but (depending on 
the definition of equivalence) is also compatible with trivalence. 
Rather II has to be seen in terms of IIII the inclusion of a unique 
negation taking just truth into falsity and vice versa. It is in 
the light of III that II is seen to be criterial, for the unique. 
inclusion of such a truth predicate has the consequence that there 
can only be one negation, whichr in taking just truth (falsity) into 
falsity (truth), does not countenance the third logical status nori, 
thereforer presupposition-f ail ure (and is thus "presupposition- 
preserving"). Now III is centrally criterial - and so is III but 
derivatively. from III. 
Howeverf while III (and by implication II) is central, it 
provides a negative and external criterion in a sense already 
explained. A demonstration that 
HI is satisfied is providedr not simply by refraining from the 
definition of a negation that countenances what would otherwise be 
presupposition-failure, but by showingr (a) that*the absence of such 
a negation is implied by the general bivalence of the system as a 
whole'and (b), in terms external to the system, that no such 
negation is required on empirical grounds anyway. This must take 
the form of an independently motivated non-semantic account of the 
phenomena that such a negation is supposed to handle. This takes us 
beyond the system itself and I postpone discussion of the matter 
until Part Three. 
This leýaves IVj, V. and VI. V itself is implied by IV (when it 
is not implied by IV, as in Seuren's system, it is indeed compatible 
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with trivalence -a further demonstration of this is given below). * 
I shall therefore say little more about V here (it becomes important 
in Part Three). The connection between IV and VI is perhaps less 
obvious. in fact they can be shown to imply each other,, as we shall 
see immediately in examining what might constitute genuine classical 
orthodoxy in a connective. 
I thus propose IV and VI as the (mutually implied) positive, 
internally demonstrable, criteria of the gapped interpretation of a 
system giving rise to sentences having the third logical status. 
That is, a logical system that includes a relation of 
presuppositionr where presupposition failure is to be construed as 
resulting in the LACK of truth value in the presupposing sentence, 
must be one that is compatible with the retention of the classical 
connectives (strictly interpreted) and retention of a relation of 
strong entailment. I discuss the significance of these interrelated 
criteria in the section that follows. 
2. The irtibritance of falsity in (classical) logic. 
I seem to remember having read somewhere that logic is about the 
inheritance of truth. Although this can be interpreted more 
generally to mean the inheritance of truth VALUE, it suits my 
purpose better to take it in the narrower sense, and point up the 
sense in which logic - orthodox classical logic, that is - is much 
more about the inheritance of falsity. 
In saying that V is not implied by IV in S-84r I mean that 
Seuren retains an apparently classical interdýf inability of the 
connectives but the connectives involved are. not the classical 
connectives. This has already been shown in part, but it will 
become more apparent by implication from what follows in this and 
succeeding chapters. 
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I shall illustrate this, and much else that I have to say, by 
reference to the conjunction of classical logic given above in 
Ch. IIIA. Consider the truth table in (1) 
(1) 
Since classical orthodoxy in a connective is at issue, I should say 
that I do not regard the truth table in (1) as being in itself the 
actual definition of classical conjunction. This is of relevance in 
the present context because we may stare at a truth table as long as 
we like and still not agree on its proper extrapolation to cover the 
third logical status. lbis can only be decided in the light of the 
principle underlying the truth tablej, and it is THIS which I take to 
be the definition. The table merely plots the implications for 
particular cases of that definition,, which I informally repeat here: 
(2) A conjunction C is true if and only if ALL the conjuncts of 
C are true,, and false if and only if ANY of the conjuncts 
of C are false. 
If we insist that a system include only classical connectives, we 
are insisting that it include only a conjunction satisfying the 
definition in (2) and only other connectives derived in the usual 
way in terms of that conjunction and standard negation. 
Now from (1)/(2) it is readily seen that the truth of a 
conjunct is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of the 
conjunction. By contrast the FALSITY of a conjunct IS sufficient to 
guarantee the FALSITY of the conjunction. Ohly the falsity of a 
conjunct is invariably inherited by the conjunction as a whole. As 
my opening remark implies, when we insist on conjunction as in (2) 
we are doing more than insisting on a specific technical point. We 
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are admitting (and making criterial) a general principle of 
(classical) logic - the primacy of the inheritance of falsity. That 
this is so is seen immediately when we acknowledge that the relation 
between a conjunction and its conjuncts is an example of the 
relation of strong entailment, where 
(3) Sl-STRCNGLY ENTAILS S2 iff 
(a) wherever Sl is true, S2 is true 
and (b) wherever S2 is false, Sl is false. 
(3a), which by itself is the definition of WEAK entailmentr 
sanctions the classical modu VQnen . (3b) I which is what makes it 
specifically one of STRONG entailment., sanctions the classical modus 
tollen The classical conjunction of P and Qr thenr strongly 
entails P and strongly-entails Q. 
The centrality of the semantic relation between a conjunction 
and its conjuncts thus lies in the fact that it constitutes a 
perspicuous paradigm of the standard notion of truth condition - one 
that is appealed to in the semantics of ATOMIC sentences (cf. eg 
Kempson 1979). The non-presuppositional classically based proposals 
of say Wilson 1975 and Kempson 1975 actually incorporate the claim 
that this is the only semantic relation. If this means that all 
other semantic relations are definable in terms of it, this is true 
(I am again thinking, for example, of the relation between a 
disjunction and its disjuncts, which is not one of strong 
entailment, but is definable in terms of negation and the strong 
entailment holding between a conjunction and its conjuncts). 
In the final analysis, then, we could take just the retention 
of a relation of strong entailment as the positive, internally 
demonstrable criterion of the gapped interpretation - strong 
entailment both in the compound and the atomic context. Ignoring 
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the externally demonstrated criterion of the number and character of 
negation operators and truth operators, then, we way propose: 
(4) A system giving rise to sentences having the third logical 
status is A TWO-VALUED GAPPED SYSTEM (and hence a candidate 
for being a genuinely presuppositional system) if, whatever 
other semantic relations it defines, it defines the 
relation of strong entailment (and thereby validates modu 
tollen ). 
The discussion so far willf I hope, pre-empt any suggestion that 
(positive) criteriality f or the gapped interpretation has here been 
reduced to a rather fine point. Its significance will become more 
apparent in due course. in the meantimer it is perhaps worth 
considering that strong entailment must be at the crux of the 
matter because in a strictly bivalent system -- a system with just 
the two values, True and False -, all entailments will be strong 
entailments. That is, in a strictly bivalent system, (3b) follows 
automatically from (3a). 
The criterion spelt out in (4) has a very direct internal 
implication f or presuppositional theories, in that it can only be 
implemented by ensuring that, in a system that includes a relation 
of presupposition, presupposition is defined so as to be consistent 
with the retention in that system of a relation of strong 
entailment. This is perhaps THE central thesis of the present work. 
It derives its importance from the fact that presupposition as 
defined by the SLDP is demonstrably NOT consistent with the 
retention of strong entailment. This is demonstrated in the section 
that follows. 
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3. The trivalence of standard presupposition. - 
I shall illustrate the discussion by reference to the question of 
how the truth table for classical conjunction is to be computed when 
we admit conjuncts having false presuppositions as defined by the 
SLDP. 
With one important type of exception to be discussed in due 
course, it is empirically the case that 
(5) A conjunction inherits all the presuppositions of its 
conjuncts. 
For example, empirically (6a) presupposes what its conjuncts 
presuppose. in particular (6a) presupposes what its second conjunct 
(6b) presupposes, namely (6c). 
(6) a. He is married and the Queen of England is married. 
b. ' The Queen of England is married. 
c. There is a Queen of England. 
Nowj, under the SLDP,, to say that A presupposes B is equivalent to 
saying that A has the third logical status whenever B is false. 
That is, presupposition is actually def ined IN TERMS OF A THIRD 
LOGICAL STATUS (more on this due course). As regards the truth table 
for I&', then, the only way of expressidg this fact about 
conjunction in terms of the Standard theory is given in (7): 
(7) A conjunction inherits any third logical status that is 
assigned to its conjuncts. 
Under the SLDP (5) and (7) are equivalent. It follows. that 
empirically there can only be one truth table for conjunction, 
namely that given (in two f orms) in (8). 
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(8) p q [p & q] 
(a) T T T 
(b) T F F 
(C) F T F 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
The property of (8) to which I wish to draw attention is this: the 
conjunction it represents is determined, NOT by the classical 
definition of conjunction.. but by the the concept of presupposition 
embodied in the MDP. (8) is not a valid extrapolation of classical 
V. In saying this.. I mean that the principle by which the values 
in cases (e)-(i) are assigned is not consistent with the principle 
(given as (2) above) by which the values in cases (a)-(d) are 
assigned. Consider (g) and (h). By the definition in (2), which 
implies and is implied by the retention of strong entailment,, we 
should expect to find the whole conjunction false in those two 
cases. But F by (8) F it is not f al se. We can no longer say, then, 
that a conjunction STRONGLY ENTAILS its conjuncts. If it did then 
(9a) would strongly entail (9b). 
(9) a. Saumur is the capital of France and the King of 
France is bald. 
b. Saumur is the capital of France. 
c. The King of France is bald. 
d. There is a King of France. 
And, since (9b) is false, (9a) would be false. But, by (8), it is 
not false. Instead it has inherited the third logical status of its 
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second conjunct (9c), which is the SLDP's means of expressing the 
fact that it inherits the (false) presupposition (9d) of that 
conjunct. (8) thus represents a standard presuppositional, ' rather 
than classical, conjunction. 
The one valid and genuine extrapolation of classical 
conjunction is not (8) but (10): 
(10) p q [p & q] 
(a) T T T 
(b) T 
(C) F F 
(d) F F 
-- --- --- ---- 3 
3 
F 
F 
3 
313 F3 
When I say that (10) is the only genuine extrapolation of classical 
conjunction, I mean that when you apply, without modification,, the 
principle expressed in (2) - which is the definition of that 
conjunction - to cover the cases (e)-(i), (10) is what you get. 
Consistent with the discussion of Ch. III abover when applied beyond 
the fully determinate domain on which classical conjunction is 
defined, as it is in cases (e)-(i), such a conjunction is to be seen 
as a PARTIAL TRUTH FUNCTION. It is partial because in (2) a truth 
value for the conjunction as a whole is specified under just IWO 
conditions: (i) when both conjuncts are true - case (a) - and (ii) 
when at least one conjunct is false - cases (b)-(d) and (g)-(h). 
Cases (e) . (f) r and (i) r and only those cases, meet neither of the 
stated conditions and hence, by classical conjunction, no truth 
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value is assigned in those cases. Here the -third logical status 
cannot be construed as a truth value. In (10) 131 simply represents 
the FAILURE of classical conjunction to assign a truth value. (More 
on this in due course. ) 
I am not of course alone in proposing (10) as the only genuine 
extrapolation of the truth table for conjunction. It is adopted by 
Van Fraassen in all his relevant papers, and by Kleene 1938 in his 
'strong'-type system. But I draw from (10) a general implication 
which Van Fraassen, who (by contrast with Kleene) was specifically 
concerned with presupposition, does not. We have seen that, by the 
Standard definition of presupposition, we are committed to the 
conjunction in (8) rather than that in (10). (10) is empirically 
incompatible with the SLDP, since under that definitionj (10) would 
commit us to saying that not all presuppositions of conjuncts are 
inherited in their conjunction - since not all third logical 
statuses are inherited. This would, from an empirical point of 
view, be bad enough in itself. But look at the totally irrelevant 
conditions under which (10) 'a la SLDP allows for a presupposition to 
be filtered out: it is filtered out just in case the MER conjunct 
happens to be falsel Illustrating this by reference to our example 
(9): were thestandard theory of presupposition to include the desired 
classical conjunction represented in (10)r it would follow that (9a) 
presupposes that there is a king of France only if Saumur is the 
French capital and that it does not presuppose any such thing if 
some town other than Saumur is the capital! (This very salient point 
about (10) under -the conception of presupposition embodied in the 
SLDP is noted in Karttunen 1973; and on that basis he rejected not 
the Standard definition of presupposition) but that definition of 
conjunction. ) 
Since (8) 
-is 
determined, not by the definition of classical 
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conjunction, but by the conception of presupposition embodied in the 
SLDPI it is determined in complete disregard of the classical 
principle of the primacy of the inheritance of falsity adumbrated 
earlier and illustrated by means of classical conjunction. of 
necessity, under the SLDP, concern with the inheritance of 
presupposition and its failure (in the form. of the third logical 
status) overrides the classical concern with the inheritance of 
falsity. This has a more general consequence that has not in my view 
been sufficiently, if at all, appreciated: that presupposition a la 
SLDP is not compatible with the retention of strong entailment and 
hence not compatible with the associated classical inference of 
modu -tollen .I 
have the impression that it is generally assumed 
that the logical approach to presupposition embodied in the SLDP 
consists in the positing of a relation of presupposition IN--ADDITION 
TO the standard relation of strong entailment as ordinarily 
understood. I have shown here that this cannot be the case. 
At the risk of offering up a candidate for Pse'uds'Corner: Standard 
presupposition is the cuckoo in the nest of strong entailment. This 
is illustrated particularly by the remarks on Keenan's system belowr 
but notice. in passing that Wilson's Formal Points (No. 1 
particularly) 1975: 24 seems to be based on the assumption brought 
into question here. * Bef ore drawing the obvious conclusion about 
the Standard Logical Definition of Presupposition, a word on the 
systems of Seuren and Van Fraassen. 
It is on these grounds that Seuren's cursorily presented 
"infection" criterion for the gapped interpretation of the 
* Formal Point No. 1 assumes that in a Standard theory 
presuppositional logic a sentence can have both Standard 
presuppositions and classical strong entailments because it more 
specifically concerns the putative case where some sentence B is 
both strongly entailed AND presupposed by some other sentence A. 
The above discussion shows that this will never be the case: B would 
only be presupposedg, not strongly entailed, by A- under the 
Standard -theory. 
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connective must be rejected. By that criterion, it is (8) that is 
bivalent-but-gapped and (10) that is trivalent. Yet clearly it is 
(10) that is in strict conformity with the classical definition of 
conjunction given as (2), and only (10) that is consistent with the 
retention of an undistorted relation of strong entailment. It is 
(8) which, in departing from (2). must be regarded as the "wonderful 
new (presuppositional) connective". And we*have adopted,, as one 
criterion of the gapped interpretation, adherence to the classical 
con nective-def initions. In the absence of a more coherent criterion 
that conflicts with this,, we must conclude that. the inclusion of (8) 
is incompatible with such an interpretation of a presuppositional 
system. Furthermore, while Seuren restricts his attention to the 
connective in itselff we have considered that connective in a more 
general context and shown what general principles hinge on taking 
(10) rather than (8) to be the conjunction of classical logic. 
As regards my agreement with Van Fraassen (and others) that 
(10) is indeed more standard than (8) (matters of truthfunctionality 
in the context of valid formulae apart), it should be noted that Van 
Fraassen nonetheless subscribes to and retains presupposition as 
defined in the SLDP - with all the unacceptablcý consequences noted 
above. In this, I suggest, we may find an explanation of why Van 
Fraassen's concern with the distinction between a gapped and a 
trivalent system and his attempts to develop the former have either 
been disregarded or regarded as peripheral. Van . Fraassen appears 
either not to notice, or to regard as irrelevant, any connection 
between the concept of presupposition embodied in the (standard) 
definition he subcribes to and other properties of the system. But 
clearlyr in the context of Standard Presupposition, the most notable 
property of the classical conjunction in (10) is its empirical 
incompatibility with the Standard definition. The distinction 
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between trivalence and gaps that emerges from within a 
supervaluational frameworki, however, is presented as not impinging 
on the Standard definition of presupposition. Either wayr the 
conclusion that the supervaluational distinction between trivalence 
and gaps is a peripheral mattery of merely technical import, is 
perhaps a valid assessment of the matter. The 4fferentiating force 
of the criteria proposed here have quite direct implications for the 
very definition of presupposition itself. This surely is as it 
should be,, and any distinction between trivalence and The Gap which 
purports to apply independently of the presupposition-def inition 
itself must be rejected on those grounds if on no other. 
In summary, the discussion has sought to show that our 
fundamental conception of presupposition is very directly implicated 
in the distinction between trivalence and gaps. In terms of that 
discussion, the SLDP induces a system that is incompatible with the 
interrelated criteria IV and VI above. A system that includes a 
relation of standard presupposition cannot then be regarded as a two 
valued system with logical gaps and hence must be regarded as 
trivalent. Within the conceptual framework developed in previous 
chapters, this means that the SLDP should be seen as failing to 
reconstruct a proper or coherent concept of presuppositionr and is 
therefore to be rejected. 
I am concerned that it may yet seem that the criterial cluster 
constituted by strong entailment and the classical connectives (esp. 
conjunction) might appear a small hook on which to hang the 
rejection of a concept of logical presupposition which is almost 
universally accepted as the most appropriate possible logical 
concept. The remaining sections of this chapter place this result 
in a wider context, justifying the centrality of strong entailment 
as a criterion of the gapped interpretation. But in the final 
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analysis the most perspicuous means of showing that the SLDP is to 
be rejected on these grounds is by the presentation of the 
alternative that is suggested by the considerations brought forward 
here and by the demonstration that this alternative avoids/solves 
the problems encountered by the SLDP. The alternative is presented 
in Pa rt Ie-e- . 
4. The ]paradox of presupposition as I (bi)va]Lenoe condition'. 
The suggestions made in this section are tentative. At the end of 
Chapter II in Part One, I noted that the SLDP embodies DIRECT 
EXPRESSION of the Salient Presuppositional Intuition (that of a 
presupposition being implied both by A and its negation) and, 
equivalently,, DIRECT EXPRESSION of a TRUTH GAP INTUITION (that 
presupposition failure leads to the third logical status of the 
presupposing sentence). * I questioned the assumption that a 
definition of presupposition should display these properties. 
Consider these issues now in the light of the distinction between 
trivalence and gaps as it has developed in the present work. A 
definition of presupposition that displays these properties of 
direct expression is, as observed in Ch. IV, a definition that 
reconstructs presupposition as a BIVALENCE CONDIT1ONr as a necessary 
condition for a sentence to have a classical truth value, true or 
false. In the light of the last section, this concept of Ibivalence 
condition' is paradoxical. 
If the SLDP is taken to express directly anything about logical 
*The particular Truth Gap Intuition that the SLDP purports to 
express directly is that the third logical status is the INEVITABLE 
consequence of presupposition failure. I am not concerned here with 
whether that is the empirical. 1Y correct MI. I am concerned with the 
matter of its direct expression. 
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GAPS strictly interpreted as such, then it is. to be construed as a 
bivalence condition in the sense of representing a necesary 
condition for the presupposing sentence TO HAVE A TRJTH VALUE AT ALL 
i. e. as a classical VALENCE condition. Yet we have seen that in 
order to give direct expression of this condition in the f orm of a 
presupposition-definition entails a concept of presupposition that 
is in fact trivalent rather than two-valued with gaps. It would 
seem that this bivalence condition is only expressible within a 
trivalent system. Put another way, it would seem that a condition 
on bivalence is not directly definable in a system that is 
semantically closed under bivalence. This precipitates the 
following contradiction in the concept of direct expression of a 
truth gap intuition: since the direct expression of a putative 
Truth Gap Intuition in a definition of presupposition necessitates a 
TRIVALENT p-def inition., it cannot in fact,, directly or indirectly, 
express a GAP intuition at all. The circumstance under which a gap 
intuition would be directly expressible actually requires the third 
logical status to be construed not as a gap but as a third truth 
val ue I 
In reconciling the reader to this suggestion of paradox, and to 
make sense of it as a paradox, I offer three brief comments. First, 
it would seem to be connected with our earlier result concerning Van 
Fraassen's f6rmulation of a directly expressed and distinctive 
Principle of Bivalence - also shown not to be formulable in a system 
that is semantically closed under bivalence. 
Secon(Uye recall our earlier observation that the MDP def ines 
presupposition IN TMIS OF rAE TH IRD LOGICAL STATUS. This logical 
status, then,, actually figures in the system j, plays a role in the 
definition of one of the kinds of truth condition admitted in the 
system. It seems reasonable to suggest that a system in which this 
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is so cannot be semantically closed under bivalence; such a system 
countenances the third logical status (and hence failure of 
presupposition) to the extent that one of the semantic relations it 
defines is defined in terms of that status. 
Thirdly and more generally, it does not seem implausible to 
suggest that the statement of a CONDITION of any sort entails an 
expressive capacity both in respect of satisfaction of the condition 
and in respect of its non-satisf action. It is uncontroversial, for 
example, that the statement of a TRJTH CCNDITION entails at least a 
bivalent systemr with one value (true) in terms of which 
satisfaction is expressible and the other (false) in terms of which 
non-satisfaction is expressible. In such term s, the inclusion of a 
superordinate BIVALENCE CCND1TION entails an increment in expressive 
capacity - in respect of non-satisfaction of bivalence - in the form 
of a third value. This need not in itself be paradoxical. But it' 
becomes paradoxical when such a condition is thought of as 
expressing a Truth Gap Intuition. For then it is to be thought of 
as a VALENCE CONDITION. And thisr strictly interpreted, IS 
paradoxical. A valence conditionr I suggestr is not a possible kind 
of condition: it entai-Is an expressive capacity in respect of non- 
satisfaction of valence, yet this must take the form of a valuer a 
value that purports to be expressive of non-valence. 
It has been observed that a BIVALENCE condition is not in- 
itself paradoxical. However,, to the extent that such a condition 
purports to stand as the definition of presupposition, and to the 
extent that presupposition-failure is held to result in statement- 
failure, modelled logically by the truth gap, to that extent 
presupposition as a bivalence condition is paradoxical. 
From this discussion it follows, that no genuine gap-inducing 
definition of presupposition can take the form of a bivalence 
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condition (let alone a valence condition); or purport to embody 
direct expression of any Truth Gap Intuition; or, since this is 
equivalent, embody direct expression of the Salient Presuppositional 
Intuition that a presupposition is implied equally by a sentence and 
its negation. In Part Three we show what a presupposition 
definition that satisfies these (negative) criteria must look like. 
5. Strong entailment and standard presupposition in Keenan's system. 
I conclude the chapter with a general consideration of the 
interaction between strong entailment and presupposition, conducted 
partly in terms of an examination of the presuppositional system of 
Keenan - especially as presented in Keenan and Hull 1973 (KH-73). 
The relevance of that system is that it is the only one known to me 
which explicitly addresses itself to the definition of other 
semantic relations in addition to presupposition. 
The difference between the trivalent conjunction of (8) and the 
gapped conjunction of (10) may be expressed as follows. In the 
trivalent (8),, the consequence of a false presupposition (i. e. the 
third logical status) takes precedence over the consequence of a 
false strong entailment. * In fact, however, ' this is wrongly 
expressed. What we should have said in connection with (8) is: 
takes precedence over the consequence of the falsity of WHAT WCULD 
OTHERWISE BE a strong entailment". In connection with (10) we 
should have said: "... takes precedence aver the consequence of the 
* One might, and I will, express this by saying that, by the 
criteria, in a trivalent systemr presupposition is STRCNGER than the 
standard relation of strong entailment, while in a gapped system 
presupposition is WEAKER than strong entailment. This, as we shall 
see in due course, is a particularly appropriate -way of expressing the matter. 
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falsity of WHAT WCULD OTBEIWISE BE a standard presupposition". 
The point is thatt where (as with the SLDP) presupposition is 
stronger than strong entailment, there can BE no relation of strong 
entailment as such. The greater strength of the former contradicts 
the definition of the latter. Converselyr where strong entailment 
is stronger than presuppositionr there can BE no STANDARD THEORY 
relation of presupposition j, for the same reason. In short no system 
can purport to define both strong entailment AND standard 
presupposition without contradiction. One of them must go. By the 
criteria for the distinction between trivalence and gaps, 
trivalence consists in its being strong entailment that goes. The 
two-valued gapped interpretation depends in part on retaining strong 
entailment and therefore abandoning standard presupposition. 
We have seen that Van Fraassen apparently fails to note, or 
does not sufficently appreciate, this interconbection and hence the 
true cost of incorporating standard presupposition. This failure is 
quite general in treatments of presuppositionr I believe. Only 
Keenan and Hull 1973 concern themselves with the issue of what other 
semantic relations there might be in a system that includes a 
relation of standard presupposition. That system#, howeverr makes 
the same default assumption as other discussions that do not 
directly address the issue: that everything else for all purposes 
remains the same. In particular they assume (and embody the 
assumption in the formal presentation of the system) that strong 
entailment is retained. We should therefore expect that system to 
be contradictory. This I now show. 
Consider the definitions in (11) - given by Keenan and Hull 
1973: 450. 
154 
(11) a. S2 is a LOGICAL CONSBQUENCE of Sl just in case 
S2 is true in every state of affairs in which Sl is true. 
b. S2 is a LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION of S1 just in case 
S2 is true in every state of affairs in which Sl is 
either true or false (so S1 is neither true nor falser 
but vacuous, whenever S2 is not true). 
c. S2 is a LOGICAL ASSERT10N of Sl just in case 
(a) S2 is a logical consequence of Sl but 
(b) is not a logical presupposition-of Sl. 
The definitions of CONSEQUENCE and PRESUPPOSITION are clear enough. 
Consequence (as observed in C14 1) is weak entailment (equivalent to 
Van Fraassen's necessitation). And presupposition is standard 
presupposition. The definition of logical ASSERTICNr on the other 
hand, is not very perspicuous. In the form presented, its 
definition in parasitic on those of consequence and presupposition. 
I believe the intention behind this apparent ORDERING of the 
definitions is to promote the idea that logical assertion is in some 
sense SUBORDINATE to presupposition. As it werer logical assertions 
are those consequences left over after you have decided what 
consequences are presuppositions. There is a concomitant suggestion 
that the question of whether the presuppositions of Sl are true is 
logically prior to the question of whether the logical assertions of 
Sl (and hence Sl itself) are true or false. Notice that this would 
seem anyway to be implied by the definition of presupposition (as a 
condition on (bi)valence). 
But it does not work, as we see when we come to unpack the 
definition of logical assertion (11c). This is best done in stages. 
First we unpack 'logical consequence' and 'logical presupposition' 
in (11c). This yields (12). 
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(12) S2 is a LOGlCAL ASSERT10N of Sl just in case 
(a) S2 is true in every state of af fairs in which Sl 
is true, but 
(b) it is not the case that Sl is neither true nor false 
wherever S2 is not true. 
From (12) it is more clearly seen to follow that, where S2 is a 
logical assertion of S1. if S2 is not true then Sl is not true, by 
(12a) I and that, by (12b)r if S2 is not truer then Sl IS either true 
or f al se. Sor where S2 as a logical assertion of Sl is not true, Sl 
itself is both [not true] AND [either true or false]. Hence (by 
Modus Tollendo Ponens) where S2, as a logical assertion of Sl, is 
false, Sl is simply false. (12), then, is in turn equivalent to 
(13): 
S2 is a LOGICAL ASSERTION of Sl Just in case p 
(a) S2 is true in every state of affairs in which 
Sl is true, and 
(b) S1 is false in every state of affairs in which 
S2 is not true. 
The reader will recognise (13) as being the definition of 
STRONG ENTAILMIM. This system, then, purports to include BOTH 
standard presupposition AND strong entailment. The ordering of the 
definitions in (11) is actually immaterial. The intention behind 
the ordering is ineffectual because it is a response to two 
conflicting impulses. on the one hand we have the very reasonable 
desire on Keenan and Hull's part to RETAIN the relation of strong 
entailment (as 'logical assertion') but, on the other hand, to 
SUBORDINATE it to (make it weaker than) the relation of standard 
presupposition, which they also wish to retain. The attempt to 
reconcile the two aims fails (as it must), for it has the following 
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contradictory consequence. Consider again (9). above, repeated here 
as 
(14) a. Saumur is the capital of France and the King of 
France is bald. 
b. Saumur is the capital of France. 
c. The King of France is bald. 
d. There is a king of France. 
By the standard definition of presupposition (11b), (14a) inherits 
the third logical status of its second conjunct (14c). This is the 
standard definition's way of capturing the fact-that the conjunction 
as a whole shares the false presupposition (14d) of its second 
conjunct (14c). But by the definition of logical assertion/strong 
entailment,, the conjunction as a whole also inherits the falsity of 
the false strong entailment constituted by its first conjunct (14b). 
The conjunction as a whole is thus both false and neither true nor 
false by the definitions in (11) - and this is a contradiction. 
Notice, incidentally, that the contradiction will arise not only in 
overtly conjunctive (compound) cases but in simplex cases. Consider 
(15). 
(15) The king of France is standing next to me. 
(15) presupposes (16) but independently strongly. entails (logically 
asserts) (17): 
(16) There is a king of France 
(17) Someone is standing next to me. 
Given the definition of presupposition in (11c) and the fact that 
(16) is false,, (15) is neither true nor false. But now suppose in 
addition that (17) is also f alse. Then by the def inition in (11c), 
(15) is false. But then (15) is both false and neither true nor 
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f al se. 
The remainder of the dissertation presents the alternative 
concept and definition of presupposition that seems to be indicated 
by the discussion of this and the preceding chapters. 
I 
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PAJU UHREE 
PRESUPPOSITIM IN A IWO-VALUED LOGIC WITH GAPS. 
This third Part presents an alternative to the Standard theory of 
presupposition, the "revised" theory, which it is claimed, induces a 
presuppositional logic that is more easily construed as a two-valued 
logic with truth-value gaps. 
0 
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COAPTER VI. 
TUE BASE DEFINITION AND ITS PROJECI! IVE IMPLICATIONS. 
This chapter first reviewp the conditions to be met by a definition 
of presupposition suggested by the foregoing discussion (sections 1 
and 2) and then (section 3) presents the proposed definition - the 
Revised Logical Definition of Presupposition (MDP). The immediate 
consequences of that definition are then illustrated by reference to 
the logical status of conjunctive propositions with presuppositions 
(section 4) and by reference to the filtering of presuppositions in 
conjunctions (section 5). The result obtained in section 5 can be 
expected to ramify through the connective system by virtue of the 
interdef inability of the connectives. But before demonstrating that 
this is the- caser I need to explain the relation between the RLDP 
itself and the general theory of presupposition that follows from 
it. That is the subject of Chapter VII. 
1. Conclitions to be met by the definition. 
We saw in Part One that the concept of presupposition embodied in 
the SLDP is empirically problematic in its ýpplication to both 
simple sentences and compound sentences. Furthermore, by the 
criteria of the distinction between a trivalent system and a two- 
valued system with logical gaps here proposed, that definition has 
been shown to induce a trivalent system. This latter issue is not 
to be viewed as yet another independent problem f or the SLDP-. the 
empirical problems of the SLDP,, I suggest, stem from its trivalence. 
This can be shown by showing the extent to which the formulation of 
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a definition of presupposition that conforms to- the criteria for the 
inclusion of presupposition with a two-valued system with gaps 
resolves of itself the empirical problems encountered by the SLDP. 
Since our fundamental conception of presupposition entails the 
concept of LACK of truth value (rather than a third truth value),, 
the alternative must satisfy the criteria for the inclusion of 
presupposition within a two-valued system in which truth gaps arise. 
Furthermore, since we are claiming that the empirical problems of 
the SLDP stem from its trivalence, if the distinction between a 
trivalent system and a gapped system has reality (and has it on the 
terms suggested here) our definition must be genuinely and 
demonstrably distinct from the SLDP. I shall briefly review the 
implications of these remarks and show the connection between them. 
Since the definition must be consistent with the retention of 
strong entailment and all that that implies, it must embody a 
conception of presupposition weaker than strong entailment, one that 
allows the consequences of a false presupposition to be limited by 
the definition of strong entailment. The most ýalient implication 
of this is that the tie between (the falsity of) presupposition and 
the third logical status must be weakened. The definition must 
allow that a sentence suffering from presupposition failure may 
actually have a truth value. It must allow that the third logical 
status is not the INEVITABLE consequence of such failure. Under the 
SLDP concern. with the inheritance of presupposition (failure) 
perforce takes'the form of concern with the inheritance of the third 
logical status. We have seen that concern with the inheritance of 
the third logical status conflicts with the classical principle of 
the inheritance of falsity (which is also a logical status). Since, 
under the SLDPr concern with 131 constitutes concern with 
presupposition-f ailure, and since presuppositions are more often 
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inherited than not, concern with the inheritance of 131 willyýnilly 
overrides the principle of the inheritance of falsity which, it 
seems to me, is at the heart of what it is to be a specif ically 
LOGICAL system. In circumscribing the consequence of presuppos- 
ition-failure, then, we effect a logical separation between 
presupposition-failure and the third logical status. The 
theoretical arguments for doing this have been presented. The 
empirical advantages of doing so will become apparent as we proceed. 
It is clear that a definition that satisfies these requirements 
will indeed be genuinely and demonstrably distinct from the SLDP, 
The SLDP, as we have seen,, formulates presupposition as a bivalence 
condition; it is a definition IN TERMS OF the third logical status; 
it DIRECTLY expresses a putative truth gap intuition. We have shown 
the interconnections between these properties of the SLDP and the 
connections between them as a set and the view of that definition as 
being trivalent. Now a definition of presupposition in which the 
consequence of a false presupposition is limited by the definition 
of strong entailment reconciles presupposition failure with the 
bivalence of the presupposing sentence - to an appreciable degree. 
Such a definition then cannot take the form of or be construed as a 
bivalence condition. It cannot be expressed IN TERMS OF the third 
logical status. Nor can it DIRECTLY express a truth gap intuition. 
Nor can it DIRECTLY express the SPI that a presupposition is implied 
both by a sentence and its negation. 
In my ef forts to emphasise the necessity of the demonstrable 
distinctnesýs of the required definition and the SLDPj'. it may seem 
that I am playing down the other side of the coin. If the 
definition to be presented is as distinct as the discussion suggests 
it should be, do we in fact want it? It might be asked how far 
removed from the SLDP can a putative presupposition-definition be 
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and remain, in any intuitive sense, a logical definition of 
PRESUPPOSITION? These are matters to which I now turn. 
2. The nature of presupposition again. 
In Chapter III, I suggested that the essence of the logical concept 
of presupposition lay rather precisely in a notion of "innocence 
with respect to presupposition failure". A presupposition S2 of 
some sentence Sl is such that a speaker of SY,. while committing 
himself to the truth of S2,, does not and cannot countenance the 
possibility of S2 being false,, and therefore cannot countenance the 
possibility that Sl might be not-true on the specific grounds of the 
non-truth of S2. More generally,, a presuppositional language is 
such that, where the non-truth of a sentence is -attributible to the 
non-truth of its presuppositions, the non-truth of that sentence is 
not expressible in the language. 
It might appear that exactly this is expressed by the SLDP. 
That definition of presupposition effectively commits us to the view 
that a presuppositional language is one which exhibits that degree 
of semantic closure at which the nontruth of certain sentences 
(namely those suffering from presupposition failure) is not 
under any circumstances expressible. 
What the SLDP expresses is certainly very close to what is 
expressed in the first paragraph. But it is not the same. it 
is, in fact, much stronger. For it follows from the SLDP - but NOT 
from the contents of the first paragraph - that there isr in a 
presuppositional language, no true negation of any sentence 
suffering from presupposition failure. But we are not required to 
express THIS in order to express what is at the core of the concept 
of presupposition: that presupposition-f ail ure cannot of itself 
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induce the truth of the negation (the falsity) of the presupposing 
sentence. And this is a distinct idea because it allows that, while 
the negation of a sentence suffering from presupposition-failure may 
be true, its truth is not compatible JUST with the falsity of the 
presuppositions. This idea merely requires us to insist that, if 
there is a true negation of a sentence suffering from presuppos- 
ition-failure, then that negation is not expressive of that failure. 
In summary of these remarks, consider the principles expressed 
in (1) r (2) , and (3) : 
(1) A presupposing sentence cannot be false (solely) by virtue 
of the falsity of its presuppositions. 
(2) The truth of a presupposition is a necessary condition of 
z- the falsity (and the truth) of the presupposing sentence. 
(3) A sentence may be false when associated with a false 
presupposition. 
The principle expressed in (1) is an integral and important part of 
the Standard concept of presupposition and indeed of any conceivable 
logical concept of presupposition. But týe-SLDP achieves the 
statement of (1) by means of the much stronger principle given as 
(2). (2) indeed is the SLDP itself. And (2) entails (1). But 
they are not equivalent. For while (2) and (3) are mutually 
inconsistent, (1) and (3) are mutually consistent. (1) allows. that 
a sentence suffering from P-failure may be false just in case the 
grounds of its falsity are INDEPENDENT of the falsity of its 
presuppositions. i. e. on the grounds that, independently of whether 
its presuppositions are true or notr it "has false strong 
entailments. In other words again, and this s6ems importantr just 
in case it would anyway be false even WERE its presuppositions true. 
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The alternative definition of presupposition that is indicated, 
then, will be one which retains (and indeed consists in) the 
principle given as (1) - which 1 maintain is the logical essence of 
presupposition - but disembarrasses itself -of the much stronger 
(standard) principle given as (2). This will induce a logic 
consistent v1ith (3)r a logic in which strong entailment and the 
associated inference of Modu tollens are retained and hence 
classical conjunction and the connective system defined in terms of 
it. 
My answer to the question of how much of the essential 
conception of presupposition can be retained on the terms here 
demanded, then, is: as much as and NO MORE than is required. 
3. She Revised Logical Definition of Presupposition (BLDP). 
I shall initially present the RLDP in the form in which it first 
suggested itself to me, that isi, in the form of a reversal of the 
definitions of Keenan & Hull quoted above. -Oddly enought the 
hierarchy of semantic relations (or rather the reverse of it) that 
Keenan & Hull sought to achieve by means of their ordering of the 
definitions is actually achieved under this reversal. We shall see 
immediately, howeverr that this has the result that the definition 
can be expressed much more simply. 
Corresponding to Keenan & Hull's logical consequence (= Van 
Fraassen's necessitation) we define a general relation of weak 
entailment - (4a). Corresponding to Keenan & Hull's logical 
assertion, we define the standard relation of strong entailment- 
(4b). Then we define (revised) presupposition - (4c). 
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(4) a. S2 is a WEAK ENTAILMU of Sl if and only if 
wherever Sl is true S2 is true. 
b. S2 is a STRONG ENrAILD= of S1 if and only if 
I (1) S2 is a weak entailment of S1 
and (ii) wherever S2 is false,, Sl is false. 
c. S2 is a PRESUPPOSIT10N of Sl if and only if 
(i) S2 is a weak entailment of Sl 
but (ii) S2 is NOT a strong entailment of Sl. 
Under (4) the set of truth conditions of a sentence are its 
weak entailments (supporting madus wnen ). A subset of these weak 
entailments are strong entailments (supporting modu tollens). 
Presuppositions are weak entailments that form a subset 
complementing the subset consisting of the strong entailments. in 
fact the relation between weak entailment and strong entailment is a 
privative opposition: all strong entailments are weak entailments 
but not all weak entailments are strong entailments; those weak 
entailments that are not strong entailments are presuppositions. 
Note that since no truth condition can both be AND not be a strong 
entailment,, it follows that no truth condition can be both a 
presupposition and a strong entailment. Thisr incidentally, has the 
standard consequence that necessary truths do not (strongly) entail,, 
but presupposer themselves. 
It will be clear that the net effect of the definitions in (4) 
can be expressed very simply indeed: presupposition is non-distinct 
from weak entailment itself. This indeed constitutes the basic 
Revised Logical Definition of Presuppositionf and the Revised theory 
of presupposition that follows from it is a theory of weak 
entailment. 
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The sole distinction between strong entailment and revised 
presupposition, then, is that the former does, while the latter does 
noti, 'support mod tallens. In this, revised presupposition differs 
from standard presupposition, which, though definable in terms of 
weak entailment (from both A and its negation - more on this in due 
course) is not equivalent to weak entailment itself. While neither 
standard presupposition nor revised presupposition supports Modus 
tollen , the definition of revised presupposition CONSISTS in this 
negative property - while being compatible with the inclusion in the 
system of a semantic relation that does support modu tollen 
(namely strong entailment). The definition of standard 
presupposition,, by contrast, does not consist in this negative 
property in itself, though it entails that property because, as we 
have seen,. it more strongly entails that there can BE no relation of 
strong entailment as such, for modus tollens is held subject to the 
satisfaction of presupposition. 
Under (4) no relation is defined in terms of the third logical 
status. By (4) a sentence is true if and only if ALL of its truth 
conditions (weak entai-Iments) are true; and a sentence is false if 
and only if ANY of its strong entailments are false. So far, so 
standard. The only nori-standard feature is the distinction between 
strong and weak entailment induced by the fact that not all weak 
entailments are strong entailments. But since weak entailment 
presupposition, it is non-standard JUST to the extent of including a 
relation of presupposition. 
We have seen that the definitions define the conditions under 
which a sentence is true and the conditions under which a sentence 
is false. But they give rise a circumstance in which neither of 
these conditions are met, that in which none of the strong 
entailments is false but some weak entailment (presupposition) is. 
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In this circumstancef the system fails to assign truth and fails to 
assign falsity. The system is a PARTIAL logic in the sense that the 
third logical status to which it gives rise, and the manner in which 
it arises, does not intrude on the normal operation of the classical 
system, but arises negatively and by default,, as a consequence of a 
classical assignment of the actual truth values, true and false. I 
suggest that, by contrast with the third logical status of the SLDP 
- which is highly intrusive, vying on an equal footing with the 
classical truth values and overriding them, the third logical status 
of the RLDP much more closely approximates to the concept of LACK OF 
TRUTH VALUE. In the next section I shall provide a rather vivid 
illustration of these observations. 
In (5) 1 summarise these observations by outlining the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a sentence to be true, false 
and neither true nor false by the definitions in (4) - expressed in 
terms of strong entailment (SE) and weak entailment (WE) - taking 
negation to be nothing other than a function from truth (falsity) 
into falsity (truth),, a function that thereby FAILS to map anything 
OTBER than a truth-value into a truth value. 
(5) 
(i) a. S is TRUE (and not-S FALSE) iff all WE's of S are true. 
- ]by (4a). Hence: 
b. S is NOT TRUE (and not-S NOT FALSE) if f any WE of S is false. 
(ii) a. S is IFAISE (and not-S ME) iff any SE of S is false. 
- by (4b). flence: 
b. S is NOT FALSE (and not-S NOT MM) iff no SE of S is false. 
Bence by (5-(i)b) and (5-(ii)b): 
(iii) a. S (and not-S) is NOT TRUE and S (and not-S) is NOT FALSE 
iff some WE of S is false but no SE of S is false. 
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In the absence of any other proposals-for criteria of the 
distinction between a third truth value and a logical gap, I shall 
assume henceforth that the distinction consists in what I have said 
it consists in and,, therefore, that the RLDP does indeed induce a 
gapped system rather than a trivalent one. I shall therefore allow 
myself to refer to the third logical status to which it gives rise 
as a 'gap' and as the LACK of a truth value. 
The general theory of presupposition that is implied by the 
Revised Definition of Presupposition will not be immediately 
apparent just from this presentation of it. But before discussing 
the relation between the definition and the general theory (in the 
chapters that follow), I devote the next two sections of this 
chapter to a discussion of one central feature of the general theory 
that follows immediately from the definition - the handling of the 
presuppositions of conjunctive propositions. 
4. 'Ihe Revi. sed definition and conjunction. 
I again use conjunctionr this time as a means of illustrating the 
general character of the system induced by the RLDP,, but also as a 
way into the general issue of the presuppositions of compound 
sentences in the context of such a definition. In particular, I 
demonstrate that the RLDP is empirically consistent with the 
extrapolated truth table for classical conjunctiont here repeated as 
(6) : 
(6) &JT F3 
TIT F3 
F1F FF 
13 
Consider now, for the third time, the conjunction discussed as (9a) 
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and as (14a) in Chapter V- repeated here as (7) - and comPare it 
with the conjunction in (8). 
(7) Saumur is the capital of France and the King of France is 
bald. 
(8) Paris is the capital of France and the King of France is 
bald. 
(9) There is a king of France. 
Empirically/intuitively,, both (7) and (8) presuppose (9). But under 
the RLDP, only in (8) does the failure of presupposition manifest 
itself in lack of truth value for the whole conjunction. This 
is because only in (8) is the strong entailment constituted by the 
first conjunct true. Consistent with the classical definition of 
conjunction - in which the truth of a conjunct guarantees nothing 
specific in the way of a truth value for the conjunction* - the full 
force and characteristic consequence of the presupposition failure 
associated with the other conjunct manifests itself in (8). But in 
(7) the f al sity of the strong entailment constituted by its f irst 
conjunct is sufficient in itself to guarantee the falsity of the 
conjunctionr independently of the p-failure induced by the second. 
A reader still in the thrall of the SLDP will find this 
perverse: why should the truth value of the totally irrelevant 
first conjunct determine whether (7) and (8) should be gapped or 
not? As indicated, the query is based on the standard assumption of 
an indissoluAble equivalence between p-failure and-the third logical F- 
status,, in terms of which the falsity of (7) would entail that (7) 
I say 'nothing SPECIFIC' because the truth of a conjunct 
guarantees that the conjunction will have the SAME logical status as 
the OTHER conjunct. It is worth considering the following 
discussion in the light of this less specific guarantee, for this 
feature of classical conjunction - (p) > ((p & q) = q) - is 
preserved under the RLDP. It is under the SLDPI too,, but see the 
next footnote. 
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did NOT presuppose (9). But under the RLDP lack of truth value in 
the presupposing sentence is not the INEVITABLE consequence of p- 
failure,, it is only the CHARACTERISTIC consequence,, all other things 
being equal (i. e. all independent strong entailments being true). 
Indeed, it is precisely in terms of the irrelevance - the 
I independence - of the first conjunct that this can be made sense of. 
The point is that (7) is f al se f or a reason that is independent of 
the falsity of the presupposition. It is important to note in this 
connection that (7) would still be false even were the 
presupposition true and there were a king of France. 
The matter is not epistemological but it may be regarded from 
an epistemological point of view. Whether or not you know whether 
there is a king of Francer (7) is readily assessQble in classical 
terms given the independent knowledge that Saumur is not the capital 
of France. That is, it is possible strictly to KNOW that (7) is 
false without knowing whether or not there is a king of France. * 
It is important to note how the RLDP shifts the focus of 
attention in this respect. The empirical INconsistency of the SLDP 
with the conjunction plotted in (6) focuses our attention on the 
irrelevance of the truth value of the first conjunct of (7) to the 
fact that the conjunction inherits the false presupposition of the 
second. Under the MDPr which is empirically consistent with (6), 
our attention is instead f ocussed on the irrelevance of the f al, se 
presupposition (inherited from the second conjunct) to the 
assessment of (7) as being false. 
I 
The observation that (7), as much as (8), suffers from 
* In classical logic it is the case that a conjunction has the same 
truth value as any f al se conjunct: (-p) > ((p &ý q) = p) is a logical 
truth of CL. -This is preserved under the RLDP. but not the SLDP. 
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presupposition-failure and the observation that lack of truth value 
(is Only 
the characteristic not the inevitable consequence of such 
failure come together in the observation that, WERE the first) 
conjunct of (7) in fact true (as it is in (8)), then (7) itself 
would indeed lack a truth value by virtue of the falsity of (9). 
And thereby the empirical fact that (7) does presuppose what its 
second conjunct presupposes is captured by the revised logical 
definition of presupposition. 
To repeat, under the SLDP,, the third logical status is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of presupposition failure. Under 
the RLDP the third logical status (in the form of a truth gap) is 
not a necessary condition of presupposition-failure. 
There is an aspect of the foregoing discussion which rather 
clearly illustrates the significance of strong entailment in 
establishing criteria for the distinction between a third truth 
value and lack of truth value. Let me explain this. Under the MDP 
the second conjunct of (7) is gapped by virtue of the falsity of 
(9). Although the conjunction strongly entails its second conjunct, 
the conjunction thus inherits neither truth nor falsity from that 
conjunct. What concerns me here is the locution "lack of truth 
value". One MIGHT express the fact that (7) inherits neither truth 
nor falsity from its second conjunct by saying-that (7) inherits 
"lack of truth value" from that conjunct. But, as usually 
understood in such discussions, this would be wrong. For, AS 
USUALLY UNDERSTOOD,, this would be taken to entail that (7) itself 
should "lack a truth value" - as it is generally supposed to do 
under the SLDP. Yet under the RLDP there is a quite precise sense 
in which (7) does INVARIABLY inherit lack of truth value f rom the 
second conjunct - as long as this is understood in a conspicuously 
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negative sense to mean "inherits neither truth nor falsity" from 
that conjunct; in the sense, that is, of not inheriting anything in 
the way of a truth value from it. Indeed, this negative way of 
understanding "inherits lack of truth value" is the only way of 
understanding it under the revised definition of presupposition, 
because it is under that definition (and only under that definition) 
that (7) is still left free to inherit a truth value (namely 
falsity) from some other conjunctive source. 
It might appear that I am actually allowing that the expression 
"(inherit) lack of truth value" may have both a positive and a 
negative understanding. Under Standard Presupposition, (7) is 
rather clearly seen to inherit "lack of truth value" in the positive 
sense. It it, positive under that theory because the "lack of truth 
value" that is inherited vies on an equal footing with the classical 
truth values. It is positive enough, indeedr to supplant falsity in 
the matter of truth-functional inheritance. In fact, I am 
suggesting that this positive sense of "lack of truth value" is not 
legitimate - that it does not in fact consist in a lack of truth 
value at all. I suggest that what it really means on this positive 
sense is "lack of a CLASSICAL truth value". The difference between 
"lack of truth value" and "lack of classical truth value" is that 
inheritance of the latter, but not of the former, is consistent with 
the (positive) inheritance of a NON-CLASSICAL THIRD TRUTH VALUE. 
Lack of (classical) truth value in this context is just the negative 
obverse of a very positive non-classical coin. ' 
The point is illustrated by the contradiction noted earlier in 
connection with Keenan's system. When you effectively define BM 
standard presupposition AND strong entailmentl you derive a 
contradiction in the case of (7): the falsity inherited from the 
first conjunct and whatever it is that is inherited from the second 
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conjunct POSITIVELY CONTRADICT EACH OTHER. This contradiction would 
be bewildering were it really the 
.. 
case that Standard 
presuppositional logic indeed gave rise to a logical gap rather than 
a third truth value. By contrast, no contradiction results from 
defining both revised presupposition AND strong entailment. That 
isr no contradiction arises from the idea that (7) inherits both 
falsity from its first conjunct ANDr in its negative sense, lack of 
truth value from its second. For this simply means that, while (7) 
inherits NO TRUTH VALUE does not inherit any truth value) from 
the second conjunctr it can with perfect consistency still inherit 
f alsity f rom the f irst. With the result that (7) is simply f alse 
(while nevertheless presupposing what its second conjunct 
presupposes). 
5. Autauatic conjunctive filtering. 
Compare the conjunction in (7) above with that in (10): 
(7) Saumur is the capital of France and the king of France is 
bald. 
(10) There is a king of France and 
the king of France 
is bald 
he 
What (7) and (10) have IN COMMON is the fact that they are both 
conjunctions of a false conjunct and a gapped conjunctl and hence 
under the RLDP both are false. What DISTINGUISHES them is the 
intuitive fact that (7) does presuppose the existence of a French 
king while (10) does not. In other words, the presupposition of the 
second conjunct is inherited as such by. the conjunction in (7) but 
not in (10). ! Instead of presupposing that there is a king of 
Francer (10) logically asserts it. 
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This simple, obvious, and important distinction between (7) and 
(10) has proved problematic not only for the SLDP but for other 
theories. For example, a crucial (though unmentioned) feature of 
Gazdar's 1979 treatment of the cancellation of presuppositions as 
such is that, since the "pre-suppositions" of a sentence are 
cancelled (fail to become actual presuppositions - of an utterance) 
only if they are NOT consistent with the context with which the 
sentence is paired, that proposal fails to predict that the 
presupposition of the second conjunct of (10) is not presupposed by 
(10) itself. In this central case, the filtering of the 
presupposition has nothing whatever to do with inconsistency. The 
presupposition of the second conjunct is not only consistent with 
(10) but is actually equivalent to that subpart of (10) that 
constitutes the second conjunct's immediate context. Yet it is this 
very fact that constitutes the explanation of why, empirically, it 
DOES get filtered out as a presupposition. In terms of Gazdar's 
system, this presupposition could only be filtered out in an 
explicitly self-contradicting discourse. 
As regards the problem posed for the SLDP by the fact that (10) 
does not presuppose what its second conjunct presupposes,, this is of 
course one aspect of the issue addressed by Karttunen 1973 in his 
exposition of the projection problem for (standard! ) presupposition. 
We have seen thati, under the SLDP and given the falsity of (9), to 
say that (7) presupposes (9) is to say that (7) has the third 
logical status; to say that (10) does NOT presuppose (9), but 
logically asserts it, is to say that (10) is false. The problem is 
that Karttunen (or rather the SLDP) has to make very special 
arrangements for this: 
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(11) Let S stand for any sentence of the form "A and B"; 
a. If A presupposes C,, then S presupposes C; 
b. If B presupposes Cr then S presupposes C UNLESS 
A (strongly) entails C. 
(11) states that a conjunction inherits all the presuppositions of 
its conjuncts unless the presupposition is strongly entailed by the 
other conjunctr in which case it doesn't. (Actuallyr Karttunen 
allows only the presupposition of the second conjunct to be filtered 
in this way, thus making a distinction between (10) and (12): 
(12) the King of France is bald and there is a king of France. 
I disregard this distinction, treating (10) and (12) as identical 
for all logical purposes. The very real distinction between them is 
pragmatic, and the oddity of (12) is easily captured by either of 
the Grice4n injunctions to orderliness or appropriate 
informativeness or both. ) 
In showing just how special this arrangement is,, we shall see 
why it is required. We have seen thatr under standard 
presupposition, it is normal (indeed, definitional) for the 
consequence of a false presupposition to take precedence over the 
consequence of a false strong entailment (ignoring the fact that 
under this arrangement there can't strictly be strong entailments). * 
IN IBIS ONE CASE, though,, where the presupposition is also strongly 
entailed,, (1 . 1) has the effect of contradicting the standard defin- 
ition of presupposition by turning the whole system on its head. 
That is,, in this one case,, strong entailment is re-instated as a 
semantic relation of the system: in this one case, the consequence 
* That is,, given a sentence B which might be regarded as a 
candidate for being both a presupposition and a. strong entailment of 
A, it f ollows from the SLDP that it will be a presupposition, not a 
stronq entailment of A (from the MDP, on the other hand, it follows 
that S will be a strong entailment.. not a presuppositiont of A). 
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of a false strong entailment now takes precedence over that of 
presupposition-failure. 
We have already seen that the Standard definition already 
implies,, not a classical conjunction, but a 'wonderful new' 
'presuppositionall conjunctionr that plotted in (8) in Chapter V. 
Now we see, in additionr that under that definition we need a 
wonderful new gj IlQg conjunction. Its ad-hocery consists in the 
fact that it is non-truth-functional: 
(13) F3 
TJ TF3 
FFF 3/F 
33 3/F* 3 
(In fact, as noted, Karttunen's conjunction is as! 'metric (in 
Schmerling's 1975 sense); that is, where I have 13/F*l he would have 
just 131. ) The SLDP empirically thus takes us even further from 
classical conjunction than the earlier discussion of conjunction 
might suggest. 
Consider now the treatment that conjunctions like (10) receive 
under revised presupposition. Under the MDPr no special ad hoc 
arrangement is needed to capture the facts of the matter: that (10) 
does not PRESUPPOSE existence of a French king follows 
automatically. In this connection the part played by the relevance 
or otherwise of the first conjunct in (7) and (10) is at a premium. 
We have seen thatj, under the MDP, the consequence of a false strong 
entailment ALWAYS takes precedence over that of a false 
presupposition anyway. This is so in (10) as elswhere. So both (7) 
and (10) are false by virtue of the falsity of their strongly 
entailed (first) conjuncts. But the falsity of (7) is compatible 
with the fact that (7) has a false presupposition BECAUSE its 
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falsity is independent of the falsity of that presupposition. As 
noted, (7) would still be false even were the presupposition true. 
(10), we have seen, is also false on the grounds of the falsity 
of its strongly entailed first conjunct. But in (10) this first 
conjunct is IDENTICAL to the presupposition. (10) is thus false on 
grounds that are NOT INDEPENDENT of (what would otherwise have been) 
a false presupposition. Notice that, in contrast to what is the 
case with (7), it is NOT necessarily the case that (10) would still 
be false even were there a king of France. But the salient point to 
note is that,, since (9) is a strong entailment of (10) 1 it is NOT a 
weak entailment that is not a strong entailment of (10). And thisr 
by the revised definition of presupposition, means that (10) does 
not presuppose, but strongly entails (or logically asserts) the 
existence of a French king. 
This satisfactory result is achieved automatically, without 
special stipul 
, 
ationt maintaining the strictest possible classical 
conjunction, maintaining truthfunctionalityr the standard relation 
of strong entailment, and the associated inference of woclu tollens. 
The result here obtained revealsr rather-clearly in my viewi, 
the basis of my earlier contention that putative projection problems 
arise from, and can only be resolved in terms ofl the actual logical 
definition of presupposition itself. The reader may have noticed 
that I have been careful. in my discussion of Karttunen's work on 
the presuppositions of compound sentencesr to describe that work as 
an EXPOSITION of the projection problem for standard presupposition 
rather than as a SOLUTION to it. I am of course aware thatr 
whatever Karttunen's intentions in this regard, that work is 
generally interpreted as an attempt to provide a solution (see eg 
Gazdar 1979b). How this interpretation of Karttunen 1973 arises is 
beyond my comprehension. (11), for example, is nothing other than - 
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the particularised observation of the conditions under which a 
conjunction intuitively inherits or fails to inherit the 
presuppositions of its conjuncts. This particular observation is 
required because, not only are the facts observed not predicted by 
the SLDP, they are actually inconsistent with the SLDP. And THAT 
is the problem: it consists in the fact that if you wish to state 
what the presuppositions of a conjunctive proposition are under the 
SLDP,, then you are obliged to make an ad hoc stipulation, in the 
form of a statement such as (11),, a statement that is required 
precisely because it is not in fact consistent with the basic 
definition of presupposition assumed. But to observe this problem,,. 
however precisely and accurately, is not to solve it. 
The result obtained here is important in two respects. In the 
first place, it needs to be noted that, by virtue of the 
interdef inability of the classical connectives upon which we are 
insisting, We may expect the automatic filtering here demonstrated 
to ramify through the connective system as a whole. It does. Buti, 
as mentioned, before I can demonstrate that this is the case, I need 
to discuss the more general theory of presupposition that is implied 
by the RLDP. In particular, I need to discuss how the 
presuppositions of negative sentences are treated under the RLDP. 
This matter 
' 
needs toldiscussed f irst since the i. nterdef inabi-1 ity of kL 
the connectives crucially involves negation. 
Secondly, and more generally, from the point of view of our 
pre-theoretical conception of presupposition (and the reader can 
take this or leave it), the result is important because it relates 
to the idea of presuppositions as being IMPLICIT commitments which, 
because they ARE implicit,, are not (presented as) subject to debate. 
in this they contrast with the EXPLICIT commitments one enters into 
in making assertions, which are (presented as) subject to debate. 
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It follows from this that a presupposition ceases to be a 
presupposition as soon as it is made EXPLICIT in the form of an 
assertion. It is this pre-formal idea that I take to be 
reconstructed by the result obtained here. Since it is so central to 
our pretheoretical concept of presupposition, it&ight and necessary 
that the result should be immanent in (follow from) the very 
definition of presupposition itself. 
L 1ý. 
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COAPTER VI I 
THE GENERALISED DEFINITICN. 
This chapter is an exposition of the GENERAL THEORY of 
presupposition that is entailed by the RLDP presented in the last 
chapter. In particular we are concerned with how the 
presuppositions of negative sentences are handled under the revised 
theory. The RLDP throws up a relation of GENERALISED PRESUPPOSITION 
which I define in this chapter. It is in terms of this generalised 
relation that the empirical adequacy of the theory is to be 
assessed. In particular, it is in terms of generalised 
presupposition that the revised theory here presented captures the 
intuitive datum that the presuppositions of any Sl are implied by 
its negation (~Sl). 
Introductory: Logical presupposition and intuitive 
presuppositions again. 
In Part One it was noted that the Salient Presuppositional Intuition 
(SPI) is that of a proposition being implied both by a sentence and 
its negation, It was noted that the SLDP consists in the direct 
expression of the SPI, as in (1) 
A presupposes B iff A (weakly) entails B 
and -A (weakly) entails B. 
Thereby the SLDP was shown to amount to (2): 
(2) A presupposes B iff. -A presupposes 
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It is not my purpose to deny that the SPI is a central 
intuitive datum to be accounted for by any theory of presupposition. 
Yet direct expression of that intuition in the form of a logical 
definition (that is, the identification of defined presupposition 
and intuitive presupposition) leads by the criteria here proposed to 
a TRIVALENT logic of presupposition which, furthermore, makes a 
CCUNTERintuitive blanket prediction of third logical statuses. 
As noted at the beginning of the last chapter, it might appear 
that the requirements on any intuitively adequate alternative 
logical theory of presupposition are mutually incompatible. On tht 
one hand, if it is to count as genuinely distinct from the SLDPj, it 
cannot embody direct expression of the SPI nor amount in itself to 
(2). On the other hand, intuitive adequacy demands that the 
def inýtion -capture the intuitive datum on which (1) / (2) is based. 
I suggested in Part one,, howeverr that a theory of presupposition 
may capture the relevant intuitive facts without incorporating a 
definition that CONSISIS DIRECILY in the logical characterisation of 
the intuitive facts - provided those facts can be predicted in terms 
of the def inition such as it is. 
I take it that the intuitive datum directly. expressed in (1) is 
that given in (3a) from which (3b) follows (by the proof in Chapter 
II) : 
(3a) A 1N'IUITIVELY PRESUPPOSES B if fA intuitively implies 
B and -A intuitively implies B. 
(3b) A intuitively presupposes B iff -A intuitively 
presupposes B. 
Under the (trivalent) SLDP, B is predicted to be an INTUITIVE 
presupposition of A if and only if B satisfies the definition of 
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logical presupposition with respect to A. This cannot be under the 
(gapped) PLDP; nevertheless (3) must follow from the MDP. 
(3a) is of course the more perspicuous characterisation of the 
intuitive datum. Before proceeding, let us spell out explicitly 
what it tells us about the conditions to be met by a theory that 
claims to predict intuitive presuppositions as *such. There are two 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on the 
prediction of intuitive presuppositions: 
(a) Wbat is predicted must be predicted of S if and only if 
it is predicted of -S. 
(b) It must be an intuited IMPLICATION that is predicted. 
P/ 
In the two sections that follow I shall do three things: 
1.1 shall show that the RLDP is not equivalent to (1). This 
entails showing that a sentence S2 satisfying the MDP with respect 
to Sl does not satisfy that definition with respect to -Sl (Section 
2. ) 
I I. Then I def ine the relation of GENERAL ISED PRESUPPOSITION. 
This definition has two crucial properties: (i) it follows directly 
from the revised logical definition of presupposition, and (ii) it 
is a generalised relation in the sense that it applies without 
distinction to positive sentences and their negations, thus 
satisfying condition (a) above (also section 2). 
III. Then (in Section 3r at greater length) I show that it 
follows from the MDP that any sentence B satisfying the definition 
of generalised presupposition with respect to A is characterised as 
being intuitively IMPLIED by A, thus satisfying condition (b) above. 
I discuss the 'nature and status of the intuited implication when A 
is negative as this is characterised by the theory. 
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I-III will effectively show that, where S2 satisfies the MDP 
with respect to Sl, -Sl is characterised as INTUITIVELY IMPLYING S2. 
Since a sentence S2 satisfying the MDP with respect to Sl is a weak 
entailment of Slr and on the uncontroversial assumption that a 
logical entailment of Sl is intuitively implied by Sl, it follows 
thatr when S2 satisfies the RLDP with respect to Sl,, S2 is 
INTUITIVELY IMPLIED both by Sl and -Sl. It will then be the case 
that, while it is never the case that S2 satisfies the RLDP with 
respect to both Sl and -Slr it nevertheless follows from the RLDP 
that S and -S do share their INTUITIVE presuppositions as defined in 
(3). 
It is thus in terms of GFNERALISED PRESUPPOSITION that we show 
that the logical theory of presupposition embodied in the MDP does 
indeed reconstruct the intuitive relation of presupposition and 
predicts the intuited range of its instantiations. That isr I am 
using the notion of generalised presupposition as a means of 
explicitly spelling out the consequences of the RLDP itself r to 
facilitate the demonstration of how we may extrapolate from the MDP 
itself to a more general range of intuitive presuppositions. 
Generalised presupposition is not an independent concept laid on top 
of the theory constituted by the RLDP to mop up its inadequacies. 
It cannot be so regarded because the concept of generalised 
presupposition as it is defined here follows fr om, is thrown up byr 
the RLDP itself. 
Finally, a point of terminology. It has just been noted that 
the generalised theory of presupposition is entailed in its entirety 
by the RLDP itself with the result that,, if S2 satisfies the RLDP 
with respect to Sl, then S2 is a generalised presupposition of both 
Sl and -Sl. On these grounds 1 am allowing myself to call any 
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sentence S2 that satisif ies the RLDP with respect to Sl, a 
PRESUPPOSITION of Sl. As indicated, thoughr there are (predicted 
to be) more instantiations of generalised presupposition than there 
are sentences satisfying the RLDP with respect to some other 
sentence. I need a convenient labelr thenr for those (generalised) 
presuppositions that do satisfy the RLDP itself. I shallr where 
necessary, call such presuppositions BASE-PRESUPPOSITIONS or simply 
WEAK ENTAILMENTS. 
0 
2. The RLDP and generalised presupposition. 
This section is devoted to the demonstration of I and Il of the 
foregoing section. III is dealt with in the next section. 
I. It is a trivial matter to show thatr under the RLDP,, S and 
-S do not share their base -presuppositions. Under the FLDP a base- 
presupposition S2 of S1 is a weak entailment of S1 that is not a 
strong entai iment of Sl. Thisr we have seenr does not preclude 
there being strong entailments of Sl. It follows from this that#, 
whil ea sentence Sl with a false base-presupposition S2 cannot be 
false solely by virtue of the falsity of S2r it may nevertheless be 
false. The falsity of S1 is thus compatible witlý the falsity of its 
base -presuppositions (eg S2). 
Now, by - the definition of negation, -Sl is true if and only if 
Sl is false. If the falsity of Sl is compatible with the falsity. of 
its base -presuppositions, then the TWTB of -Sl. is compatible with 
the falsity of S2 where S2 is a base-presupposition of S1. Hence S2 
cannot be a (weak) entailment of -Sl - and hence cannot be a base- 
presupposition of -Sl. Thus, by the MDPI S and -S do not share 
their base-presuppositions, and the IRLDP is thereby shown not to be 
equivalent to (2) and to be a genuine alternative to the SLDP. 
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Although the demonstration of this fact has been brief and simple 
the reader will need to bear it in mind in what follows. 
II. We have just seen that under the RLDP where Sl base- 
presupposes S2,, -Sl does NOT base-presuppose S2 because -Sl does not 
(even) weakly entail S2. It is, neverthelessr equally easy to show 
that, where Sl base-presupposes S2, S2 plays a role in whether or 
not -Sl gets assigned a truth value which is identical to the role 
it plays ih whether Sl itself gets assigned a truth value. The 
facts are displayed in (5) of Chapter VI,, repeated here. 
(i) a. S is TRUE (and -S FALSE) iff all WE's of S are true. 
b. S is NOT TRJE (and -S NOT FALSE) iff any WE of S is false. 
a. S is FALSE (and -S ME) iff any SE of S is false. 
b. S is NOT FALSE (and -S NOT TRJE) iff no SE of S is false. 
(iii) S (and -S) is NOT ME and S (and -S) is NOT FALSE if f 
some WE of S is f al se but no SE of S is f al se. 
There it is seen that S and -S lack a truth value under the same 
condition, namely: if and only if the only false entailments of S 
are base-presuppositions of S (in other words, if and only if there 
is no false strong entailment of S but there is a false weak 
entailment of S). Thus, by the MDP, it is the case that 
(4) S lacks a truth value iff -S lacks a truth value. 
(For convenience, I shall occasionally refer to what is expressed in 
(4) as 'the shared property' of S and -S. ) 
(4) . incidentallyr is consistent with our criterion that only 
classical negation- which is nothing other than a function mapping 
truth onto falsity and vice versa - be included in a two-valued 
gapped logic. Thus negation is as in (5): 
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(5) AA 
TF 
FT 
33 
(5) appears to be the familiar negation of the SLDP. However, this 
is more a matter of appearange than anything else. Under the SLDP 
(5) means that a negative sentence shares the presuppositions of the 
sentence it negates. But we have just shown (in I) that, as far as 
BASE presupposition is concerned, (5) does not have this 
interpretation under the RLDP. Whereas under the SLDP the third 
logical status is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
presupposition failure,, under the MDP it is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition of base-presupposition-failure. Under the 
MDP, both positive and negative sentences may lack a truth value; 
but lack of truth výlue in a POSITIVE sentence is not a necessary 
condition of base-presupposition-failure in that sentence, and lack 
of truth value in a NEGATIVE sentence is not even a sufficient 
condition of baseý-presupposi tion-f ail ure in that sentence, since 
negative sentences do not have base-presuppositions as defined. I 
return to the matter shortly. 
I now define a relation of GENERALISED PRESUPPOSITION in terms 
of the shared property precipitated by the MDP. As mentionedr it 
is in terms of the notion of generalised presupposition that the 
RLDP is seen to predict the full range and character of intuitively 
attested presuppositions. Since we are insisting that an INTUITIVE 
PRESUPPOSITION of S be an INTUITIVE IMPLICATION of S,, and since the 
property utilised in the definition of generalised presupposition is 
indeed shared between S and -S, the definition commits us to the 
prediction that -Sr as much as S itself, INTUITIVELY IMPLIES the 
BASE-PRESUPPOS IT IONS of S. As mentioned, III is devoted to the 
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discussion of how this commitment is met by the theory; in the 
meantime (in advance of that discussion) howeverr the reader is 
going to have to take the 'generalised presupposition' defined in 
(6) as a purely theoretical entity. 
S2 is a GENERALISED PRESUPPOSITION OF Sl if and 
only if the falsity of S2 renders S1 liable to 
lack of truth value. 
The expression "renders ... liable (to lack of truLh value)" 
sounds vague and imprecise. out of context of the RLDPI (6) in 
itself is indeed vague. This is because it presupposes an 
independent statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a 3.! 1. -. (- LO lack a truth value. These are explicitly provided by 
the RLDP itself; that expression is provided with a precise 
interpretation by reference to the consequences of the MDP as these 
are spelt out in (5) of the last chapter, repeated above. It is 
precisely because (6) does depend on an independent logical 
specification of the conditions under which a truth value gap is 
induced, that (6) cannot itself serve as the base definition of 
presupposition under the theory. Inspection of that table shows 
that, ýf S1 base-presupposes S2 then both Sl and -Sl have S2 as a 
generalised presupposition. 
Before demonstrating that generalised presupposition as defined 
in (6) is characterised by the theory as being systematically 
correlated with an intuitive IMPLICATION from -Sl to S2. it is worth 
considering what (6) in itself tells us about the general theory of 
presupposition induced by the MDP, in particular about the relation 
between lack of truth value and base presupposition-failure. 
In aid of this, I shall introduce some special terminology. I 
noted earlier thatr under the IRLDP, lack of truth value in a 
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sentence (-)S is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of 
BASE presupposition-failure in (-)S. The RLDP may thus be described 
as a LOGICALLY DIVERGENT theory of the relation between the third 
logical status and presupposition-f ail ure. (This is why it is 
empirically consistent with a system of connectives (adopted by Van 
Fraassen) in which the third logical status is what Seuren would 
call "non-infectious". ) Neverthelessr I am of course accepting the 
existence of an empirically attested Truth. Gap Intuition (TGI). 
Furthermore, I concede that it is, in some. senser a CONVERGENT 
INTUITION (i. e. that there is a convergence between intuitions of 
presupposition-failure and intuitions about truth-value gaps). 
In contrast to the RLDP, the SLDP may be described as a 
LOGICALLY CONVERGENT theory of that relation. indeed, a logical 
theory of presupposition in which S1 is predicted to INTUITIVELY 
presuppose S2 if and only if S1 presupposes S2 by the logical 
definition, such as the SLDP,, must be LOGICALLY convergent if it is 
to be INTUITIVELY convergent. We have seenj in ef f ect, that the 
particular form of intuitive convergence predicted by the logically 
convergent SLDP is strict and absolute: S actually has the third 
logical status if and only if S suffers from (standard) 
presupposition-f ail ur e. (I shall call this 'STRONG' convergence. ) 
Thereby the SLDP models one particular Truth Gap Intuition. * This 
particular TGI, howeverr is not the only possible one, nor is it the 
only possible. CONVERGENT one. In other words, strong convergence is 
not the only possible kind of convergence. In point of fact, that 
particular TGI appears NOT to be the empirically attested Truth Gap 
Intuition. This, I will suggest, provides the source of the kind of 
intuitive counter-examples to the SLDP cited by Kempson 1975, among 
*The earlier demonstration that, under the SLDP, it cannot in fact 
be construed as a truth-value GAP (but must be construed as a third 
truth value). is beside the point in the present context. 
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- others. And Strawson 1964 concedes as much 
in respect of 
simple sentences. (Chapter IX is devoted to the issue. ) To be more 
specific, while the empirically attested TG I is convergent, it is 
not strongly convergent, as it is predicted to be by the SLDP (by 
means of its blanket prediction). These observations rather 
strongly suggest it is empirically NOT DESIRABLE for a logical 
theory to pfedict INTUITIVE convergence by way of LOGICAL 
convergence,, for it precipitates too strong a convergence. 
(6) shows that, in additionr it is NOT NECESSARY for a theory 
to predict intuitive convergence by means of logical convergence. 
(6) characterises a distinct, but nevertheless convergent, Truth Gap 
Intuition. But the convergence it characterises is more general 
(less absolute, weakerr more subtle). I shall call it just 
'convergence' or, where necessaryt 'weak convergence'. On the one 
handr it is convergent in the sense of tying lack of truth value to 
the failure of intuitive presupposition. on the other hand, the 
convergence is 'weaker' (and more subtle)* because it is a 
convergence, not between intuitive presupposition .. failure and ACTUAL 
lack of truth valuer but between intuitive presupposition-f ail ure 
and LIABILITY to lack of truth value. 
Strong convergence asymmetrically entails (weak) convergence - 
which is why -I have used those terms. In 
this respectr thenr the 
TG1 predicted by the SLDP is a special (much stronger) case of the 
TGI predicted by the RLDP. (Actual lack of truth value 
asymmetrically entails liability to lack of truth value. ) 
In summary, the RLDP is a LOGICALLY DIVERGENT theory of the 
relation between truth value gaps and presupposit ion-failure,, but 
it is an INTUITIVELY CONVERGENT theory of that-relation (it is 
MWERGENT in its predictions about the relation between truth value 
gaps and INTUITIVE presupposition-f ail ure). This reconciliation 
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between logical divergence and intuitive convergence is made 
POSSIBLE by dropping the (unnecessary) Standard assumption that an 
intuitive presupposition is predicted to hold from S1 to S2 if and 
only if S2 directly satisfies the logical definition of 
presupposition with respect to Sl. And this particular means of 
achieving intuitive convergence is,, I suggest, PREFERABLE because 
the weaker kind of intuitive convergence that it predicts is 
empirically a more accurate modelling of speaker's truth gap 
intuitions than the strong convergence Modelled by the logical 
definition of the SLDP. 
3. Generalised presupposition and the implication from -S. 
I now discuss (III) the intuitive implication 'that is characterised 
by the RLDP as holding from -Sl to S2 when Sl base-presupposes S2. 
What do we already know about the logical relation between -S1 
and S2 when Sl base-presupposes S2? on the one hand, we know that 
S2 is not a logical entailment of -Sl. On the other,, we have seen 
that the falsity of S2 may render -Slj as much as Sl itself, 
truthvalueless (whereas the falsity of a strong entailment of Sl 
renders -Sl true). That is, while the truth of S2 is a necessary 
condition of the truth of Sl, the falsity of S2 is NOT a SUFFICIENT 
condition of the truth of the negation of Sl. 
From this it follows that the negation of Sl is expressive of 
and only of the falsity of the conjunct set of the strong 
entailments of Sl. I mean by this that -Sl is true if and only if 
the conjunct set of strong entailments (that is, the entailments 
excluding the base-presuppositions) of Sl is false. Since, by the 
RLDPI -Sl cannot be true by virtue of the falsity of just the 
presuppositions of Sl, -Sl is NOT expressive of base presupposition- 
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failure in Sl. This means that there are entail ments of Sl which 
are not, and by definition cannot be, AT ISSUE in what is 
nevertheless the negation of Sl. 
In this respect at least, the MDP and the SLDP are exactly the 
same: neither. standard nor revised presuppositions of S are subject 
to the negation in -S. Let us pursue this comparison of the RLDP 
and the SLDP. 
Under the SLDPr a negative sentence -S is not expressive of 
(cannot be true by virtue of) failure of presupposition in S. This 
means to say that standard presuppositions of S by definition do not 
come within the scope of negation in -S. This fact is part and 
parcel of the idea that standard presuppositions are preserved as 
such under negationr and thereby of the idea that S and -S share 
their standard logical presuppositions. 
Under the RLDP,, presuppositions of S by definition equally do 
not come within the scope of negation in -S. I conf ess that at one 
time I was under the impression that it was sufficientr in the light 
of the contents of the preceding paragraph, to show just this in 
order to demonstrate that what is base-presupposed under the MDP by 
S will be implied by -S. (Russell 1905,, f or exampler took it thatr 
when Sl logically entails S2. an implication from -Sl to S2 is 
modelled simply by excluding S2 from the scope of negation in -Sl). 
This is not the case, though; indeed it could not be the case since,, 
if it were, it would indicate that the relation between -Sl and S2 
was one of logical entailment. But we have conclusively shown that 
base presuppositions (weak entailments) of S are NOT logically 
preserved as such under negation (i. e. are not preserved as weak 
entailments of -S). 
I suggest that we need to distinguish here between (a) not 
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being expressive of Presupposition-f ailure and (b) being expressive 
of presupposition-satisfaction. Under the SLDPr -S is not 
expressive of presupposition-failure in S BECAUSE, more strongly, it 
is expressive of presupposition-satisfactionr rather than 
conversely. And the standard theory consists in the expression by 
-S of presupposition-satisfaction in S. By contrastr the RLDP 
simply (and more weakly) consists in the non-expression by -S of 
presupposition-failure in S. 
Methodologically,, then, it is not enough in itself to 
demonstrate that a base-presupposition S2 of Sl falls by definition 
outside the scope of negation in -Sl in order to demonstrate that S2 
will in some way or another bV, implied by -Sl. Methodologically, 
more is required. This is not to say that it is irrelevant that the 
base-presuppositions of S by definition do not come within the scope 
of negation in -S. On the contrary, this exclusion f rom the scope 
of negation is fundamental to the further demonstration that -Sl 
intuitively implies S2 when S2 is a base-presupposition of Sl. I 
shall now show in what way the existence of an intuitive implication 
f rom -Sl to S2 follows from the fact that a base-presupposition S2 
of Sl is excluded from the scope of negation in -Sl. 
Up to this point I have been fairly vague about the 
implication,, calling it an 'intuitive implication' or an 
'implication of one sort or another'. It is in fact a DEFAULT 
IMPLICATION. I can best explain what I mean by this by discussing a 
familiar default implication that arises in the pragmatic domain of 
conversation. 'Having done that, I shall discuss the similarity and 
the difference between this conversational default implication and 
the presuppositional default implication which is our concern. 
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Consider the following conversational exchange: 
(7) Q: Has Max changed the oil and mended the brakes? 
R: He hasn't mended the brakes. 
It is uncontr over sially the case that (7R) . in its context of (7Q) 
carries the strong intuitive implication that, Max HAS changed 
the oil. This of course is not a sem-antic implication. 
Semantically the simple answer "No" is compatible with (a), (b) and 
(c) : 
(a) Max has done neither 
(b) Max has done the first but not the second 
(c) Max has done the second but not the first. 
The response given in (7) rules out (c), strongly suggests (b)r but 
is still logically compatible with (a) even though (a) and (b) are 
mutually incompatible. Since (a) is compatible with the answer 
given, r the suggestiort-that-(b) is cancellabler for example by "... and 
in fact I don't think he's changed the oil either". 
This intuitive implication to (b) is a clear case of 
conversational implicature - with special reference to the Maxim of 
Quantity. And,, like most if not all quantity implicatures, it is a 
default implication. A simple "No" by way of response, if it 
conveys anything beyond its semantics (which consists in the 
disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts specified in the 
context (7Q)) would implicate that BOTH conjuncts are false (this 
too is explicable by reference to the Maxim of Quantity). The 
actual responder has gone beyond a simple "No". taking the trouble 
to specify the negation of the second conjunct while not mentioning 
the first. Thereby he implies that the whole conjunction is false 
specificallyJand solely) by virtue of the falsity of the second 
conjunct. The intuitive implication to the truth of the first 
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conjunct thus arises by default, by virtue of the fact that the 
answer actually given is expressive just of the falsity of the 
second conjunct (is true if and only if Max-has not mended the 
brakes). 
The conversational default implication just discussed and the 
implication which I am claiming holds from -Sl to S2 when S1 base 
presupposes S2 are IDENTICAL IN ALL RESPECM EXCEPT GNE: under the 
RLDP the latter implication is NOT conversational. The IRLDPr in 
other wordsr invites us to entertain the idea that,, in addition to 
conversationally driven default implications, there are semantically 
(truth-conditionally) driven default implications. I shall now 
justify these' remarks. (In reading what follows,, the reader may 
find it helpful mentally to schematise a positive sentence with base 
-presuppositions as a conjunction of a single such presupposition 
and a single strong entailment. ) 
We have seen that the conversational default implication of 
(7R) in the context of (7Q) arises because (7R) is true if and only 
if Max has not mended the brakes. That response, in other wordsr is 
expressive of and only of Max' failure to mend the brakes. A 
speaker uttering that sentence in the context of (7Q) implies by 
default the truth of the first conjunct (that Max has changed the 
oil) by specifically excluding the first conjunct from the scope of 
the negation in the response that he does offer. Exactly the same 
may be said of -Sl and S2 when S1 base presupposes S2 under the 
RLDP. -Sl, to repeat, is true if and ONLY if some strong 
entailment of Sl is false: it is expressive of and ONLY of the 
falsity of the conjunct set of strong entailments of Sl. The weak 
entail ments (presuppositions) are specifically and by definition 
excluded from the negation. 
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Now, in the case of (7R) the default implication to Max' having 
changed the oil arises because of the context in which (7R) is 
uttered - namely (7Q). And that context includes an allusion to the 
proposition that Max has changed the oil. Now this context (7Q) is 
a genuine context - it is constituted independently of what it 
contextualises, namely (7R). And the impli cation arises only by 
virtue of that independent context: discount that context and the 
conversational default implication disappears leaving just the 
semantic implication that Max has not mended the brakes. By 
contrastr under the RLDP, by virtue of the fact that it is THE 
negation of Sl,, -S1 constitutes IN AND OF ITSELF the "context" in 
which S2 is seen to be specifically excluded from the scope of 
negation. The default implication to S2'arises not from an 
independent context but from the semantics of the very sentence 
(-Sl) itselfr from the fact that -S1 (and only -Sl) is nothing other 
than the negation of S1 (where S2 is a (weak) entailment of Sl),, -. 
Were we to attempt to discount whatever it is in -S1 that is the 
parallel of (7R)ls context and is thereby responsible for the 
default implication from (7R)r we would effectively have to discount 
the very semantics of -S1 under the RLDP: that is,, we would have to 
discount the fact that -S1 is the negation of Sl. In that case 
there would be nothing left over to talk about. The "context" that 
drives this default implication is constituted in the very semantics 
of -S1 itself. Since -S1 constitutes its own "context" in this 
respect andr since the notion of something constituting its own 
context is neither a legitimate nor coherent application of the 
concept of context, we are entitled to conclude that, in contrast to 
the conversational default implication discussed earlierr this 
particular default implication is NOT context-dependent. 
We have. seen thatr in addition to being context-dependent#, the 
conversational default implication from (7R) is cancelable (in fact 
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this can be seen as a matter of context-dependence also - see Gazdar 
1979). In other words, there is no semantic obligation on the 
utterer of (7R) to implicate that Max has changed the oil. More 
generally, and very obviouslyi, there is no semantic obligation on 
any responder to (7Q) who wishes to give an answer that negates or 
entails the negation of the conjunction to imply that Max has 
changed the oil. The implication that arises from the actual 
response given arises from the responder's intentional CHOICE in 
specifically excluding the first conjunct from the scope of his 
negative response. By contrast,, under the MDP, the exclusion and 
hence the default implication are NOT AT CHOICE. There is no 
negation of S1 but -S1 and, in -Sl, S2 (as a base presupposition of 
Sl) is semantically (not conversationally) excluded from the scope 
of the negation. The default implication is thus semantically 
driven, is not subject to utterer's decision, is not subject to 
cancellation. 
I am satisfied that the discussion has established that it does 
indeed follow directly f rom the RLDP that, where Sl base-presupposes 
S2r it is quite clearly predicted that -S1 intuitively implies S2. 
Let me now summarise what we know about this i6tuitive implication 
as it is characterised under the the revised theory of 
presupposition. 
(a) it is directly correlated with S2 being a generalised 
presupposition of -Sl. That is, it is semantic. It is even truth- 
conditional to the extent that the falsity of S2 renders -Sl liable 
to lack of truth-valuer and hence actually lacking in truth-value in 
some circumstances. 
(b) Yet, as an implication, it is NOT truth-conditional; i. e. 
it is not (even) a weak entailment of -Sl (since -S1 may be true 
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when S2 is false) . 
(c) It is a default implication of a kind already familiar to 
us from the study of pragmatic, conversational-implication. 
(d) Yet it is not conversational. 
This is as much as I know about it. If we were to summarise 
these points by saying that the implication is semantic but non- 
truth-conditionalf this would invite comparison of the implication 
with conventional implicature. Leaving aside any question of th6 
accuracy of that summary,, there would seem little reason not to 
characterise the implication as a conventional impIcaturej, since not 
much is known about conventional implicature other than that it is 
semantic and non truth-conditional. By the same token, however, the 
observation is of little explanatory value in this context since it 
seems to me that we know more about this particular implication than 
we know about conventional implicature. For example, we know that 
it is a default implication; furthermore,, we are in a position to 
give a quite precise account of how it arises and how it meshes with 
the truth conditional semantics of S and -S as these are 
characterised by the revised theory of presupposition. Assigning 
the implication to the non truth-conditional, ' non-conversational 
waste-paper basket of semantic convention does not, for example, 
explain how, if it is not truth-conditional, it is not cancellable 
without contradiction (Karttunen & Peters 1979: 2) -f or 
contradiction is a logical,. and hence truth-6onditionalf concept. 
What is a semantic but non-truth-conditional contradiction? 
Concomitantly, Karttunen & Peters 1979: 12 also assert that a speaker 
asserting Ar -where A conventionally implicates B, is COMMITTED to B, 
failing to note that commitment to B is commitment to the TRUTH of 
B; commitment is thus, at least in part, a logical, and hence truth- 
conditional, concept. This is the general conceptual problem that 
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is raised (in my mind at least) by the concept of conventional 
implicature. 
Karttunen & Peters,, of course, propose that some central cases 
of presupposition (including those induced by referring expressions) 
be treated as conventional implicatures (1979: 48). Wilson and 
Sperber's 1979: 301 remarks on this idea are very much to the pointr 
in particular their contention that this proposal results in no- 
clarification of their status. It should be notedl incidentallyi, 
that in order to characterise the implication from -Sl to S2 as a 
conventional implicature, Karttunen & Peters are obliged to 
characterise the implication from Sl to S2 as'conveniional as well. 
This is a very radical move indeed, at variance both with 
presuppositional and counter-presuppositional theories, but one that 
might be justified if it had any explanatory power. Buti, in this 
context, the appeal to conventional implicature as such constitutes, 
in my opinionr a very positive REMEAT from explanation. It appears 
to me thatr to the extent that the implication from -Sl to S2 as 
characterised by the Revised theory is accurately summarised as a 
semantic but non-truth-conditional implicationr then the Revised 
theory provides a much more clearly delineated explanation of the 
implication from -Sl to S2 than Karttunen & P'eters' theory; it is 
furthermore a theory that retains the basic assumption of truth- 
conditional theories (be they presuppositional or counter-presupp- 
ositional) that the implication from Sl to S2 at'least is a logicalr 
and hence truth-conditional, implication. 
The questions posed here require answers of course, but it 
seems to me that, in the present context, they may be left to stand. 
I do not have the answers; besides, what was required to be 
established for the purposes of the revised theory of presupposition 
has been established. At the risk of repetitivenessr I now 
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summarise this. i 
Two things follow most perspicuously from the basic revised 
logical definition of presupposition as weak entailment: (i) If Sl 
base-presupposes S2r then Sl is predicted to intuitively imply S2; 
(ii) Sl and -S1 do not share their base-presuppositions. We have 
nevertheless established (iii) that it also f ollows f rom the RLDP 
thatr where Sl base-presupposes S2. there is predicted to be an 
intuitively discernible semantic default implication from the 
negation of S1 to S2. From (i) -(iii) it follows (iv) that although 
-S1 does not base-presuppose what Sl base-presupposes, S2 is 
intuitively implied both by S1 and -Sl when Sl- basepresupposes S2. 
(v) To this extent, the RLDP characterises and predicts the 
character of intuitive presuppositions but without directly 
embodying a description of it. (vi) The RLDP concomitfintly makes 
directly available the definition of a relation of Generalised 
Presupposition such that (a) if S2 is a base-presupposition of S1 
then S2 is a generalised presupposition of S1 but not conversely 
(i. e. it is not (necessarily) the case that if S2 is a generalised 
presupposition of S1 then S2 is a base-presupposition of Sl); and 
(b) nevertheless, S2 is a generalised presupposition of Sl if and 
only if S2 is a generalised presupposition of -Sl. The relation 
between base-presupposition and generalised presupposition is thus 
identical to that between base-presuppositions and the character and 
range of intuitive presuppositions that are to be predicted. We may 
thus formulate the predictions of the MDP in terms of generalised 
presupposition,, as follows: 
B is predicted to be an intuitive presupposition of A if 
and only if B is a generalised presupposition of A. 
It should be emphasised that my use of the term "generalised 
presupposition" is not theoretically necessary (and hence neither is 
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the term 113ASE (presupposition) "). The MDP would make exactly the 
same intuitive predictions even if, in presenting the theory, we did 
not explicitly avail ourselves of the relation of generalised 
presupposition that it makes available. However, this notion of 
generalised presupposition is of great perceptual help since it is 
in terms of that relation that the salient implications of the MDP, 
(in particular for negative sentences) are embodied. The notion of 
generalised presupposition is thus a convenient way of packaging the 
theory for the purposes of presentation. Most of the ensuing 
discussion is presented in terms of it. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
PRWECTIVE PROPERTlES OF G12RIMISED FRESLIPPOSIT10N 
In this chapter I examine the projective properties of generalised 
presupposition. I show how the distribution of presuppositions in 
compound sentences and the resolution of presuppDsitional conflict 
in compound sentences follow automatically from the definition of 
generalised presupposition and hence from the MDP itself. The main 
point of the' discussion is to show that an adequate theory of 
presupposition should characterise projective properties as 
following from the concept of presupposition itself rather than 
attributing them as properties of the connectives. in later 
sections I show how a theory of presupposition that correctly 
predicts the presuppositions of compound sentences handles the 
presuppositions of modal sentences. 
Conjunction again. 
The (revised) base presuppositions of conjunctive sentences were 
discussed in Chapter VI. In the final analysis,, however, it is in 
termsýthe relation of GENERALISED presuppositibn thrown up by the 
MDP that the empirical predictive capacity of the revised theory is 
to be assessed. Every base-presupposition of S is also a generalised 
presupposition of S (and of -S). But, as' noted, not every 
generalised presupposition of S is a base-presupposition of S (in 
I 
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particular, if S is negative then it has generalised presuppositions 
but not base-presuppositions. ) Here I briefly show that the results 
obtained in Chapter VI in connection with the BASE-presuppositions 
of conjunctive sentences carry over to GENERALISED presuppositions. 
Consider the sentences in (1): 
(1) 
a. There is a king of France. 
b. The king of France is bald. 
c. The king of France isn't bald. 
Pa 
d. rumur' 
is the French capital & the king of France is bald 
Paris 
e. aumur 
aris 
is the French capital & the king of France isn't bald 
P 
f. There is a king of Franceý &týhe king of France i# bald. 
(bu 
It follows f rom the fact that (a) is a base--presupposition of (b) 
that (a) is a generalised presupposition both of (b) and of its 
negation (c). That is,, (c) exhibits the liability to lack of truth 
value that (b) does. 
The second conjuncts of both (d) and (e) thus have generalised 
presuppositions. The truth table for conjunction indicates that in 
both (d) and (e) - regardless of the polarity of the presupposition-- 
inducing conjunct - the conjunction as a whole is rendered liable to 
lack of truth value by virtue of the liabilify to lack of truth 
value of their second conjuncty which is turn is due to the falsity 
of (a). Thus (d) and (e) inherit the generalised presupposition (a) 
via (b) and (d) respectively. 
A conjunction then inherits all the generalised presuppositions 
of its conjuncts. abis, with the exception of conjunctions such as 
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that in (f). There the falsity of (a) straightforwardly renders (f) 
false since (a) is the first conjunct of (f) and is therefore 
strongly entailed by (f). The falsity of (a) does not,, thereforer 
render (f) liable to lack of truth value, but renders it false. As 
a strong entailment of (f),, (a) can neither be a base nor a 
generalised presupposition of (f). 
This establishes thatr in terms of generalised presupposition), 
which is a function of the definition of base-presuppositionr the 
revised theory of presupposition correctly predi*ctsf without special 
stipulationr the intuitive presuppositions of conjunctive 
propositions. 
2. Disjunction. 
It was observed in Chapter III that in CL 
(2) A disjunction is TRJE iff at least one disjunct is true 
and F&SE iff all disjuncts are false. 
Assuming (i) the classical propositional equivalences presented in 
Chapter III, in this case that in (3) below, (ii) the conjunction 
defined in (6) of Chapter VIr repeated as (4) below,, and (iii) the 
negation defined in (5) of chapter VII, repeated here as (5): 
(A V B) ': -- -(-A & -B) 
T F 3 
T F 3 
F F F 
3 F 3 
we derive a truth table for disjunction as in (6): 
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TF 
TTTT 
FTF3 
3T33 
Since both the conjunction in (4) and the negation in (5) 
conform to the classical definitions,, it is inevitable that the 
disjunction in (6) should do so too. The reader may confirm for 
himself that (2) still holds in (6). A (revised) presuppositional 
language gives rise to a circumstance in which neither of the 
conditions defined in (2) is met. This is the circumstance in which 
there is no true disjunct (and hence the disjunction is not true) 
and in which it is not the case that all disjuncts are false (and 
hence the disjunction is not false). In this circumstance, then, 
the functor defined in (2) fails to yield a truth value. (It is a 
classical functor but partial with respect to logical statuses other 
than the truth values. ) Thus liability to lack of truth value - and 
thereby generalised presupposition - is truthfunctionally inherited 
by a disjunction. This is what is plotted in '(6). 
For : Lilustrative purposes, I will plot the derivation of this 
result in 'terms of the equivalent conjunctive sentence made 
available by (3) above#, namely -(7a), which it is convenient to 
represent as (7b): 
(7a) -(-A & -B) (7b) 1. 1 
2. 
39 
4.13 
If C is a base-presupposition of A then C is a generalised presupp- 
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osition of A (Level 4) and of -A (Level 3). Likewise for B (L. 4) 
and -B (L. 3). It has just been shown that a conjunction inherits 
the generalised presuppositions of its conjuncts (L. 2). Inheritance 
from L. 2 to L. 1 is effected by the application of the same principle 
as that which effected the inheritance from LA to L. 3,, since L. 1 is 
the negation of L. 2. Hence (7a) and any sentence equivalent to (7a) 
shares the generalised presuppositions of A and of B. [A V B] is 
equivalent to (7a), hence, in generalf disjunctions inherit the 
generalised presuppositions of their disjuncts. 
That there should be an exception to this generalisation about 
disjunction is predictable from the fact that there is an exception 
in the conjunctive context. Presuppositions may be filtered in 
disjunctions as in conjunctions. Since, under the RLDPr the 
filtering is automatic in conjunction,, we may expect the filtering 
effect of disjunction to follow automatically. 
The intuitive datum to be predicted here is the fact that 
neither (8a) nor (8b) presuppose the presupposition of their second 
conjunct, namely (8c). 
Ma. Either there's no king of France or he's bald. 
b. Either there's no king of France or he isn't bald. 
c. There is a king of France. 
See also (d): 
d. Either the KF is(nlt) bald or there's no KF. 
There is of course a more natural way of expressing exactly what is 
expressed by (8a-b and d) in terms of a conditional. This is dealt 
with shortly. The same filtering phenomenon is exhibited,, slightly 
more naturally, ', in (9a)r which equally does not presuppose what its 
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second conjunct presupposes, namely (9b): 
(9)a Either Max hasn't written a letter of acceptance or 
it has got lost in the post. 
b. Max wrote a letter of acceptance. 
In what follows I abbreviate "There is *a king of France" as 
"Exkf (x)", and "The king of France is bald" as "kfb". We saw above 
that, under the RLDP, neither (10a) nor (10b) inherit the 
generalised presupposition of its second conjunct, namely (10c): 
(10) a. Exkf (x) & kf b 
b. Exkf(x) & -kfb 
cl Exkf (x). 
Since S2 is a generalised presupposition of S1 if and only if S2 is 
a generalised presupposition of -Slj, it follows that the negations 
of (10a) and (10b) - (11a) and (11b) respectively - do not inherit 
that generalised presupposition either. 
(11) a. ~ (Exkf (x) & kf b) 
b. ~ (Exkf (x) & -kf b) 
By de Morgan's law,, (11a) and (11b) are respectively equivalent to 
(12a) and (12b): 
(12) a. ~~ (-Exkf (x) V ~kf b) 
b. -~(~Exkf(x) V ~~kfb) 
By double negation - once in (12a) f twice in (12b) - (12a) and (12b) 
are respectively equivalent to (13a) and (13b): 
(13) a. -Exkf (x) V -kf b 
b. 
. 
~Exkf (x) V kf b. 
But (13a) is the abbreviation of (8b) and (13b) is the abbreviation 
207 
of (8a). In short, the disjunctions in (8) are predicted not to 
inherit the generalised presupposition (8c) by virtue of the fact 
that they are logically equivalent to conjunctions already 
characterised by the RLDP as not inheriting that generalised 
presupposition. 
An alternative and more summary way of presenting this result 
is by noting that the disjunctions in (8) are TRUE by virtue of the 
truth of their first disjunct. But the first disjunct is the 
negation of (8c) j, where (8c) is the base presupposition of the 
second disjunct. Since (8a) and (8b) are thus actually TRUE by 
virtue of the falsity of (8c)#, they are not rendered liable to lack 
of truth value by virtue of the falsity of (8c). Hence (8a) and 
(8b) do not exhibit (8c) as a generalised presupposition. 
The fact that has been captured here, without sad IlQg post- 
definitional stipulation or a concomitant loss of truth-function- 
ality, is that all presuppositions of disjuncts are inherited by 
their disjunction EXCEPT where the negation of the presupposition is 
strongly entailed by another disjunct. This fact cannot be captured 
by the SLDP without special stipulation and loss of truth-function- 
ality. In order to capture the fact that all presuppositions of 
disjuncts are inherited by their disjunction the SLDP is committed 
to an "infectious" disjunction (in which 131 in a disjunct 
invariably precipitates 131 for the disjunction). But then special,, 
non-truth-functional account must be taken of the exception. 
What is achieved under the Revised theory is achieved by virtue 
of compatibility between the definition of generalised presuppos- 
ition and the classical disjunction plotted in the truth table (6) 
above. That truth table is familiar from the work of Kleene 1938 
and Van Fraassen ef 1970 (see Herzberger 1970r Karttunen 1973). 
Hausser employs it too. In contrast to Kleene, who was not 
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concerned with presupposition, Van Fraassen 1970 and Hausser 1976 
explicitly employ (6) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SLDP. This is 
curious. The SLDP is, as noted, not empirically compatible with 
that disjunction. In the context of a logically convergent theory 
such as the SLDP, (6) entails that no disjunction EVER inherits the 
presuppositions of its disjuncts (the point is noted but very much 
Ras. 9an in Gazdar 1979: 94). This is so because, under the %DP#, 
presupposition inheritance is to be tracked by and only by the 
inheritance of the third logical status 131; but in (6) the 
disjunction may not be 131 when any disjunct is. 
In the disjunctive context particularly, there is a yet more 
serious aspect of the inadequacy of a theory that includes both the 
SLDP and a connective in which 131 is, in Seuren's terms, "non- 
inf ectious". (i. e. a theory that attempts to reconcile the standard 
definition of presupposition with the classical disjunction defined 
in (2)). Under the SLDP, intuitive presuppositions are predicted' 
wholly in terms of weak entailment. It cannot be the caser theni, 
that S1 standardly presupposes S2 if S1 may be true when S2 is 
false. Now let S1 be a disjunctive proposition and S2 the false 
presupposition of one of its disjuncts. That disjunct will be 
assigned 131 by the SLDP, but (6) shows that a disjunction that 
includes a disjunct assigned 131 may not only have a truth value but 
may in fact be TRUE. Hence by (6) no disjunction ever weakly 
entails (and hence never standardly presupposes or (revised) base- 
presupposes) the presuppositions of its disjuncts. 
As notedr Van Fraassen simply ignores this incompatibility of 
Standard Presupposition and classical disjunction (more generally, 
the classical connective system). Hausser 1976, on the other handr 
appears to be aware of the incompatibility. He. informally attempts 
to reconcile his retention of the strongly convergent Standard 
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theory of Presupposition with his retention of the non-infectious 
classical connective system. We have seen that they are not 
empirically reconcilable. However, it is the overriding thesis of 
the present work that a logical theory of presupposition can (and, 
to conform with the criteria for a gapped logic, must) be reconciled 
with classical logic,, but that this can be achieved only by 
ABANDONING the SLDP in favour of a weaker definition of presuppos- 
ition in which the third logical status is more genuinely 
construable as a truth-value gap, precipitated by a classical system 
that includes that weaker relation of presupposition. I suggest 
that what Hausser, in effect, sought to achieve is logically 
achievable,, but not without abandoning the SLDP. Hausser's evident 
reluctance even to entertain this idea (despite'its being so clearly 
indicated by the enterprise upon which he was engaged) provides a 
rather clear example of the general commitment to Standard 
Assumption 1. the assumption that the SLDP is necessary component in 
a logically based theory of presupposition. 
Weak entailment provides the basis of both the Standard and the 
Revised theory of presupposition. Yet we have seen that,, given the 
disjunction in (6), the fact that no disjunction weakly entails the 
weak entailments of its disjuncts renders the SLDP empirically 
inadequate but not the IMDP. The crucial difference is that, under 
the SLDP, S1 is predicted to intuitively presuppose S2 if and only 
if S2 is a weak entailment of Sl. While the revised theory of 
presupposition is based on weak entailment (the-9, DP consists in the 
contention that there are weak entailments that are not strong 
entailments), the RLDP precipitates a more general relation of 
presupposition (generalised presupposition) which is not directly 
characterisable in terms of weak entailment. It is in terms of this 
generalised relation of presupposition that intuitive 
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presuppositions are predicted. And generalised presupposition 
operates in terms not of actual lack of truth value but in terms of 
LIABILITY to lack of truth value. 
3. Corditional. s. 
As observed in Chapter III, in CL 
(14) A conditional is TRUE if and only if either the consequent 
is true or the antecedent is f al se, and FALSE if and only 
if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. 
Assuming the classical equivalence in (15): 
(A > B) M -(A & -B) 
and classical conjunction and negation as before (see (4) and (5) 
above). a familiar (cf Kleene, Van Fraassen, Hausser) truth table 
for conditionals is derived as in (16): 
TF 
ITF3 
TTT 
33 
(14) still holds in (16) as the reader may confirm. As with the 
other connectives, a (revised) presuppositional language gives rise 
a circumstance in which neither of the conditions defined in (14) is 
met, namely that in which the consequent is not true nor the 
antecedent false (hence the conditional is not true) and in which it 
is not the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false 
(hence the conditional is not false). In this circumstance, then, 
the f unctor defined in (14) fails to yield a ýruth value. This is 
what is plotted in (16). Thus liability to lack of truth value - 
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and thereby generalised presupposition - is truth-functionally 
inherited by a conditional. 
Conditionals of the kind exemplified in (17),, however,, do NOT 
inherit the generalised presupposition (c) of the consequent: 
he's bald (a) 
(17) If there is a king of Francer he's not bald (b) 
c. There is a king of France. 
Again, this fact is predictable (i. e. predicted) since, by virtue of 
the logical equivalences in (18)r 
(A > B) ME V 
(A > -B) 3-- (-A) V (-B) 
(17a) and (17b) are logically equivalent to the disjunctions in (8a) 
and (8b) respectively, which have already been shown not to inherit 
(17c) (=8c) as a generalised presuppposition. 
And againr it should anyway be noted thatr by the classical 
definition of conditionalityr both (17a) and (17b) are TRUE by 
virtue of the falsity of their antecedents. But the antecedent is 
(17c) itself r the generalised presupposition that is our concern. 
Since (17a) and (17b) are actually true by virtue of the falsity of 
(17c),, they are not rendered liable to lack of truth-value by virtue 
of the falsity of (17c). Hence neither (17a) nor (17b) have (17c) 
as a generalised presupposition. 
As with most discussions of the presuppositions of 
conditionals,, this discussion has proceeded on the assumption that 
the material implication of the standard propositional calculus 
adequately dharacterises the semantics of the natural language 
correlative expression if-the . This is a contentious issuer of 
course,, but one which lies beyond the scope of the present 
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discussion. Two comments seem worth making, though. (a) Ina 
context in which we wish to claim that the semantics of natural 
language conjunction, negation, and disjunction ARE adequately 
characterised by the appropriate operators of the standard 
propositional calculus, it is not clear that we are at liberty to 
pick and choose among the connectives of that system. (b) In the 
context of presuppositional logic, I am impressed by the fact that 
the classical system of connectives that includes material 
implication, when allowed to operate in conjunction with a more 
appropriate definition of presupposition (one that does not 
override or distort the inherent features of that system), does of 
itself make the correct predictions as to the presuppositions of 
logically compound sentencesr including conditionals. We should be 
chary of abandoning it. 
4. McCawley on multiple compounding. 
In this section I briefly rebut a suggestion made by McCawley 
1979: 372. McCawley effectively contends thatr from the fact that a 
theory captures the filtering of presuppositions in conjunctions and 
in conditionals, it does not of necessity follow that it captures 
such filtering in more complex cases, for example cases involving 
BOTH conjunctions AND conditionals. The example he cites is (19a): 
(19a) If Nixon is Jewish, then he loves his mother and regrets 
that he's Jewish and loves his mother. 
This particular example does not appeal to me so I'll change it, in 
non-relevant ways, to (19b): 
(19b) if Jim is a semanticist, then he knows something 
about logic and regrets that he's a semanticist and knows 
something about logic. 
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The facts of the matter are that, while the second conjunct of the 
consequent of the conditional presupposes that Jim is a semanticist 
and knows something about logicr the whole conditional (19b) itself 
does not. 
McCawley's contention is expressed in terms of Karttunen's 
filtering conditions on connectives. He maintains that those 
conditions "do not account f or the f il tering in [ (19b) I (that is,, 
they incorrectly imply that [ (19b) I presupposes that [Jim is a 
semanticist and knows something about logic]" (p. 373). Apparently 
they 
"prov. ide no way for the antecedent of the conditional and the 
first conjunct of the conjunction to join forces: ... [ilin j'a a semanticist md regre 1hat; lw.!, g a sewanticist. &=d know something 
abou logi I presupposes that [Jim is a s(ýmanticist and knows 
something about logic] since [L" j,. g a gemanti Ugtl does not entail [Z" jg aae m anti r-i st And h2gXg som thing about logi I .... [(19b)] will then presuppose that [Jim is a semanticist and knows something 
about lWic since the antecedent Q11jig "g semanticis ]) does not 
en ail the presupposition of the consequent (Qin "a semanticist 
know- gmething &QUL lwic]). " (McCawley 1979: 373) 
This argument is premissed on what appears to me to be an almost 
wilful disregard of the fact that if a sentence presupposes a 
conjunction, it presupposes the conjuncts of that conjunction. I 
see no reason not to assume that (20) presupposes (21) if and only 
if (20) presupposes (22) and presupposes (23): 
(20) Jim regrets that he's a semanticist and knows something 
about logic. 
(21) Jim is a semanticist and knows something about logic. 
(22) Jim is a semanticist. 
(23) Jim knows something about logic. 
The relevant features of (19b) maybe displayed as follows, where 
I VN' I means "presupposes". 
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(19b) > 4. 
(22) 3. 
(23) (20) 2. 
-V- 
& (21) 
Z'*"ý 
(22) (23) 1. 
At level 2, since (20) exhibits (21) as a presupposition, it 
exhibits (22) and (23) as presuppositions. But at level 31 (23) is 
a strong entailment of the conjunction and hence not a 
presupposition of that conjunction, by reasoning already presented. 
Since the conjunction at level 3 does not presuppose (23), it cannot 
presuppose any conjunction (such as (21)) having (23) as a conjunct. 
But the conjunction at level 3 does still presuppose (22). Moving 
up to the conditional at level 4, (22) is the antecedent of that 
conditional: - (22) is thus f il tered out as a presupposition of the 
conditional by reasoning already presented. (19b) is thus predicted 
not to presuppose either (22) or (23) and this filtering is 
predicted directly on the basis of the filtering predicted in 
conjunctions in combination with the filtering predicted in 
conditionals. 
5. Conflicting presuppositions. 
One of the more intriguing (and, for the standard theory, 
problematic) projective properties of presupposition is that when 
the presuppositions of different atomic sentences conflict with one 
another, all such presuppositions are filtered out of compound 
sentences containing those atomic sentences, with a consequent 
resolution of the conflict. This was first noted by Liberman 1973r 
and almost en passant by Wilson 1975: 81. in particular, it is 
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discussed by Hausser 1976 and, at great length, by Soames 1979. The 
phenomenon is illustrated in (24), adapted from W il son, (25) and 
(26) from Soamesr and (27) from Hausser: 
(24) Either John is regretting that he went to the party or he 
is regretting that he stayed away. 
(25) Either the loan company repossessed Bill's only car or 
they repossessed his second car. 
(26) Either Bill spoke to the King of Slobovia or he spoke to 
the president of Slobovia. 
(27) The liquid in the tank has either stopped fermenting or it 
has not yet begun to ferment. 
These disjunctions are truth-functionally transformable into 
conditionals in which the same phenomenon ýs observable. For 
exampler (24) is equivalent to (241) and to (24"): 
(241) If John's not regretting he went to the party,, he's 
regretting he stayed away. 
(24") If John's not regretting he stayed away from the party, 
he's regretting he went to it. 
A logical theory of presupposition that is empirically 
compatible with the classical connective syýtem, such as that 
induced by the RLDPr captures these facts automatically and 
beautifully. I owe my perception of this to the discussion in 
Hausser 1976. Recall that Hausser there attempts to reconcile the 
standard theory of presupposition with the classical connective 
system. The reconciliation, perforcei, is non-logical, extra- 
theoretical and notional, since in terms of the logic of the 
standard theory itself, the standard definition of presupposition 
and the classical connective system are NOT empirically compatible. 
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Nevertheless,, it is Hausser's insight that, WERE it somehow or other 
possible to ef f ect a logically consistent reconciliation between 
SOME logical definition of presupposition' and the classical 
connective system,, it would provide the means of capturing these 
f acts. I shall therefore explain how the revised theory of 
presupposition captures the facts of the matter by reference to 
Hausser's exampler (27) above. In what follows I have used a 
pronoun "instead of "the liquid in the tank". 
Let us assume, with Hausser, that (28) presupposes (28a) and 
logically asserts/strongly entails (30): 
(28) It has stopped fermenting. 
(28a) In the past, it was fermenting 
(30) It is not fermenting now. 
And again, with Hausser, let us assume that (29) presupposes (29a) 
and logically asserts/strongly entails (30): 
(29) It has not begun to ferment. 
(29a) In the past it was not fermenting. 
(30) It is not fermenting now. 
These empirical assumptions (especially that associated with (29)) 
may be open to question,, but that is beside the point in the present 
context. If the relevant facts are as we are assuming, (27) may be 
represented schematically as: 
(27) =V 
(28) (29) 
presupposes asserts presupposes 
.111 (28a) (30) tz9a) 
where (28a) and (29a) are contradictory. 
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Clearly, if the strong entailment (30) is false (i. e. if the 
liquid IS fermenting) then both disjuncts (28) and (29) are false 
and the whole disjunction (27) is false, for reasons that are 
independent of the presuppositional status of (27). But let us 
assume that the liquid is indeed NOT fermenting (i. e. that (30) is 
true). Now: the liquid either (A) WAS or (B) WAS NOT fermenting in 
the past. Therefore: 
A. If the liquid WAS fermenting in the past, then: 
the presupposition (28a)" ýhe presupposition (29a) 
is TRJEj, and therefore is FALSE, and therefore 
AND 
(ii) (28) is TRIE (29) LACKS TIUTH VALUE 
and (iii) the. disjunction (27) is ME by virtue of Lr[ (28) 1=T. 
B. If the liquid was NOT fermenting in the past#, then: 
the presupposition (28a) the presu sition (29a) 
is FALSE, and therefore is TRUE,, 
MO 
therefore 
AND 
(A) (28) LACKS TRJTB VALUE (29) is TRUE 
and (iii) the disjunction (27) is TRUE by virtue of V-[(29)] = T. 
What this demonstrates is that, in all possible states of 
affair's (that. are relevant to our concern), (27) is either true or 
false, never lacks a truth value. If the liquid is fermenting, then 
the whole disjunction is FALSE. But where 'the liquid is not 
fermenting (ie. where (30) is true)r the falsity of the 
presupposition of the second disjunct renders the first disjunct,, 
and hence the whole disjunctionr TRUE - while the falsity of the 
presupposition of the first disjunct renders the second disjunct, 
and hence the whole disjunctionr TME. 
In summary,, under the circumstances considered, (27) is not 
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rendered liable to lack of truth value by virtue of either the 
falsity of (28a) or the falsity of (29a). Hence neither (28a) nor 
(29a) satisfy the definition of generalised presupposition with 
respect to (27). and thereby the filtering of conflicting 
presuppositions in compound sentences is captured automatically. I 
am not aware of any simpler internally consistent treatment of this 
phenanenon. 
In the above exposition I have assumed that all other 
presuppositions are satisfied, since they are irrelevant to the 
matter of presuppositional conflict. (27) of course is still liable 
to lack of truth value by virtue of presupposing (31), for example, 
and this is as it should be. 
(31) There is liquid in the tank. 
6. Modality: the basic case. 
In this and the next section I deal with aspects of the logic of 
presupposition whichr with one important exception, do not 
differentiate the Standard Theory and the Revised Theory presented 
here. They may thus be seen as a general defence of the logically 
based (semantic) approach to presupposition. 
In the general criticism that a semantic approach to 
presupposition has attracted, the following fact has received more 
than its fair share of attention (see eg Karttunen 1971,1973). 
(32) Sentences of the form Posgibl L intuitively inherit the 
presuppositions of A notwithstanding the fact that PossibI 
does not-(even weakly) entail A. 
That is, a theory of presupposition must be capable of giving an 
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explanation of the intuitive validity of (33) (taken f rom Karttunen 
1973) 
(33) a. A presupposes B 
b. A is possible. 
c. Therefore B. 
Karttunen comments: 
"By defining presupposition in terms of entailment ... one can only justify a weaker conclusion, namely (cl) 
cl. Therefore B is possible. 
Contrary to what is claimed in Karttunen 1971 1 do not think that 
the intuitive validity of [ (33) J can be accounted for by giving a 
more adequate semantic definition of presupposition. " (1973: 171)* 
This putative problem for truth-conditional definitions of 
presupposition led Karttunen 1973 to assign Rossibl (and other 
modal expressions that might be taken to be equivalent to it egwAy., 
wight. maybe. perhapa) to an ad hoc (non-semantic) category of 
'holes' (presupposition-inheriting predicates). And generally (32) 
has been taken to demonstrate the impossibility of any theory of 
presupposition based on entailment. 
Even on methodological and prima facie groundsr this suggestion 
strikes me as misconceived. We have seen that the definition and 
resulting truth table for disjunctionr for exampler constitutes a 
logically coherent algorithm capturing the fact that a disjunction 
inherits the presuppositions of its disjuncts*and it does this 
notwithstanding the fact that a disjunction does not (even weakly) 
entail its disjuncts. Yet the issue that has received most 
The "more adequate semantic definition" alluded to here is: A 
resupposes B iff ssible-A implies B and possible-not-A implies B 
Karttunen 1971F. 
0 
This definition of presupposition simply 
describes that phenomenon which Karttunen regards as constituting a 
problem for the SLDP itself. Why this should count as giving a more 
adequate definition is not clear to me. 
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attention in connection with the Standard theory's treatment of the 
Presuppositional behaviour of disjunction is not this, but the fact 
that the standard definition makes the wrong predictions as to the 
CONDITIONS under which presuppositions are inherited by a 
disjunction. 
That particular problem does not arise under the revised theory 
presented here. Buty independently of this distinction between the 
SLDP and RLDP, we know that there is at least one case (namely 
disjunction) in which it is not incompatible with a logically based 
theory of presupposition that a sentence A should inherit the 
presuppositions of a sentence that is A's constituent but which A 
does not entail. I conclude from this that no prima facie case 
against a logically based theory of presupposition can be 
constructed on the basis of the phenomenon described in (32). 
My use of disjunction to illustrate this point is advised. In 
fact my present purpose is to argue that any theory that captures 
the presuppositions of logically compound sentences thereby captures 
the fact that Vgssibl & inherits the presuppositions of A. In this 
section I establish that this is so in the basic case before turning 
(in the section that follows) to the issues raised by more 
complicated cases involving pgz%jWu- 
It is well recognised (see, for example, Horn 1972: Ch. 2, 
1973: 208, Burton-Roberts 1984: 111) that necessity*(G) is the modal 
analogue of conjunction, and possibility (, ý>) the modal analogue of 
disjunction. We have seen that conjunction is definable in terms of 
universal quantification over constituent sentences: necessity is 
definable in terms of universal quantification over possible worlds 
(0 AA is true in all possible worlds). Disjunction., we have 
seen, is definable in terms of existential quantification over 
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constituent sentences: possibility is definable in terms of 
existential quantification over possible worlds (4>A = there is at 
least one possible world in which A is true). Thus the following 
hold: 
(34) a. [I A entails <ý 
entaas V( 
(35) a. nA entails A 
but4o 
A does not entail A. 
b. &( ... A ... ) entails A but V( ... A ... ) does not entail A. 
(34)-(35)#, integ Lj, ", are a function of the fact that the 
semantic relations betweenV3 and,; ý5, and between & and V are merely 
examples of a very general de Morgan's equivalence, expressible as 
in (36), where 0 and 0 are variables aver the relevant operators: 
12 
(36) 0000~ (o 000 (-0 0 0) ) l(2) 2(1) 
For exampler just as conjunction (disjunction) is definable in terms 
of a negation within the scope of disjunction (conjunction) which is 
in turn in the scope of negation, as in 
(37) (A & B) -A V -B) 
Q 8) (A V B) -A & -B) 
so (0) is definable in terms of a negation within the scope of 
Aýý-([)) which is in turn in the scope of negation: 
(39) [2 A=~ <ý ~A 
(40)'ý> A=- EI -A 
We have seen that the inheritance of generalibed presupposition 
in disjunctions is predictable - at least from the base (and hence 
generalised) presuppositions of conjunctions. That 13 A should 
inherit the pr-esuppositions of A is unproblematic both in itself 
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(because it entails A) and by virtue of being the modal analogue of 
conjunction. 4ý>A bears the same relatign toCIA as V(... A... ) 
bears to &(... A ... ),, and the same relation to V(... A ... ) as 
VI A 
bears to &( A... ) . 
Given these wel 1-establ i shed facts it wouldr from the point of 
view of a logically based theory of presupposition, be 
extraordinary and highly problematic were it not the case that O-A 
empirically (intuitively) inherits the presuppositions of A. This, 
then,, is the general prima facie argument to the effect that the 
presuppositional behaviour of pgssibl is not only compatible with a 
theory of presupposition based on entailment but naturally predicted 
by such a theory. 
As to the actual mechanics of the prediction, these are readily 
apparent as being constituted in the equivalence expressed in (40) 
abover repeated here. In (41) the left-hand side of the equi- 
valence is factored out into 'levels': 
(40) 0P=-0 -P (41) 
. 1: 
4. 
'J3. 
- 
2. 
p 1. 
At level Ll let P exhibit a base-presupposition Q. Then P 
exhibits Q as a generalised presupposition. As discussed above, 
for any k the negation of A shares the generalised presuppositions 
of A. L2 is the negation of Ll; hence L2 inherits the generalised 
presupposition Q. Inheritance by L3 of the generalised 
presupposition exhibited at L2 is effected by virtue of the axiom of 
necessity ([JA ý> A); i. e. L3 semantically entails L2. Inheritance 
by L4 of the generalised presupposition exhibited at L3 is effected 
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by the same principle as that invoked for the inheritance by L2. 
Hence, at 4,, -q-P inherits the generalised presuppositions of P. 
But -U-P is the definition of -OP. Hence <ýP is predicted to 
inherit the generalised presuppositions of P. 
Given the standard definition of possibility in terms of 
necessity and negation, it is inevitable that any property of P that 
is shared by its negation will also be shared biý <>P. 
This observation applies both to standard. presuppc)sitions and 
to the generalised presuppositions of the revised theory. However, 
we shall shortly see t hat it has a general implication in the 
context of the standard theory which it does not have in the context 
of the revised theory. A proper examination of this implication 
lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. In what follows I 
shall do no more than outline what seem to me to be the bare 
essentials of the matter. 
Gazdar (1979b: 92) observes "Proof that [(possible A) I cannot 
semantically presuppose [the presupposition's of (A)] if the 
possibility operator is taken to be that of S5 can be found in 
Thomason 1973. " (In referring to semantic presupposition herer 
Gazdar is referring to a (standard) concept of semantic 
presupposition in which if A does not weakly entail B then A cannot 
semantically presuppose B. ) Now Thomason does indeed provide such 
a proof (pp 12-3). The implication of the above result, then, is 
that the apprcpriacy of S5 is brought into question by the standard 
theory. Since S5 is commonly regarded (though not universally - cf 
Hughes and Cresswell 1968: Chs. 3,, 4) as the simplest and most 
intuitive modal system, this implication is of some importance. 
The crucial feature of S5 is this. In S5 the accessibility 
relation between possible worlds is universal and absolute. By this 
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I mean that it is'transitive,, symmetric, and reflexive. Each and 
every possible world is accessible to each and every world including 
itself. Thus what is true in one possible. world is at least 
possible in EVERY other world. With the result that the 
characteristic thesis of S5 is: 
(42) Op = Dýp. 
(What is possible is necessarily possible - and of course 
conversely). 
In presenting Thomason's proof, I will take (43)-(45) as my 
examples: 
(43) There is a king of France. 
(44) Týe king of France is bald. 
(45) It's possible that the king of France is bald. 
(43) effects An exhaustive and non-intersecting division of the set 
of all possible worlds into a (sub)set A in which (43) is true and a 
(sub)set B in which it is not. The set of worlds in which (43) is 
true is a set consisting of worlds in which (44) is either true or 
f al se. In a logical system admitting of truth value gapsi, the set 
in which (43) is false is a set consisting of worlds in which (44) 
is undefined. Picture this as in (46): 
(46) 
[ (43)] 
[ (44)] [- (44) 1 
Since the set of all possible worlds is one constituted by the 
union of A and B and, since in S5 each world in that set is 
accessible to every other world including itself, it follows that 
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the worlds in which (43) is true are accessible to those in which it 
is not (A and B are mutually accessible). But every world in which 
(43) is true is a world in which either (44) or. -(44) is true. From 
this it f ollows that the possible worlds in which (44) is true are 
accessible to the worlds in which (43),, as the presupposition of 
(44)f is false. This means that, even in worlds in which (43) is 
false, (44) is possible (true in some accessible possible world). 
Hence the truth of (45) is compatible with the falsity of (43). In 
an ordinary S5 system, then,. Possible-A does not weakly entail the 
presuppositions of A and hence cannot standardly presuppose them. 
Standard presupposition thus implies a modal system that is at 
least a modification of S5. Revised presupposition does not have 
this implication. Under the revised theory, the presuppositions 
that possible-A inherits from A are GENERALISED presuppositions, and 
generalised presuppositions need not be (and,, in the case of 
ssible, are not) weak entai-Iments. Given the intuitive centrality 
of S5,, the fact that the Revised theory succeeds in capturing the 
presuppositional behaviour of possibl WITHOUT bringing S5 into 
question might appear to count rather strongly In favour of the 
revised theory as against the standard theory. However, it is not 
clear to me, as it appears to be to Thomasonr that S5 should be 
taken for granted, particularly in a context in which presupposition 
(of any kind) is taken into account. I will exp; ain this remark by 
means of a brief examination of the modification of S5 that is 
implied by the standard theory. 
The standard theory implies, in particularr that the 
accessibility relation between worlds be defined and constrained in 
terms of the relation of presupposition. This would amount to 
establishing presuppositionally-bounded subsets of worlds (A and B 
in the above example) which are mutually INaccessible. (There is 
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incidentally no reason not to assume that each such subset is an S5 
system. ) 
This would have the ef f ect of making those worlds in which 
either (44) or its negation is true accessible only to those worlds 
in which (43) is true. Thus (44) and its negation are only (seen to 
be) possible (true in some accessible possible world) for worlds in 
which (43) is true. This does not seem totally implausible. 
Concomit, nntlyr the worlds in which (43) as a presupposition of 
(44) is true would ALL be accessible ONLY to each other (i. e. each 
in A to all and only those in A). This has the result that (43) 
acquires the status of a necessary truth in A (i. e. in those worlds 
in which it is possible). 
Furthermore, as already been observed in Ch. IV: in a gapped 
logic mainta ining truth-functionality,, [(44) V -(44)] is true 
(logically so) only on the assumption that the presuppositions of 
(44) - eg (43) - are true. That is to say, [ (44) V -(44) ] is true 
only in that presupposition-bounded set of mutually accessible 
worlds defined by (43). And [(44) V -(44)] is true in ALL those 
worlds. Thisr combined with our earlier observation that (43) is 
necessary in A, would yield the satisfactory result that [(44) V 
-04H is necessary in and only in a set of worlds in which its 
presuppositions are necessaryl 
By this modif ication, we derive a modal reconstruction of the 
distinction between a (strong) entailment, q of p. and a standard 
presupposition, r of p, such that, while p is true only in those 
worlds in which both q and r are truer r as a presupposition of p 
renders worlds in which -r is true INACCESSIBLE to the worlds in 
which p is true. But q, as an entailment of p, does not have a 
comparable effect: the worlds in which -q is true remain accessible 
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to those in which p is true. 
It appears to me that the driving forcer - the rationaler of this 
modification of S5 is not entirely lacking in plausibility. 
It amounts to the not unreasonable idea that one's powers of 
conceiving of alternative states of affairs is circumscribed by what 
one presupposes/takes for granted. This perhaps rather bland 
observation, and the observed properties of the modified S5 system 
here envisaged, are in fact entirely consistent with the 
(independent) pretheoretical account of the nature of presupposition 
of f ered in Chapter I 11.5. Recall that it was suggested there that 
to ASSERT P is to be committed to P while COUNTENANCING the 
possibility that P might be false, but to PRESUPPOSE P is to be 
committed to P while NOT COUNTENANCING the possibility that P might 
be f al se. This idea is rather closely reconstructed in the 
modification here considered. 
It should arryway be noted that there nothing extraordinary in 
the general idea of modal presupposition-bounding. The unmodified 
S5 system that is taken for granted by Thomason is itself a 
presupposition-bounded modal system. That system is defined and 
circumscribed by the set of valid propositions. in an unmodified 
S5 system, a world i is in the system if and only if all the valid 
propositions are true in i and in all the worlds accessible to i. A 
world in which a valid proposition is false is to not accessible to 
i and hence, _ from the viewpoint of i and its mutually accessible co- 
worlds, is not a possible world. Butr as already noted,. all valid 
propositions satisfy the definition of presupposition with respect 
to every proposition (i. e. they are trivial presuppositions). Hence 
an unmodified S5 system is "trivially" a presupposition-bounded 
modal system. In the present context,, though, this is no trivial 
matter. 
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The difference between this "trivial" presupposition-bounding 
and the "non-trivial" presupposition-bounding envisaged above is 
that the former defines a UNIQUE set of possible worlds: all the 
valid propositions satisfy the definition of presupposition with 
respect to the same single (universal) set of propositions. Non- 
trivial presupposition, on the other hand, is a proposition-specific 
and hence variable relation. Each proposition definesf in terms of 
its own particular non-trivial presuppositions, its own particular 
presupposition-bounded set of accessible worlds. And each such 
presupposition-bounded set may or may not overlap and/or be 
consistent with any other such set. 
This is merely the roughest of sketches of the S5 modification 
that seems to be implied by standard presuppositioni, and I shall not 
pursue its ramf ications further here - in part because they are not 
relevant to the revised theory of presupposition. I confess to being 
somewhat relieved that the revised theory of presupposition does not 
commit us to such modal complications. On the other hand,, as my 
latter remarks may have indicated, I am not sure that these 
complications of modality should not be implied by ANY properly 
worked-out theory of presupposition. In this connection,, a 
suggestion of Rescher's is relevant: "a correct understanding of the 
nature of presupposition requires the use of modal concepts" 
(1960: 527). 
7. Compound modal cases. 
Mie foregoing section established, inter alia, that under both the 
standard and revised theories of presupposition, the presuppositions 
but not the strong entailments of A are correctly predicted to be 
inherited by Wssibl L, at least in the basic case considered. In 
229 
this section 1-deal with two types of example (first noted by 
Liberman 1973) which have been viewed as posing a particular 
projection problem for certain theories of presupposition. They are 
represented by (47) and (48): 
(47) It's possible that John has children and it's possible that 
they are away. 
(48) It's possible that John doesn't have children but it's 
possible that they are away. 
The significance of (47) is that intuitively it does not presuppose 
the presupposition of its second conjunctr namely (49): 
(49) John has children. 
This datum might be taken to be problematic f or the revised theory 
because the filtering exhibited in (47) is 'reminiscent of the 
filtering exhibited in non-modal conjunctions such as (50): 
(50) John has children and his children are away. 
Recall that the filtering in (50) is straightforward1y explained by 
the fact that (50) strongly entails (49) andr in doing so, cannot 
presuppose it under the revised theory. In (47). howeverr since the 
conjuncts are modal? (49) is not a strong entailment of the first 
conjunct: [possible A] does not entail A. It might appear, thenr 
that the revised theory fails to predict the intuitive filtering in 
(47). 
The most natural move to make in explanation of this filtering 
is to analyse (47) - with the two mssibl Is inside the scope of the 
conjunction - as being equivalent to (51), where the relative scopes 
of modality and conjunction are reversed: 
(51) It's possible that John has children and they are away. 
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ol 
A 
Then the filtering of the presupposition (49) is captured at the 
(lower) level of the conjunction#, - just as it is in (50), andy since 
on this analysis the (conjunctive) complement of rassibI does not 
exhibit (49) as a presupposition, neither does (51) or,, therefore,, 
(47) itself. 
Gazdar (1979b: 112) considers this explanation in the context of 
his critique of Karttunen and Peters 1977. He comments: "It is not 
really open to Karttunen and Peters to claim that such sentences 
)b actually map in/semantic representations in which there is only one 
modal operator outside the scope of the conjunction, since they 
would then be faced with the job of explaining why [(52)] and [(53)] 
are not synonymous": 
(52) It is possible that John has children and it is possible 
that he is childLess. 
(53) It is possible that John has children and is childLess. 
Gazdar is mistaken in this. It is true that (54) 
(54) (4>p) & (0q) = <>(p & q) 
is not a theorem of orthodox modal systems (see Hughes and Cresswell 
1968: 34f 37-8); - that is, it is not the case that every formula of 
the f orm [ (iýp) & (<>q) I is equivalent to af orm6ia of the f ormj[ (p 
& q)]. This is precisely because of cases such as (52)/(53), in 
which p and q are inconsistent. But it does not follow from this 
that NO such pairs of formulae are equivalent. On the contrary: 
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where either p or q (strongly or weakly) entails the other, as in 
our example (47) j, it is clear that such a pair of formulae will 
indeed be equivalenti, as I now demonstrate. Given the 
prcpositional equivalence (55) 
(55) (A > B) (A & B) 
we may substitute (A & B) for every occurrence of A when A implies 
B. Now set A to (0p) , and set B to (<1q), In respect of our 
example (47). p implies q. It follows from thi s that (<ýp) implies 
(4ýq) - see Hughes and Cresswell 1968: 31,, T8 ( (p-, 3q) > (Mp > M, q)). 
Hence,, by (55)r (56) and (57) are equivalent. 
(5 6) p) & (0 q) 
(57) (p & q)) & 
Furthermore, given T10 of Hughes and Cresswell 1968: 37: 
(58) 'ý' (p & q) >( Op & <ý q) 
and the equivalence in (55) again, (57) is itself equivalent to 
(59) : 
(59) '0 (p & q) 
Thus when p implies q,, (56) and (57) are equivalent and (57) and 
(59) are equivalent. Hence when p implies q. (56) and (59) are 
equivalent. But (56) is the form of (47) and (59) is the form of 
(51). Hence (47) and (51) are indeed equývalent. The non- 
equivalence of (52) and (53) has no bearing on this result. 
In conclusion, the proven equivalence of (47) and (51) 
constitutes the natural (indeed inevitable) explanation of the 
filtering exhibited by the former. 
I turn now to (48), repeated here: 
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(48) It's possible that John doesn't have children but it's 
possible that they are away. 
This example exhibits the same filtering of the presupposition (of 
the second conjunct) that John has children exhibited by (47). The 
explanation provided for the f iltering in (47), however, is not. 
directly available in this case because (48) is not logically 
equivalent to (60)f which would be required by such an explanation. 
(60) lt's possible that John doesn't have children and they are 
away. 
(60), but not (48). is necessarily false. 
1 have said that that explanation is not 'directly' available; 
butr as this impliesr I believe the filtering exhibited in (48) is 
attributable, though more indirectlyr to the same conjunctive 
filtering appealed to (by means of the reversal of modal and 
conjunctive scopes) in the case of (47). The indirectness involved 
is due to the fact that this claim depends on establishing an 
appropriate relationship between the first conjunct of (48) and that 
of (47). if that can be establishedr I shall, feel entitled to 
suggest that *(47) and (48) should be treated in essentially the same 
manner. In the first instance, I shall draw attention to the 
PRAGMATIC relation between the first conjuncts of (47) and (48). In 
due courser though, I shall strengthen the argument by showing that, 
in this particular caser the relation is not simply pragmatic, but 
semantic. 
It is uncontroversial (cf Fogelin 1967y Horn 1972,1973, Gazdar 
1979 among others) that, while sentences of the form of (61) and 
(62) 
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(61) Possible A 
(62) Possible -A 
are semantically independent of each otherr utterances of such 
sentences are pragmatically related. * In fact, as discussed in 
Burton-Roberts 1984, they are pragmatically equivalent; utterances- 
of sentences of the form (61) conversationally implicate sentences 
of the form (62) and utterances of sentences of the form (62) 
conversationally implicate sentences of the form (61). This 
equivalence is so intuitively salient as to have led Aristotle to 
incorporate it in his modal logic,, despite its inconsistency with 
other features of that logic (cf Hintikka 1960, Lukasiewicz 1960j, 
Fogelin 1967). 
Given this general pragmatic equivalence between (61) and (62) 
the first conjunct of (48) is pragmatically equivalent to the first 
conjunct of (47). Thus (47) and (48) themselves (s'ince their second 
conjuncts are identical) are at least pragmatically equivalent. The 
semantic explanation of the filtering exhibited by (47) could well 
be seen as being carried over to (48) on the back of this pragmatic 
equivalence. 
However, to the extent that this explanation of the filtering 
in (48) depends on its PRAGMAT1C equivalence to (47) r it might be 
regarded as rather weak. Besidesr it would be tantamount to 
claiming that, in 'semantic realitYr (48) does presuppose that John 
has children and that,, from the semantic point of viewr the 
filtering is only apparent (a matter of 'pragmatic appearance). I 
am not content with saying this and want to strengthen the 
*. Actually,, there is some controversy on the question of whether 
the relation is semantic or pragmatic cf eg Cormack 1980, though it 
is not one that I propose to engage in here. I might as well put on 
record here thatr contrary to the suggestion made by Horn 1985r 
Burton-Roberts 1984 does not argue for a semantic analysis of the 
relation but merely points up technical (and conceptual) 
inadequacies of the available pragmatic analyses. 
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explanation. So I shall now present the case f or regarding (47) and 
(48) as semantically equivalent. Success in this will render the 
foregoing observations on the pragmatic equivalence otiose (though I 
am reluctant to lose their expository value by excising them). 
If we turn our attention to the broader sentential context 
within which the first conjunct of (48) appearsf f ocussing on (48) 
as a whole, it is noticeable that what we have been regarding as the 
CONVERSAT10NAL IMPLICAWRE f rom the first conjunct of (48) to the 
first conjunct of (47) is not in fact canceRable without 
contradiction: 
(63) 1 It's possible, and in fact necessary, that John doesn't 
have children but it's possible that they are away. 
(63) asserts both that there is No possible world in which John has 
children AND that there is a possible world in which his children 
are away and hence that there IS one in which he does have children. 
This shows that, unless the first conjunct of (48) is in fact 
construed as equivalent to the first conjunct of (47). (48) is 
contradictory. 
That the logical coherence of (48) should actually depend upon 
the putative conversational implicature to the first conjunct of 
(47) NDT being cancelled is in fact incompatible with regarding the 
relation between (47) and (48) AS a conversational implicature. On 
the assumption that entailment (a non-canceAable relation) and 
conversational implicature (a cancellable relation) are mutually 
incompatible,, (48) and its first conjunct in its contextr cannot 
conversationally implicate,. but must semantically entail, the first 
conjunct of (47). That (48) as a whole does in fact entail that it 
is possible that John has children is uncontentious since that is 
entailed by its second conjunct. It is perhaps a moot point whether 
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the first conjunct in itself conversationally implicates 
; 
the 
possibility of John's having children. Since the implication is not 
cancelable in the context of (48) 1 do not see that it can be 
regarded as conversational. 
In short, the semantics of the conjunctive (48) as a whole are 
such that the interpretation of the modal operator in the first 
conjunct is (to use the terminology of Horn 1972F 1973) not simply 
pragmatically upper-bounded by conversational implicature, but 
semantically- upper-bounded by its co-conjunct with which it is 
required to be semantically consistent. Ibis upper-bounding on the 
interpretation of the first conjunct renders it semantically 
equivalent to the first conjunct of (47). This, combined with the 
observation that the second conjuncts of (47) and (48) are 
identical, yields the conclusion that the overall semantic 
interpretations of (47) and (48) are nondistinct. And this provides 
the explanation of the filtering in (48). 
That the filtering in (47) and (48) should receive the same 
explanation is especially satisfactory given the earlier 
pretheoretical observation that to presuppose a proposition is to be 
committed to that proposition without countenancing the possibility 
that it is false. In themselves,, the second conjuncts of (47) and 
(48) would commit the speaker to presupposing that John has 
children. But neither (47) nor (48) commit the speaker to that 
presupposition since the possibility that John might not have 
children IS countenanced by each of their first -conjuncts. 
This chapter has been intended to show in broad terms the 
general predictive capacity of a theory of presupposition rooted in 
the MDP, by reference to some central cases. It is not intended as 
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an exhaustive investigation of potential "projection problems". 
Rather than pursue these further here, I now turn to a discussion of 
how the Revised theory of presupposition reveals an interesting 
connection between these projective properties of presupposition and 
certain intuitive data concerning the presuppositions and resulting 
logical status of simple sentences. 
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CBAPTER IX 
REVISED PRESUPFOSITICN AND THE LOGICAL STAZJS OF SIMPLE SERIMES. 
1. Introduction. 
This chapter is devoted to the consideration of a well-attested 
intuitive datum which, in broad terms, is described in (1): 
(1) There are non-compound sentences in which,, even assuming a 
logical approach to presupposition (and hence the exist- 
ence of a third logical status) it is NOT intuitively the 
case that presupposition-f ailure results in the presup- 
posing sentence having the third logical status. 
I 
This datum is not compatible with (not predicted by) the Standard 
Logical Definition of Presupposition: the SLDP, as the reader will 
now be weary of being reminded, purports to model a version of the 
Truth Gap Intuition in which the third logical status in a 
presupposing sentence is the INEVITABLE consequence of 
presupposition-failure in that sentence. 
The datum was f irst acknowledged and treated of in Strawson 
1954 and in more detail in 1964 (reprinted 1971: all further 
references are to the reprint). As noted in Ch. II,, the intuition is 
quite generally attested: cf. Cooper 1974, Gundel 1977F Lyons 19771 
Fodor 1979, McCawley 1981, Reinhart 1982, Seuren 1984. 
The significance of the datum to be considered here lies in the 
fact that it arises most saliently in connection with logically 
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simple sentences. To my knowledge, every writer who treats of the 
datum cites only simple sentences in its connection. Conversely, 
writers whose primary concern is with the presuppositions of 
compound sentences (with the so-called projection problem) either 
ignore the datum and assume (heuristically or otherwise) that the 
SLDP is adequate in its application to simple sentencest or treat 
the two species of data,, simple and compoundr independently. * Such 
bifurcation exemplifies a general trend towards what I have been 
calling the disassociation of definition and projection. The 
inevitable result of this disassociation is that proposed "solutions 
to the projection problem for (standard) presupposition" will appear 
to leave the standard definition intact, while attributing special 
projective properties to the logical f unctors,, compl ementisabl e 
predicates etc. This has the result that no "solution to th6 
projection problem" as such could have any bearing on the 
counter-exemplary data arising in connection with simple sentences. 
In the foregoing chapters I have argued in general that a 
genuine explanation of the distribution of presuppositions in 
compound sentences must be immanent in (follow from) the very, 
concept of presupposition itself as this is characterised by a 
presupposiýion-definition. I have sought, more particularly, to 
show that the theory of presupposition that stems from the RLDP 
provides just such an explanation. Under this'Revised Theory, the 
connectives have no special presupposition-projective properties. 
They are purely classical. The presuppositiop-filtering exhibited 
by certain compound sentences follows directly from the definition 
1 believe Kempson Ch. 5 may be an exc%tion to this. Her 
observations, however, are adduced in aid of e total rejection of 
the (standard) logical approach to presup)? osition, so it is not part 
of her purpose to investigate in detail what the connection might be 
between the problem of the logical status of presupposing simplex 
sentences and the problem of correctly predicting the distribution 
of presuppositions in compound sentences. 
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of generalised presupposition thrown up by the RLDP itself. it 
will be recalled that. the particular feature of the revised theory 
that makes this possible consists in a loosening of the (standard) 
tie between presupposition-failure in S and lack of truth value in 
S. The consequence of revised presupposition-failure in S is not 
ACTUAL lack of truth value but LIABILITY to lack of truth value. 
Lack of truth value therefore is not the INEVITABLEF but only the 
CHARACTERISTIC,, consequence of revised presupposition-failure. 
ne general argument of this chapter, then, takes the following 
form. Given that 
(i) Under the revised theory, presupposition-f ail ure in S is 
compatible with S having a truth value,,. 
and given that 
(ii) this loosening of the tie between presupposition-failure and 
lack of truth value has been shown to provide an appropriate 
explanation of the distribution of presuppositions in 
compound sentences, 
and since 
(iii) the datum under consideration here in connection with simple 
cases consists in an intuitive compatibility between 
presupposition failure in S and S's having. a truth value,, 
then 
(iv) The revised theory of presupposition is to be seen as 
providing a unifiedi, global explanation of the distribution 
of presuppositions in compound sentences and of the simplex 
counterexamples to the SLDP. 
In the sections that follow I consider two treatments of the 
intuitive simplex counterexamples to the SLDP and I compare them 
with the account suggested by the revised theory of presupposition. 
The two treatments are Strawson 1971, which appeals to the concept 
of topic, and Fodor 1979, which appeals to the concept of under- 
specified possible world. Both treatments will be criticised on 
specific grounds of internal adequacy. But both treatments are 
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subject to the more general criticism that, in being restricted in 
their application to simple sentences, they do not (in any way 
apparent to me at least) suggest any connection between the data of 
which they treat and the distribution of presuppositions in compound 
sentences. 
2. Strawson's thEmatic approach. 
Consider the following sentences: 
(2) The king of France visited the exhibition. 
(3) The exhibition was visited by the king of France. 
(4) The king of France is in this room. 
(5) Jones spent the day at the local swimming pool. 
(6) Kim's neighbours broke her window. 
(7) Ann's husband met her at the airport. ' 
In connection with such sentences we will assume, not only that 
there is no king of France, but also that there is no swimming pool 
locally, that Kim has no neighbours, and that Ann is not married. 
We shall further assume that all other expressions with implication 
of reference do indeed have a referent (i. e. JU gxhibition. kjLjZ 
riogm. Jones. Zip, 11" window. Ann, JU airpor ). I shall adopt 
Strawson's terminology in distinguishing between.: such expressions: A 
GUILTY expression is a referring expression WITHOUT an actual 
referent i. e. an expression that induces presupposition-failure. An 
INNOCENT (or non-guilty) expression is a referring expression WITH 
an actual referent, i. e. one that does NOT induce presupposition- 
failure. 
Given these assumptionsf Strawson 1971 concedes (the SLDP 
notwithstanding) that, while each of these examples suf f ers f rom 
presupposition-f ail ure, intuitively they do not necessarily suffer 
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from lack of truth value, but may be f al se. - And if these may be 
false, their negations may be true. As indicated, this (or a 
stronger version of it) is a quite widely attested intuition even 
among proponents of presuppositional logic (and associated truth 
value gaps). And f or critics of presuppositional logics, notably 
Kempson 1975, the intuition has provided a veritable mine of 
ammunition. As Kempson 1975: 87 justly observes "Anyone wishing to 
maintain an analysis in terms of [logical] presupposition must 
explain away such examples as these". 
In developing his explanation of the phenomenont Strawson 
considers two approaches to it. On the FIRST approachr Strawson 
considers attributing the intuition to the presence of innocent 
referring expressions in addition to,, and independent of,, the 
guilty expression. On this approach, the mere presence of the 
innocent expression JU exhibitio in (2) and (3) renders those 
examples false rather than lacking in truth value. Lack of truth 
value would thus arise, not simply in the presence of guilty-. 
expressionsf but only in the absence of innocent expressions. 
Notice,, furthermore, that on this approach it is. not merely the case 
that (2)-(7-) MAY be false,, they ARE false (without modal 
qualification) 
Strawson offers little or no -rationale for this approach to the 
data because he is in fact intent on rejecting it. Fodor 1979, who 
seeks to defend the approachr presented a detailed rationale for it,, 
and on this basis was led to develop an explanation in terms of 
underspecified possible worlds. The present discussion also 
defends this approach. But while Fodor and I concur in our 
preliminary. account of the data,, we diverge radically in our 
explanations of it. 
On what grounds did Strawson reject this f irst approach? He 
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rejected it on the grounds that it did not cover cases which he 
wished to regard as intuitively false (not gapped) but in which the 
intuition could not be attributed to the independent presence of 
innocent referring expressions, for the simple reason that the 
relevant examples did not contain any innocent expression. He cites 
the response in the following minimal discourse: 
Q: What reigning monarchs are bald? 
(8) 
R: The king of France is bald. 
Strawson attests the intuition that the proposition expressed by Ike 
. 
kim. 2j is false rather than lacking in truth value 
when that sentence is uttered in response to (13-JD. Now (8-R) seems 
to presuppose Uiat Uiere is a king of France as much as (9-R) does: 
Q: Is the king of France bald? 
R: (Yes, ) the king of France is bald. 
Yet Strawson based his explanation on the intuition that only (8-R) 
constitutes a counter-example to the SLDp in being false; (9-R) for 
Strawson is gapped, as predicted by the mDP. 
On this. SECOND approach to the intuitive datum,, the logical 
status of a sentence suffering from presupposition-f ail ure varies 
according to the discourse context in which that sentence is 
uttered.. Accordingly, on this second approachr the intuition is 
modally weaker than it is on the first: (2)-(7) may lack a truth- 
value (a la SLDP) or be false (contra SLDP) depending on their 
discourse-context of utterance. 
On this basis, Strawson sought to explain the' data by appeal to 
the concept of topic; that isr to the concept of what an utterance 
is ABOUT. For him, the crucial dif ferene between (8-R) and (9-R) is 
that he takes (9-R), but not (8-R) r to be ABOUT a putative king of 
243 
France. Let us say that an expression in an uttered sentence 
identifies the topic of the utterance (what the utterance is ABCUT) 
if and only if that expression is the TUEME of the sentence uttered. 
Strawson's suggestion then is that a guilty expression induces lack 
of truth value in the sentence in which it appears only when that 
expression is the theme, picks out what the sentence is being used 
to talk about. If The kjW DL Erang " I&Jjj is used to talk ABGUT 
a putative referent of Jbg, IW2g Df Fran then It is not being used 
to talk ABOUT anything, f or there is no king of France. And if it 
is not being used to talk ABOUT anything, then there isOt anything 
f or it to be true or f al se ABOUT. If,, on the other hand, it is not 
being used to talk ABOUT a putative ref erent of Ilia kjj2Z. Qf Franc 
but ABOUT something else that really does existj, then it really is 
ABOUT something, and what it says about that other thing is f alse, 
because there is no king of France. 
Among writers who have considered the matter (including all 
those mený6ned at the opening of this chapter) there is general 
agreement that this analysis is essentially correct. ý Even Fodor 
1979, despite her advocacy of the first approach for sentences 
containing innocent expressions, concedes that Strawson's second 
topic-centered approach is appropriate in cases where there are no 
innocent expressions. But if this second approach is correct for 
such cases, it gonstitutes a compelling counter-argument against ANY 
application -of the first approach. In other words, if the logical 
status of Jhg jdjlg DJ Franc is held to be subject to its 
thematic structure, then surely the logical status of (2)-(7) should 
be as well. - On this point we mustr it seems to me, concur with 
Strawson: the adoption of the second approach for (8-R) entails the 
rejection of the first for (2)-M. 
Donnellan 1981 is an exception and Kempson 1975 argues that it is 
circular. 
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The first approach, theni, can only be sustained in the light of 
a demonstration that,, if indeed (8-R) is intuitively false rather 
than lacking in truth value, its falsity could not anyway be 
explained in terms of its thematic structure. Such a demonstration 
is presented by Burton-Roberts 1986a and b, in the course of 
providing an explanation of the pragmatics of non-descriptive 
definition. I now summarise the main points of the argument. 
As noted, Strawson's thematic approach depends on the 
assumption that the subject of (8-R) (klie Jdmg QL France is not the 
theme of the sentence (does not identify what that utterance is 
about). I seek to establishr then,, that the subject of the 
sentence in (8-R) IS its theme. The argument depends on three 
assumptions, all of which are uncontroversial: 
Assumption 1. Subject is unmarked theme. 
Assumption 2. For every uttered sentence having a topic 
identified by a (thematic) expression that is NOT 
the subject , there is a propositionally equivalent 
sentence in which that expression DOES function as 
subýect and this sentence is usable without difference 
in the same context. 
Assumption 3. Every uttered declarative se. ntence has a 
theme. 
Assumption 1 is widely accepted (cf. among others Halliday 1967 
and'elsewhere, Chafe 1976r Allerton 1978,, Taglicht 1984 - also 
Strawson 1971 who goes as far as to say that a non-topic (i. e. a 
non-theme) is "absorbed into the predicate". ) in Assumption lr we 
make an identification-in-principle between subject and theme: it is 
NORMAL,, though not necessary, for subject to be theme. The utility 
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of Assumption 1 lies in the resulting marked-un marked correspondence 
relation invoked in Assumption 2. And Assumption 2 amounts to the 
uncontroversial idea that f or any MARKED term there should 
correspond another which is its UNMARKED counterpart. 
Assumption 3 may not be necessary f or my purpose, though it is 
entailed by Halliday 1967 and strongly implied by Strawson's 
discussion of topic in terms of subject and -predicate. I invoke 
Assumption 3 in order to make it clear that I view Strawson's 
contention that the subject of (8-R) is not its theme as committing 
him to (8-R) having a thematic predicate i. e. as having its topic 
picked out by its predicate. Reinhart 1982: 15t a champion of 
Strawson's thematic analysis, makes this commitment explicit: "the 
topic expression my 'theme' - NBR] is ja JQJd rather than 114g 
king Df Franc " 
On what basis has Strawson (among Others) decided on this 
thematic analysis? It appears to be the assumption that,, since the 
whole discourse - (8) - intuitively is not ab6ut a putative king of 
France, no utterance that is a constituent of that discourse can be 
about a putative king of France. This would appear to stem from the 
more general assumption that a discourse-topic is a function of the 
topics of the utterances that go to make up that discourse (which 
in turn implies that all utterances in a (coher ent) discourse should 
have common utterance-topics). The intuitive point of denying that 
the subject of of (8-R) is its theme appears to be to get oneself 
into the position of being able to say that the predicate is theme 
and thereby analyse (8-R) as having an utterance-topic that is 
identical to the discourse-topic. 
What then is the discourse-topic of (8) ? It does not seem 
entirely lacking in plausibility to suggest the topic of the whole 
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discourse is a/the set of bald individuals. Strawson speaks in this 
connection of a class antecedently introduced in the question; and 
Reinhart 1982: 15 concurs, asserting that (8-R) "is most likely to be 
interpreted as asserting something about the set of bald 
celebrities". See also Cooper 1974: 38-9: 'Where 
Franc jjg JAJd] is uttered in reply to the request to name some bald 
notable it is reasonable to suggest that the topic is not the king 
but the class of bald notables. " 
In summary of this analysis, thenj instead of having an 
unmarked thematic structure with subject as themer (8-R) is 
thematically markedr having the predicate as theme,, and as such is 
about a set of bald individualsf a topic it has in common with the 
discourse of which it is a constituent utterance. This picture of 
things appears plausible and has been widely accepted. 
By contrast with such a picture, however, I will argue that,, 
where the predicate of jhC king j2f Franc ig bLjj is thematic, an 
utterance of that sentence will NOT be about any set of bald 
individuals but about (the property of) being bald, baldness. it 
is true that the set of bald individuals and the property of 
baldness are often conflated in discussions of the semantics of 
predicate expressions. In Montague semantics (cf Dowty et al 1981) 
for example,, a one-place predicate is a function from individuals to 
truth values and it is a common (extensional) simplification to 
identify such characteristic functions with sets of individuals, 
See also Goodman 1961. In this context, howeverr this simplifying 
conflation will not do - as I now show. 
If predicates identify such things as baldness (a property) 
then ±bQ DL Franc jZ Igald with a thematic predicate is about 
baldness. In that case, I suggest, 1hp.. kilig D1 Franc ja ha" does 
not constitute a coherent answer to the question un der consideration 
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- which is a version of Wbg jg bal and is agreed to be a question 
that concerns the/a set of bald individuals. Instead it would 
answer the distinct question (10): 
(10) What is bald? 
understood to mean Whak. ". Ibal or WIlak j,. g baldness2 or 
bald or kjbAtdgag ! bald! mean (The distinction between 
the two questions is actually less confusing when a noun is used 
instead of an adjective. Compare,, then, the relevant questions when 
the expression is a noun: IglIg ". g rpcidivist2 (=., WtLhgJ " ig g 
rp. cidivist]]. -a question about the/a set of recidivists vs bibiat A9 
.a xecidivist2 
(= I lwhatl regidivist lz gU) -a (def inition- 
requesting) question about recidivism). 
That this is so may be demonstrated by reference to Assumptions 
1 and 2 above. By Assumption 1, if in any context of utterance, 
the predicate of pJ Franc U bLld is theme, then such an 
utterance has MARKED thematic structure. By Assumption 21 we expect 
there to be a propositionally and pragmatically equivalent sentence 
with UNMARKED thematic structure - that is, a propositionally 
equivalent sentence in which the theme (4jgJbA") is subject and 
which is usable without difference in'that context. The only 
sentence that satisfies the semantic and syntactic criteria is (11): 
(11) Bald is what the king of France is. 
Butj, whil e (11) satisfies the semantic criterion of propositional 
equivalence to JJW Jýjfig gL Franc jg ", d, and the syntactic 
criterion of having the (thematic) expression 12. fi-aA in subject 
position, it fails in the matter of pragmatic equivalence in the 
designated context, (8). in other words (11) is not a coherent 
answer to (8--Q). Discourse (81) appears to me (and numerous others 
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with whom 1 have checked) bizarre and lacking in cohesion: 
Q tWho is bald? 
What reigning monarchs are bald? 
R Bald is what is the king of Franceis. 
On the contrary, but as predicted by the foregoing discussion, (11) 
coherently answers the question in (10) - in whatever form of that 
question the reader may prefer. 
Q (10) What is 'bald"? 
(12) 
R (11) Bald is what the king of France is. 
(Notice that any desire to identify discourse-topic with the topics 
of the utterances of which it is made up, would be fulfilled at 
least in discourse (12) - for thatt surelyr is discourse about 
baldness. ) 
Given that a (putativel) individual is to be dragged into the 
response to the (definition -requesting) question (10)1, (11) is the 
thematically UNmarked response. However, while (11) is THEMATICALLY 
UNMARKED in the context of (12), it is CONSTRiCTIGNALLY MARKED (in a 
fairly obvious sense discussed in BR 1986b: 325-6). The 
constructionally UNmarked 'counterpart of (11) is of course lbh-. jdag 
. af 
Franc ig b Wd, which is itself a possible,, but thematically 
marked, response to the question in (10), as shown in the discourse 
in (13): 
Q: (10) What is 'bald"? 
(13) 
R: (14) The king of France is bald. 
The use of (14) by way of response to (10) is what I have called a 
'non-descriptive definition'. indeed the them atic/pragm atic 
equivalence between (11) and (14) (in the context of (10)) provides 
a rather simple explanation of the mechanics of the use of (14) in 
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that context (its use as a non-descriptive definition) and hence an 
explanation of the coherence of discourses such as (13)- see BR 
1986a. In addition, it provides an interesting explanation of the 
more special phenomenon of ostensive definition - see BR 
forthcoming. 
In conclusion, and pac Strawson, Ilig " Dj Franc jja J&U is 
(presupposition-f ailure apart) in every respect an unmarkedr 
canonical answer to the question (8-Q). Were its predicate its 
theme in that context, we should expect to find that its 
thematically unmarked counterpart,, (11), was equally - if not more - 
acceptable as a response to the question. But it is not. This is 
becauser while it is agreed that that question is a question about 
the/a set of bald individuals, (11) cannot be construed as answering 
such a question; instead,, it answers the distinct question (10) a 
question about baldness. I conclude that the predicate of Jbg " 
gf Franc " bAU is the theme of that sentence only in the context 
of (10) (=(13Q)), not in the context of (8-0. 
If , as I have shownr the predicate of (8-R) is not thematicr 
then its subject is thematic. This conclusion is indicated by 
Assumption 3- that every uttered declarative sentence has a theme. 
But the conclusion is natural independently of that assumption. It 
seems reasonable to ask how any question of that general type UbQ 
, jg- bald2) could be answered except by mentioning an individual who 
is bald and giving the required information ABOUT that individual 
that he is indeed bald. To be sure, this conclusion entails 
abandoning the (implicit) assumption that a discourse-tcpic is in 
any simple way to be equated with the (necessarily common) topics 
of the utterances that constitute that discourse (f orr under the. 
thematic analysis proposed here, Discourse (8) -may indeed be ABCUT 
the set of bald individuals,, but (8-R) is (or purports to be) about 
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a king of France). This and other matters-are discussed in BR 
1986b, where it is shown, inter alia, that this assumption may be 
abandoned without any loss, and perhaps an increase in, intuitive 
appeal. (Should this seem too summary a'rejection of Strawson's 
thematic approach, the reader is referred to the more detailed 
discussion in BR 1986a and b. and forthcoming. ) 
I conclude this consideration of Strawson's thematic approach 
with three general comments. 
M We have seen that the rationale of Strawson's thematic 
analysis of (8-R) as having the predicate rather than the subject as 
theme is the (misleadingi) intuition that a use of that sentence in 
that context is about a set of bald individuals. 9bis would seem to 
commit its proponent to a purely extensional semantics of predicate 
expressions. Yet Strawson is surely committed, generally (1950F 
1959,1971f 1974) and in particular by his conception of 
presupposition, to a rejection of this view of predicate 
expressions. 
_ 
If predicates as such simply identify sets of 
individuaisr then Strawson's theory of presupposition is in 
jeopardyr for that account,, at least in its simplest form,, invites 
us to inspect the actual set of bald individuals in order to 
evaluate Jbjý king DL Franc " JW". Russell 1905 and many others 
(see Atlas 1977 for a clear presentation of the view) feel impelled 
to accept that invitation and pronounce the sentence false as a 
result (thereby rejecting any theory of presupposition and adopting 
a theory of ambiguous negation instead - to a' ccount for the fact 
that no king of France will be found among t he set of NON-bald 
individuals either). But Strawson wishes to reject the invitation 
and his truth'gap theory of presupposition is grounded in this 
rejection. 
(ii) Let us suppose that Strawson's thematic analysis were 
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successful, that (8-R) is indeed false and that this valuation is to 
be explained by reference to its thematic structure. This would be 
an unwelcome kind of success, for it has the counterfactual. 
consequence that, uttered in reply in to (8-Q) r Jbgkjng. Qf Franc 
j, g bajd does not PRESUPPOSE that there is a king of France. The 
thematic approach has this consequence because a logical theory of 
presupposition, if it entails nothing elser must at least entail 
that the falsity of a presupposition cannot, in and of itself,, lead 
to the f al sity of the presupposing sentence (i. e. if A presupposes 
B. the falsity of B is NOT a sufficient condition for the falsity of 
A). The SLDP, as already noted,, goes further than this; the RLDP, 
by contrastr captures JUST this. Therefore, if we seek to evaluate 
(8-R) as false AND maintain the idea that it nevertheless 
presupposes the existence of a French king, we must find grounds for 
its falsity OTHER THAN THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A KING OF FRANCE. We 
CANNOT have it both that (8-R) presupposes that there is a king of 
France and that it is false BECAUSE and only because there is no 
king of France. But on what grounds is (8-R) false under the 
thematic analysis? It is false on that analysis for NO OTHER REASON 
than that there is no king of France. Hencer on the thematic 
analysis and. contrary to the facts of the matter, (8-R) cannot 
presuppose th"e existence of a French king. We shall see in the 
next section that this general issue is crucially relevant in 
choosing between two different versions of the alternative to the 
thematic analysis. 
(iii) My discussion Of the thematic approach has been conducted 
independently of the intuitive question of whether Jha king juf 
Franc in the context of discourse (8)', should indeed be 
regarded as false rather than gapped, Strawson's judgement that it 
should be so regarded is, as noted, widely accepted. However, the 
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above discussion deprives us of an explanation of it. I have to 
conf ess that this does not disturb me unduly -f or I do not concur 
in that judgement. One might wonder in fact.,. whether, the foregoing 
demonstration that the thematic explanation is untenable could have 
been developed unless it was informed by scepticism with regard to 
the judgement. Concomitcxntly,, one might wonder, in the light of the 
discussion of this section,, whether the intuitive judgement is as 
clear as it otherwise seemed to those who do concur. (In this 
context, Donnellan's 1981 remarks on intuition and presupposition 
seem relevant. ) 
Let me then mention a consideration that brings the judgement 
itself into question. strawson's judgement that (8-R) is false 
rather than gapped is bound up with his judgement that it should be 
pronounced WRONG AS AN ANSWER TO ITS QUESTION (1971: 96). Certainlyr 
we may concede that it is wrong as an answer to its question. But a 
framework that admits of truth-value gaps entitles us to question 
whether judgements of the rightness or wrongness of an answer are 
isomorphic with classical judgements of its truth value. Consider 
(15) 
(15) Kruschev was bald. 
(15) is true. But considered as a response to (16): 
(16) Which U. S. presidents have been bald? 
it is a wrong answer to the question, as wrong an answer to its 
question as -(8-R) is to (8-Q). Are we then to say that (15) . as a 
constituent of the question-answer pair (16)-(15),, is false? Surely 
not. If truth-value gaps have a use, this is the place to use them. 
Why shouldn't Strawson, as a proponent of the logical approach to 
presupposition', do what Keenan and Hull 1973 do in such a situation? 
Given a semantics of questions that is ef f ectively a semantics of 
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question-answer pairs, they seek to build into the semantics what it 
is that makes (15) a WRONG ANSWER to (16). They. would observe, very 
reasonably, that (15) as a response to (16) carries the false 
presupposition that Kruschev was a U. S. president. They thus 
reconstruct the wrongness of (15) as an answer to (16) by means of a 
logic that assigns (15) (or rather the pair (16)-(15)) the third 
logical status. 
What this example shows, it seems to me', is that Strawson's 
judgement that, when it comes to answersf WRONGNESS should be 
modelled by a classical truth value (falsity) r rather than by a 
logical gapp retains whatever plausibility it has only when we 
restrict our attention to those cases where the most natural choice 
seems to be between the logical gap and FALSITY. Cases such as 
(16)-(15), in which the cho. ice is between the logical gap and TRUTHr 
place the judgment in a more dubious light. (It is perhaps 
appropriate at this point to remind ourselves that the gap is NOT a 
species of falsity. ) The following exampler closer to home, 
illustrates the same point. 
Q: What reigning monarchs are NOT bald? 
R: The king of France isn't bald. 
If (8-R) is f al se as an answer to (8-Q) r it would seem that (17-R) 
should be TRUE as an answer to (17-Q). This runs very clearly 
against the intuitive facts of the matter; and it is precisely these 
intuitive facts that a logical theory of presupposition is supposed 
to capture. 
3. Falsity and the irrelevance of (revised) presupposition-failure. 
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The foregoing section outlined the grounds. on which Strawson's 
thematic approach should be rejected. This section considers the 
issues that arise in connection with the alternative and argues that 
the Revised Theory presented in previous chapters handles the data 
automatically. 
Recall that this alternative approach takes the presence of 
extra,, successful referring expressions to be crucial to the 
intuitive judgement thatt presupposition-failure notwithstanding, 
(2)-(7) of section 2 are false rather than gapped. As mentionedr 
Fodor adopts this general approach too. She begins by observing 
that what distinguishes the sentences in (18) -from those in (19) 
(18) (bal d (a) 
is airy 
The king of France 
ýan 
atheist 
loves Camembert 
has three daughters 
is standing next to the Queen of France 
(19) is standing next to me (a) 
is dining with Mrs Thatcher 
The king of France ate your Camembert 
is married to one of Kim's friends 
is that those in (18) do "not connect with the real world at 
all because [they] say nothing about anybody or anything that is 
present in the real world" (Fodor 1979: 201). By contrast, those in 
(19) do "connect with the real world"; for example, (19a) "says 
something about me and the reason we judge it to be false is that 
what it says about me is false" (201). * 
On these points Fodor and I are in agreement. But there the 
agreement ends: Fodor continues 
* Note that Fodorr in this context at least, is using 'about' in a 
different, and looser,, sense from Strawson. Here a sentence is 
equally 'about' the referents of all the referring expressions it 
contains. (Strawson 1950 used it in this latter sensej, too. ) 
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"There are two ways of pursuing this account of the contrast 
between [(18a)] and [(19a)] and I will start with one which, 
though superfically appealing,, turns out to lead nowhere. The 
idea here is that the existence or non-existence of the [sic] 
kin of France is IRRELEVANT to the valuation of [(19a)]" 
(P-Tol) . 
Now this idea, which according to Fodor leads nowhere, is the idea 
which I develop in this chapter and show that it is anyway implied 
by the Revised theory of presupposition. In fact, and this follows 
from the second general remark of the last section, I shall in due 
course argue that any account of this phenomenon that does NOT 
involve what Fodor calls IRRELEVANCE is straightforwardly 
incompatible with the concept of presupposition. Howeverr by way 
of introduction to the idea,, I shall confine myself in the first 
instance to a consideration of Fodor's presentation and rejection of 
it. 
Length notwithstanding, it is perhaps best to give Fodor's 
account of it'verbati - This is her presentation: 
'We need not know whether there is a king of - France 
in order to 
establish that [(19a)] is false; all we nee'd to establish is 
that there is no king Of France standing next to me; that is, 
either that there is no one standing next to me or that the 
person 0ý persons standing next to me are not king of France. 
De ending on the degree of our ignorance about the political 
situation in France, we could appily use one or other of 
sentences. [a]-[c]. 
[a] Whether or not there's a king of Francer the king of 
France is not standing next to me. 
[b] If there's a king of France, he's not standing next to 
me. 
[c] Even if there's a king of France, he's not standing next 
to me. 
This seems promising, for the corresponding sentences about 
baldness are quite bizarre. What justification could there 
possibly be for the assertions [d] to [f]? 
[d] HWhether or not there's a king of France, the king of 
France is not bald. 
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[e] IlIf there's a king of France, he's not bald. 
[f] IlEven if there's a king of France, he's not bald. 
Notice that for the predicate ig standin . 11= 
IQ na. Sentence 
[(19a)] is just like Sentence [g]r for which there is no 
ref erence f ailure. Statements [h] - [j I are quite coherent and 
reasonable if one is unsure about the existence of a queen of 
England but is sure that the only person in the vicinity is, for 
instance, Robert Redford. 
[g] The queen of England is standing next to me. 
[h] Whether or not there's a queen of England, the queen of 
England is not standing next to me. 
[i] If there's a queen of England, she's -not standing next to 
me., 
[j] Even if there's a queen of England, she's not standing 
next to me. 
To put it informally, and in overtly verificationist terms, this 
theory says that [(18a)] has no truth value because to evaluate 
it we would need to look at the king of France and we cannot; 
and that [(19a)] does have a truth value because to evaluate we 
need only look at me and at those people who are near me. " 
Fodor 1979: 201-2. 
This is a fair preliminary presentation of the idea. Indeed, given 
Fodor's earlier quoted remarks about connection with the real worldr 
it is difficult to see on what basis she proposes to reject it. The 
rejectionr which immediately follows the above presentationr takes 
the following form. 
"But this is unsatisfactory for it simply shifts the puzzle one 
step further back. If we can make a list of the people standing 
next to me and determine that no king of France is on it, why 
could we not also make a list of people who are bald and 
establish that no king of France is on IT? More formally, why 
is the argument (k) valid and the argument (1) not? 
(k) No one who is standing next to me is the king of France; 
therefore it is false that the king of France is standing 
next to me. 
(1) No one who is bald is the king of France; therefore it is 
false that the king of France is bald, 
Of course,, it is likely to be much harder in practice to make an 
exhaustive list of all the bald people in the world than of the 
people standing next to me; that is,. harder to establish the 
truth of the premise in (1) than in (k). But that is a 
practical matter only, and should have no bearing on the 
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validit of the inference if we allow our-selves to imagine,, at leasti, Yhat the premise has been established as true. 
"In fact, the explanation of the invalidity of the (1) is 
quite obvious. On the reading on which it- is truer the premise 
of (1) quantifies over EXISTING bald people. It therefore 
entails only thatr IF the king of France exists, it is false 
that he is bald. Since he does not, we can draw no conclusion 
about the state of his head from th'S remise. Thus an 
additional existence premise would be neeldeMr argument (1) to be valid. And then, Joy parity, it would seem that argument (k) 
should be likewise valid only in conjunction with an existence 
premise. In the absence of an explanation of why (k) and (1) 
should differ in this respect, we must conclude that the 
apparent validity of (k) is an illusion. " 
Fodor 1979: 202-3. 
I have a difficulty here. Fodor asks why [k] should seem valid 
and [1] invalid. But by the end of the quotationr I find myself as 
much inclined as before to answer that [k] not only seemsf but is 
valid (as against [1]) - and that the distinction between them is 
due to the fact that the existence or otherwise -of a king of France 
is irrelevant or peripheral to [k] but crucial to [1]. Fodor's 
discussion of [k] and [1] in my view fails to demonstrate that this 
idea is not viable; on the contraryr her discussion of [k] and [11 
appears to me simply to ignore that idea. 
Consider first the discussion of practicality (immediately 
following [1]). 1 do not accept that the distinction between making 
an exhaustive list of the individuals standing next to me and making 
an exhaustive list of bald individuals is a difference of 
practicality,, merely quantitative. There is here a qualitative 
difference in principle (one which is relateýd in my mind to 
Russell's 1910 distinction between kn owl edge-by-acquai ntance and 
knowledge-by-description). The difference lies in the fact that 
it is POSSIBLE to know that the set of individuals standing next to 
me does not include a king of France, independ. ently of knowing 
whether or not there is a king of France and even notwithstanding a 
belief in the existence of such an individual. By contrast,, I would 
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want to deny that it is POSSIBLE to know that the set of bald 
individuals does not include a king of France without knowing that 
there is no French king. I do not,, of coursej, deny that the truth 
of the premise in [k] and the truth of that in [1] may both in fact 
be established as it were deductively from the premise that France 
is a republic not a monarchy. The difference is that the truth of 
the premise in [1] may ONLY be established thus, while that in [k] 
may alternatively be established as it were inductively, by 
establishing of each individual in the set of those standing next to 
me that he/shd is not a king of France. The point I seek to make is 
that,, in the absence of knowledge as to the existence or otherwise 
of a French king, it would not be possible to know whether a list of 
bald individuals that did not include a kin g of France was THE 
exhaustive list of bald individuals, By contrastj, it IS possible to 
know whether a list of individuals standing next to me is THE 
exhaustive list of individuals standing next to me without knowing 
whether there is a French king. 
Consider the matter from this angle. The premise of [1] is 
distinguished from that in [k] by the fact that it is ONLY possible 
to know that the premise of [11 is true if it is ALSO known that 
(20) is true: 
Premise of [11: No one who is bald is a French king. 
(20) No one who is NOT bald is a French king. 
The relevance -of this observation,, of course, is that (20) and the 
premise of [1] can both be true (if and) only if there is no king of 
France. Now we (Fodor and 1,, at least) are operating on the 
assumption that, where there is no king of France, the conclusion of 
at least [1] suffers from lack of truth value. That is, the only 
circumstance in which the premise of [11 may be established is 
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exactly the circumstance in which the conclusion of [1] lacks a 
truth value. Thus, given the (logically presuppositional) framework 
within which this discussion is being conducted, [11 is viciously 
circular. The circularity could be escapedr and the validity of [1] 
established,, only by denying that the " gf Franc j,. g ba" 
PRESUPPOSES that there is a French king (for then the conclusion 
(and premise) may be valuated as true and true BECAUSE there is no 
king of France. ) Since this is contrary to the fundamental 
assumption of the enterprise that both Fodor 'and I are engaged inj, 
(namely that both (18a) and (19a) do presuppose that there is a king 
of France) we must conclude that [1] is invalid. I return to these 
matters in more detail below. 
In [k] by contrastr the premise may be established quite 
independently of (21): 
Premise of [k]: No one who is standing next to me is a French 
king. 
(21): No one who is NOT standing next to me is a 
French king. 
This appears to me self-evident. Since the premise of [k] may be 
established independently of the truth of (2l)-,, the premise of [k] 
may be established as true independently of the non-existence of a 
king of France. Hence the conclusion of [k] may be established as 
true on the basis of the truth of [k]'s premise independently of the 
grounds on which it would (otherwise) lack a truth value. 
Of course,, the salience of our de facto knowledge of the non- 
existence of a king of France is possibly such as to obscure the 
point. Let me then change the example: 
(22) Max spent the day at the local swimming pool. 
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Again, it appears to me self-evident, given a referent f or B=, that 
it is possible to KNOW (in the strictest possible sense of that 
word) that (22) is false,, without knowing whether or not there is a 
local swimming pool, believing even that there is one. To know that 
Max spent the whole day in hospital, or travelling 70 miles from the 
locality to visit friends (who may or may not have taken him to 
THEIR swimming pool) is sufficient in itself to falsify (22)r quite 
independently of the existence or otherwise of a local swimming 
pool. Itsexistence then is peripheral/"irrelevant" to that 
valuation. 
In the first few sentences of the final paragraph of the above 
quotation Fodor concedes the argument from relevance to the non- 
validity of [1]. The argument breaks down in the last two 
sentences - precisely at the crucial point where her argument 
requires her to DEMONSTRATE that ir/relevance is NOT capable of 
distinguishing between [k] and [1] (and hence -between (18) and 
(19)). Rather than demonstrating parity between [k] and [1]. Fodor 
ASSUMES it (by means of "And then by parity... ") without support or 
argument. Thereby Fodor must be seen as simply ignoring the 
distinction in relevance to [k] and [1] of the non-existence of a 
French king, rather than as establishing that there is no such 
distinction. 
Let us return now to the more general issue discussed at the 
end of the last section (under (ii)) and alluded to earlier in this. 
Fodor's claim that the irrelevance idea "leads nowhere", failing to 
distinguish between (18a) and (19a) , is the claim that the non 
existence of a French king is NOT IRRELEVANT to the falsity of 
(19a). Then (19a) is false BECAUSE of the non existence of a French 
king. Then the falsity of ther jjgg kiW Dj Fran is a sufficient 
condition of the falsity of (19a). This indeed is precisely Fodor's 
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argument and the basis on which she characterises [k] as invalid, 
alongside [1]. "The non-existence of the king of France is 
SUFFICIENT to render [(19a)] false" (204? Fodor's caps). 
Fodor's argument then suf f ers from the -same general flaw as 
Strawson's thematic analysis. I have argued that it is incompatible 
with a framework that postulates truth-value gaps induced by failure 
of presupposition to allow that the falsity of. a presupposition is a 
sufficient condition of the falsity of the presupposing sentence. 
This principle (which I shall call the PRESUPPOSITIONAL PRINCIPLE - 
PP for short) underlies both the Revised and the Standard theoriesr 
indeed must be seen as underlying any theory that seeks to establish. 
a connection between presupposition failure and lack of truth. 
value. The Revised theory simply CCNSISTS in this principle; the 
standard theory goes considerably beyond itr by making the truth of 
a presupposition a necessary condition of the falsity of the 
presupposing sentence. 
Fodor's contention is that the non-existence of a king of 
France (KF) is relevant to the judgement that (19a) is false because 
it constitutes a sufficient condition for that judgement. I now 
spell out the consequences of this contention as they appear to me. 
In the first place it draws the wrong distinction between (18a) and 
(19a). If we adhere to the Presuppositional Principler Fodor's 
contention has the consequence that, while (18a) may presuppose that 
there is a king of France, (19a) cannot presuppose it. Instead, and 
unfathomably,, (19a) is characterised as STRONGLY ENTAILING that 
there is a king of France. This of course is quite contrary to the 
facts of the matter and is not at all what we sought to achieve. 
The enterprise we are engaged on is that of developing a logical 
theory of presupposition (and its connection with the truth value 
gap) which is capable of reconciling the intuitive falsity of (19a) 
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with the fact that (19a), as much as (18a)r PRESUPPOSES that there 
is a king of France. 
But worse is to follow. Were it not for the Presuppositional 
Principle - and the fact that we wish to s ay of (19a) that it 
presupposes the existence of a French king -I would of course have 
to agree with Fodor that the non-existence of a king of France was 
indeed sufficient to falsify (19a). If we abandon the PP to the 
extent of allowing that (19a) is f al se BECAUSE there is no KF, we 
surely have no reason not to allow that (18a) is false on those 
same grounds. For (18a) bears the same semantic relation to the 
proposition that there is a king of France as (19a) does. This 
conclusion seems indicated in general terms and quite specifically 
in terms of Fodor's own argument. Having argued that the non- 
existence of KF is as relevant to [k] as to [1], and having allowed, 
on that basi"s, that (19a) is false BECAUSE there's no KF,, the 
falsity of (18a) would follow by the very parity that Fodor takes 
herself to have established. At best, then, Fodor's argument 
commits us to inconsistency in adherence to the Presuppositional 
Principle. But, more generally, we may ask: If the non-existence 
of KF is sufficient to falsify (19a) why should it not be sufficient 
to falsify ANY positive sentence in which Jhc jdag DJ Franc appears 
as a referring expression? We may be sure of this at least: that 
the anti-presuppositional "lobby" is waiting in the wings to argue 
just this; for these considerations lead directly to the abandonment 
of any presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps. 
But Fodor and I are only indirectly mounting a general defence, 
against this lobby,, of a logical approach to presupposition. what 
we are attempting to do is to establish a more refined account of 
the relationship between the truth value gap and presupposition 
f ailure W ITH IN af ramework that assumes that there is a gap and that 
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there is some such relationship. In this, context, these are 
fundamental working assumptions. We thus START with the premise 
that at least (18a) lacks a truth value. Fodor herself (fn 5,, p. 
203) refers to 
"the fact that we becjan with, namely that it is neither true 
nor false that the king of France is bald". 
Fodor herself,, thenr subscribes to,, and cannot abandon, the 
Presuppositional Principle - that the falsity of a presupposition is 
NOT a sufficient condition of the falsity of the presupposing 
sentence. 
Given the Presuppositional Principle, the choices open to us 
are clear. If '(18a) is neither true nor false because it 
presupposes the existence of KFI thenr if (19a) presupposes the 
the existence of KFI it cannot be false-BECAUSE-there-is-no-KF; it 
must EITHER be neither true nor false OR false-for-some-other- 
reason. 
It is on these grounds that I am defending the idea of 
"irrelevance" as not only correct but necessary, given our 
fundamental working assumptions. What is at issue in the 
"irrelevance" idea,, then, is more than a merely parochial choice 
between two presuppositional accounts of the data; it is the issue 
of whether or not there IS an internally consistent presuppositional 
theory capable of handling the data. * 
I am, of course, assuming that Fodor wishes to assignt ba ing gf to the truth value gap ON ACCOUNT OF its 
presupEýosition-f ail ure. Fodor is committed to the Presuppositional 
Principle just so long as her theory of gaps purports to be a theory 
of presupposition. In the final section of this chapter, I pursue 
the ideaj, suggested by the present discussion, that the alternative 
theory of gaps that Fodor develops in terms of underspecified 
possible worlds cannot in fact be a theory of presupposition. 
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At the risk of misrepresenting my own view of the distinction 
between (18a) and (19a), I have defended it in terms of Fodor's 
allusion to IRRELEVANCE. This may not be wrong exactly, but certain 
adventitious connotations need to be removed. When this is doner I 
expect Fodor's rejection of it to appear in a yet more dubious 
light. 
We have *seen that Fodor attempts to distinguish (18a) and (19a) 
in terms of the SUFFICIENCY of the non-existence of KF as a 
f al sif ier of those sentences. I have shown that what is at issue 
cannot be its sufficiency. This either (i) makes the wrong 
distinction between them or (ii) is inconsistent (in its adherence 
to the Presuppositional Principle) or (iii) undermines the rationale 
of the discussion by putting the very existence of the truth value 
gap in doubt. Butr even disregarding such matters of principle, the 
sufficiency or otherwise of the non-existence of a king of France IS 
not, as a matter of factr what is at issue anyway. in our worldr 
France is a republic, not a monarchy. Were (18a) to be judged 
false, it could not soundly be judged so for any other reason. In 
other words, were (18a) to be judged false in our world, the 
non-existence of KF is NECESSARY to the soundness'of that judgement 
(and, since this contradicts the Presuppositional Principle, (18a) 
is therefore neither true nor false). It is not'(and cannot be) the 
suf f icency of the f act to the soundness of the f alsity judgement 
that is at issuer but its necessity. This is what distinguishes 
(18a) and (19a). 
imagine two situations. The FIRST is one in which the " of 
(19a) refers to me (NBR)r in which the only personjif any) standing 
next to me is Tessa, and in which France is a monarchy with a male 
incumbent on the throne. The SECOND is exactly the same except 
that France is not a monarchy and there is therefore no king of 
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France. Fodor and I agree that (19a) is false in the second 
situation. I wish to defend the "irrelevance" idea on the basis of 
what appears to me a very obvious fact: that (19a) is false in the 
first situation as well as the second. Thus (19a) is f al se in two 
situations which are differentiated from each other only by the 
existence vs. non-existence of a French king; to that extent it is 
false irrespective of that consideration. 
It is on this sense of "irrelevance". and this sense alone, 
that I defend it. The matter boils down to this: We may retain the 
Presuppositional Principle and still maintain'that (19a) is false; 
but (18a) could only be false by abandoning the' PP. 
There is a sense of "irrelevance", though, which I would NOT 
want to defend. I do not,, f or exampler seek to deny that in a world 
such as ours there is a connection between (a) -the fact that there 
is no king of France and (b) the fact that of all the individuals 
standing next to me (if any) none is the king, of France. But we 
must be on our guard against allowing the undoubted salience of our 
. 
da fact awareness of (a) to dazzle us and highjack the point at 
issue. This is why it is so important to remind ourselves that 
someone unaware of (a) could nevertheless judge (19a) as false and 
do so with the strictest possible justification. This means that, 
even for a speaker AWARE of (a), (a) is not logically necessary 
either to his judgement that (19a) is false or to the soundness of 
that judgement, however salient in his mind (a) might be. 
Within the framework of the Presuppositi onal Principler the 
connection between (a) and (b) is this: We may grant that in a 
world in which (a) holds,, (19a) cannot be TRUE. But by the PP, (a) 
cannot of itself render (19a) FALSE. Nevertheless,, any world in 
which (a) holds will be a world in which ADD1TIONAL facts 
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(concerning eg who is standing next to me) will be available, and 
TUESE facts ARE sufficient to falsify (19a). *They are connected to 
fact (a), but they are facts in their own rightf additional and 
independent of (a) in as much as they could still be f acts even when 
(a) was not a fact. 9bus,, while failure of presupposition in (19a) 
is not unconnected with the reasons f or its f alsityj, it cannot in 
and of itself constitute the reason for its falsity (though it does 
constitute a reason why (19a) could not be true). 
As intimated earlier, these remarks have the implication that, 
when it comes to speakers,, failure of presupposition in an assertion 
will be INCIDENTAL to speakers' acts of actually DENYING the 
assertion, even when they are aware of the presupposition failure. 
In illustration of this, compare (24) and (25) as continuations of 
(23) : 
(23) The bishop of Gateshead didn't confirm me... 
(24) ... and incidentally Gateshead doesn't have a bishop. 
(25) ... and incidentally the bishop of Durham did. 
I discern a clear distinction in acceptability in the use of 
incidentg1ly here; that in (24) is acceptable, that in (25) not. 
The effect is retained when ingidentally is replaced by similar 
disjunctive adverbials such as by the JýZ, beside&. anyw and by Jbg, 
ioy. This distinction would be extraordinary and inexplicable in 
the absence of a Pri ncipl e 4ebarri ng af al se presupposition f rom 
acting as a sufficient condition of the falsity of the presupposing 
sentence (the PP). Were the nonexistence of a bishop of Gateshead a 
sufficient condition for the truth of (23), it could no more be 
incidental to (23) than the fact that it was the bishop of Durham 
who performed the confirmation, and (23)+(24) would be as bizarre as 
(23)+(25). (23)+(24) makes it clear that, while the speaker is 
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aware of the fact that there's no Bishop of Gatesheadr it is not 
that which motivates the denial in (23). Indeed, (23) considered in 
itself accepts the presupposition there is a bishop of Gateshead. 
(More on this in Ch. X) The speaker must thus have, and be in a 
position to provider OTHER suf f icent conditions f or the truth of 
(23), as in (26): 
(26) The bishop of Gateshead didn't confirm me; the Bishop of 
Durham did; and incidentally Gateshead doesn't have a 
bishop. 
I have been concerned here just with the issues that surround the 
use of expression such as incidentally. (26) of course raises other 
issues as well'and these are discussed in Chapter X. 
I have devoted considerable space to the rebuttal of Fodor's 
rejection of the "irrelevance" idea. Me reason for this should be 
manifest. As I understand it, "irrelevance" centres on the idea 
that a sentence with a false presupposition may itself be false 
provided there are grounds for its non-truth OTHER than the falsity 
of its presuppositions. Having developed the Revised Theory, I am 
already, independently,, fully committed to this idea. That theory 
was developed to capture precisely this idea - on independently 
motivated grounds. 
At the root of the Revised Theory is a definition of (base) 
presupposition. 
, 
(the MDP) that is much weaker than that of Standjd 
Presupposition (the SLDP). It is weaker in the sense that Revised 
Presupposition (its definition equivalent to the Presuppositional 
Principle) is compatible with the independent retention of the 
classical relation of strong entailment,, whereas Standard 
Presupposition (which entails but is not equivalent to the PP) 
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overridesj, implies the abandonment of, an independent relation of 
strong entailment. The revised theory thus adheres to the classical 
principle I earlier dubbed 'the Primacy of the inheritance of 
Falsity'; a sentence that would be anyway be false -independently of 
presupposition-failure - will be false under the Revised Theory. 
Recall our independent discussion for conjunction, for example. 
I have presented a strong theoretical and intuitive case f or 
regarding (27) as false by virtue of the f al§itY of its (strongly 
entailed) first conjunct: 
(27) The capital of France is Saumur and the king of France is 
bald. 
This is indicated by the classical definition of conjunction. No 
other principle can be permitted to cut across the classical 
principle it exemplifies (re the inheritance of falsity) - and 
especially not if what we seek to develop is a two-valued logic with 
gaps. We have already noted of (27) that it is f alse for a reason 
that is independent of the presupposition-f ailure induced by the 
second conjunct. Concomitatntly, we have already noted that (27) 
would still be f al se even were the presupposition of its second 
conjunct true. Under the Revised Theory, these" facts are captured. 
Most importantlyr of courser this feature of the Revised Theory 
has been shown to provide automatically for a simple and perspicuous 
account of the filtering out of presuppositions as such in sentences 
such as (28) and its logical equivalents. 
(28) There is a king of France and the king of France is bald. 
Having allowed that (27) is false on the grounds of the falsity 
of its first conjunct, the theory may (and must) allow that (28) is 
likewise false. In this case, howeverr the first conjunct is NOT 
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independent of the presupposition of the second conjunct: it 
is EQUIVALENT to that presupposition. In this casei, then, the 
falsity of 'There is a king of France' (strongly entailed by (28) 
via its first conjunct) is sufficient to falsify (28). Therefore, 
by the Presuppositional Principle to which the MDP is equivalentr 
the conjunction (28) cannot and does not PRESUPPOSE the 
presupposition of its second conjunct, that there is a king of 
France. 
This explanation is not open to the Standard Theory of 
Presupposition. The SLDP positively goes beyond the 
Presuppositional Principle in such a way as to make the TWTH of a 
presupposition of Aa NECESSARY condition of both the truth and the 
FALSITY. of A. Under this characterisation, the falsity of a 
presupposition of A is incompatible with A being either true or 
false. So (27) - with a false presupposition - cannot be false 
under the SLDP. And if (27) cannot be f al se even by virtue of the 
falsity of its strongly entailedfirst conjunct,, neither can (28). 
In this 'situation.. special jgL JWC arrangements are going to have to 
be made in order to allow that (28) ISr after all, false on the 
grounds of the falsity of its first conjunct. And we need to say 
that at least (28) is f al se if we are to capture the fact that (28) 
does not PRESUPPOSE (but strongly entails) that'there is a king of 
France. 
The parallelism of our discussion of (27) and (19a) will be 
evident. Under the Standard Theory#, to allow that (27) and (19a) 
are false (as they intuitively are) is incompatible with allowing 
that they PRESUPPOSE that there is a king of France (which they 
intuitively do). Under the (weaker) Revised Theory, both are false 
for reasons that are independent of presupposition-failure. Like 
(27), (19a) has, independently of its false presupposition, false 
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strong entailments. This is evidenced by the fact that (like (27)) 
it could be false even in situations where there is a king of 
France: most saliently., it WOULD be false in the first situation 
considered earlier. I have argued that recognition of the classical 
case for regarding (27) as false and its independence of the need to 
recognise that (27) has a false presupposition is a PRECONDITION of 
predicting, and providing the obvious explanation off the fact that 
(28) DOES NOT PRESUPPOSE (but strongly entails) that there is a king 
of France. In this respect the Revised Theory's explanation and 
prediction of the facts in (27) and (28) are inseparable from its 
character i sa tion of the sentences in (19) as being false while 
independently carrying the false presupposition that there is a king 
of France. 
In conclusionr the 'relevance'/irrelevance' dichotomy is very 
clearly at. work in providing the simplest and most obvious 
explanation of the distribution of presuppositions in compound 
sentences. If it is operative in the compound contextr we are more 
than entitled to expect it to be operative across the board, in 
simplex cases as well. I have shown that this is indeed the case 
and that it provides an obvious explanation of the differing logical 
statuses of different simplex sentences suffering from 
presupposition-failure. What is at stake in the 
'relevance'/'irrelevance' dichotomy, then, is more than just 
intuitive differences in the logical status of simplex sentences 
suffering from presupposition-f ail ure: the revised theory's solution 
to the "projection problem" for Standard presupposition is at stake. 
In the section that follows I provide. a' critique of the 
alternative treatment proposed by Fodor in the wake of her rejection 
of the "irrelevance" idea and conclude that this alternative is not 
attractive. But, even dismissing the arguments advanced against 
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Strawson's thematic approach and Fodor's possible world approachr 
those treatments are weakened by the fact that they have no 
implications in terms of which the distribution of presuppositions 
in compound sentences might be predicted. In the Revised theory, by 
contrastr the presuppositions of compound sentences and the 
differing logical status of different simple sentences are accounted 
for in terms of a single fundamental principle constituted in the 
Revised Logical Definition of Preasupposition itself. 
4. Fodor's incompletely specified possible worlds. 
Tb account for the intuitive distinction in logical status between 
sentences such as (18a) and (19a) (repeated here) 
(18a) The king of France is bald. 
(19a) The king of France is standing next to me. 
Fodor proposes (p. 205) that "we respond to sentences containing the 
111C " Df Franc in the same way as to sentences about any 
FICTIONAL individual" (my emphasis) - for example,, Winnie the Pooh 
or Sherlock Holmes. To this end she allows speakers to choose the 
possible worlds of which they speak. There is no king of France in 
the actual world, but there are other (non-actual) possible worlds 
in which there is, and speakers may speak about such worlds. Fodor 
further appeals to the idea that individual worlds may be 
incompletely specifiedr just as the worlds of Pooh Bear and Holmes 
are incompletely specified. Fodor contends that the possible world 
inhabited byý a king of France is specified only for his existence: 
it is not specified whether or not he is bald. Fodor describes such 
a king of France as Ila very thin fiction" (205). 
Now, Fodor in fact allows of (18a) that 
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"it can be intended or construed in two dif f erent ways. As an 
attempt to say something about the real worldr it fails,. for it 
does not say anything about apXthing that is in the real world. 
As an attempt to say something about a non-real worldr it 
succeeds. But WHAT it sa s about that non-real world cannot be 
assigned a truth value or the cluite straightfoward reason 
that the world is not fully specif ied and it is neither true 
nor false within it that the king of France is bald. " 
At this point,, a number of comments seem called for,, but I shall 
reserve my commentary,, except f or the following point. It is not 
clear what Fodor means when she says that,, construed as an attempt 
to say something about the real worldi, (18a)'. fails. Fodor cannot 
mean by this that it fails to have a truth value,, for this would 
contradict her earlier argument that the distinction between making 
an exhaustive list of actual bald individuals and making an. 
exhaustive list of actual individuals standing next to me is a 
merely practical difference, one which therefore can have no bearing 
on the logical status of (18a). If Fodor allows that (18a) can be 
about the real world,, and if it is merely "in practice ... harder to 
establish" that no bald person is a king of France than to establish 
that no one standing next to me is a king of France, then Fodor must 
allow that (18a) so construed does indeed connect with the real 
world which it is about and is, therefore, FALSE. - it appears to me 
that, having wheeled on other possible worlds, and having allowed 
speakers choice as to the worlds of which they speak, Fodor must (if 
only for the sake of her own argument) limit the choice to the 
extent of insisting that a sentence containing the Iha I! = DL 
Franc is about a (non-real) world in which there IS a king of 
France. I would have liked to ignore the possibility that Fodor 
allows of in the above quotation; but she continues, in her 
treatment of (19a), in a similar vein: 
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"Sentence [ (19a) ]. with its two referring -expressions, must now be f itted i nto this pictur e, and it of f ers us three dif f erent 
kinds of construal. (1) Uttered with the intention of making a 
statement just about the real world it fails, for the attempt 
is to describe a relationship holding. between two individuals 
in that world,, but only one of them is present in it. (2) As 
an attempted statement wholly about a nonreal world, its status 
is more controversialr for it depends on whether we are 
prepared to allow that a nonreal world containing the king of 
France could also contain me. (3) But in any case, the most 
natural construal for a hearer who knows that I (the speaker) 
exist and knows that the king of France does not, is as a 
statement about both worlds at once What is asserted is that 
the relation of standing next to holds between me, an 
inhabitant of the real world, and the'king of France,, an 
inhabitant only of some nonreal world. " (p. 206)* 
Fodor is committed to the third construal for it is on the basis of 
that construal that she develops the argument that (19a) is FALSE 
because 'stand next to' is a SAME-WOMD RELATION -a relation that 
can only hcld between individuals existing in the same world (as is 
'dine with', 'eat', and 'be married to'; in contrast to 'describe' 
'resemble' and 'write about' which need not be). 
Even accepting this roughly sketched trichotomy, there is it 
seems to me nothing pretheoretically more "natbral" about the third 
construal at. all. But the trichotomy itself appears to me spurious 
anyway: construals (1) and (2) are either incoherent or equivalent 
to (3) itself. Take construal (1). Fodor claims that#, because on 
this construal. (19a) is about the real world,, it fails. Why this 
should be is not explained. But consider thatr on construal (3) 
(19a) is also about the real world. To be sUre, on this third 
construal, it is about a non-real world as well. - But if (19a) fails 
on construal (1) (with respect to the real world), why should it not 
also fail with respect to BOTH of the worlds it is about on 
construal (3)? For each of those worlds is such that it does not 
contain one of the mentioned individuals. To reiterate my earlier 
suggestion, Fodor must rule out construal. (1) as a coherent 
*The numbering in this quotation is my own. 
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possibility. within her framework,, she must insist that a sentence 
be 'about' whatever worlds contain the refe rents of its referring 
expressions. 
This brings me to the choice between construal (2) and (3). 
Fodor makes a bow in the direction of the issue of cross-world 
identity (see eg Kripke 1972). In this contextr however, this is 
not a side issue. In basing her treatment of (19a) on construal 
(3),, Fodor is firmly committed to the rejection of cross-world 
identity. She cannot allow that the actual referent of "I" can 
exist in the king of France's world,, for the simple reason that,, if 
she did,, she would be obliged to allow that (19a) was wholly about 
a possible world which contained both the speaker and a king of 
France (construal (2)). In that case, since that world is 
incompletely specified (most relevantly, in respect of who is 
standing next to who in it) . (19a) would emerge as neither true nor 
false. But again, this is not what we sought 'to achieve, which is: 
an explanation of the FALSITY of (19a). 
It is essential to Fodor's distinction between (18a) and (19a) 
that, in her possible world ontologyr there is no cross-world 
identity. The king of France and the speaker are trapped each in 
their separate worlds. (19a) must then be about BOTH of those 
worlds. 
This then is Fodor's distinction between (18a) and (19a): 
(18a) is about a world specified only for the king of France's 
existence. It is not specified whether or not he is bald in that 
world and therefore "it is neither true nor false within it that the 
king of France is bald". (19a) is false because it asserts that a 
SADIE-WORLD RELATION holds between two individuals which are 
inescapably in DIFFERENT worlds, the one real and the other not. 
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I should perhaps remark that, in summarising Fodor's account as 
in the preceding paragraph, I have indeed curbed the liberality with 
which Fodor allows speakers to choose their worlds. What we seek to 
explain is the predictabilityr the consistency, of the intuition 
that (19a) (as against (18a)) is FALSE. We have seen that the 
logical status of (19a) would varyg, and thus not be predictable or 
predicted, under the liberal choice countenanced by Fodor. In due 
course I shall argue that speakers' choices are not merely curbed 
but that, in the normal way of things, they have no choice 
whatsoever. 
I come now to my commentary, beginning with the matter of 
CROSS-WOMD IDENTITY. We have seen thati, in basing her account of 
the falsity of (19a) on the concept of SAME-WOMD RELATIONF Fodor is 
committed to the rejection of cross-world identity: Fodor is bound 
to reject the supposition that I myself (as such) could be in the 
non-real world that a king of France inhabits. But this is quite 
evidently contradicted by the very examples of which Fodor treats. 
Fodor is anyway committed to cross-world identity by virtue of 
having to allow that there is, in some other possible world, a king 
of FRANCE. ahis other world then contains France. But France is in 
the real world as well. If Fodor allows for cross-world identity 
with respect to France she must allow it with respect to the 
referent of "I". There is then no reason not to allow that (19a) is 
about that incompletely specified world containýboth a king of k 
France and the speaker. And,, as already argue d, this leads to the 
conclusion that (19a) is neither true nor f al se. But we sought an 
account f rom which it would f ollow that (19a) was f alse. 
Secondly, the matter of INCOMPLETENESS. This is less 
straightf orward. It appears to me that Fodor's account exhibits a 
confusion as to what it is we take to be incomplete when we speak of 
276 
incompletely specified worlds. There is a world of difference 
between an incompletely specified world and an incomplete world. 
ALL (non actual) possible worlds are incompletely specified; but NO 
POSSIBLE world is incomplete (i. e. a possible world cannot be 
incomplete). Fodorr it seems to me, conflates these two notions. 
By way of example, I have already quoted "the world is not fully 
specif ied and it is neither true not f al se W ITH IN IT that the king 
of France is bald". In saying this Fodor is taking a property of 
the specification (namely, incompleteness) and attributing it as a 
property of the world itself. Clearly, though, (wigs and the 
possible vagueness of 12ald apart) any POSSIBLE world in which there 
is a king of France IS a world in which he either is or is not bald. 
(18a) does then have a truth value within that world; it would be 
perverse to suggest otherwise. But where does this leave us? I 
barely know how to f rame the question I want to ask here but it 
would be something like this: what is the locus of the lack of 
truth value of (18a)? It appears to me that we are coming close here 
to saying that (18a) does have a truth value within the world to 
which it applies but we don't know what that truth value isl But 
thi s, even if it is coherent,, is not what anyone has ever intended 
by the concept of "lack of truth value". 
At the very least this account compounds the conceptual 
difficulties encountered earlier in connection with Van Frassen's 
abandonment of truth-functionality. If the king of France's world 
is a POSSIBLE world,, then [kfb V -kfbjr as an instance of (P V -P)I, 
is literally true in that world. Yet Fodor's conception of that 
world is such as to assign no truth-value to either of the disjuncts 
of that disjunction, even though there actually is a king of France 
in that world. 
There is, of course, another way of talking about incompletely 
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specified worlds and one which is better in this context, for it 
preempts any attempt to transfer the incompleteness of a 
specification to the world of which it is a specification. it also 
has the advantage,, in my eyes,, of giving a more accurate picture of 
Fodor's proposal. In talking about an incompletely specified worldy 
one is not really talking about a single world at allj, but about a 
SET of worlds. We may then translate Fodor's discussion of (18a) as 
f ollows: (18a) is about that (infinite) SET of worlds which contain 
a king of France; each is of course complete,. and in addition each 
is fully specified, but each is specified differently: in some he is 
bald and in others he is not. Fodor herself acknowledges (p. 204) 
that this as an appropriate translation - albeit en passent. In 
these termsf Fodor is claiming that the truth value gap arises 
because (18a) is about THAT GENERAL SET of worlds and,, since the set 
contains both worlds in which the king is bald and worlds in which 
he is not, we cannot assign it a truth value. 
I believe this gives a more accurate picture of what Fodor is 
actually proposing. And I have to say I do not conceive of the 
truth-value gap in the way that this view entails. Here the truth 
value gap seems to be modelling a kind of vaguenessr a lack of 
specificity, af ailure to be more precise, rather than the kind of 
logical failure that statement-failure is, let alone statement- 
failure induced by failure of presupposition. If a speaker is 
allowed to choose the set of worlds of which he speaks,, if a hearer 
is allowed free construal as to the relevant set - consistent at 
least with the referring expressions employed, on what grounds does 
Fodor insist that the set must be of sufficient generality as to 
guarantee that what is said is so vague and so imprecise as to allow 
her to argue that it cannot be assigned a truth value? If speakers 
can choose, can we not allow them to choose to be more precise and 
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speak of more delimited, less general, sets? -Aren't speakers anyway 
obliged to be more precise? More to the pointr aren't hearers 
anyway obliged, if they possibly can, to interpret speakers as being 
more precise than this? 
This brings me to my third main criticism of Fodor's treatment. 
In what way CCULD a speaker be more precise about the set of worlds 
he speaks about? This and the previous questions presuppose that 
the speaker can in fact be imprecise in the way and to the extent 
that Fodor suggests. I want to deny this. A possible world is a 
set of propositions. Possible worlds are identified and 
differentiated according to which propositions are true in them. 
Vacuously, we may say that a proposition describes in part any 
possible world of which it is true (alternativelyr a proposition is 
true in every possible world it describes). Having allowed speakers 
free choice as to the set of worlds of which.. they speak, Fodor 
allows that sentences containing jhg jdjig j; ýf Franc may be about the 
worlds that contain a king of France. In fact,. as already argued,. 
she must go further and insist on this. I would-deny on conceptual 
pretheoretical grounds that there is any imprecision or lack of 
specification in (18a); but more importantlyr in terms of possible 
worlds,, I deny that the set of worlds that (18a) can apply to is so 
general as to -include worlds in which the king of France is NOT bald 
in addition to those in which he is bald. If it is clear from the 
presence of jhC king gf Franc in (18a) that the speaker is speaking 
about a set of worlds containing the king of France, it is equally 
clear f rom the presence of " bA" which MORE SPECIFIC,, more 
delimited, set within that set he is talking about. if the speaker 
of (18a) is allowed to talk about other possible worlds, then he is 
and must be talking that set of worlds in which there is a BALD king 
of France, because THAT is the set that (18a) defines and partly 
describes. 
279 
Having assimilated the king of France to fictions, having 
allowed speakers a choice as to the worlds of which they speak, we 
cannot but allow that what they say of those worlds is (vacuously) 
TRUE. If this were not so, how would we know how to identify and 
differentiate possible worlds? When we accept Conan Doyle as a 
writer of fiction, we accept that he is talking about another 
possible world. It is senseless to ask WHICH possible world, for it 
is precisely (and vacuously) the one in which all the sentences that 
go to make up the fiction are true. The sentences identify and 
def ine the world. We cannot allow for talk of OTHER possible 
worlds without simultaneously allowing that such talk will of 
necessity be precise enough to permit of an assignment of truth- 
value, and of necessity the value assigned will be [true]. How else 
could the speaker identify the set of worlds of which he speaks? 
But Fodor and I sought an account f rom which it f ollows that (18a) 
lacks a truth value. 
In the previous section the question arose whether Fodor's 
theory of truth-value gaps could indeed be regarded as a theory of 
presupposition. The fact that Fodor abandons the Presuppositional 
Principle (and provides no definition of presupposition) suggests 
not. The discussion of this section has fully borne out this 
suggestion; the whole trend of her argument commits her coming up 
with something very different. Strawson and others (myself 
included) are concerned with PRESUPPOSITlCNALLY-INEUCED truth-value 
gaps. They- are concerned with the concept of presupposition and 
with existential presupposition in particular. In (18a) there is at 
least an existential presupposition - i. e. there is at least a weak 
logical implication of existence. And when- I say 'existence',, I 
mean actual existence, existence in the real world - not some kind 
of Meinongian subsistence. And when it comes to speakers making 
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existential presuppositions, we mean a particular kind of commitment 
to the existence of some individual in the -real world. Fodor's 
account simply brushes all this aside. For Fodor, speakers mayr in 
the normal way of things and without warning, choose the worlds of 
which they speak: thereby they are released, even as successful 
statement-makers, of commitment to anything beyond the meanings of 
the expressions they employ. This is in flat contradiction of the 
empirical facts of the matter; but it seems to me that we have 
anyway moved too far away from the concept of presupposition and of 
presuppositionally-induced statement-failure to regard Fodor's 
alternative as either viable or attractive. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE PRACMATlCS OF "PRESUPPOSITION CANCELLATION" 
1. Introduction: presupposition and negation again. 
In this section I briefly review what has been established so far 
about negation in a semantically presuppositional. language (cf esp 
Ch. I 11: 3 and Ch. IV above) and make some general comments on the 
rationale of pragmatics. 
I have sought to show that a semantically presuppositional 
language ist in a quite particular way,, constrained in its 
expressive capacity. A semantically presuppositional language is 
such that, in itr there is no semantic negation of A that is 
expressive of presupposi tion-f ail ure in A. At LEAST this is implied 
by any theory of presupposition that seeks a-logical account of 
implications from both A and its negation. The Revised Theory 
presented here precipitates a negation of A that is compatible with 
an INDEPENDENT failure of presupposition in A but is not expressive 
of it. The Standard Theory goes beyond that idea, incorporating the 
stronger claim that, in a presuppositional language,, there IS NO 
negation of A if A suffers from presupposition-failure (under that 
theory, -A is not only not expressive of p-failure in A but is 
INcompatible with it). Either way.. I have dismissed the idea that 
a logical theory of presupposition might (or can) admit of a further 
semantic type of negation of A that is true (just) when A suffers 
from p-failure (i. e. a negation that IS expressive of p-failure). 
Such a negation would be a function from the third logical status to 
truth and would, thereby, be a presupposition-cancelling negation, 
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under both theories. A presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps 
that includes such a negation is a theory capable of handling its 
own proper counterexamples and thereby contradicts itself and is 
unfalsifiable, or is at best trivial. It has been shown (in Ch. 
III).. moreover, that the inclusion of such a negation directly 
conflicts with the criteria for a two-valued logic with gaps. That 
a logical theory of presupposition incorporating a presupposition- 
cancelling negation must be construed as a three-valued logic would 
anyway seem to be implied by the fact that, as a logical f unctor, 
semantic negation of ANY type is a function FROM a truth-value TO a 
truth-value; the admission of a negation capable of mapping a third 
logical status onto an actual truth value would oblige us to view 
that logical status as a (third) truth value. This suggests that 
the contradiction inherent in the idea that a presuppositional logic 
could incorporate a presupposition-cancelling negation is shared by 
the idea that a presuppositional logic could be a three-valued 
logic. 
In summaryr a presuppositional logic cannot without 
contradiction include any semantic negation other than a single, 
univocal presupposition-preserving negationr mapping just truth 
(falsity) onto falsity (truth) -a negation that thereby FAILS to 
map anything OTHER than a truth value onto a truth value. Such a 
logic cannot admit of a semantic ambiguity between a presupposition- 
preserving and presupposition-cancelling negation. 
When we combine this general observation with the fact that 
what appears to be presupposition-cancellation (special, marked and 
unnatural though it may sound - cf. Ch 11: 3) is, as a matter of 
f actr an observed phenomenon, as in (1) - (and (2) and (3) if regre 
and stop in fact logically presuppose their complement clauses) 
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(1) The king of France isn't bald - there-is no king of France! 
(2) 1 don't regret inviting you - you jolly well gate-crashed! 
(3) 1 haven't stopped smoking - I've never smoked in my life! 
we f ace a choice: (a) abandon the enterprise represented by 
presuppositional logic, or (b) develop a non-semantic, non truth- 
conditional, non truth-functional, pragmatic account of such 
"presupposition-cancellations". (This, of course, is to take a 
decision on what kind of "phenomenon" has been "observed". ) 
Were this a merely equal choice, it seems to me clear that we 
should be obliged to adopt the (a) alternative and abandon the 
enterprise. That is, if all that is at issue is whether to pursue 
or abandon the enterprise of presuppositional logic,, then (b) quite 
clearly lacks sufficient motivation. * Something other than a logic 
of presupposition must be at issue. That is, there should be 
independent, general motivation for the non-semantic account of the 
negation we wish to invoke in the case of presupposition 
cancellation. Furthermore, since this is to be. a PRAGMATIC account 
of negation, we must show that there exists an independently 
plausible, independently required, general motivation for this non- 
semantic understanding of negation, which provides an explanation of 
it. 
With respect to this last point, pragmatics is not unlike 
phonology as conceived of in standard generative phonology. To take 
a simple and familiar exampler consider the word jgat and 
its 
systematic phonetic representation [k 
k ýMt]. Some but not all aspects 
of this phonetic representation are predictable and motivated; that 
is, some (but not all) are subject to, and derivable by, general 
* 1n saying this I am ( temporarily) ignoring an argument to the 
effect that it is precisely a presuppositional- logic that provides 
the proper explanation of the special, marked and (in Kempson's 
wordY unnatural character of such examples. 
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rule. on the one hand, the fact that this particular word begins 
with a voiceless velar stop [k] is not explainable by any general 
principle - it is a particular, arbitrary fact to be observed, and 
recorded as such in the underlying phonological representation of 
the word in the lexicon. On the other hand, the aspiration ff 
1-1 1) 
associated with that initial voiceless stop in the pronunciation of 
the word is REGULAMY associated with voiceless stops in the initial 
position of stressed syllables (it regularly does not occur non- 
initially, eg in the pronunciation of the non-initial [k] of the 
word sca ). The aspiration is therefore to be abstracted in the 
form of a phonological rule that aspirates such segments. The 
underlying phonological representation is thus simplified by not 
including representation of this aspiration; indeed the underlying 
representation will be wholly constituted by a RESIDUE of arbitrary 
phonological materialr that which remains once the regularities 
inherent in the phonetic representation have been abstracted in the 
form of phonological rules. This particular rule thus predicts the 
(complementary) distribution of two sounds, [kj and [kh], by 
deriving the latter from the former in some but not all 
environments. 
Considerl, by way of parallel, that the natural language con- 
junction IIg and the noun 1= each have two understandings. * _P DI D 
may be understood (i) in an inclusive sense compatible with, and 
indeed implied by, 12 swi-d _Q, and 
(ii) in an exclusive sense not 
compatible with .2 And 
Q, indeed implying 7(p And,, of 
course, = can be understood as meaning (i) link-requiring writing 
instrument' or (ii) 'enclosure'. Now in the 'case of 12aD the 
dichotomy of understanding is an irreducible particular fact, not 
*I use "understanding" here as a general term. When I say "has two 
understandings" I mean "can be understood in two different ways" 
without (or prior to) commitment as to whether the dichotomy is a 
matter of semantics or pragmatics. 
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explainable by reference to any general principle. There neither is, 
nor do we seek, any alternative but to observe the dichotomy, as 
semantic, and record it as such in the lexicon - i. e. acknowledge 
the existence of a genuine AMBIGUITY. In the case of j", on 
the 
other hand, a general explanation IS available for the exclusive 
understanding (ii). Not only is that exclusive understanding of DI 
derivable from the inclusive understanding by a plausible 
conversationally-driven calculation (involving Grice's Quantity 
Maxim), but this same calculation underlies and is required for 
parallel secondary understandings of a host of other expressions, 
for example the derivation of a partitive understanding of som from 
its existential understanding, the derivation of a contingency 
understanding of posgibl from its non-contingent understandingr and 
many others besides. Furthermore, the explanation is general in the 
further sense that it is available and r equired for those 
expressionst not only in English,, but in 'a variety of other 
languages (if not all). That ist in contrast to what is the case 
with 120j, these dichotomies of understanding are typically RETAINED 
by translations into other languages. * 
In this sense pragmatics and phonology may in principle be 
compared. Pragmatic explanation takes the form of specifying a 
general calculation that derives one understanding from the other 
understanding in some, but not all,, circumstances. Just as the 
phonological rule may be regarded as a function from a non- 
dichotomous (unique) underlying phonological representation ([k]) to 
a dichotomy in phonetic representation ([k] so pragmatic 
explanation is a function from a non-dichotomous (univocal) semantic 
representation (eg IV') to a dichotomy (IV' - IV') in pragmatic 
This is not to deny that the formalisation of such quantity 
implicatures is not without its problems (cf Burton-Roberts 1984). 
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'representation' (a non-semantic dichotomy of understanding). 
Underlying 
phon. rep. 
Systematic 
phonetic rep. 
/k/ 
r(ýh 
-on. 
ru -le 
[k] [k 
Semantic rep. 
(meaning of S) 
Pragmatic 'rep' 
(understanding 
of U) 
/'general prag. 
calculation 
pr 
v 
In thus outlining a rationale of pragmatic explanation and its 
implications for the strictly semantic, I am perhaps setting the 
scene for what follows in a rather deliberate and schematic manner. 
There is a reason for this. My purpose in this 'chapter is to argue, 
by way of support for a logical theory of presupposition, for the 
pragmatic analysis of a distinctive, special use of negation and 
show that such an analysis is necessitated independently of a 
logical theory of presupposition. But none of the data that I shall 
adduce is at all novel. On the contrary, it is w ell-establ i shed and 
has been the subject of some discussion. I am -concerned with the 
general implications of the data, and these crucially involve the 
notion of pragmatically relevant generalisatign. It seems to me 
that previous discussions of this body of data have obscured its 
implications for presuppositional theories of truth gaps. 
Having shown that such theories in fact receive the required 
support f rom the independent necessity of a pragmatic analysis of 
special negation,, I shall go further. I shall suggest, more 
strongly, that presuppositional theories of truth value gaps not 
only require.. BUT ARE REQUIRED BY,, a properly general pragmatic 
theory of special negation - showing thereby that the data provides 
additional, external motivation for such theories. This much 
stronger implication of the data cannot be brought out unless it is 
explicitly acknowledged that to characterise anything as 'pragmatic' 
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is to be committed to there being some semantic/pragmatic 
generalisation to be captured, and committed in the matter of what 
understandings do and do not fall strictly within the scope of 
semantics. 
As a preliminary illustration of these remarks, consider again 
the Kiparskýs' (1971) discussion quoted in Ch. - 11: 3 above. It is. 
clear (or will shortly become so) that it is this special use of 
negation that the Kiparsk_qls were describing when they observed: 
"Presuppositions are preserved under negation. That is, when 
ou negate a sentence you don't negate its presuppositions.... 
n fact, if you want to deny a presupposition you must do it 
explicitly .... Lhg didn'. regre that II. Q ha--d forgotten. - 
Im 
remembered. The second clause casts the first into a different 
level; it's not the strai btforward denial of an event or a 
situation,, but rather the 
gnial 
of the appropriateness of the 
word in question. Such negations sound best with the inappropriate word stressed. " 
As already noted, the Kiparsk, ýIs were writing at a time,, and in an 
intellectual -climate, in which a rationale for pragmatic explanation 
and its implications for semantic enquiry in linguistics were not 
articulated, and possibly could not BE articulated* So, although it 
is in retrospect quite clear that what they were describing was but 
one example of a more general PRAGMATIC phenomenon, their discussion 
proceeded not only on a fairly particularistic basis but, more 
importantly, one that was necessarily indifferent to any semantics- 
pragmatics distinction. 
This made it possible for the Kiparsk_qls to be universally 
* By 'an intellectual climate' here I am referring to one 
cLsistent with an appeal to the USE theory. of meaning as providing 
the most appropriate programme for enquiry in linguistics (one 
cognate with generative semantics). As argued in Burton-Roberts, in 
connection with a generally accepted Wittgensteinian analysis of 
ostensive definition (to appear), a thoroughgoing use theory of 
meaning is in principle inimical to a sem anti cs-pragm ati cs 
distinction. See the useful remarks of Wilson 1975: 13 on Fillmore 
1971 in this connection. 
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represented, as we have seen,, as postulating a (semantic) ambiguity 
of negation. And theories of presupposition have been attacked 
(and, curiously enough, defended) on that basis ever since. And it 
is dismaying to find that the most recent treatment of this use of 
negation - lengthy and comprehensive though it is - merely confirms 
and compounds the confusions. I refer to Horn's 1985 paper 
"Pragmatic ambiguity and metalinguistic negation". * 
2. On florn's dilemma. 
The phenomenon in question is more generally illustrated in (4)- 
(18), all of which are taken, or adapted in non-relevant waysi, from 
Horn 1985. $ Consider also (19). 
(4) I'm not his daughter - he's my father! 
(5) The glass isn't half empty, you pessimist, it's half fulli 
(6) We didn't engage in sexual intercourse, we made love! 
(7) Granny isn't feeling lousy,, Johnny, she's badly indisposed! 
(8) 1 didn't eat the[tý-) .. t: zdqz]F I ate the 
CL-60t- 8. -'LZGjL]1 
(9) 1d idn't trap two mongeese, I trapped two mongooses! 
(10) 1 didn't read the paper and get up, I got up and read the 
paper I 
(11) Ilm'not happy, I'm ecstatic! 
(12) We don't like cricket, we love it! 
(13) Max didn't buy two cars,, he bought seven carsl 
(14) Some men aren't chauvinistsf all men are chauvinists! 
(15) Maggie isn't either patriotic or quixotic, she's bothl 
(16) I'm not meeting a woman this evening, I'm meeting my wifel 
Burton-Roberts 1984: 203 remains agnostic on the ambiguity of 
negation, but I now see that those remarks were consistent with this 
general trend in interpreting the Kiparsky's. - 
$ And Horn in turn owes many of them to earlier discussions, Wilson 
1975 in particular. 
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(17) John didn't manage to solve the problem - it was quite easy f or him to solve! 
(18) The next Prime Minister won't be Wilson'r it'll be Beath or 
Wilson! 
Max i's not not very tallf he's a dwarf! 
Horn 1985 is dedicated to the demonstration that there is 
indeed a marked, specialf non-truth-functional (non-logicalF 
non-semantic) USE of negation. This use mýLy be described as 
metalinguistic in character, is most (or only) appropriate in 
contexts where the utterance in which it figures can be construed as 
a rejoinder, and is a device for objecting to another speaker's 
UTTERANCE on any grounds whatever, including the way it was 
pronounced, without actually constituting the semantic denial of 
the SENTENCE previously uttered. * This use indicates a speaker's 
unwillingness to assert or commit himself to a given proposition in 
a given way. It counts, not as an act of asserting the falsity of 
a proposition, but as an act of rejecting the utterance as 
unassertable or not assertable in the given way. This use of 
negation is'itself highly pervasive in the use of language and 
connects with other metalinguistic uses of language. $ 
*The uninitiated reader should, however, be warned that a confusing 
tradition has grown up in which this use of negation is actually 
called 'DENIAL' negation (presumably in order to reflect the above 
allusion to rejoinders). Henceforth, I shall use scare quotes 
when referring to it as 'denial negation'. 
$ With respect to this last point, it is odd that Horn nowhere 
mentions the very relevant general work by Sperber and Wilson 1981 
on the metalinguistic character of ironical utterances. They 
analyse irony in terms of the mention (as opposed to the use) of a 
proposition. The use of negation described above involves a special 
case of mention, namely (semi-) quotation. In characterising 
quotation as a special case of mention, I mean that quotation 
involves the mention of a proposition but, more specifically, 
mI enti. on of one that actually has been used in the discourse context. 
( Semi-quotation' is the term Fillmore (1969: 122) uses in connection 
with this use of negation. ) That work would seem to be of 
particular relevance in accounting for the rather archl more or less 
ironical tone that many associate with this use of negation. 
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None of these descriptions are original., In so describing the 
phenomenon, I am saying nothing that is not said - and in so many 
words - by Horn himself. * It is all the more striking then thatr 
were one in the position of having to INVENT or FABRICATE a perfect 
solution to the problem posed for presuppositional semantics by 
utteranbes such as (l)-(3) above, it is just such a use of negation 
that one would be called upon to invent (I shall elaborate on this 
in section 3). What Horn's data and his description of it 
demonstrate is that there is no need to invent it. It exists, 
independently of the need to solve that problem. Put this another 
way: had we not noticed the independent existence of this pragmatic 
device (as indeed the Kiparskýls had not) a logical theory of 
presupposition would/should have encouraged us to go looking for it. 
In other words, such a theory predicts its existence. 
While the remarks of the preceding paragraph suggest that the 
data and its accurate description have inescapable implications 
supportive of a presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps, Horn 
very conspicuously refrains from drawing any such conclusion. This 
is all the more surprising because he explicitly and repeatedly 
cites cases. of 'presupposition cancellation' such as that in (1) 
above as being central examples of this same metalinguistic use of 
negation, thus taking (l)-(19) to be homogeneous in representing a 
single general pragmatic phenomenon, a view in which I concur. 
This conspicuous failure on Horn's part requires explanation. 
The f act is that H orn f aces af undamental dil emma - one which he 
$ Nor is Horn alone in this. Indeed Horn invites us to conceive of his discussion "as a more explicit formulation of some ideas inherent in Ducrot 1972,1973r Grice 1967r Wilson 1975 and others" 
(121). This is difficult since,, as will become apparent, Horn's 
discussion is not more explicit. Horn (162), incidentally, disassociates his description of the phenomenon from that given by 
the K arskq)s (quoted above) but without discussion. I discern no 
such 
21stinction. 
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attempts to resolve (or rather avoid resolving) by compromise. The 
dilemma arises because Horn is reluctant to bring into question what 
lies at the basis of the controversy surrounding negation and its 
relation to a presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps. This 
puts him in the position of having to disagree both with the truth 
gap theories AND with their critics. 
The basis of this controversy just alluded to is the Standard 
Assumption (SA-4 of Ch. II: 3),, shared by Thomason, Wilsonr Kempsont 
Atlas and Gazdar among others, that a theory of presuppositionally 
induced truth-value gaps is by its very nature committed to a 
SEMANTIC AMBIGUITY OF NEGATION (SAN). Horn never questions this 
assumption, -indeed reiterates it in one form or another on almost 
every page of his discussion, even at the cost of obliging himself 
(122) to describe Strawson as a proponent of SANr in flat 
contradiction of the facts (as he elswhere (131) admits and proposes 
we should ignorel). This leads him to impale himself on one horn of 
the dil em ma - as f ollows. What we have in (1) - (19) 1 and what Horn 
seeks to establish that we have, is very clearly a distinctive 
PRAGMATIC phenomenon (though we have yet to provide the details that 
this intuitive assertion commits us to providing). As a PRAGMATIC 
phenomenon, it preempts a distinctive semantic analysis of (1)-(19) 
and hence preempts the positing of a semantic ambiguity of negation. 
So, IF a theory of truth value gaps is committed. to SAN, the clearly 
pragmatic character of (l)-(19) counts against such a theory. (As 
indicatedr though, it is a big 'if I. I have argued that, far from 
implying SAN, a truth gap theory is incompatible with SAN. This 
observation, combined with the pragmatic character of (l)-(19) 
yields the conclusion that, as far as a theory of truth-value gaps 
is concerned,. SAN IS NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR NECESSARYr which is 
indeed one of the arguments of this chapter. ) 
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So. on the one handr Horn finds himself in agreement with the 
critics of semantic presupposition in saying that negation is 
semantically unambiguous - and, given his unquestioning loyalty to 
SA-4, in agreement with them cLua critics of semantic presupposition. 
on the other hand, however, he is not entirely happy with the 
counter-presuppositional analysis of negation either. 
am partly in accord with the classic monoguist position 
summarised by Gazdar (1979a: 92): "There are no grounds for 
thinking that natural language negation is semantically 
distinct from the bivalent operator found in the g9spositional 
calculus. " But the spirit (if not the letter) of 1 position 
is violated by my approach, which takes a wide array of uses of 
natural language negation to be non-trutbfunctional and indeed 
entirely non-semantic. " (Horn 1985: 137) 
Further, having noted (154) that, in Kempson's treatmentr negation 
is unambiguously "the falsity operator of logic",, he comments "I do 
not wish to rebut the gist of her account" and mildly reproVes 
Kempson for ignoring "those cases of 'denial' negation whose 
behaviour does not naturally fall within the proper bounds of 
logical negation" (154). (1 quote more fully below. ) 
I have to say that these remarks (and the compromise they 
anticipate) appear to me obfuscatory andr in the final analysis, 
incoherent. They obscure a quite fundamental disagreement between 
Horn and the critics of semantic presupposition.. Kempson in 
particular. Beside this disagreement the points of agreement pale 
into insignificance. Let us be clear about this. in claiming 
that natural language is not semantically presuppositional and has 
an unambiguous negation, Kempson (and following her, Gazdar) are 
claiming that all the truth conditions of a positive sentence S are 
in the scope of negation in -S, including those truth conditions of 
S that are analysed by presuppositional logicians as presuppositions 
of S. This claim amounts, of courser to a denial that there 1S a 
semantic relation of presupposition; all truth conditions of S are 
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strongly entailed by S (and the single semantic negation can only be 
described as a 'presupposition-cancelling negation' - though, since 
there are thereby no presuppositions, the description is vacuous. ) 
Now the distinction between INTERNAL (descriptive, narrow scope) 
negation and EXTERNAL ('denial', wide-scope) negation is, in this 
context, the distinction between a presupposition-preserving and a 
presupposition-cancelling negation. The terminological distinction 
between the negations only makes sense within theories which purport 
to admit BOTH of semantic presuppositions AND of semantic ambiguity 
in negation. Now Kempson's theory admits of neither. So, strictly 
speaking, it makes no sense to ask which of these two negations 
Kempson's theory claims is the single semantic negation. 
Nevertheless, if we allow ourselves for a moment NOT to speak 
strictly and pose that question, the answer is clear: for Kempsonr 
the single semantic negation has the logical effect of the external 
'presupposition-cancel ling" negation (that is WHY her theory is non- 
presuppositional: it is a negation of S that unfailingly yields an 
assignment of truth for -S when S is not- true; it is thus 
indifferent to a distinction between 'false' and 'neither true nor 
false' andr since this is the ONLY negation admitted, this amounts 
to the DENIAL of any such distinction; hence semantic 
presuppositions are disbanded. ) And, continuing to allow ourselves 
to speak non-strictly, when I by contrast claim that 
presuppositional theories of truth gaps also imply a semantic 
univocalitY of 'negation, the single semantic negation that is 
implied by this is the internali, descriptive negation 
("presupposition-preserving", though the description is vacuous 
since it is the only negation and the theory is presuppositional). 
These remarks are intended to make it clear how the pro- and 
counter-presupposition camps must be seen as squaring up to each 
other once the red-herring of semantically ambiguous negation is 
294 
dismissed as an issue. The theories must. be seen as being in 
agreement that negation is semantically unambiguous. The issue in 
contention is this: which understanding of negation is to be taken 
as THE truth-functional (logical) semantic negation and which 
pragmatically derived? Critics of truth gap theories are committed 
to its being the "presupposition-cancelling" (external, so-called 
'denial') negation that is semantically basic and that any other 
understanding of negation is to be derived from that semantic 
operator in pragmatic terms, in terms of an explanation of a 
particular USE of that semantic operator in utterances. 
Diametrically opposed to this, proponents of truth gap theories are 
committed to its being the "presupposition-preserving" (internal,. 
descriptive) negation that is semantically basic and that any other 
understanding of negation is to be derived pragmaticallyl in terms 
of an explanation of a particular USE of that operator. The 
disagreement then boils down to a disagreement as to which of two 
phenomena is to be given a distinctively prag matic explanation, 
"presupposition-cancellation" or "presupposition-preservation" (i. e. 
in the final analysis, whether presupposition itself is a semantic 
or pragmatic phenomenon). This is the issue. 
Horn obscures the issue. Indeed, he positively misrepresents 
Kempson (1975) on this, making it appear that Kempson is arguing 
exactly the opposite of what she is arguing: '. 
"[Kempson] goes on to present and challenge a variety of 
presuppositionalist views of ambiguous negation in which 
external or denial negation is taken as a semantic operator. 
Since I agree with Kempson that her 'denial' negation cannot be 
a semantic operator, and is indeed 'one of the uses to which 
negative sentences could be put' (99). 1 do not wish to rebut 
the gist of her account. " 
I Horn 1985: 154. 
Yet it follows quite clearly from the remarks of the preceding 
paragraph, and from her own discussion,, that Kempson must be, and 
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is, arguing f or a treatment of negation in which the 
('presupposition-cancelling') external understanding of negation is 
DIRECILY characterised by the semantics. For exampler when Kempson 
1975: 99 considers the possibility that presuppositionalists, in an 
effort to resolve their problems as she conceives themr might 
attempt to "retain 1-11 [external negation] as a denial operator and 
agree that the truth conditions of 1-1 [internal negation] must be 
extended to cover all these cases [i. e. cases 'such as (1)-Q)]", she 
correctly observes that this would be "to relinquish the very claim 
on which the entire presuppositional. analysis is based" - for that 
is precisely the semantic analysis of negation that she herself is 
proposing. Since Kempson's position is that the understanding of 
negation found in (l)-(3) above is directly characterised by the 
semantics, it is that understanding which by her theory requires no 
special pragmatic explanation. Kempson 1979 is quite explicit on 
this point. She remarks of such examples that their existence "is 
consistent with this view and poses no problem for it" (287-8). 
Horn's analysis of (l)-(19) as forming a homogeneous pragmatic- 
metalinguistic phenomenon is clearly and fundamentally opposed to 
the position of Kempson and counter-presuppositionalists in general. 
This is the other horn of Horn's dilemma. 
The resolution of a dilemma necessitates the making of an 
unequivocal choice. Horn attempts to avoid the choice that faces 
him by retreating into vague and contradictory compromise. 
"In the synthesis that I shall advocate here negation in indeed 
ambiguOusr contra Atlasr Kempson Gazdar et al. But contra... 
the three-valued logicians, it is not SEMANTICALLY ambiguous. 
Rather we are dealing with a PRAGMATIC ambiguity, a built in 
duality of use" 
Horn 1985: 132. 
I cannot conceive what Horn might mean bj this. Is negation 
ambiguous or is it not? Is the expression 11sema ntically ambiguous" 
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tautological or not? If not, what is a "pragmatic ambiguity"? What 
is a "built-in duality of use"? (Is Horn proposing a use theory of 
meaning? ) What is this "built-in duality" built into? The 
expression itself? If so, it sounds semantic. But, we are told.. it 
is a "duality of USE". Does the duality then reside in USE? If so, 
in what sense is it "built-in"'i' Assuming that 'ýpragmatic ambiguity" 
is coherent, on what grounds does Horn claim that negation is 
pragmatically ambiguous? If he means that it remains equivocal even 
when used in utterances, this is simply false. Negation 
unequivocally has the 'presupposition-preserving' understanding in 
every case except those in which that understanding is starkly 
impossible - as in (l)-(3) above - in which cases it is, again 
unequivocally, 'presupposition-cancelling'. As Horn himself 
observes (121) this latter understanding is one that is "FORCED" 
upon the hearer in a particular context (see also Kiefer 1977). 
My general remarks on pragmatics have the implication that if 
we are claiming that the understanding of negation evidenced in (l)- 
(19) is a matter for pragmatics, we are committed to deriving that 
understanding from another understandingr where this other 
understanding is directly characterised by the semantics, indeed is 
the semantic reading itself. In the case of (11, this commits us to 
the PRAGMATIC derivation of a "presupposition-cancelling" 
understanding of negation from a semantically basic, logical 
negation that is presupposition-preserving. in short, it is to be 
committed to a presuppositional semantics. 
Horn resists this conclusion - clearly indicated though it is 
by his own discussion. Horn characterises the phenomenon in (l)- 
(19) as pragmatic (and this seems intuitive enough) but never 
provides any explanatory derivation of it and repeatedly contradicts 
himself in the matter of how this PRAGMATIC understanding of 
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negation relates to the logical SEMANTICS -of negation. . For 
exampler at one point Horn speaks of this marked negation "as an 
extended metalinguistic use of a basically truth-functional 
operator" (122) and elsewhere makes remarks consistent with this. 
Now this seems clear enough (and - by my earlier arguments - this 
basically truth-functional operator must be the "internal", 
"descriptive'l, "presupposition-preserving" operator - indeed, Horn 
actually concedes it is "descriptive" (139)1). But, to take just 
one of many examples,, Horn flatly contradicts this by alluding to 
"this special or marked use of negation, irreducible to the ordinary 
internal truth-functional operator" (132). In fact#, Horn frequently 
goes so far as actually to obscure any semantics/pragmatics 
distinction, important though this should be in the context of this 
his discussion of negation,, and is in much of his previous work (eg 
1972,1973). In illustration of this, consider his suggestion (151) 
that "we should be unwilling to claim that all negations are one",, a. 
suggestion that is almost meaningless in the context of a semantics- 
pragmatics distinction, for it fails to make explicit whether Horn 
is talking about negation per se (a matter of semantics) or the USES 
of negation (a matter of pragmatics). Pee also his discussion (165) 
of the question posed by Atlas 1981r "Is j2_QJ logical? " 
Whenr finallYr Horn does explicitly address the question we are 
asking (164) we get this: 
"One issue remaining is the directionality of the relationship 
between- descriptive and metalinguistic negation. Which is 
primary and which derivative? Or do both uses branch off from 
some mote basic undifferentiated notion? * I have little to 
contribute on this point. " 
This at least is explicit, but it is extraordinary in a treatment 
*In terms of the phonological parallel drawn earlier, this 
suggestion of Horn's is reminiscent of phonemicists' postulation of 
Imorphophonemes' and concomitent morphophonological rules. Recall 
Halle's (1959: 22-3) demonstration of the loss of generality that 
this move incurs. (I am being no more than semi-serious in thus 
extending the parallel - but no less either. ) 
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that purports to treat of metalinguistic negation as a PRAGMATIC 
phenomenon. 
I have devoted considerable space to the critique of Horn 1985. 
That paper offers itself as a candidate for extended discussion 
because it represents such a comprehensive review of the state of 
the art vis a vis special, marked negation and its relation to 
logical presupposition. In the section that follows I spell out in 
more detail the pragmatics of metalinguistic negation and its 
application to the general phenomenon of "presupposition- 
cancellation. 
3. Metalinguistic negation and mpresupposition-cancellation". 
The single most important fact that I wish to draw attention to in 
this section is that there are good grounds for saying that (with 
just one exception to be discussed) each of the examples in the set 
(4)-(19) at least is a contradiction. It is striking that Horn at 
no point explicitly makes this observation. The generalisation 
rests,, of course, on certain assumptions, most of which are 
uncontroversial, though some are more theory-dependent than others - 
as I now show. 
(4)-(5), 1 take itj, require no further elaboration in respect 
of this generalisation. similarly, (6)-(7) are semantically 
contradictory on the assumption that 'make love' and 'engage in 
sexual intercourse' are (on one interpretation of the former at 
least) semantically equivalent, as are 'feel lousy' and 'be badly 
indisposed'. Such expressions are distinguished not in their 
semantics, but in their stylistic register; (6)-(7) are therefore 
contradictory. In (8) we have two pronunciations of TBE SADIE WORD 
'tomato'; this distinction in pronunciation is immaterial to the 
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semanticsf hence (8) is contradictory. Similarly in (9) we have two 
morphological analyses of THE SAME WORD 'mongoose'; again the 
distinction in perceived morphology is immaterial to the semantics, 
hence (9) is contradictory. (10) is contradictory on the assumption 
that the semantics of land' are correctly characterised by the 
(symmetric) truth-function IV (where (p, & q) = (q & p)) and any 
perceived non-truthfunctional assymmetry involving temporal sequence 
and/or causality is pragmatically explainable in terms of the 
Gricean injunctions to orderliness and/or relevance in co-operative 
speech, or in terms of Wilson and Sperber's 1981 development of 
Grice's theory. (1l)-(15) may be loosely grouped together. If 
ecstasy is intense happiness then to be ecstatic is to be (at least) 
happy and (11) is contradictory. Similarly in (12). (13) is 
contradictory on the assumption that to buy sdven cars is to buy (at 
least) two (i. e. two plus five more), 171 being equivalent, inter 
alia, to 12+51. As regards (14). on the assumption that sentences 
containing -'all' (semantically, the universal 'quantifier) entail 
otherwise identical sentences containing 'some' (semantically,, the 
existential quantifier), all... ' contradicts 1-( ... some... 
Similarly,, (p & q) entails (p V q); hence (15), which is of the 
semantic form ((- (p V q)) & (p, & q)) (where (p V q) = ((-p) & 
(-q)), is contradictory. These examples fall together because the 
semantic analysis involved in each depends upon giving a pragmatic 
explanation (in terms of conversational quantity implicature) of the 
discrepancy between this semantic analysis and how such expressions 
can be understood in ordinary discourse. 'Example (16) may be 
another such example. (16) is contradictory on the assumption that, 
although a man uttering the first clause would convey the suggestion 
that the woman he is meeting is not his wifer this implication is 
not semantic, but a special case of conversational quantity 
implicature; therefore if a man is meeting his wife he is of 
necessity meeting a woman. 
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(17) requires slightly more care. It has been claimed 
(Kartunnen 1971a, Kartunnen & Peters 1979) that sentences containing 
'manage' (as an 'implicative' verb) are truth-conditionally 
equivalent to the clause functioning as the complement of that verb 
(so that 'John managed to solve the problem' is true (false) if and 
only if 'John solved the problem' is true (false)), but that the 
SEMANTICS of this verb includes a NON TRJTH CONDITIONAL element of 
CONVENTION to the effect that there is some difficulty involved in 
the achievement that is 'managed'. If this is so, (17) is 
contradictory for the first clause of the example is truth 
conditionally equivalent to 'John didn't solvE i the problem' while 
the second entails that he solved it. (It is relevant to note that, 
were the suggestion of difficulty to be treated truth-conditionally, 
and as a strong entailment, (17) would NOT be a logical 
contradiction - it would be equivalent to 'John didn't solve the 
problem with difficulty,, he solved it with ease). * 
(18) - due to Wilson - is not in fact contradictory as it 
*Wilson 1975: Chs 6 and 7 considers the possibility of treating the 
semantics of certain other expressions in a similar manner. For 
exam le and , gVajg. On such an account, 
the truth 
condNfonal s9mantics of these verb would be identical (X deprives/ 
spares Y (of)* Z iff X witholds Z from Y) but the SEMANTICS of each 
includes a further non-truth-conditional element. In the case of 
depriv , that z is desirable (in someone's eyes), and 
in the case of 
that Z is undesirable (in someone's eyes). Less 
convincinglyr Wilson considers a similar treatment for the 
distinction between plan and pl", ýnd trustin and credulo . These I think are diff-e-rent. There is it seems to me no reason not 
to analyse plots TRUTB-OC)NDITIONALLY as secret and nefarious plans, 
credulity as undiscriminating trust. 'ibis wholly truth-conditional 
analysis predicts that (i) and (iii) are contradictions but not (ii) 
or (iv), a prediction I am happy with. 
(i) That's not a plan, that's (! simply) a plot. 
(ii) That's not a plot, that's (simply) a plan. 
(iii) Dinah's not trusting, she's (Isimply) credulous. 
(iv) Dinah's not credulous, she's (simply) trusting. 
(ii) merely denies that the plan is secret and nbf arious. (iv) merely 
denies that Dinah's trust is undiscriminating. This asymmetry comes 
over more clearly in (v) and (vi): [continued] 
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stands. But we are immediately led to a contradiction in 
considering the obvious intention behind its utterance. (17) is of 
the f orm ((-p) & (p V q)). From this we are entitled to infer q (by 
modus tollendo ponens) i. e. that Heath will be Prime Minister. But, 
as Wilson 1975: 150 observes "this is not at all what is meant". The 
non-logicalo, epistemological point the speaker is making would be 
brought out if (18) were followed by: 
B: Are you saying it'll be Heath? 
A: No. I'm simply pointing out you can't yet be so sure 
it'll definitely be Wilson. 
What the speaker intends, then, is consistent with the contradictory 
(18a) : 
(18a) It won't be Heath and it won't be Wilson, it'll be either 
Heath or Wilson. 
(The opposite epistemological point would be made by the 
directly contradictory (18b): 
(18b) It won't be Beath or Wilsonr it'll be Wilson! ) 
I have included (19) because it is a rather clear example of 
a. Mat's not a planr though it IS a PLOT. 
b. That's not a plot, though it IS a PLAN. 
(vi) a. Minah's not trusting, though she IS CREEULOUS. 
b. Dinah's not credulous, though she IS MST1NG. 
dý-. I? xav and spax: , by contrast,, remain resolutely symmetrical 
in 
this respect: 
(vii) a. I didn't deprive him of a discussion, thoughl 
did SPARE him one. 
b. I didn't spare him a discussion, though I did 
DEPRIVE him of one. 
If this indicates that depriv and spar should indeed include a non 
truth-conditional component of meaning, so be it. It should follow 
from that analysis however, that both (vii-a) and (vii-b) are truth 
conditional contra3ictions. ibis is not obvious to me. 
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the general phenomenon. By double negation, the first clause 
semantically entails that Max is very tall, which contradicts the 
assertion that he is a dwarf. It is the fact that this application 
of double negation is so clearly at odds with what the speaker 
intends and is doing here that makes it such a clear example. 
In such terms, then, (4)-(19) are truth-7conditional contra- 
dictions. In itself, this observation is of course a gross 
distortion of what is going on here. In saying this, though,, I do 
not mean that it is a distortion of the sentence-semantics as such,, 
but a distortion of what a speaker would be doing and intending to 
convey in uttering those sentences. The semantic analysis of these 
examples as being literal contradictions (as being, from a semantic 
point of view, impossible) is not only correct, it is actually 
required if we are to provide an explanation of what a speaker must 
intend by his utterance of them and of the ease with which this 
intention is recognised. abat is, a recognition of their "semantic 
impossibility" is a necessary component in the explanation of their 
"pragmatic possibility". 
It is clearr in (19) for examplej, that it is the immediate 
utterance of the contradiction-inducing second clause that prevents 
usr on the pragmatic level,, from adhering to the analysis indicated 
by the semantics and analysing 'not not very tall'. as meaning 'very 
tall' (In fact, 'not not very tall" willy-nilly means 'very tall'. 
What I should have said here is: analysing the speaker's use of 'not 
not very tall! to CONVEY 'very tall'; this makes it clearer that we 
are talkingr not of sentence meaning, but of speaker's meaning. ) 
Similarly in (15)r it is the second clause that prevents us (and the 
hearer) analysing the utterance of the first clause as conveying the 
negation of a disjunction (having as its logical consequences that 
Maggie is not patriotic and that she is not quixotic) which, in 
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logical terms, is exactly what it is. 
In the face of such blatent contradictions, the co-operative 
hearer - that is, the hearer who assumes that the speaker is being 
co-operative - must perform a re-analysis in order to recover from 
the utterance of these literal contradictions an intention to convey 
another, non-contradictory idea. This calculation is NECESSITATED 
by the contradiction induced in each case by the second clause. And 
it will be FACILITATED by a context that includes an appropriate 
previous utterance by some other speaker (or an allusion to such a 
previous utterance). "Facilitating" is perhaps too weak a 
description of the role played in this by an appropriate previous 
utterance. Such a context is not merely facilitatingr but ENABLING 
in this respect. For, even though none of these examples has in 
fact been supplied with a context, it is striking that we feel 
impelled to conceive of them as occuring in a context in which they 
can be construed as rejoinders to some previous utterance. 
The explanation of the enabling character of such a context is 
inalienably bound up with the metalinguistic character of the*-., 
examples themselves. Take (15). The enabling context for (15) 
would include an utterance of (15a): 
(15a) Maggie is/must be either patriotic or quixotic. 
This is enabling of the required re-analysis in that it allows (if 
not obliges) us to construe the utterance of the first clause of 
(15), NOT as the semantic denial of (15a) i. e. not as a 
straightforward use of the proposition (15a) I which is anyway 
ruled out by the second clause of (15) but as a use of negation 
that operates in respect of a quotational allusion to the previous. 
use of,, and hence in respect of a MENTION of,, the positive 
proposition (15a). This analysis explains why the normal rules of 
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logical inference (which apply in respect of -the actual sentences) 
do not apply to these apparent utterances of them. For what is 
mentioned (as opposed to used) is, as it were, hermetically sealed 
in logical terms from its immediate (intra-sentential) linguistic 
context. nus in (19) double negation is inapplicable because the 
two negations are operating on different levels (to use the 
Kiparskis' term), the one "sealed" within the -mention (""(Max is) 
not very tall"") , the other operating externally on that mentionr 
whose internal logical content is opaque for all purposes external 
to that mention. * Similarly,, quantifier exchange fails in (16), 
modus tollendo ponens in (18), and so on. In each, the interaction 
of this sealed-off negation would be crucial to the functioning of 
those logical principles. 
Conceiving of the relevant expression or proposition as being 
sealed within a mention thus simultaneously resolves the 
contradiction and reveals the speaker's intention. lt resolves the 
contradiction because in mentioning (rather than using) a 
proposition, a speaker is absolved of any responsibility for, or 
commitment to, any aspect of what he mentions. $ And it reveals his 
intention as being object to a previous utterance, a previous USE of 
*As Horn and others have observed, there is a. purely morphol(> 
,? 
ical 
reflex of this "sealing up" effect: semantically. 'not be happy and 'be unhappy' are equivalent, but the latter, in which the negative 
is morpholoýically incorporated, precludes the pragmatic 
metalinguistic re-analysis I am here describing (cf. 1"I'm unhppw, 
I'm ecstatic". Me dislike cricket, we love it", "'Maggie's neir-her 
patriotic nor quixotic, she's both". ) Andr although the negative 
particle appears to e playing its normal role in the positional 
syntax of the senten it fails to trigger negative polarity items 
such as ygk., - dawn/hoot etc. . LDya a nal-g. 
lif a finger, giv .9 
$TO take only the most recent example I've encountered: when Chief 
Daniels ("Hill Street Blues" 7.3.87) complains: 
I subscribe to the survival of the fittest and I'm an 
unfeeling brute; Darwin subscribes to it and he's a genius! 
he is not committed to the proposition that he is an unfeeling brute 
(nor for that matter to the proposition that Darwin is a genius) because he is MENTION1NG (rather than using) a proposition that he 
feels is in the air. 
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the proposition, and not as denying that the. proposition is true/ 
asserting its falsity. 
The grounds on which I earlier suggested that the independent 
existence of such a use of negation constitutes "a perfect solution" 
-a perfect explanation of so-called presuppo. §ition-cancellation - 
should now be clear. It will present the matter first in terms of 
the stronger Standard theory of presupposition before considering, 
in the section that follows, how the Standard and the Revised 
theories compare in the light of the remarks that follow. 
The Standard presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps has it 
that a sentence suffering from presupposition-f ail ure is neither 
true nor false; negation is not expressive of the non-truth of such 
sentences,, for the negation of any such sentence ef f ects an equal 
commitment to the truth of the (failed) presupposition and such an 
attempted denial incurs the same logical failure as the would-be 
assertion thqt it purports to deny. Such a theory is intended as a 
theory of statement failure: positive or negative,, sentences 
suffering from presupposition-f ail ure are not assertable. Under 
such a theory, it is truth conditionally contradictory to deny the 
truth (assert the falsity) of a sentence on the grounds of the 
falsity of its presuppositions. 
Under that theory,, (1) receives the following truth-conditional 
analysis. The first clause logically presupposes (20): 
(20) There is a king of France. 
The second qlause entails (is) the negation of (20). (1) is 
therefore a truth-conditional contradiction. Under this theory, the 
speaker - as the speaker of a presuppositional language and one who 
knows that (20) is false - cannot assert the falsity of (21) below. 
The pragmatics of (1) are therefore identical to that (4)-(19). As 
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with those examplesr (1) is only perceived as appropriate in a 
context in which it can be construed as a rejoinder - in this case, 
as a rejoinder to the utterance of (21): 
(21) The king of France is bald. 
As part of this rejoinder, the first clause is to be pragmatically 
re-analysed as a use of negation operating, not (truth-functionallY) 
on a proposition, but non-truth-functionally on the MENTION of a 
proposition previously used - i. e. operating on the speaker's 
QUOTATION of a previous speaker's USE of (21).. The utterer of (1) 
is thereby pragmatically absolved of any responsibility for,, or 
commitment to, what he WCULD be committed to by the (presupposit- 
ional) semantics of the negation of (21) were he simply USING the 
negation of (21). He is MENTIONING (21) in order to object to it in 
the only way he CAN object to it, given that he is speaking a 
logically presuppositional language with truth-value gaps, i. e. as 
in all the other cases considered, not by denying its truth 
asserting its falsity), but by objecting to it on the grounds of its 
assertability - for in that presuppositional language (21) is NOT 
false: it is neither true nor false. 
Notice in passing that, as Horn observes, the morphology and 
syntax of the use of negation in the first clause of (1) is entirely 
consistent with what we know of metalinguistic negation in general. 
Compare (22) and (23): 
(22) The king of France is not happy there's no king of 
France. 
(23) Me king of France is unhappy - there's no king of France. 
See also: 
(24) Me king of France doesn't give a damn - there is no king of France. 
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(25) the king of France isn't lifting a finger - there is no king of France. 
se alrea , 1% 
(26) the king of France hasn't losti.! 
any 
hair there 
om 
1yet"Yj. 
is no king of France. 
There is incidentally a further ramification of this analysis. 
Consider (27): 
(27) The king of France isn't baldj, because there is no king of 
France! 
I am concerned with this use of becaus If, as Horn and I are 
claiming, (1) -involves a special, metalinguistic use of negationt 
then (27) must involve not only that special use of negation but 
also a special metalinguistic use of becaus operating on "the same 
level",, as it'were,, as that use of negation. The general pragmatic 
analysis predicts in other words, that a special metalinguistic use 
of becaus is observable in speakers' utterances. Otherwise the 
bgpaus clause would have to be analysed as providing a reason f or 
the content of the first clause fthe king of France isn't bald) on 
an assumption of the literal truth of that clause. On the 
metalinguistic analysis that is indicatedr the becaus clause is, 
and must be seen, not as providing a reason for thinking that the 
first clause is true, but as metalinguistically expounding the 
SPEAKER'S reason for DOING what he is doing by- means of the first 
clause. And this pragmatic analysis of a special, use of becaus is 
by no means peculiar to such examples. Compare (28) and (29): 
(28) John has got his hat on because he's going out. 
(29) John is going out because he has his hat on. 
(28) is consistent with an ordinary semantic analysis of becaus 
clauses as providing a reason for John's having his hat on on the 
assumption that it is the case that he indeed has it on. But if 
(29) is construed thus - as providing a reason for John's going out 
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(and on the assumption that he IS going out) a quite bizarre picture 
is conjured up of John and his reasons for going out! No; in (29) 
the becaus clause must be construed metalinguisticallYr as 
providing, not the reason for John going out, but an explanation of 
the SPEAKER'S reason for SAYING that he is. The same metalinguistic 
analysis is indicated for (30) and (31): 
(30) Max is in because I can see smoke coming from his chimney. 
(31) Please leave the room now because I'm going to wash the 
floor. 
In (31) the becaus clause is not part of the'request (as it would 
be in the rather odd request "Don't do it simply because I ask your 
do it because you want to"). It offers,, not a reason for the 
addressee to leave the room,, but a reason for the speaker's making 
the request. (Wliy is subject to the possibility,. as when I ask a 
flat-earther "Why is the earth flat? ". Here I am not in fact asking 
why the earth is flat, I'm asking why the flat-earther SAYS it's 
flat. Coming from anyone but a flat-earther, the mhy-in this 
question must be construed as operating on a MENTION of the 
proposition that the earth is flat. ) 
Before we turn to the general implications of this analysis, 
consider the following. The particular relevance of example (19) is 
that it provides an example of something that is anyway predicted by 
the general account of metalinguistic negation: that the 
metalinguistic use of negation is not confined to the rejoinder- 
rejection of the utterance of a POSITIVE. In (19) we have a 
rejoinder that rejects the previous utterance of a negative. This 
is of particular relevance in the context of presuppositional 
theories of truth-value gaps, for such theories predict that anyone 
disposed to reject an utterance of (21) as being unassertable (as in 
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(1)) will be equally disposed to reject its -negation on the same 
grounds, as in (32): 
(32) The king of France isn't not bald - there is no king of 
France! 
and, indeed, as in (33)! 
(33) The king of France isn't either bald or not bald - there 
is no king of Francel 
seen as a rejoinder to a previous utterance of, say, "Either the 
king of France is bald or he isn't". 
The reader will have noticed that my use of the term 
"presupposition-cancellation" has been attended by scare-quotes. 
The reason for this is that that term is ordinarily empIcyed in the 
context of negation to mean the use of not-S to deny the 
presuppositions of S. Now, by definition a presupposition of S is a 
presupposition of not-S. So "presupposition-cancellation" specif- 
ically involves the use of a sentence to deny its own 
presuppositions. (This is what I mean when I talk of denying a 
presupposition QUA presupposition. ) I have consistently maintained 
that this is impossible (i. e. not possible without contradiction) - 
this is why the concept of a (semantic) presupposition-cancelling 
negation is contradictory, and hence why (l)-(3), seen as examples 
of exactly that (semantic) concept of presupp6sition-cancellation, 
must be seen as incorrigibly inimical to a -logical theory of 
presupposition. No logical theory of presupposition can admit of 
such a thing. *And the foregoing discussion of metalinguistic 
negation shows that in (1) we do not in fact HAVE "presupposition- 
cancellation" as such. At the semantic level we would indeed have 
a contradiction; on the actual (pragmatic) level of utterance at 
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which (1) is properly construed, no presupposing sentence is USEDr 
though a presupposing sentence (the positive one) is MENTIONED. 
Furthermore, the denial of the sentence that is presupposed by the 
mentioned (quoted) sentence occurs explicitly and separately in the 
SECOND clause and is not therefore a case of "presupposition- 
cancellation" in the special (and contradictory) sense that is 
inimical to logical theories of presupposition. To regard it as 
s uch would entail regarding the explicit denial "There is no king of 
France" as presupposing its own negation. 
If there is a single case that comes at all close to being a 
case of "presupposition-cancellation" as such, it would consist in 
the utterance of (34)r (=the first clause of (32)). 
(34) The king of France isn't either bald or not bald! 
I say this because, under a presuppositional logic, a speaker 
uttering something like (35): 
(35) Surely, either the king of France is bald or he isn't! 
is committed to nothing of empirical substance beyond the presuppos- 
ition that there is a king of France. There would then be little 
point in uttering (34) unless one sought to reject the utterance of 
(35) on the grounds of its failure of presupposition. So, if there 
is a candidate for "presupposition-cancellation" as such, I concede 
that (34) might be it. But look at what the utterer of (34) has bad 
to do in order to cancel the presupposition as such! He has 
committed himself to the contradiction of denying a necessary truth. 
This denial of a particular non-trivial presupposition as such 
commits him to the more sweeping denial of the infinite set of 
trivial presuppositions, thus bearing out the contention that 
semantic presupposition-cancellation as such is contradictory and 
the connection (mooted in Chs I. III, VIII) between trivial and non- 
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trivial presupposition. 
I now make explicit the further implications of this general 
description of the pragmatic phenomenon of me talinguistic negation. 
The discussion has established that the phenomenon in (l)-(3) 
(though it is (1) that I am really concerned with) is but one 
example of a general pragmatic phenomenon. This indicates the 
independent necessity of some pragmatic explanation. There is 
therefore no need to concoct an ad hoc account of the phenomenon in 
(1) and its (pragmatic) possibility does not therefore constitute 
evidence against presuppositional theories of truth-value gaps. 
This is the very least of what has been demonstrated here. A 
much stronger implication emerges from the fact that M-(19) are 
literal (truth-conditional) contradictions. Not only is this a very 
obvious generalisation in its own right, it plays a role in the 
provision of an explanatory motivation for the pragmatic analysis of 
those examples. On a presuppositional theory of truth-value gaps, 
and only on such a theory, this explanatory generalisation extends 
automatically to include (l)-(3) in its application, thereby 
applying across the board. It hardly needs pointing out that on 
counter-presuppositional theories of negation such as that expounded 
by Kempson, (l)-(3) simply are not semantically contradictory. That 
theory denies that the implication to (20) from the first clause of 
(1) is a truth-conditional implication. On the contraryl it is 
analysed (with Grice 1981) as a conversational implicature,, one that 
is (as conversational implicatures are by definition prone to be) 
cancelled WITHOUT CCNTRADICTION in the second clause. And then.. on 
that theory, the use of negation in the first clause of (1) must be 
(and is) claimed to receive a straightforward-pragmatic construal 
that is identical to its semantics, with negation construed 
pragmatically as the ordinary truth-functional negation of a 
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proposition on the unexceptionable grounds of the falsity of one of 
its strong entailments. Since this theory commits us to denying the 
homogeneity of (1) with respect to (4)-(19), while still requiring 
an independent account of the latter set.. I take it to be inadequate 
on observational, descriptive, and explanatory grounds. (See the 
critique of the conversational analysis in Kiefer 1977). 
Since I. with Horn and others, take (l)-(19) to constitute a 
homogeneous set of metalinguistic, negations, it is of somd 
importance to capture the generalisation that the motivation for 
the pragmatic re-analysis invited by this use of negation stems 
from the need to resolve a truth conditional contradiction. This 
implies that a properly general and explanatory account of' 
metalinguistic negation itself depends upon a presuppositional 
theory of truth gaps. It is on these grounds that I earlier claimed 
that a logically presuppositional theory not only requiresi, but is 
required by,, -. a general explanation of metalinguistic negation. The 
latter phenomenon thus provides additionalf external motivation for 
such a theory. 
I have mentioned that Horn ignores this generalisation. 1 
attribute this to the fact that Horn is focussing on anotherr lesser 
generalisation. This is a generalisation to the effect that what 
is being objected to by the metalinguistic use of negation is some 
NON TRUTH -CONDITIONAL aspect of a previous utterance, be it 
pragmatic, non truth-conditionally semantic, phonetic, morpho- 
logicalr or stylistic. This is a lesser generalisation because, 
while it holds in respect of (4)-(19), it does not hold in respect 
of (l)-(3). That is, (4)-(19) and (l)-(3) are distinguished by the 
fact that the latter are used to object to what on any theorYr be it 
pro- or counter-presuppositionalr is a truth-conditional implic- 
ation. For exampler (1) is used as a rejoinder to (21), objecting 
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to it on the grounds of its truth-conditional relation to (20). * 
So, if what we seek to capture is the homogeneity of the set (l)- 
(19), and it is (for Horn as well),, this particular observation is 
NOT in fact a generalisation that holds in respect of the set at 
issue (Horn fails to note this). 
It might appear that this discrepancy between (l)-(3) and 
(19) could be viewed as the thin end of a coUnter-presuppositional 
wedge, indicating that, appearances notwithstanding, (l)-(19) do not 
in reality constitute such a homogeneous phenomenon after all. -- 
'Ibis line of thinking must be rejected, I think. For it depends on 
ignoring yet another generalisation, one which resolves the 
discrepancy in way that is perhaps rather surprising. It is true 
that (1) is used to object to a truth-codditional aspect of a 
previous utterance ((21) as it happens), whereas (4)-(19) are used 
to object to NON truth-conditional aspects of previous utterances. 
But, as I noted earlier, under a presuppositional theory of truth- 
value gaps, the utterer of (1) is analysed as "MENTIONING (21) in 
order to object to it in the only way he CAN object to it, given 
that he is speaking a logically presuppositional language with-. 
truth-value gaps i. e. as with all the other cases considered, not by 
denying its truth (=asserting its falsity) but by objecting to it on 
the grounds of its non--assertability, for in that presuppositional 
language (21) is not false: it is neither true nor false. " As 
discussed in earlier chapters,, I conceive of a language that is 
logically (truth-conditionally) presuppositional as being 
*To my knowledge, only Karttunen & Peters (eg 1979: 48) suggest that 
the relation between (21) and (20) is non truth-conditional. They 
treat it as a conventional implicature. See, my earlier remarks 
(Chapter VII. 3) on this proposal. 
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(relatively) constrained in its logical expressive capacity: it does 
not afford the truth conditional, truth functional, expressive means 
of rejecting (21) as such, i. e. a semantic rejection in terms of the 
negation of (21). 
The higher generalisation that covers (l)-(19) is that,, 
although what is objected to in the metalinguistic use of negation 
is truth-conditional in (l)-(3) but non-truth-conditional in (4)- 
(19). in NONE of these cases can it be objected to truth- 
conditionally and as such - i. e. in none of the cases can the 
objection itself take the form of an ordinary truth-functional 
logical denial of the content of the utterance being objected to. 
As regards (4)-(19)1, it is self-evident that if a speaker objects to 
some non truth-conditional aspect of a previous utterance he can 
hardly expect (and he can hardly be expected) to be able to reject 
the utterance by the ordinary use of the truth-functional negation 
operator. By def initiont this operator is a function that takes 
only a set of truth-conditions as its argument. As regards (I)- 
(3), on the other handr this negation function again takes only a 
set of truth-conditions as its argument but, in this case and by the 
definition of presupposition (Standard or Revised) j, NOT ALL truth 
conditions of a sentence are included in the set that constitutes 
the argument of this function. It is a defining property of those 
truth-conditions that are presuppositions (Standard or Revised) that 
they are EXCLUDED from that set of truth-conditions which 
constitutes the argument of the truth-function we call negation. 
This then is a point of contact between logical presupposition 
and non truth-conditionality (generally, of whatever character): 
that if the grounds on which an utterance is to be rejected are 
either presuppositional or non truth-conditionalf the rejection 
itself cannot be achieved by means of the ordinary truth-functional 
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use of negation. This does not indicate,, as counter- 
presuppositionalists might seek to suggest, that presuppositional 
phenomena are wholly non truth-conditional in character. By the 
argument presented here, quite the reverse is the case: a truth- 
conditional, logical account of presupposition articulates the 
connection in an explicitr coherent, explanatory fashion. 
4. Standard and Revised*theories compared. 
I have now presented the general case for regarding metalinguistic 
negation as not merely buttressing a presuppositional theory of 
truth-value gaps but as providing additional external motivation for 
one. It appears to me a strong case. In presenting it, however,, I 
did not discriminate between Standard Theory presupposition and the 
base- and generalised presuppositions of the Revised Theory. I 
conclude this chapter by disentangling those theories and assessing 
how each individually fares in the light of those general 
considerations. In one particular respect, I am obliged to end on 
an inconclusive note, due to my uncertainties regarding the logical 
status of the generalised presuppositions of negative sentences (cf 
Ch VII: 3). 
Perhaps the most important point to be made about the case 
presented in previous sections of this chapter is that it depends on 
a recognition of the incompatibility of presuppositional logic and a 
semantic ambiguity of negation. I regard this as being the single 
most important enabling factor in drawing out those implications 
from the data. Consider Wilson's 1975 position, for example. The 
reader will have noticed the reiterated allusion to Wilson 1975 as 
the source of many of the examples of special, paradoxical negation. 
Yet Wilson is a stern critic of logical presupposition. Wilsonj, 
316 
like Horn, draws out no positive implication for logical 
presupposition from the data in part because she too regards such 
theories as committed by their nature to a semantic ambiguity of 
negation: 
".,, an adequate theory of presuppositions must allow for 
negative sentences to be ambiguous between readings on which 
they carry presuppositions and reading on which they do not. " 
WAson 1975: 35. 
But, in Wilson's case, this is not the whole story. Her critique of 
logical presupposition is a critique of Standard logical 
presupposition. In that contextr she views the postulation of an 
ambiguity of. negation as just one among many ad hoc devices that are 
required to buttress the Standard theory against its counter- 
examples. We have seen that conjunctions mostly do, but sometimes 
do not, carry the presuppositions of what is conjoined. The same 
applies to disjunctions. And it applies to conditionals. These 
facts do not follow automatically from the Standard Logical 
Definition of Presupposition. They must be captured piecemeal, by 
attributing special (semantic) properties to each logical f unctor. 
Wilson sees the fact that negations mostly do, but sometimes do not, 
carry the presuppositions of what is negated as being all of a piece 
with this general picture. And it is in terms of this general 
picture that Wilson elaborates her critique of the Standard theory 
of presupposition. 
This is a valid general criticism of presuppositional logic as 
instantiated by the Standard theory of presupposition. Its validity 
provides an important motivation for the Revised theory presented 
here. The implication of this, in the present contextr is that the 
Standard theory can draw little comfort from the foregoing 
discussion of metalinguistic negation. Whatever solution is 
available for negation,, that theory is still burdened with the need 
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to elaborater piecemeal for each other f unctor, special semantic 
properties in accounting for the facts. On the Revised the ory, by 
contrastr the facts about the presuppositions of compound sentences? 
and others concerning the logical status of simple sentences, fall 
out automatically. 
But a more general argument of the present work should be borne 
in mind: that the problems faced by the SLDP are to be attributed 
to the more general fact that the SLDP induces a URIVALENT logic of 
presupposition by the criteria here proposed. This I think is more 
strictly relevant to the question of how the foregoing discussion of 
metalinguistic negation bears on the Standard theory of 
presupposition. 
In presenting the arguments of the last section, I used the 
term "truth value gap" in much the same way as it is generally used 
in discussions of presuppc)sition i. e. with gay abandon. But the use 
of that term was in fact crucial to the intuitive force of those 
arguments: I appealed to presuppositional theory as a theory of 
statement failure, having implications for what is truth- 
conditionally and truth-functionally assertable and deniable, as 
placing a particular expressive constraint on the language. It was 
intuitively important to the argument that my allusions to the 
logical status "neither true nor false" be understood as allusions 
to exactly that logical status as such, a LACK of truth-valuer not 
some third truth-value implying a yet greater expressive capacity 
than that afforded by standard classical logic. The connection 
between presuppositionality and non truth-conditionality in 
particular depended on this. It appears to me, then, that the 
arguments of the foregoing sections would lose much if not all of 
their force if it could be shown that this third -logical status was 
a third truth value. By the criteria developed in earlier chaptersr 
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this has indeed been shown to be the case in respect of the Standard 
theory. By contrast, the Revised definition was formulated in 
response to the need f or a definition conf orming to the criteria f or 
a two valued logic with gaps. in such terms, the arguments of the 
foregoing sections hold with respect to the presuppositional logic 
induced by the Revised theoryr not that induced by the Standard 
theory. 
As indicated earlier, however, there is an uncertainty in 
connection with the Revised theory. We have seen that by the 
Standard theory, (20) is unequivocally a truth conditional 
implication of the first clause of (1) - henceforth (1-i) - r-uth-- 
Vt 
conditional-1-y-i-mpi-ies-(20) - this is directly contradicted in the I/ 
second clause (1-ii); hence the truth-conditional contradiction. 
(1) (i) The king of France isn't bald - (ii) there's no king of 
France, 
(20) There is a king of France. 
(21)The king of France is bald. 
But what can we say of (1) when.. as under the Revised theory, the 
relation between (1-i) and (20) is characterised as one of 
GENERALISED presupposition? This is the uncertainty I wish to 
present here. Its resolution would involve a resolution to the 
questions posed in Chapter VII: 3. I did not pretend to answer them 
there and I shall not pretend to here,, but I will present the facts 
as they appear to me. What is at issue is whether the 
generalisation that metalinguistic negation stems from the need to 
resolve a contradiction can be maintained under the Revised theory 
in quite the same strong unequivocal (truth-conditional) form it is 
under the Standard theory. 
We have- seen that this relation of generalised presupposition 
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that holds between (1-i) and (20) is precipitated by the truth- 
conditional (presuppositional) semantics of (21) and the fact that, 
construed literally, (1-i) is the truth-conditional truth-functional 
negation of (21). Given that (21) base-presupposes/weakly entails 
(20), (20) is by the definition of base-presuppositionr excluded 
from the scope of negation in (1-i); thereby the relation between 
(1-i) and (20) could be described as a truth-conditional default 
implication (or: a truth-conditionally induced-default implication). 
In this particular case, indeed,, the falsity of (20) actually does 
have the logical consequence that (1-i) lacks a truth value. These 
observations seem to suggest that (1-i) does truth-conditionally 
imply (20). In which case, (1) as a whole is a truth-conditional 
contradiction. * For in respect of the actual logical status of (1) 
as it stands, the Revised and the Standard theories make the same- 
prediction. 
Against this, it will be recalled that generalised 
presuppositions of negative sentences are demonstrably NOT simple 
straightforward logical implicationsr for by the definition of 
generalised presupposition a negative sentence may be true in 
situations in which its generalised presuppositions are false, more 
specifically in situations where the independent strong entailments 
* It is a contradiction in the exclusive sense outlined in Chapter 
IV. To see this, let me represent it as the conjunction in (i) 
(i) -(kfb) & -(Exkfx) 
The first conjunct is gap d,, the second conjunct true. The whole 
conjuncq týus inherits tre gap. Indeed it is the truth of the 
second conjunct that induces lack of truth value in the first and 
hence the conjunction as a whole. The first conjunct could only have a truth value were the second conjunct false. But were the 
second conjunct false, the conjunction as a whole would be false. 
Summarising these observations: (i) CAN only be either false or 
lacking in truth-value. It thus satisfi-es the (exclusive) 
definitionof contradiction inaga pedlogic,, giveninCh. III: a 
contradiction is a sentence wh. it has a truth value, always 
has the value false. 
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of the positive are false. In the case of (17i) particularly, this 
would be the (counterf actual) situation in which no-one is bald, for 
I take it thatr independently of its failed presupposition, (21) 
strongly entails that someone is bald (i. e. that baldness is 
instantiated). On the basis of just this latter observationr 
ignoring how this default implication arises and intermeshes with 
the truth-conditional semantics of (-)S and focussing exclusively on 
the non-logical character of the implication, we might as indicated 
earlier consider regarding it as akin to a conventional implicature: 
a semantic but non truth-conditional implication - as with the case 
of manag in (17). In that case we would have to abandon the strong 
version of - the generalisation concerning the role of truth- 
conditional contradiction in the motivation of metalinguistic 
negation. 
With respect to (1) in particular, neither alternative seems to 
do justice to the facts of the matter. As a generalised 
presupposition of (1-i), (20) is indeed a' semantic non truth 
conditional implication of (1-i), but it is not entirely non- 
truthconditional,, as witnessed by the fact that both (21) and (1-i) 
are indeed neither true nor false by virtue of the falsity of (20). 
Furthermore, it is because both (21) and (1-i) do both lack a truth 
value on the revised theoryr that the special, non truth-functionalf 
metalinguistic use of negation is still predicte d to provide the 
only means available of rejecting (21) to a speaker who knows that 
(20) is f al se. 
But consider now (36) 
(36) Jones spent the day at the local swimming pool. 
and suppose that Jones spent the day in bed and, independently, that 
there is no local swimming pool. Then by the Revised theory, (36) 
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is in fact false 1, while still carrying the (base and) generalised 
presupposition that there is a local swimming pool. Since it is 
literally false, it is truth-functionally deniable under the revised 
theoryr as in (37) : 
(37) Jones didn't spend the day at the local swimming pool. 
Although it is deniable, it is not deniable on the grounds of its 
failure of presupposition; those logical implications of (36) which 
are its base-presuppositions are excluded from the negation in (37) 
(this is why (37) shares the generalised presuppositions of (36)). 
(36) is truth functionally deniable only on the basis of the falsity 
of its strong entailments, eg only on the grounds that Jones did not 
spend the day at a swimming pool, local or not. What then of (38)? 
(38) Jones didInt spend the day at the local swimming pool - 
there is no swimming pool locallyl 
is this use of negation as clear a case as (1) of the 
metalinguistic use of negation? The revised theory suggests notr 
predicting weaker,, less unequivocal, motivation for the pragmatic 
metalinguistic re-analysis of the use of negation in this case. 
The distinction can be seen as being borne out by the fact that in 
(38). but not (1)r the possibility exists for DIMINISHING the 
motivation for a pragmatic metalinguistic re-analysis of the first 
clause by a means already mentioned in Ch IX, the use of 
incidentgUy and similar adverbials. Compare (39) and (40): 
(39) Jones didn't spend the day at the local swimming 
pool - and incidentally, there IS no local swimming 
pooll 
(40) IlThe king of France isn't bald - and incidentally there 
no king of France! 
The possibility of using such adverbials in (39), but not (40), 
indicates, rather clearly in my view, that in the first clause the 
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speaker is rejecting the proposition that Jones spent the day at the 
local swimming pool on perfectly standard truth-functional grounds 
independent of its failure of generalised presupposition, 
considerably reducing, if not entirely disposing ofr any 
motivation for a pragmatic re-analysis of the first clause as a 
special non-truthfunctional use of negation. Under the revised 
theory, this possibility of recuperating the negation in (1) as 
ordinary an truth-functional denial is simply not available,, and 
thereby the theory predicts a strongerr more inescapabler 
motivation for the pragmatic re-analysis given above. For what it 
is worth, these predictions are oonsonant with my intuitions but, as 
we might expect from the more subtle predict . ions of the revised 
theory,, they involve rather fine judgements and I do not guarantee 
in this case that my intuitions are theoryýindependent. 
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